Believing and the Practice of Religion by Bell, Catherine
Santa Clara University 
Scholar Commons 
Religious Studies College of Arts & Sciences 
2008 
Believing and the Practice of Religion 
Catherine Bell 
Santa Clara University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/rel_stud 
 Part of the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bell, Catherine, "Believing and the Practice of Religion" (2008). Religious Studies. 63. 
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/rel_stud/63 
FOR COPYRIGHT PERMISSION, PLEASE 
CONTACT STEVEN GELBER AT 
smgelber@gmail.com 
This Unpublished Work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies by an authorized administrator of Scholar 
Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu. 
• 
BELIEVING 
And the Practice of Religion 
• 
Catherine Bell 
• 
* *DO NOT DISTRIBUTE* * 
FOR COPYRIGHT PERMISSION, PLEASE 
CONTACT STEVEN GELBER AT 
sn,gelber@gn,ail.con, 
• 
• 
• 
Frontispiece 
-- Wittgenstein: "The meaning of prayer is the activity of praying." (Phillips '65:3 
Concept of Prayer) 
-- Macy: "belief' does not exist, just beliefs. (No! Just acts of believing) 
-- Zizek: belief the structuring priniciple of socially bound lives and deepest yearnings 
-- (Based on Mark Lilla, NYTMag art-> book) To more scholars, religion in its fullness 
is unfamiliar, more easily romanticized. The more society today, thinking to contain religion, 
emphasizes the secularity of our society, the more unfamiliar religion becomes, the more 'other.' 
Secular and religious mutually define each other, just as does science and religion. For many 
religions, secular West is all that is godless. But are we really so secular; or just degrees of 
difference, not along a spectrum but multiple dimensions (gov't, individual, etc) . 
• 
• 
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Preface 
Introduction. The 'Problem of Belief 
-- \)'hy Belief is a problem for · 
-{Problem status in various fields 
-- researching this book has ~u ~ Hume to Dennett to the new pragmatism 
of Rorty and literary criticism of Herrnstei -Smith or continential criticism of Foucault; 
t.v anthropology from Evans-Pritchard thr/01.agh Needham and Rappaport; historically 
Pelikan Amo d etc; wm James o Wini .. ; sociology; cognitive and evolutionary 
neuroscience hurchland as 1 a he wildly growing field of cognitive anthropology- ~ 
psychology Boyer Whitehouse. M of these lines of thinking link to the each other and 
are regularly tapped by scholars of religion. So I will focus as much as possible on the 
study of religion and the field of religious studies, which will bring in so much more in 
the course of the discussion. This processual decision is not meant to be ontologically or 
historically desciptive, simply a tactic for dealing with the plethora of material in regard 
to the goals of this book. 
-- Goal= Not aiming at a theory (see Bauerlein), but a conversation, less about 
how we think of ourselves (reigning conversations about religion???) and more about 
how we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories ... Hope to introduce the 
possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that does not violate too much entrench 
linguistic habits of the world in which we live -- which would doom any new attempt --
but attempts simply to heighten awareness and shift the emphasis of certain relationships 
in that world. So will not seek to condemn or advocate a ban on language of belief, but 
change where our confidence lies when using it. Quine on how pragmatic analysis 
undertakes "the task of making explicit what had been tacit, and precise what had been 
vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, lopping off vestigial 
growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) 
-- Section by section precis 
Chapter One. Belief, Beliefs, Believing 
-- [ this section can be fitted into the beginning of the next one] the definitional 
morass, in English and beyond: versions of the folk category an what is debated in it; 
more formal attempts in neuroscience, cognitive science, anthropology? Philosophy ... ); 
going beyond English ( are there beliefs where there are not words for such things?) 
-- Universalism vs Particularism ~~ 
- Argument against Christian universalism: Lopez, Pouillon, Ruel, Wiebe? 
- Cult semantics & Hist linguistics: Pelikan, Needham, Veyne? WCSmith? 
- Hist and Cult utility ie 'social fact': Arnold, Shweder, Southwald 
- Cognitive and Evolutionary arguments: Boyer, Rappaport 
Or Biological here and Cognitive in next subgroup? 
• 
• 
• 
-- Mental Private Experience vs Performative Social Representation 
Wm James, Hume, Wulff, Needham, Reckwitz?, Zizek 
Also Boyer as anti Social Representation 
Chapter Two. 
-- Thinking. Social History of Belief - how bodies of theological doctrines arise 
(Izutsu); oral vs written (Pelikan, Good); Language of Comparative Religion (WHSmith, 
Wiebe) 
-- Traditions of Western Rel or how once Christians Came to Believe (not 
the first?) they decided others do or should; Pagans, Primitives and all those "other" 
religions; Description of Islamic orthodox development. Pelikan and WC Smith 
--Feeling. Experience = Psychological Center - explaining mysticism, collective 
representations, cultural symbols 
--[Socio-]Biology of Belief or Cognitive Naturalism 
Chapter Three. Believing - A Doing not a Thinking or a Feeling 
Mechanisms that are psycho-social focus on individual 
Prayer as agency (vs the lack of agency in most social and critical theory views 
that would have social structuring lead to embodied ideology 
Cosmologies for action 
Compartments vs coherence 
But It Feels Better: Your Truth, My Truth 
Performative practices for constructing a formulaic psycho-social identity 
Role of the marginal & imaginative (aka hope) 
4. Constituencies with a Stake, Some Suggestions for the Study of Believing 
Scientists, Religionists, Scholars, and the Rest 
Let Me Count the Ways ( we believe) 
Who are we trying to convince 
Breaking out of the Us/Them's: Scholars have no purchase, just interest 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter 1: Introduction: The problem; Belief, Beliefs, Believing; o~~~~ 
a) Main problems identified: Universal or particular; mental or performative; private or 
social. This is the supposed universality given Christian assumptions; the problem of implied 
individual/private existence, as well as the historical, political cultural "social fact." 
[Durk on rel as beliefs and rites suggestes that these two categories may be the founding 
assumptions of universality in the study ofreligion.] 
b) Many (all anthrop?) declare they cannot use the term (Ruel, Pouillan, Needham, Wulff, 
Lopez), tho others have productively done so (Southwold, Arnold, phil of rel ... ?). 
c) History of religions/rel studies has not examined its use; in fact, it appears to deny its 
importance per se, but such unexamined assumptions can be very misleading, ill serving (leaving 
our discourse more theological?). Unexamined use of the term does make arguments rest on 
inherently theological ( or about theology) grounds ( distance from or ally with Wiebe?): 
-- historical exp of Christian credo formulation 
--faith rooted in individual experience [cp 'science' explaining cognitive/biology of 
belief] 
-- ignoring how belief is used ethnically, politically, role of polls ( census already noted); 
Viswanathan, Lilla, etc 
-- Theorization of belief in theology (Reckwitz) 
d) The problems resulting from or just accompanying the current particularism (when a 
theological-universal is rejected for particularistic; eg Needham; Evans Pritchard, etc) and post-
colonial analysis (Lopez); benefits of particularism too, of course! Namely, 
-- the subtle reintroduction of universalist assumptions endemic to any posturing of 
"study." Need to grapple with that! 
-- ramifications for any definition of "religion" and methods for its study, e.g. religious 
studies 
["Religion": Paradigms plus: use Chidester on West slow to call others' "religion"; also add JZS 
to argument about Christianity as prototype ( see Guide to SofRel 41, Drugery 90) and his world 
religions research (before Masuzawa) Guide 11-42, Map 295?, Harvard Theo Rev '96:295-6.] 
e) Practice theory: value of a focus on believing and construction of a focus on practice; 
later look at multiple examples of believing from a comparative practice stance ... 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter 2: Theorizing Belief: Three Exclusive Angles 
a) The Social History of Belief: Take the above-mentioned emergence of theological 
doctrine and find in it a purely social historicar explanation (Izutsu-ish; Veyne) Greek world -
early Christian social/theological heritage - involves a theory of belief as developing in response 
to social challenges from within or without, so very likely in plural environment, even midst 
'orthopraxy', that is, more isolated society, where there are still challenges that occasion some 
degree of formulation of resolve and practice, even if it is simply reason for greater or lesser 
participation; so all cultures are involved in this approach to belief-formation even when 
minimally in formal ideas. Lilla, Ruel, Izard 
b) The Psychological Analysis of Belief: Take the psychological theme and find in it an 
historical recasting in terms of experience (Christian -post-Reformation w/ a contrast w 
Enlightenment rationality yielding the irrational, and Arnold-type explanation of personal 
reflection on ( or against); role of empirical reality, social influence, etc. WJames, Wulff, 
Needham 
c) The Biology of Belief #3: cognitive theories of neurophysiology, neuroscience, 
evolutionary adaptation, incl. Barrett, Atran and Rapaport, Fuller notes 
• 
• 
• 
Chapter 3: Believing: A Practice Theory 
a) Makes non-dualist activities the main focus, not secondary to some mental orientation. 
Enables the exploration of the mentalities of performance; focus on expressions, not 
representations; -
b) Universals that accompany all theorizing are theoretical categories not data; what this 
angles hides is outweighed by what it affords: access to components of world construction, 
individual/social from another perspective; a wider characterization based on power 
arrangements 
c) The cosmological (w/wo coherence) and the contradictory (as power structuring, 
empowering) in the independent and the plural societies, doctrinal and non-doctrinal traditions 
d) Practice theory approach w/ 4 features; 
Southwold, Arnold, Cameron, Bourdieu 
Chapter 4: Believing -- Case Studies in How Practice Approach Informs ... 
Responding to polls; Praying for money; Healing; Evangelical face-to-face witnessing; 
Abiding by the book; Ritual grazing; Chinese morality? Magic? 
Conclusion: 
Role of theory in 'conferring', not presuming, universalism -- even as it involves 
uncovering and recovering particularism (how differs from Shweder?); how this meets the post-
colonial critique. Using the terminology of believing . 
• 
• 
• 
[Draft: Preface] 
Preface 
As she was approaching ninety years of age, my mother began to talk more directly 
about God, what she believed, and whether she could be found wanting. As the 
child who studied religion, I got all her hard questions. Invariably, however, she 
would structure the conversation around the same points and what I had to say, 
whether challenging or soothing, never really mattered. "I'm not sure I believe or 
not. I certainly don't think it's likely there's the sort of God I wa-s~~[er taught to 
believe in. It's hard to believe there is a God who cares about us y\11 I can do is 
hope that if God exists, he' 11 accept that I tried to understand and thaJJ ·,tried to live 
a good life -- I did what I could." My mother did not want a theological r sponse 
and she certainly had no use for any historical or comparative framing. She was 
trying to make things right, work out who she had been, in her own estimation, and 
clarify what she could believe and what was too uncomfortable to invoke even at 
this late moment in her life. She inevitably wanted the comfort of being true to 
herself and, naturally, being on the right side of God should he exist. After all, she 
repeated, she was a believer "in her own way." However, my mother would 
regularly begin and end these predominantly one-sided discussions with the "hard" 
questions: "Am I a believer or not? What counts as belief?" 
There are many reasons to address my mother's specific and more general 
questions of my mother. This book, however, will not even make the attempt. It is 
an effort quite different, limited and, from my mother's perspective, hopelessly 
abstract. Aside from the fact that I would hesitate to discuss topics for which I have 
such a poor track record of useful contributions, my agenda is shaped by other 
issues. Yet I take up the topic of belief, in my own way, quite aware that for many 
people questions about belief are very personal and often complicated. Hopefully, 
my more abstract perspective will not lose sight of this fact. 
I address the phenomenon of believing for several reasons, none of them quite so 
motivationally distinct as they might appear here. For starters, I was reminded of a 
challenge to myself contained in the opening page of my first book on thinking 
about ritual to return some day to give equal attention to that other component of 
religion identified in the simple Durkheimian definition of religion of ritual and 
belief. In an short effort in that direction, I was surprised that this ubiquitous term 
among scholars of religion had received so little attention by the comparativists, 
those most exposed to other ways of believing. Some discussions certainly exist 
and they will be fully mined here. Yet they are all quite polemical, usually limited 
1 
• I 
/ 
in scope, and rarely invoke the more expansive treatments of the topic available in 
related disciplines such as anthropology, history, and philosophy. New 
developments were the goad that made the enormous challenge irresistible. On the 
one hand, a spate of books on the rationality of religious belief by some eminent 
scholars and writers, among others, staked out some highly ludicrous/questionable 
positions given much attention by the popular press. On the other hand, new 
theoretical and empirical developments in cognitive neuropsychology ( cognitive 
theory) were introducing the perspective, and fruits, of a new rationalism to the 
study of religion. Their various studies of religious belief appeared to redefine the 
topic that was so rarely addressed by more traditional scholars of religion. 
There are, of course, even broader reasons to inquire into our ideas about believing. 
This is a contradictory time. For many, secular and religious boundaries have never 
been as clear and important. Yet for others, confidence in the exorable spread of 
secular modernity is giving way to a new examination of the self-interested 
assumptions underlying this European and American ideology; the door is open for 
~ scholars of all persuasions to take religious beliefs with a new seriousness. Today 
• 
• 
I 
religious strife, the form in which secular society generally notices religion, does 
not appear as simply another form of class struggle, colonial resistance, or 
opposition to modernization. Rather, a fragile consensus is forming that ideas 
matter, cultures matter, religion matters. But at this time of opportunity, the 
developments of the last thirty years leave many scholars of religion unable to pass 
through that door, let alone help explain what is on the other side. Stimulating 
scholarship on embodiment and performance, as well as more highly nuanced 
discussions of older distinctions between oral literate cultures, or tribal and creedal 
religions make it uncomfortable to return to the term belief. And the insights of 
postmodernist and postcolonial studies give us an aversion to char~cterizing 
( essentializing) large entities such as Islam or global Christian evangelicalism in 
terms of their beliefs. We are effectively sidelined for the very discussion to which 
we could be particularly relevant. 
These reasons reasons for a book on such a huge, amorphous and contentious topic 
as belief lead me, first of all, to impose some order on our resources for addressing 
it and our past patterns of engagement. New sources of information, either ignored 
or overly embraced by scholars of religion, also demand incorporation. And the 
book does argue a thesis; while clear, in the spirit of the age it affirms this, 
problematizes that, ultimately suggesting a shift of perspective to afford a 
reasonable, and effective way to deal with competing scholarly goals . 
2 
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• Preface When I first decided to study religion so many years ago there were a number of clear issues on 
-.;:::---
my mind, topics that I wanted to understand and that possible to understand. Foremost among 
~
these topics was the question of belief. If I had articulated it then I might have put it something 
like this: Are there effective ways to understand the reasons for types and degrees of belief such --~ ( ~-~ 
as those I had encountered in my admittedly limited experience? Given the background was --
bring to my studies, I would have continued, I am set to take belief seriously but unsure how to 
bring all of its dimensions under the light of objective cxaminationf eading on this topic had 
intrigued me and drew me to study religion, but my own experience with religion convinced me 
that solving the question of belief, whatever "solving" might mean, it, would involve the attempt 
to address something very profoundly human. Graduate studies and the demands of an academic 
career, however, do not encourage anything but the most delineated questions and projects, 
r 
always with the assumption that the larger issues are more properly addressed "later" as one 
~ 
matured in knowledge and experience. t has been gratifying in my 'mature' years to see a few 
• colleagues shift their focus to consider more encompassing formulations that ultimately animate the study of religion. More often we are apt to stay in the small field we have plowed for years, 
digging a little deeper, widening one's contribution, but always trying to get the specifics of a 
discrete set of phenomenon as right as possible. Those big, floppy questions with which we 
began usually looked a bit naYve as they were stowed in the closet of old artifacts. 
'f-
For me this book is a return to my early over-sized queries. It is a grateful but anxious return. 
Despite the some satisfaction of addressing the bigger questions around which the intellectual 
~ details of my career might possibly be rendered more coherent, I have known that the probability 
of a satisfying set of answers if very slim. This long delayed feat of gestation might give birth to 
a mere mouse, that is, a morsel of well-meant effort wrapped up wordy explications of what were 
never quite the right question to begin with. But armed with various protective dissemblings, I 
rose to the bait provided by the sheer size and prominence of the void, the void that is the 
absence of any real attention to the concept of belie n the most definitive tool of the trade, the 
Encyclopedia of Religion. In both the original 1986 edition and the revision of 2005, there is no 
• entry for the term belief. An inquisitive reader is instructed to " ee Doubt (and Belief)" for what I t ~ () ~ 
• the revised edition explains is a philosophical discussion of the interrelation of doubt and belief in the Western tradition (get a quote here). It is in fact more theological than philosophical; it is certainly not a social scientific analysis of the term or the phenomenon. [More on references to 
belief in EofR as developed in Smith Festschrift] 
2 
1 Such a lacuna at the heart of religious studies is intriguing in any number of ways. Oversights 
have the own peculiar logic which, as Freud suggested, may reveal the contrivances that keep a __ --, . 
• 
particular logical structure afloat as an effective discourse. Perhaps the explicit unease the term 
'(" 
has caused a handful of ethnographers (from Needham to Ruel?) and historians (Lopez) is the 
cause of this lacuna. Or it might be that the signature discussion of belief and faith by an 
eminence of a particular school of religious studies (W C Smith, D Wiebe) suggests a narrowing 
specificity to any further treatment. Yet, however much these arguments might also constitute 
material for more encompassing engagement, the sheer fact that hardly a page can be turned in 
the Encyclopedia of Religion, or most other books in the field, without seeing the author's 
recourse to the term from one angle or another itself demands a more self-conscious and 
critically reflexive analysis . 
Scholars of religion are insignificant in the dynamic popular engagement of the phenomenon. In 
this decade the question of belief has been the subject of volleys of mass-market publications. 
The decade began with Michael Shermer's Why People Believe Weird Things (1997) and Wendy 
Kaminer's Sleeping with Extra-Terrestials (1999). More recently a stir has greeted The God 
Delusion by Richard Dawkins, Breaking the Spell by Daniel Dennett, and The End of Faith by 
Sam Harris. Yet the foregoing authors see themselves are merely responding to the popularity 
and assertive styles of American religion. There has been a remarkable growth of religious 
publishing, effectively epitomized by the success of Huston Smith's The World Religions and the 
Christian fundamentalist novel, Going Beyond. Simultaneously, biological and evolutionary 
accounts of the roots and rise of religion, introduced by Dawkins' s The God Gene by Richard 
Dawkins, have been equally numerous, with such titles as Why God Won't Go Away: Brain 
Science and the Biology of Belief by A. Newburg et al., and The God Part of the Brain by 
Matthew Alper. The level of interest in religion and belief in this post-millennial era is 
• unquestionably high. While scientists have weighed in on the problems of religiosity despite how 
3 
our evolutionary heritage makes us biologically prone to believe , and the specter of religious 
terrorism has made all thinking people try to better understand religious dispositions , scholars of 
religion have generally been very slow to engage the bigger question at the root of these 
discussions. not engaged any particular part of the wide-ranging interest in what it is to believe. 
While not nearly as entertaining as some of the aforementioned titles, this book is a small 
contribution to effort to locate and animate this discussion within the formal study of religion. 
Materials included here were first developed for three conferences and subsequently published, 
in part, under the aegis of those events: a small conference sponsored by Dartmouth College in 
/ 2000, which subsequently published the papers as Radical Interpretation in Religion , edited by 
Nancy K Frankenberry; a joint Princeton-Oxford seminar on "Faith in the Ancient World" held 
✓ 
• 
in 2006-07, with my presentation subsequently developed in part for publication in Introducing 
Religion: Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith (2007) and a volume of seminar papers currently 
under development .... ; and finally a small conference on religion held by the journal History 
and Theory at Wesleyan College, which published the papers in a 2006/7 special issue of the 
journal. I am grateful to my colleagues at these events for their generous responses to my initial 
efforts in this area and their permissions to reproduce sections of that material. 
I am indebted to the generosity of the College of Arts and Sciences at Santa Clara University for 
the time to work on the early stages of this book and to a research fellowship from the National 
Endowment for Humanities (2007-2008) during which time it was put into its final form. Finally , 
I want to thank my husband , Steven Gelber , who prodded me to continue to work on this book 
despite many physical distractions: he believed in me and this project and would brook no 
heretical objections. 
Catherine Bell 
2007 
1 
I 
Introduction - "The Problem of Belief' 
An investigation of a topic should begin with an explanation of why that topic warrants 
one ' s interest in the first place. In other words, an investigator should understand why the topic 
constitutes a 'problem' - at least for her. Of course, many scholarly investigations, indeed some 
of the best, focus on pies that most people do not consider a problem; only a small pool of 
(? 
similarly-focused colleagues would pay any attention. Analysis of the type of problem posed by 
I 
the topic is also not really a preliminary step so much as the initial stage of an argument that will 
permeate all subsequent stages. In the same vein, any answer as to why the topic constitutes a 
problem worthy o£study is usually not the whole of it; the reasons to research a topic are usually 
not the research itself. Although why something strikes us as needing to be accounted for often 
goes far to explain how that topic might be more effectively understood. 
I entered graduate school with a history of on-again off-again believing, a set of 
experiences that made me very aware of the intricacies of religious belief and its powerful role in 
'-1 ti 
shaping how a person acts. hat could be more basic to study? I was eager to assemble a fuller 
( 
a d thoroughJ..y objective picture of wha happens when people believe, why they believe, or 
1 
hat makes them continue to believe. Admittedly , these were questions that even a first-year 
graduate student understood as shaped by large historical forces: clearly , at one time and w m 
other places, people may not be aware of themselves as believers ; and questions about belief ~ J 
~ n1 erfully g.ern§:.J:M'llffb6ttt eli ion as some sort of clear cut phenomenon /when most belief 
is not in re igion so much as it is in such and such a deity or doctrine or practice · And then there 
are all the beliefs that have little to do : religion in our secular societies -;i,,U(/4 ()4A 
The effect o graduates hool reorientations and specializations is such that only now do I ) 
have the time and inclination to return to such an unwieldy topic. d it is also one of the effects 
of graduate sch Land a career in the scholarly community, that one ends up primarily interested 
\ 
in how scholars 1,_LU,..C~- '""' put ,together this category and proceed to use it- or igore it --
even more than how the phenomenon might exist in the world. I do not doubt that in so far as 
our words mean anything belief does exist: though its parameters may be H:U;;J..(;y,"""r less large, en 
less clearly demarcated, w_hife the problem of its effective characterization will be the he_art of 
rv1;. 
this book. t the topic of belief has always b n a 'problem' to those who would chilllge the 
way in which another people were religious; 01 those for whom a secular separation o the 
r-r{ v'- I )--,,, 
:3 
sphere of rational discourse was fairly distinct from discourse of various religiously-minded 
communities, a roup that would include scholars focused on that other great category 'religion'; 
r even1those whose theological or pastoral instincts , shaped by this modem differentiation of 
spheres, wis to address themselves to the religiosity of those in their care, beingwont to talk 
as much about hat belief: 
missionaries and ethnologists, through the intelligentsia's mapping of social facts, to the 
immersed theologians reflecting the relevant categories - all speak of beliefs. 
~ /} 
a study o religious belief 
of scholars of religion ignore the topic: not philosophers or psychologists of religion, but 
f - > istorians of religion (phenomenologists?), comparat ists, and specialists in particular traditions. 
A 
J t 
Toda awareness of the historically provisional nature of any such secular questioning is 
routinely considered part of the 'problem' identified with the topic. As an individual scholar with 
the training generally expected of an academician I share a perspective with other disciplinary 
approaches the distinctive biases which we are not expected to transcend ut we are certainly 
J ~ 
encouraged to explore. When such biases are made the subject of scrutiny they can lead the 
investigator in circles of self-exami tion .... The compensation, adequate or inadequate , 
~ 
depends on e the study locates its dominant bias, as in the bias of secularism , defined as 'not 
including' or 'opposed to' religion, or the bias of colonialism, argued to propagate distortions 
deriving from one culture's assumptions about belief. 
/ 
1 Needham notes the definitions of religion that depend on belief: Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Geertz, etc. pp 21. 
"standard acceptation of belief as the distinctive feature of religion ... " E-P appears convinced that the lack of "a 
system ofnomenclature " enabling the "wide comparative study of phenomena" hindered his presentation of Zande 
religion, and if provided would be of great service. (EP p8) 
Scholars of religion, however, have always addressed belie , as well as beliefs in science and 
1 
3 
secularism. Nonetheless, for them as well as the lar o ulatio , belief i commonly rJ 
I p. ,.,_,~ 
understood to be the essential feature of religio However, few in Religious Studies have 
explored the pertine t ambiguties of the term._Donald Lopez was a welcome voice on the matter, 
t 
fo~ny-years-th ork of W C Smith) and his critic Donald W eibo/ ~ 
Encyclopedia of Religion editie b Mircea Eliade, did not even include a distinct entry for 
-"- ~ .,/ 
"Belief'; under that heading the reader is told to "See Doubt (And Belief)." 
t ~ )~ 
t/tp, .. 
The ambitious goal of this book is, simultaneously, to propose an analysis of the tangle of history 
/ and current motivation that might influence a tendency to think of religious belief.as clear entity, 
1. or a clear problem; to analyze how constructions of religious belief have governed our thinking 
3 about religion; and to propose a way to enable our ingrained linguistic patterns to lead to 
translations of allow for a wider variety of experience than older patterns have generally allowed. 
It became something of a reflex of "the problem" of belief, a problem first identified by Hume, 
who suggested that particular "operation of the mind" constitutes "one of the greatest mysteries 
of philosophy." 2 Bertrand Russell added a serious emphasis, avering that "belief ... is the central 
problem in the analysis of mind." 3 Its status as a problem in philosophy continues. 
7 
On another front, the anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard was the first to broach the idea that 
categories like belief, as with the process of cultural translation in general, may not be able to 
convey type of spiritual relationships in Zande have, the mystical notions (kwoth) they find 
supported by their own experience [N 29: a verbal concept of belief does exist in Nuer ... ngath; 
E-P distinguishes faith from belief, tho N does not, no reference]. His student, Rodney Needham, 
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the idea , and determined that its Indo-European roots 
made it inadequate to translate concepts and interior experiences from cultures that never saw 
any need to generate a comparable concept. N Donald Lopez depicts the internalization of belief 
2 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago , 1972), p. 7 
3 Rodney Needham , Belief , Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 (Russell , 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham, p. 7. It was to become important to Pierce and Quine, Hartshorne and 
Wittgenstein , even among more recent . 
1 
in the historical circumstances of the Inquisition and its role in cross-cultural obscurantism in the 
colonial reach of its Christian biases. N Rejecting the conclusions of his disciplinary forebearers, 
the anthropologist Richard Shweder finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ...... (1989).4 
But Rodney Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and 
anthropologically, argued that it could not be restricted to any particular academic disciplines 
since it "has to do with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 5 Talal Asad's 
"genealogy" of religion argue that an critical emphasis on belief as the internal psychology of 
individuals, (Needham conclusion) enabled marginalization of religion in the modem world. 6 
(1998: xvii). In the context of postcolonial literary criticism, Gauri Vivswanathan extends Asad's 
argument to the role of conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of 
the modem state as it opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil 
rights. (?) 7 
< In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to secularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and polarized 
by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
unprecendented social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naYve 
misunderstanding" ofboth. 8 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
4 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
5 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), xiv. 
6 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 46. 
7 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 
xvi. 
8 Although a decade earlier the philosopher ofreligion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a naYve misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (I 989): 149 [-168]. 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion. "9 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses of religion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots to its modem conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. Sheer semantic spread 
suggests a few problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) This study will simply probe the 
/ issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study ofreligion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation that is, it will attempt to indicate all the 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this.most basic of categories. 
, 
The goal of this study is not a new theory of belief. Such a project would cement the 
( reification that is already enshrined in this concept. No, the goal is to contribute to a conversation 
( about how we think of ourselves ( already underway in regard to the category of religion ???) and 
how we think about what we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories. This is a 
pragmatic analysis that, in the words of Quine, emulates "the task of making explicit what had 
been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing 
kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) I hope 
to suggest and support the possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that neither so 
violates entrench linguistic habits of the world in which we live that it is doomed from the 
beginning nor shuns the real work task of heightening heighten awareness that leads to a shift in 
the emphasis of certain relationships in this world. Therefore I will not seek to condemn or 
9 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001 ), p. 2. 
advocate a ban on language of belief, however trendy that might seem, but instead aim at 
{ changing where our confidence lies when using it. 
Few terms are more broadly scattered across the palette of Western languages than ... rough 
equivalents of the noun and verb, belief and believe. The definitional morass, in English and 
beyond: versions of the folk category an what is debated in it; more formal attempts in 
neuroscience, cognitive science, anthropology? Philosophy ... ); going beyond English (are there 
beliefs where there are not words for such things?). Least read book: Needham 
Some describe the difficulties of defining belief and then getting at the experience described 
(Arnold 19: Needham argues that one cannot get at the diffbetw belief, its expression in 
language and its experience in lived reality) 
Today the topic ofreligious belief fills the popular press of the secular world. Global and 
regional terrorism generf!te numerous attempts to explain the political and redemptive logic of 
religious beliefs. (nb M Lilla 2007) The 200(?) decision by the Kansas State School Board to 
include 'intelligent design' in the high school(?) science curriculum occasioned more blanket 
critique s' of religious beliefs by distinguished scientists among others, even though the decision 
was reversed when a new school board was voted in the following year. (Dennett, Dawkins, 
Harris, et alia). Overall, the story of Western secularism is being rewritten due to the unexpected 
roles of religious belief in shaping events. 
For Anthropology, however, the issue was the subject of an extended exploration that included E 
E Evans-Pritchard, Rodney Needham, Martin Southwold and Richard Schweder .... among 
others. It appears that the field most dependent upon the concept of belief is the most reluctant to 
fully engage its complexities. 
Chapter one addresses the various tensions that have contradictorily shaped discussions of belief. 
Foremost is the impasse between the forces of universalism on the one hand and particularism on 
the other. It has been a working assumption throughout the history of discussions of religion that 
belief is universal; it is an assumption that continues to prop up the whole explanative framework 
of "comparative religion," (( world religions," and "global religions." Yet a handful of impressive 
voices have long argued for the particularism of belief, notably, its embeddness in the Christian 
identity that was forged in the early centuries of anno domino. To use a term so coined by and 
·saturated with a Christian outlook is only to handicap further any scholarly rags of objectivity. 
An equally powerful tensions exist between thinking of belief as mental or physical, private or 
social. Is belief something that the individual embraces in his or her heart and mind, on the basis 
of which the individual participates in a social community marked by rites and customs; or is 
belief the product of one's social involvement in such a community and it exists only as a 
performative disposition and bodily experience that is instigated as much in a social context as 
private one? The study of religion has tracked in different directions based on how they favor 
one set of tensions over another. Certain Catholic or Protestant tendencies lace these choices, but 
many other factors have become equally important. 
Chapter Two takes us the historical treatment of belief. Not simply how it came to be associated 
with Christian identity, but whether it predates Christianity, without assuming universality. one 
of the lower key tensions surrounding belief is whether it should be reserved for personal 
) commitment to a set of doctrines or used more loosely to fit the evidence that people made 
choices about the nature, degree and object of their commitments. Further, there are several 
studies that argue for the social conditions in which 'believing' comes to be expected of 
followers and the nature of that belief is very much shaped by the questions that emerged in 
these communities and how they came to be answered -- by formalizing doctrine, sectarian 
division, or emering authority structures. 
Universalism vs Particularism 
- Argument against Christian particularism/universalism: Lopez, Pouillon, Ruel, Wiebe? 
- Cult semantics & Hist linguistics: Pelikan, Needham, Veyne? WCSmith? 
- Hist and Cult utility ie 'social fact': Arnold, Shweder, Southwald 
- Cognitive and Evolutionary arguments: Boyer, Rappaport 
Or Biological here and Cognitive in next subgroup? 
[Beware the universalism of theoretical language and its wielders] 
Mental Private Experience vs Performative Social Representation 
Wm James, Hume, Wulff, Needham, Reckwitz?, Zizek 
Also Boyer as anti Social Represen 
• 
• 
Introduction. The Problem of Belief 
-- Why Belief is a problem for this book 
-- Problem status in various fields 
-- researching this book has taken from: Introduction. The Problem of Belief 
-- Why Belief is a problem for this book 
-- Problem status in various fields 
-- researching this book has taken from: Hume to Dennett to the new pragmatism of 
Rorty and literary criticism of Herrnstein-Smith or continential criticism of Foucault; 
anthropology from Evans-Pritchard through Needham and Rappaport; historically Pelikan 
Arnold etc; wm James to Wini .. ; sociology; cognitive and evolutionary neuroscience 
Churchland as well as the wildly growing field of cognitive anthropology-psychology Boyer 
Whitehouse. Many of these lines of thinking link to the each other and are regularly tapped by 
scholars of religion. So I will focus as much as possible on the study of religion and the field of 
religious studies, which will bring in so much more in the course of the discussion. This 
processual decision is not meant to be ontologically or historically desciptive, simply a tactic for 
dealing with the plethora of material in regard to the goals of this book. 
-- Goal= Not aiming at a theory (see Bauerlein), but a conversation, less about how we 
think of ourselves (reigning conversations about religion ???) and more about how we are doing 
with our inherited interpretive categories ... Hope to introduce the possibility of a new way of 
speaking about belief that does not violate too much entrench linguistic habits of the world in 
which we live -- which would doom any new attempt -- but attempts simply to heighten 
awareness and shift the emphasis of certain relationships in that world. So will not seek to 
condemn or advocate a ban on language of belief, but change where our confidence lies when 
using it. Quine on how pragmatic analysis undertakes "the task of making explicit what had been 
tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, 
lopping off vestigial growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) 
-- Section by section precis 
slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) 
-- Section by section precis 
Introduction - "The Problem of Belief' 
An investigation of a topic should begin with an explanation of why the topic warrants 
one's interest in the first place. In other words, an investigator should understand why the topic 
{J- constitutes a 'problem' - at least for her. After all, most scholarly investigations, indeed some of 
the best, focus on topics that many people do not consider a problem. Analysis of the problem 
• posed by the topic is also not a preliminary step so much as the initial stage of an argument that 
• will permeate subsequent stages. In the same vein, an answer to why the topic constitutes a problem worthy of study is usually not the whole of it; in other words, the reasons to research a topic are usually not the research itself, although why something strikes us as needing to be 
accounted for often go far to explain how that topic might be more effectively understood. 
A personal longstanding reason for a book inquiring into the phenomenon of religious 
X belief is simple. Once I was a believer, thoughtfully and intimately committed, and then I was no 
• 
longer one, with a different set of thoughts and emotions. While I was able to 'explain' my 
believing and my not-believing in the popular Freudian patois of the day, I wanted to assemble a 
fuller picture of what had happened and explore whether what was true for me might useful for 
understanding others. These were the personal motivations among the various circumstances that 
led me to the study of religion in the first place. There are also more immediate triggers for this 
project on belief. For example, my first book addressed ritual and I noted at the time that a full 
study of religion would demand a corresponding analysis of belief, following the great Durkheim 
in the simple definition of religion as a matter of beliefs and rites. This definition remains a 
working, first-level description of religion, so for both scholarly and popular ways of slicing of 
religion, belief would be a natural topic to follow work on ritual. Another spur to engage the 
topic in some way lay in the realization that my discipline, the history of religions, has given 
rather short shrift to the whole issue of belief even as it remains a major purveyor of the term. 
X The Encyclopedia of Religion, in both first and second editions, fails to include a discrete entry 
for such a basic concept. 1 The oversight, if it is that, was greatly redressed with Donald S. 
Lopez's 1998? essay on belief in Mark Taylor's Critical Terms for the Study of Religion, to 
• 
which this study will constantly refer. 2 
Taking these motivating circumstances together, one might conclude that I will 
understand belief to be an essential though too easily ignored topic in the study of religion. 
Granted.3 However, I will be especially curious about how belief could be ignored. And I will 
also argue that how we deal with the category of belief is tightly linked to how we understand 
and investigate religion, as ethnographic phenomenon or analytic concept. The fact that belief-
1 The first 1986? edition edited by Mircea Eliade, the 2005 edition by Lindsay Jones 
2 Taylor 1998? 
3 Needham notes the definitions of religion that depend on belief: Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Geertz, etc. pp 21. 
"standard acceptation of belief as the distinctive feature of religion ... " E-P appears convinced that the lack of"a 
system of nomenclature" enabling the "wide comparative study of phenomena" hindered his presentation of Zan de 
religion, and if provided would be of great service. (EP p8) 
• 
• 
( 
• 
especially the irrationality of having it - is the focus of a spurt of publications by scientists, 
philosophers, and cultural critics was another factor in the shaping of this study. The extra public 
attention to very simple understandings of belief acts as a reminder: questions about the personal 
experience of belief are never far removed unless one is rendered oblivious to them by the 
anesthetizing qualities of the scholarly approach. The conflict between this approach and popular 
concern with belief replicate familiar stances rooted in the eighteenth century Enlightenment. 
The secular scholar inquiring into belief, a task imagined by the scholar more than the believer, 
must fear acting the part of an Enlightenment homunculus defined by the classic ascriptions of 
faith in conflict with reason, faith as the object of reason, or faith objectified by the 'neutral' 
forces of reason. To stand in the position of a non-believing secularist is, we know, to look at 
religion from a very particular perspective, one that is taken to be foreign to the practitioner's 
self-consciousness. So many answers I might entertain to my questions about belief could 
constitute answers only from one angle and not another, perhaps not to believers. With that 
awareness, the constraints of the Enlightenment on the questions it allows are as clear as the 
liberties we know it affords. 
? Today awareness of the historically provisional nature of any such secular questioning is 
routinely considered part of the 'problem' identified with the topic. As an individual scholar with 
the training generally expected of an academician I share a perspective with other disciplinary 
approaches the distinctive biases which we are not expected to transcend, but we are certainly 
encouraged to explore. When such biases are made the subject of scrutiny they can lead the 
investigator in circles of self-examination .... The compensation, adequate or inadequate, 
depends on where the study locates its dominant bias, as in the bias of secularism, defined as 'not 
including' or 'opposed to' religion, or the bias of colonialism, argued to propagate distortions 
deriving from one culture's assumptions about belief. 
The ambitious goal of this book is, simultaneously, to identify the bias that casts religious 
belief as a problem, to analyze how constructions of belief have governed our studies of religion, 
and to propose a way to enable ingrained linguistic patterns to lead to translations of a wider 
variety of experience than such patterns have generally allowed. 
It became something of a reflex of "the problem" of belief, a problem first identified by 
Hume, who suggested that particular "operation of the mind" constitutes "one of the greatest 
• 
• 
• 
mysteries of philosophy." 4 Bertrand Russell add emphasis, avering in 1921 that "belief ... is the 
central problem in the analysis of mind." 5 It became important to Pierce and Quine, Hartshorne 
and Wittgenstein. 
On another front, the anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard was the first to broach the idea 
that categories like belief, as with the process of cultural translation in general, may not be able 
to convey type of spiritual relationships in Zande have , the mystical notions (kwoth) they find 
supported by their own experience [N 29: a verbal concept of belief does exist in Nuer. .. ngath; 
E-P distinguishes faith from belief, tho N does not, no reference]. His student, Rodney Needham, 
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the idea, and determined that its Indo-European roots 
made it inadequate to translate concepts and interior experiences from cultures that never saw 
any need to generate a comparable concept. N Donald Lopez depicts the internalization of belief 
in the historical circumstances of the Inquisition and its role in cross-cultural obscurantism in the 
colonial reach of its Christian biases. N Rejecting the conclusions of his disciplinary forebearers , 
the anthropologist Richard Shweder finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ...... (1989). 6 
But Rodney Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and 
anthropologically , argued that it could not be restricted to any particular academic disciplines 
since it "has to do with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 7 Talal Asad's 
"genealogy" of religion argue that an critical emphasis on belief as the internal psychology of 
individuals , (Needham conclusion) enabled marginalization of religion in the modem world. 8 
(1998: xvii). In the context of postcolonial literary criticism , Gauri Vivswanathan extends Asad's 
argument to the role of conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of 
the modem state as it opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil 
rights. (?)9 
In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to secularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and polarized 
4 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief , Language and Experience (University of Chicago , 1972), p. 7 
5 Rodney Needham , Belief , Language and Experience (University of Chicago , 1972), p. 7 (Russell , 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham , p. 7. 
6 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
7 Rodney Needham , Belief , Language and Experience (University of Chicago , 1972), xiv. 
8 Talal Asad , Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1993), p. 46. 
9 Gauri Viswanathan , Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press , 1998), p . 
xvi. 
• 
• 
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by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
unprecendented social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naive 
misunderstanding" of both. 10 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion." 11 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses ofreligion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots to its modem conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. Sheer semantic spread 
suggests a few problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) This study will simply probe the 
issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study of religion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation, that is, it will attempt to indicate all the 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this most basic of categories. 
10 Although a decade earlier the philosopher ofreligion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a nai"ve misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (I 989): 149 [-I 68]. 
11 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001 ), p. 2. 
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The goal of this study is not a new theory of belief. Such a project would cement the 
reification that is already enshrined in this concept. No, the goal is to contribute to a conversation 
about how we think of ourselves ( already underway in regard to the category of religion ???) and 
how we think about what we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories. This is a 
pragmatic analysis that, in the words of Quine, emulates "the task of making explicit what had 
been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing 
kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) I hope 
to suggest and support the possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that neither so 
violates entrench linguistic habits of the world in which we live that it is doomed from the 
beginning nor shuns the real work task of heightening heighten awareness that leads to a shift in 
the emphasis of certain relationships in this world. Therefore I will not seek to condemn or 
advocate a ban on language of belief, however trendy that might seem, but instead aim at 
changing where our confidence lies when using it. 
Section by section precis 
• 
• 
• 
-
Introduction - "The Problem of Belief' 
Any investigation of a topic should begin with J analysis of why that topic warrants 
one's interest in the first place. In other words, an investigator should understand why the topic 
constitutes a problem -- for her at least. Afterall, most scholarly investigations, indeed some of 
the best, focus on topics that many people do not consider a problem. Further, this analysis of the_ 
problem posed by the topic is not a preliminary step but an initial stage of analysis that will 
permeate subsequent stages. Yet an answer to why the topic constitutes a problem worthy of 
study is usually not the whole of it, in other words, the reasons to research a topic are usually not 
the research itself, although why something strikes us as needing to be accounted for often go far 
to explain how that topic might be more effectively understood. 
A personal longstanding reason for a book inquiring into the phenomenon of religious 
belief is simple. Once I was a believer, thoughtfully and intimately committed, and then I was no / 
longer one, with a different set of thoughts and emotions. While I was able to 'explain' my / 
believing and my not-believing in the popular Freudian patois of the day, I wanted to understand 
more fully what had happened and why and whether what was true for me is useful for 
understanding others. These were among the circumstances that led me to the study of religion. 
But there are also more immediate triggers for this project on belief. For example, my first book 
addressed ritual and I noted at the time that a full study of religion would demand a 
corresponding analysis of belief, following the great Durkheim in the simple definition of 
religion as a matter of beliefs and rites. This definition remains a working, first-level description 
of religion, so for both scholarly and popular ways of slicing of religion, belief would be a 
natural topic to follow work on ritual. Another spur to engage the topic in some way lay in the 
realization that my discipline, the history of religions, has given short shrift to the whole issue of 
belief even as it remains a major purveyor of the term. The Encyclopedia of Religion, in both 
first and second editions, fails to include a discrete entry for such a basic concept. 1 The oversight, 
ifit is that, was greatly redressed with Donald S. Lopez's 1998? essay on belief in Mark Taylor's 
Critical Terms for the Study of Religion, to which this study will constantly refer.2 Taking these 
motivating circumstances together, one might conclude that I will understand belief to be an 
1 The first 1986? edition edited by Mircea Eliade, the 2005 edition by Lindsay Jones 
2 Taylor 1998? 
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essential yet too easily ignored topic in the study of religion. Yet question about the way in 
which it might be essential to investigating religion as ethnographic phenomenon or analytic 
concept is probably more accurate. The fact that belief - especially the irrationality of having it -
has become the focus of a recent spurt of publications by scientists, philosophers, and cultural 
critics may make any study of terms a useful exercise. The increase in the potential stakes for 
religion that this extra public attention brings is not further motivation for this book, but it might 
be the salvation of what feels at this stage to be a quixotic foray into a very live minefield. 
? Questions about personal experience with belief as well questions about how it should be 
approached loom over the study of religion generally. And together these concerns replicate 
familiar stances rooted in the secular Enlightenment. The secular scholar inquiring into belief, a 
task imagined by the scholar more than the believer, must fear acting the part of an 
Enlightenment homunculus. Further, to stand in the position of a non-believing secularist is, we 
know, to look at religion from a very particular perspective, one that may seem very foreign to 
the practitioner's self-consciousness. So any answers I might entertain to my questions about 
belief might constitute answers only from some angles not others, and perhaps not to believers. 
With that awareness, Enlightenment constraints on the questions it allows become as clear as the 
liberties it affords. 
? Today awareness of the historically provisional nature of any such secular questioning is 
routinely considered part of the 'problem' identified with the topic. As an individual scholar with 
the training generally expected of an academician I share a perspective with other disciplinary 
approaches the distinctive biases which we are not expected to transcend, but we are certainly 
encouraged to explore. When such biases are made the subject of scrutiny they can lead the 
investigator in circles of self-examination .... The compensation, adequate or inadequate, 
depends on where the study locates its dominant bias, as in the bias of secularism, defined as 'not 
including' or 'opposed to' religion, or the bias of colonialism, argued to propagate distortions 
deriving from one culture's assumptions about belief. 
The ambitious goal of this book is, simultaneously, to identify the bias that casts religious 
belief as a problem, to analyze how constructions of belief have governed our studies of religion, 
and to propose a way to enable ingrained linguistic patterns to lead to translations of a wider 
variety of experience than such patterns have generally allowed . 
2 
• 
• 
• 
I am certainly not the first/alone? in the last few decades to isolate the idea of belief and 
find it a problem. It has been consistently approached that way in various disciplines and even 
something of a reflex for some scholars to speak of 'the problem of belief,' even to see this 
problem as central to scholarship or the cultural-political landscape itself. In philosophy, any 
number of scholarly efforts continue with the emphasis proposed by Hume, that belief as an 
'operation of the mind' constitutes 'one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy." 3 Bertrand 
Russell suggested in 1921 that "belief ... is the central problem in the analysis of mind. "4 The 
anthropologist Richard Shweder, who inherits an articulate tradition of concern about the 
language of belief, finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ...... ( 1989). 5 But Rodney 
Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and anthropologically, 
argued that it could not be restricted to any particular academic disciplines since it "has to do 
with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 6 Talal Asad's "genealogy" ofreligion 
argue that an critical emphasis on belief as the internal psychology of individuals, (Needham 
conclusion) enabled marginalization ofreligion in the modem world. 7 (1998: xvii). In the context 
of postcolonial literary criticism, Gauri Vivswanathan extends Asad' s argument to the role of 
conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of the modem state as it 
opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil rights. (?)8 
In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to secularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and polarized 
by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the_ biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
unprecendented social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
3 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 
4 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 (Russell, 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham, p. 7. 
5 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
6 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), xiv. 
7 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 46 . 
8 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 
xvi. 
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is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naYve 
misunderstanding" of both.9 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion." 10 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses ofreligion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots to its modem conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. Sheer semantic spread 
suggests a few problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) This study will simply probe the 
issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study of religion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation, that is, it will attempt to indicate all the 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this most basic of categories. 
9 Although a decade earlier the philosopher ofreligion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a nai've misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (1989): 149 [-168]. 
10 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001 ), p. 2. 
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Chapter One. The Problem of Universality 
Lopez: Belief = historical and cultural Christian particularity 
Discuss the evidence for the liberal assumption of universality , seen in Huston Smith, missionary 
history .... 
Role of emphasis of symbol in anthropology and HR's Eliade. (Asad?) 
First to suggest that the assumption that everyone believes something is a holdover from 
Christianity? Who? Hume? Evans-Pritchard 
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Challenging the Category of Belief 
Universalism/particularism 
The literature as a whole contains a two-stage critique of the category of belief, with 
linguistic/semantic scribbles about the terminology at both stages. At the outset there is the 
argument that this "universalizing" category cannot apply to those societies that do not formulate 
what they 'do' in concepts or reified in representations as Christianity has always done. The 
Christian baggage attending the concept of belief comes from its original and on-going context of 
religious diversity and contestation in which concepts or representations were clearly articulated 
(doctrines and creeds being the finished products) so as to define the precise object of belief and, 
by the same exercise, those objects of disbelief. Examples of this anti-universal particularism are 
the arguments by Donald Lopez, Rodney Needham, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Martin Southwold, and 
Jean Pouillon, etc. They ultimately imply the minimal integrity of nothing more than thick 
description (with any categories?), challengi~g ~ic assumptions in the meta-narratives of 
anthropology. ~ 
Belief/disbelief and science/religion 
pr,../) v's(.;UV~.,..,,,,--
At a second stage, the context of diversity and contestation is seen as so intrinsic to the concept of 
belief that the concept forever carries the ambiguity of its own negation (what is formulated as 
that which is believed clearly implies that is can also be rejected, in disbelief), lodging the 
experience of doubt within the imagination of every believer. The possibility of doubt creates the 
demand for complete commitment and practices of constant affirmation; some analyses find that 
believers' belief/commitment sets up a type of contractual relationship with the deity in which the 
believer expects a return on the commitment. Generally, however, it is argued that social scientist 
inevitably cast believers as the irrational other; moreover, the context of diversity and 
contestation leaves no position that is not a position of belief and disbelief, including science and 
political ideologies which demand their own types of commitments in turn. From this perspective, 
and others too, science and religion are meta-phenomena that effectively define each other by the 
beliefs and disbeliefs to which they commit. Not able to recognize this defining relationship, it is 
argued, social scientists by their own self-definitions attempt to grasp what they will be unable to 
grasp (until they allow true self-knowledge?), namely, the 'other' of religious belief which is not 
other, or the rationality of religious practice; so they persist in the ascription of beliefs to the other 
that are what they imagine they would believe if they were not unbelievers. In other words, 
religious belief is not grasped in its own rationality, on its own terms, only in the language of 
negating assumptions of those who define themselves by their disbelief. Strands of this argument 
are found in Jean Pouillon, Micheal deCerteau, Susan Harding ... 
1U ,0b~ 
My generation of scholars was probably the ast i which the majority had some first hand ~ ,., -p 
experience of religion. As believers turned disbelievers, we created as social science very 
concerned to maintain the boundaries. (E.g., the field of religious studies is not theological, it is 
the objective study of religion as a social and psychological phenomenon .... ). Increasingly social 
scientists are people with no prior experience of religion, to whom the boundary is clear but just 
asking to be transgressed .... They are able to be more than participant-observers: instead of 
translating the experience of the other, they put themselves in the shoes of the other and then 
translate their own experiences back . 
• 
• 
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Universal argument and counterargument =assumptions of the universality of 
belief (more or less) in contrast to arguments for its culture-laden 
provinciality/limitations. The latter extended into a fear that its use is a distortion, 
easily promoted by the interests of colonialism. 
Evidence for universality of a term like belief is thin at best. Arguments against it 
are limited but compelling. However, the whole collision of views (not a debate!) 
evokes the issue of the status of analytical language. 
Can folk categories ever be used? Refined for use? Is an analytical language Gust 
terms that are constantly challenged?) desirable? If not, we can learn about each 
other only on a very limited way, since even to describe the culture of others, one 
needs to use culture-laden terms. 
Those terms can be 'refined' by purposive historical and linguistic analysis BUT 
could end up with a set of terms far removed from standard use and thus a very 
esoteric discipline. Or terms can be refined, at least to some degree, simply be 
constant extensions of their use, as when cross-cultural interactions appropriate 
religion to cover practices that might not have figured in any more original sense 
of the term . 
Terms are never frozen in history. They carry their history but they are not always 
passive to that history. When a term is adopted as a useful analytical term, all 
limitations noted, it continues its history. 
Analytically languages run twin dangers: adhering too ~losely to folk meanings 
and become too far divorced from them. Fears of the hegemonic ambitions of an 
analytical language can be overstated, but not always, and surely the unwittingly, if 
colonially useful, effects are many . 
• 
• 
• 
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religious person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon"; anyone who 
loves something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion." 7 none form or another, 
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The Problem of Universality 
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actually approach quite distinctly for all. The most salient parts of their arguments are an 
inescapable way of demonstrating a broad dissatisfaction with the implications of universality -
that all people can believe and do so in the same way -- easily attributed to the term. 
A review of the literature, recent, reveals very similar concerns. On the one hand, there are 
philosophical concerns rising from an analysis of language and communication: Wittgenstein 
was particularly straightforward, wondering if believing was an interior experience, and whether 
it was constituting by the thinking component or the doing. Other philosophers .... culminating 
in Donald Davidson (see Frankenberry) who explicitly argues for the universality of believing as 
the basis for communication (?). On the other hand, a body of more ethnographically-oriented 
studies looks at the meaning of belief in cross-cultural communication and representation. It is 
mostly this second group that addresses religious behavior. And they generally question three 
assumptions about belief, namely that belief is universal, that it is a mental state, and therefore 
that it is the personal experience of the individual. In questioning these categories, particularly 
the first, studies have stressed examples that demonstrate the particularity of belief (location in 
specific times and places; instability of meaning over time). References have also suggested that 
believing may be better thought of residing in doing rather than thinking and that a persistent 
sociocultural dimension to belief negates a focus on the psychological experience of the 
individual. 
The challenge to universality primarily rests on the apparent misapplication of the term to the 
relationship that people in tradition societies have to their gods. Needham opens his study with 
the experience of the impossibility of rendering "I believe in God" in Penan. Likewise Evans 
Pritchard is loath to describe Azande feelings about .... with belief. Lopez takes the case furthest 
showing how use of the category was a colonial distortion of indigenous culture. None of these 
studies makes a formal point that traditional societies as some sort of group are not well served 
by representing their relations to or thoughts about their deities in terms of belief; nor do these 
studies conclude that non-traditional - e.g., modern, industrial, dominating - societies do have 
religions in which belief is an appropriate term. To make these points begs many questions, such 
as exactly what do you mean by belief, other than it is a Christian term? do all so-called modem 
• 
• 
• 
and traditional societies fall neatly on either side of the belief /non-belief divide? The French 
anthropologist Jean Pouillon has dealt with these issues most theoretically and succinctly ... 
Several scholars have explicitly attempted to describe what it means to believe, namely de 
Certeau, Veyne and Izutsu - usually in route to another goal. 
The consistent reaction of ethnographers against use of the term is part of a new sensitivity to the 
distortions possible in translation and to fundamental differences in cultural constructions of 
religious cosmologies and divine interactions. Not new in the sense that only postmodern 
scholars of the late 1990s evidence this sensitivity. E-P writes in the 1930s. This sensitivity is 
new with regard to an earlier quandary in anthropological assimilation of diverse cultures. It was 
once asked if tribal, traditional societies actually had religion as such, since what they had 
appeared to differ substantively from religion as it was extrapolated from the Christian 
experience. The weight of history shifted to favor an expansion of the term to include more types 
of religiosity than ever before, with a simultaneous theorizing on the nature of religion beyond 
the historical conditioning of Christianity. David Chidester for one notes how long it took for 
Africans to be deemed religious, that is, as possessing religion. Accepting the wide use of the 
term religion, the next stage of collective concern about categories was reluctant to apply such a 
Christianized category as belief , or to de-christianize the category sufficiently starting either with 
a theoretical redefinition or by simply flooding/inflating the category with new examples. These 
latter efforts do appear in some works: Southwold writing on belief in Sri Lankan Buddhism 
works to refine the category as well as the religious activities in question so that he can include 
them as believers; the medieval historian Philip Arnold wants to recognize multiple mode of 
religiosity (specifically popular religion) that had long been deemed un-Christian as sincere 
sources of belief; not tampering with the nature of belief as a category, he suggests the belief-like 
nature of these popular religious arts and the vacuity of the historical criteria used to determine 
what counted . 
• 
• 
While Hume is a natural place to start because of his exterior and critical position in trying to 
explain religion, but there is not an unbroken line of scholars so much as a question that had kept 
popping up. Hume is a resource for latter investigators, but their projects often differed the 
questions about belief per se have been considerably similar. In A Treatise of Human Nature 
(-1739-40), Hume writes that belief as "an act of mind has never yet been explained by any 
philosopher." (1888: 97n, edited ed.) Moreover, "this operation of mind, which forms the belief 
of any fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy" (Hume, 
1888, p. 628) (Needham, p. 7 for Hume quotes). 
When Durkheim broke religion down into the components beliefs and rites, he effectively 
established the basic sociological 'fact' that the supposed universality ofreligion extends to each 
of its constituitive elements. Was Durkheim influenced by the overlooked history of belief as an 
elemental and explicitly universal Christian category? Not long after Durkheim, but in another 
world of face-to-face ethnographic encounters, E.E. Evans-Pritchard weighted the ability of the 
term to translate Azande religious ideas. For E-P the Christian assumptions behind the term 
made it a distorting lens through which to get a true picture of .... 
Features of the Christianization (does not predate Christianity?) of belief: universal, mental or 
interiority (not practice/performative ), and therefore individual (not social). Does not have to be 
real early Christian understanding, just what critics ascribed to it as Christian features. 
[Durkheim] on beliefs in more primitive forms of religion: find how he uses it as universal, 
mental and individual. .. 
Evans-Prichard '3 Os ( see Needham too) 
Rodney Needham '70s 
Needham opens his book with two questions that drive the comparative ethnographic 
investigation he launches, recasting Wittgenstein's questions "is belief an experience" in more 
• anthrological terms, he asks whether "the capacity for belief constitutes a natural resemblance 
• 
• 
• 
among men" so as to require it be considered as a "human" faculty. (xiii) In other words, for his 
analysis, belief is tested as to whether it is a matter of a psychological state or experience, and if 
so does it take the form of an individual interiority or social constructed collective 
representations, or both. And in any of these forms is belief not universally human. He finds 
quite diverse ethnographic and analytic accounts have relied on the term. If 
Malcolm Ruel 80s? 
Pouillan 80s? 
Lopez 
• 
• 
• 
~1 
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a) Main problems identified: Universal or particular; mental or performative; private or 
~ ........... ➔ 
social. This is the supposed universality given Christian assumptions; the problem of implied 
individual/private existence, as well as the historical, political cultural "social fact." 
b) Many (all anthrop?) declare they cannot use the term (Ruel, Pouillan, Needham, Wulff, 
Lopez), tho others have productively done so (Southwold, Arnold, phil ofrel ... ?, ). Engelke and 
what- 's-her-name? 
c) History of religions/rel studies has not examined its use; in fact, it appears to deny its 
importance per se, but such unexamined assumptions can be very misleading, ill serving (leaving 
our discourse more theological?). Unexamined use of the term does make arguments rest on 
inherently theological ( or about theology) grounds ( distance from or ally with Wiebe?): 
-- historical exp of Christian credo formulation 
--faith rooted in individual experience [ cp 'science' explaining cognitive/biology of 
belief] 
-- ignoring how belief is used ethnically, politically, role of polls ( census already noted); 
Viswanathan, Lilla, etc 
-- Theorization of belief in theology (Reckwitz) 
d) The problems resulting from or just accompanying the current particularism (when a 
theological-universal is rejected for particularistic; eg Needham; Evans Pritchard, etc) and post-
colonial analysis (Lopez); benefits of particularism too, of course! Namely, · 
-- the subtle reintroduction of universalist assumptions endemic to any posturing of 
"study." Need to grapple with that! 
-- ramifications for any definition of "religion" and methods for its study, e.g. religious 
studies 
["Religion": Paradigms plus: use Chidester on West slow to call others' "religion"; also add JZS 
to argument about Christianity as prototype (see Guide to SofRel 41, Drugery 90) and his world 
religions research (before Masuzawa) Guide 11-42, Map 295?, Harvard Theo Rev '96:295-6.] 
• 
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e) Practice theory: value of a focus on believing and construction of a focus on practice; 
later look at multiple examples of believing from a comparative practice stance ... 
• 
• 
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Project Believing: Particularity and Universality in Understanding Religion 
History of Religions 
September 2006 to June 2007 
Project Narrative (1785 words or 3 single-spaced pages, including certain types of 
information) 1768 words 
America is a nation of "believers," we are told by one poll after another. The beliefs 
about which the population is polled conflate doctrinal tenets about the Bible with political 
positions on abortion and social views about the family. Since the emergence of the evangelical 
right in politics, the language of belief has become central to political discourse and, increasingly, 
social analysis. However, going back further in history to the Scopes trial, it is clear that "belief' 
- or not- then and there became central to the main forms American identity. 
Over the last ten years, a new wave of studies addressing 'belief has appeared, a rich if 
often ragtag collection earnestly pulling in predictably contrary directions. Some studies don the 
mantle of traditional rationalism, explaining with horror or studied sympathy the unnatural 
persistence of religious or truly "weird" beliefs; others take up the guise of historical, social or 
postmodern examinations of the cultural, even economic, factors behind the dynamics of belief 
and unbelief. Despite the magnitude of the current fray, scholars ofreligion, specifically 
historians of religions, have not been effective contributors to the conversation. Apparently 
preceding generations of religion scholars conceded the idea of belief to theology, which would 
be in keeping with their efforts to distance the study of religion from the theological world in 
which it was born. So, for example, the 1986 and 2005 editions of the magisterial 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, first edited by Mircea Eliade, one of the main figures in the 
History of Religions, do not even carry an entry for "belief." The reader is referred to "Doubt 
(and belief)" for an uncompromisingly specific theological discussion. Although the concept was 
then influentially deconstructed to its Christian roots (Lopez 1998), the term is widely used in 
every monograph in the field and related fields. Historians of religion do not know how to 
analyze the issue of belief as a working idea. 
My project will first analyze the manner in which the concept of belief is currently 
addressed in order to demonstrate both a personal thesis about how to modify our concept of 
believing as well as a revised theoretical basis for doing so. I judge that the latter will encourage 
historians of religion to pursue methodologically coherent historical and cultural studies of the 
phenomenon--especially if they disagree with the former thesis. That thesis will center on. the 
question of the relative value of defining belief in terms more umversal than its Christian origins 
or cfefining it as a particularity of performance that cannot be re urned beyond the ~ ere of 
Christian influence. Ultimately, current uses o e term appear to require both approaches. - During my current sabbatical leave I planned the larger project and began the research. 
Given the enormity of the written sources pertaining to belief, this has been an exercise in 
determining which areas I must address and which I can avoid due to their more secondary, and 
all-consuming, nature ( e.g., analytic philosophy). A published article, developed at a small 
weekend conference with Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, Maurice Bloch, Terry Godlove, Jonathan 
Z. Smith and several others, helped me clarify how to use the rich store of analytical philosophy 
on belief/truth statements, such as pursued by Donald Davidson (Frankenberry, 2002). A more 
recent paper to appear in HISTORY AND THEORY contains an analysis of the construction of 
"religion" by Christian Euro-American culture that will be the groundwork for the rest of the 
project. The work I have done on cognitive theory, economic analyses, historical studies, and 
methodological analyses now enable me to shape a mature project and hazard a thesis. 
I have worked for over twenty years with the larger issues of how to think about religion, 
which Durkheim defined so simply as a matter of rites and beliefs. My work on ritual theory is, 
of course, the best evidence of my qualifications to wade into this companion issue. My 
reputation is primarily based on my theoretical contributions to understanding ritual and religion, 
and I am constantly learning that this work has been picked up in other disciplines, most recently, 
history, classics, and archeology. My Sinological work exploring aspects of the "medium" in the 
message of Chinese religious texts, the topic of an earlier NEH grant, is also important 
preparation for the more material dimensions of how and what people believe. While drawing on 
this broad background in research, and years of teaching, I plan to refine my understanding of 
particular topics (e.g., the "will to believe," according to Nietzsche and Wm James) and broaden 
my grasp of some very recent developments ( cognitive theory). However, I want this study of 
belief to return to themes that the history of religions has ignored since the rise of Eliade' s 
~
henomenology ofreligion, namely, the highly materialistic concerns long associated with 
rehg10n in its so-called "primitive" forms--the quest for health, wealth, and life after death. 
Hence, my study aims not only to sort through the crowd of conflicting current work, and 
( 
develop a methodological framework and thesis addressing the phenomenon of believing, it also 
• intends to bring back into formal consideration the easily observable events in which a 
congregation prays for money, expects healings, or communicates with those on the other side. 
At some point, as the discipline increasingly focused on so-called "world religions" (Masuzawa 
2005), we let these ways of being religious fall from consideration. Anthropology has been better 
at seeing them in religions abroad, while sociology has been better at tracking the middle-class 
search for spirituality. 
I expect to spend the year completing my research in the areas noted below as well as 
fully drafting the most critical formulations and major thesis. The book will be finalized in a 
second year. In conversations with religion editors at Oxford and Princeton University presses, I 
have described this as a two-year project; due to the reputation of my previous work (and 
continued sales), each has pressed me on the manuscript. They also urged me to keep it 
accessible to the general reader. The success of Karen Armstrong's books make clear that an 
educated readership is hungry to understand religion better and they appreciate the association 
between our religious history and the current international environment. While my first book on 
ritual (1992) would not be considered generally accessible, even though it has been assigned to 
undergraduates, my second book was deliberately written in a more straightforward style. This 
"belief' project crystallized in the wake of the last two presidential elections, so I am intent on 
writing a book that can address both my colleagues in academe and the educated reader. But 
most of all, I want to do what I think I do best, namely, open up an area theoretically, inviting all 
comers to take the discussion further. 
My particular strength in dealing with theory has made my work both distinctive and 
directly challenging to studies that have reigned in the field of history of religions. My rethinking 
I ofritual overturned the supremacy, if not the enduring utility, of Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, 
• 
and Jonathan Z. Smith on the topic ofritual. Likewise, by building on Donald Lopez's influential 
deconstruction of our historical assumptions about belief , I expect to establish fresh ground on 
which to re-engage both the concept and the phenomenon we now mean to define with it. A 
study that redefines reli ion through an analysis of the overly familiar features of belie · 
contribute to the general discourse with which we discuss politics, values, and human diversity. 
This is an ambitious statement. I make it with a humility born of long experience in projects that 
never go in the direction one expects. At present it is, of course, an objective and an aspiration, 
but it is one that I believe I have the experience to pursue--and even presume in this description. 
In its scope this project is in keeping with the editor's call in the March 2006 issue of the 
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION asking the field to "not just 
produce more disconnected, atomistic goblets of knowledge v --- ·~v . 1 dge," leaving their 
"implications untouched." (74:5) My hope to contribute beyond religious studies may not be 
unrealistic. I have been invited to participate in two events that show the interest of other areas, a 
Classics seminar at Oxford University on "faith" and a Sociology conference on "prayer" at 
Princeton University. 
Aside from those events, I do not plan any travel. Languages are not an obstacle and I 
expect to draw on my familiarity with texts in Chinese popular religion. Beyond the excellent 
interlibrary loan services at my institution, I can use the nearby libraries at Stanford and Berkeley. 
Finally, the book is currently sketched out in chapters that are likely to slim down as my 
thesis takes on a more precise formulation. The following is a tentative table of contents: 
I. Introduction: Praying for wealth , expecting the "last days," thanking God that you were 
spared when others were not - the questions raised by these familiar scenarios are a place to 
begin in looking at what and how people believe affects the study of religion . 
II. How Christians Came to Believe and Found Other Religions Believe Also (Don't 
They?)--locating "belief' in enduring Christian paradigms of religion; the fundamental challenge 
of non-Christian "belief systems" 
III. What about Truth? Current Arguments concerning "Belief' 
A. Traditional Rationalism-contrasting belief with the mindset of empirical proof; 
the Aristotelian heritage in Biblical studies; Enlightenment naturalism; American pragmatism; 
philosophy on belief statements and truth claims; the cultural context of scientific realism since 
Darwin; rational choice theory; the therapeutic psychology of belief 
B. The Rationalism of Cognitive Theory--evolutionary speculation; psychology of 
religious experience; neurological theories of the naturalness of belief; studies of the counter-
intuitive 
C. Socio-Culturalism-the fate of classic theories; explorations of social memory; 
historical studies of power relations in belief/truth; postmodern critiques of belief and how 
religious studies pose its questions. 
IV. The Critical Question: Is Believing a Form of Universal Cognition or a Culturally 
Particular Performative Action?--returning to the oldest and widely shared dimensions of 
religion, namely, praying for health, wealth and life after death; community and morality; 
individual and social frames; the perception of religious similarities and differences 
V. Believing: a cultural way of thinking about a universal cognitive activity occurring in 
erformative practices in which a cosmolo and a social identity is acted/constructed through ~ l 
formulas of word d deed; the dynamics of believing in religion, science, the marginal, hope; ~ 
analytic language for talking about beliefs one does not share 
I 
Preface 
As she was approaching ninety years of age, my mother began to talk more directly 
about God, what she believed, and whether she would be found wanting. As the 
child who studied religion, I got all her hard questions. Invariably, however, she 
would structure the conversation around the same points and what I had to say, 
whether challenging or soothing, never really mattered. "I'm not sure I believe or 
not. I certainly don't think it's likely there's the sort of God I was ever taught to 
believe in. It's hard to believe there is a God who cares about us. All I can do is 
hope that if God exists, he' 11 accept that I tried to understand and that I tried to live 
a good life -- that I did what I could." My mother did not want a theological 
response and she certainly had no use for the historical or comparative framing. 
She was trying to make things right, work out who she had been, in her own 
estimation, clarify what she could believe and what she was not comfortable 
invoking even at this late moment in her life. She inevitably wanted the comfort of 
being true to herself and, naturally, being on the right side of God should he exist. 
After all, she was sort of a believer "in her own way." She would begin and end 
these predominantly one-sided discussions with some simple questions: "Am I a 
believer or not? What counts as belief?" 
There are many reasons to address the specific, and implied, questions of my 
mother. This book, however, will not even make the attempt. This book is 
something quite different, limited and, from my mother's perspective, hopelessly 
abstract. I would not presume to discuss topics for which I have no particular 
qualifications -- or track record of useful contributions. Yet I take up the topic of 
belief, in my own way, quite aware that for many people questions about belief are 
very personal and complicated. Hopefully, my more impersonal perspective 
confined to scholarly discussions does not lose sight of this. I decided to address 
the phenomenon of believing for several reasons, none of them quite so clearly 
distinct in my motivation as I can make them on paper. In the wake of my earlier 
work on ritual, I was reminded of a challenge to myself contained in the opening 
page of my first book on thinking about ritual, namely, to return some day to 
consider how the other component of religion identified in the simple Durkheimian 
definition of religion might yield to an analysis similar to the one in that work. 
Pursuing this, another reason for this book emerged: the surprising paucity of 
attention to this ubiquitous topic or category or phenomenon by scholars of 
religion. Some discussions exist -- counting on one hand, a finger or two is left 
over- and they will be fully mined here. But they are quite polemical and often 
limited in scope, rarely invoking the more expansive treatments of the topic in 
related disciplines of anthropology, history, and philosophy. Finally, the silliness 
of the recent public positions staked out by well-known writers and some eminent 
scholars, fully convinced of the obvious rationality of their own reasoning, are the 
mere top of a scholarly food chain. The new rationalism, however, better 
repres_ented by many more careful studies in the fast-paced flourishing of what has 
come to be grouped as "cognitive theory," may overfill the void with its own 
distinctive manner of defining (away) the topic. 
There are more general reasons to inquire into our ideas about believing. At a time 
when European and American confidence in the exorable spread of secular 
modernity is giving way to a new examination of the assumptions underlying that 
self-interested ·ideology of Europe and America, the door has opened to take 
religious beliefs more seriously. Religious strife, since that is the form in which 
society generally notices religion, appears today not simply as another form of 
class struggle, colonial liberation, or resistance to modernization. Rather, there is a 
bit of a general consensus forming that ideas matter, cultures matter, religion 
matters. At the same time, the insights of postmodernist and postcolonial studies 
leave scholars of religion unable to pass through that door, let alone widen it or 
explain what is on the other side, due to our resistance to essentializing those large 
entities such as Islam and global Christian evangelicalism of current discourse. We 
are effectively sidelined for the very current discussion to which we might actually 
be relevant. We may also be hesitant to join in any general discussion of 'beliefs' 
per se due to the decades of scholarship on the body and embodiment or 
performance and practice, as well as the highly nuanced discussions of what were 
once cruder debates about oral versus literate cultures, or tribal versus creedal 
religions. 
These reasons for attempting a book on the huge and amorphous topic of belief 
lead me to try to impose some order on our resources for addressing it. This book 
does have a thesis; while clear, it is, in the spirit of the age, a bit of an anti-thesis: 
affirming this, problematizing that, ultimately suggesting a shift of perspective to 
afford a reasonable, and effective, way to deal with competing scholarly goals. 
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America is a nation of "believers," we are told by one poll after another. The beliefs 
about which the population is polled conflate doctrinal tenets about the bible, with political 
positions on abortion and social views about the family. Since the emergence of the evangelical 
right in politics, the language of belief has become central to political discourse and, increasingly, 
social analysis. However, going back further in history to the Scopes trial, it is clear that "belief' 
- or not- then and there became central to the main forms of American identity. 
Over the last ten years, a new wave of studies addressing 'belief' has appeared, a rich if 
often ragtag collection earnestly pulling in predictably contrary directions. Some studies don the 
mantle of traditional rationalism, explaining with horror or studied sympathy the unnatural 
persistence of mild and extreme beliefs; others take up the guise of historical, social or 
postmodern examinations of the cultural, even economic, factors behind the dynamics of belief 
and unbelief. Despite the magnitude of the current fray, scholars of religion, specifically 
historians of religions, have not been effective contributors to any part of the conversation. 
Apparently the preceding generation of religion scholars ceded the idea of belief to the realm of 
theology; that would be in keeping with their efforts to keep distancing the study of religion from 
the theological world in which it was born. So, for example, the 1986 and 2005 editions of the 
magisterial ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, first edited by Mircea Eliade, one of the main 
figures in the History of Religions, do not even carry an entry for "belief." The reader is referred 
to "Doubt (and belief)" for an uncompromisingly narrow, theological discussion. Historians of 
religion do not know how to address the issue of belief. Although formally ceded to theology and 
influentially deconstructed to its Christian roots, the term is still widely used in every monograph 
in the field and related fields where the problems are noted but not resolved. 
My project will first analyze the manner in which the concept of belief is currently 
addressed in order to demonstrate both a personal thesis about how to modify .our concept of 
belief as well as a revised theoretical basis for doing so. I think that latter will encourage 
historians of religion to pursue methodologically coherent historical and cultural studies of the 
phenomenon, especially if they disagree with the thesis. The thesis of the project will center, I 
believe, on the question of the relative value of defining belief in terms more universal than its 
Christian origins or defining it as a particularity of performance that cannot be presumed beyond 
the sphere of Christian influence. Ultimately, current uses of the term require both. 
During recent sabbatical leaves I planned the larger project and began the research. Given 
the enormity of the written sources pertaining to belief, this has been an exercise in determining 
which areas I can address and which I can avoid due to their more secondary, if all-consuming, 
nature ( e.g., analytic philosophy). A published article, developed at a small weekend conference 
with Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, Maurice Bloch, Terry Godlove, Jonathan Z Smith and several 
others, helped me clarify the logic for avoiding the rich store of analytical philosophy on 
belief/truth statements, such as pursued by David Davidson (Frankenberry, 2002). A paper to 
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appear in History and Theory contains an analysis of the construction of 'religion' by Christian 
Euro-American culture that will be the groundwork for the rest of the project. Work I have done 
on cognitive theory, economic analyses, historical studies, and methodological critiques of the 
field of religious studies now enable me to shape the project and hazard a rough thesis. 
I have worked for over twenty years with the larger issues of how to think about religion, 
which Durkheim defined so simply as a matter of rites and beliefs. My work on ritual theory is, 
of course, the best evidence of my qualifications to wade into this companion issue. My 
reputation is primarily based on my theoretical contributions to understanding ritual and religion, 
and I am constantly learning that this work has been picked up in other disciplines, most recently, 
history, classics and archeology. My Sinological work exploring aspects of the "medium" in the 
message of Chinese religious texts, the topic of an earlier NEH grant, is also important 
preparation for the more material dimensions of how and what people believe. While drawing on 
this broad background in research, and years of teaching, I plan to refine my understanding of 
particular topics (e.g., the "will to believe," according to Nietzsche and William James) and 
broaden my grasp of some very recent developments (cognitive theory). However, I want this 
study of belief to return to themes that the study of religion has ignored since the rise of Eliade' s 
phenomenology of religion, namely, the highly materialistic concerns long associated with 
religion in its so-called "primitive" forms-the quest for health, wealth, and life after death. 
Hence, my study aims not only to sort through a crowded and conflicting set of current work, 
and develop a methodological framework and thesis addressing the phenomenon of belief, it also 
intends to bring back into formal consideration the easily observable events in which a 
congregation prays for money, expects healings, or communicates with those on the other side . 
At some point, as the discipline increasingly focused on "world religions" (see Masuzawa), we 
let these ways of being religious fall from consideration. Anthropology has been better at seeing 
them in religions abroad, while sociology has been better at tracking the middle-class search for 
spirituality. 
I expect to spend the year completing my research in the areas noted below as well as 
fully drafting the critical formulations and major thesis. The book will be finalized in a second 
year. In conversations with the religion editors at Oxford and Princeton University presses, I 
have described this as a two-year project; due to the reputation of my previous work (and 
continued sales), each pressed me to offer the manuscript to their press. They also urged me to 
keep the manuscript accessible to the general reader. It is clear from the success of Karen 
Armstrong's books that an educated readership is hungry to understand religion better and they 
appreciate the association between our religious history and the current international 
environment. While my first book on ritual (1992) would not be considered generally accessible, 
even though it has been assigned to undergraduates, my second book was deliberately written in 
a more straightforward style. This "belief' project crystallized in the wake of the last two 
presidential elections, so I am intent on writing a book that can address both my colleagues in 
academe and the educated reader. But most of all, I want to do what I think I do best, namely, 
open up an area theoretically, inviting all sorts ofreaders to take the discussion further. 
My particular strength in dealing with theory has made my work both distinctive and 
directly challenging to studies that have reigned in the field of history of religions. My rethinking 
ofritual overturned the supremacy, but not the enduring utility, of Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, 
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and Jonathan Z. Smith on the topic ofritual. Likewise, by building on Donald Lopez's influential 
deconstruction of our many assumptions about belief , I expect to establish fresh ground on which 
to re-engage both the concept and the phenomenon we mean to define with it. A study that 
redefines religion through an analysis of the overly familiar feature of belief will contribute to 
the general discourse with which we discuss politics , values, and human diversity. This is an 
ambitious statement. I make it with a humility born of long experience in projects that never go 
in the direction one expects . It is, of course , an objective and an aspiration , but it is one that I 
believe I have the experience to pursue--and even presume in this description. In its scope this 
project is in keeping with the editor's call in the March 2006 issue of the JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION , asking the field to "not just produce more 
disconnected , atomistic goblets of knowledge of knowledge," leaving their "implications 
untouched." (74:5) Contributions beyond religious studies may not be unrealistic. I have been 
invited to participate in two events that show the interest of other areas, a Classics seminar at 
Oxford University on "faith" and a Sociology conference on "prayer" at Princeton University. 
Aside from these events , I do not plan any travel. Languages are not an obstacle and I expect to 
draw on my work in Chinese popular religion. Beyond the excellent interlibrary loan services at 
my institution , Stanford and Berkeley libraries are in my general area and I have used them 
frequently. 
Finally , the book is currently sketched out in chapters that are likely to slim down as my 
thesis takes on a more precise formulation. The following is a tentative table of contents: 
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I. Introduction: -Praying for wealth, expecting the "last days," thanking God that you were spared 
when others were not - how these familiar scenarios raise questions about what and how people 
believe that affect much of the study of religion. 
II. How Christians Came to Believe, And Found Other Religions Believe Also (Don't They?) --
locating "belief' in enduring Christian paradigms of religion; the fundamental challenge of non-
Christian "belief systems." 
III. What about Truth? Current Arguments Concerning "Belief' 
A. Traditional Rationalism - contrasts belief with the mind-set of empirical proof; the 
Aristotelian heritage in Biblical studies; Enlightenment naturalism; American pragmatism; 
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Darwin; rational choice theory; therapeutic psychology of belief . 
B. The rationalism of Cognitive Theory: evolutionary speculation; psychology of 
religious experience; neurological theories of the naturalness of belief; studies of the counter-
intuitive. 
C. Socio-Culturalism - fate of classic anthropological theories; explorations of social 
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BELIEVING: 
FURTHER EXPLORATIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Catherine Bell 
[Projected October 2007] 
Fueled by the recent presidential elections and the longer-standing controversies over 
teaching evolution and intelligent design, there has been a fresh spate of books on belief 
and an increase in the venues in which this notion is bandied about. Scholars of religion, 
however, have practically avoided the term. The latest edition of the Encyclopedia of 
Religion (2005) makes no change in the earlier one's (1986?) omission of a separate entry 
for belief. The reader is directed to the entry for "Doubt (and Belief)," which is fully 
theological in its purview and assumptions. Two non-theological attempts to analyze the e 
term (Lopez, "Belief' in Taylor's Critical Terms for the Study of Religion, 1998 and .. J,/ 
Robert Campany's article in History of Religion, 2000) suggest that any discussion of the rfl1 
it will quickly break down due to a variety of semantic problems; while Lopez sees no 
way to overcome these problems, and no particular reason to try, Campany optimistically 
predicts useful avenues for cross-cultural discourse. However, neither attempts to comes 
to terms with the way the notion of belief currently functions in the debates of our day, or 
whether the study of religion is avoiding the term as a way to avoid those same debates or 
preserve some paradigm. 
The field of religious studies has been generated and propelled by a series of paradigms. 
The most central paradigm for all academic disciplines has been the Enlightenment's 
distinction between the rational world of empirical study and logical argument versus 
what they understood as the traditional cosmology of belief in God and acceptance of 
divine truths on faith alone. This paradigmhas been beset, of course, by a number of 
ambiguities, not least of which is the role played by Biblical Studies in the emergence of 
European scientific and linguistic scholarship, among other areas, which did so much to 
bring about the Enlightenment. With reason versus faith ( or belief) as the mental 
infrastructure of the modern world's understanding of science and religion, then 
postmodernist analyses of the culturalism of the sciences, which demand as much belief 
from the normal citizen as many of the wares religion offers, present yet another 
ambiguities underlying the modernist mindset. Cognitive science, relentlessly 
antagonistic to postmodernism, is still contributing to the project in both positive and 
negative ways. The work of Pascal Boyer differs greatly from the apocalyptic vision of 
Roy Rappaport, just as the breezy common-sense style of Justin Barrett differs from the 
density of McCauley and Lawson's work. Yet the new ways of mapping mental states 
explored in this scholarship lends continues to approach belief as a way of thinking while 
blurring the lines by which the mental is opposed to the physical. 
• 
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The multi-disciplinary scholars of religious studies have more to offer. Aside from the 
few studies laying some groundwork, religious studies has the various empirical results 
of specific work in cognitive science, all the work in cultural anthropology, and the 
potential analytic data on the idea of belief in both popular and theoretical discourse. 
However, the most exciting material since Malinowski's treatment of religion, magic and 
science has been several disconnected studies by linguists and anthropologists exploring 
people's verbal activity in their construction of the social identity of "a believer," most 
notably Susan Harding's The Book of Jerry Falwell (2001). Since Paul Veyne's Did the 
Greeks Believe their Myths? (1988) and Paul Connerton's How Societies Remember 
(1989), anthropologists have also been exploring cultural transmission is ways that also 
unpack reliance on specific behavioral dynamics, notably architecture as much as oral 
tales. 
I have published one essay to date on this enormous topic (in Nancy Frankenberry's 
Radical Interpretation [Cambridge, 2002], "'The Chinese Believe in Spirits': Belief and 
Believing in the Study of Religion," which was a paper presented to a small weekend 
seminar that included Richard Rorty, Maurice Bloch, Jonathan Z. Smith and Jeffery Stout, 
among others. Since the seminar was predicated on the work of the philosopher Donald 
Davidson's idea of "radical interpretation," my paper was able to engage the significance 
of the heavy load of philosophical studies of the verb "to believe" in order to design an 
approach that considers such philosophizing more as data for cultural study than a history 
of insights. Since then, I have pushed the project forward in a number of papers, notably 
a study of paradigms in Religious Studies to be published in History and Theory . 
In planning the book manuscript, I am cognizant of the fact that the unexpected success 
of my first book, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (1992), which has been repeatedly cited 
for its major contribution to the field, was based on redefining the conversation about 
ritual in two steps. First, I demonstrated why the main theories of ritual (Durkheim, 
Turner and Geertz) appeared so useful, but were ultimately dead ends due to the 
circularity with which they played with the polarization of thought and action. Second, I 
suggested a fresh direction in which ritual was not a fundamentally distinct mode of 
human activity, but a strategic form of cultural practice like so many others. Its similarity 
to and its difference from other modes of practice, and the reasons why people would 
choose to ritualize a situation rather than deal with it another way provided unexpectedly 
rich ways of describing the ritual practices in their context. [During my years of work on 
ritual I also studied the ways in which printed Chinese morality books constructed a 
specific belief system (that is, cosmologically described morality) that was assimilated in 
a highly diverse culture offering many alternative systemizations.] 
The Believing manuscript I am working on begins by tracing the role of the belief 
concept within the main paradigms constituting the modern study of religion, including 
the many verbal constructions that use the term in English (notably, W. C. Field's line --
"What do I believe? Well, I believe I'll take a walk."), as well as who and what are served 
by current uses. For example, Religious Studies depends on a number of interlocking 
paradigms, such as (i) Christianity is the de facto prototype for all religions, (ii) religion 
is fundamentally irrational, (iii) there are comparable "world religions," where the 
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"beliefs" are similarly described , (iv) religion is a cultural necessity , at least with regard 
to social morality , (v) the idea ofreligion is just a Western construct , and (vi) and perhaps 
the most diffuse and persistent , an underlying assumption , based on the foregoing , that 
religion is intrinsically good (when something awful occurs concerning religion it is 
usually ascribed to something like extremism or derangement). These paradigms are 
maintained by the "either /or" political-religious arguments that posit a false clarity 
between religion and science , on the one hand , and the political-religious agendas based 
on a false confusion of knowing and believing , on the other. In other words, continued 
understanding of believing as a mental state weak 9n real knowing (but perhaps rooted in 
a fundamentally humanizing experience something greater) serves purposes that must be 
unraveled to understand the perpetuation of the term. In their support of the preceding 
paradigms , popular notions of belief do not only support theology and religious studies , 
as we have known them , they also maintain ideas that are basic to the assumptions about 
modern science. 
In a more positive light , the book will go on to develop a new model for understanding 
what it means to be a believer. I do not care to reject popular usage for some esoteric 
terminology ; on the contrary, popular usage is more of a guide than theory . However , I 
do want to provide scholars with an approach to the idea, and its history , that gives them 
a more analytic , if less participatory , basis for study. My approach will analyze 
"believing" as an active , performative practice of social identification - not primarily a 
private , mental state of commitment to religious ideas. There is sufficient data available 
to be used creatively in this regard , particularly in developing the idea of "social 
identification" in a broader sense that mere group belonging. Going beyond Durkheim , 
therefore I want to focus primarily on the main ways people demonstrate or act out belief 
to themselves and others , which involve a modest set of linguistic and performative 
actions that tend to revolve around particularly basic human concerns (not theological 
abstractions): concern with the dead , insuring the health and well-being of the living ; and 
the desire to seek greater wealth by virtue of demonstrating religiosity to supernatural 
powers. These "basics" have fallen out of focus due to a concern with "the Sacred" and 
the complexity of ritual and theological detail afforded us by the accessibility of data 
from many disciplines. 
This project will be the substance of the prestigious Gates lecture at Grinnell and the 
Eliot lecture at Reed College which I will deliver in March and April of 2007. Thus the 
heart (gist?) of the book could be complete by the end of this academic year , with another 
six months to elaborate a full manuscript for dissemination to outside readers. 
If , as I have been repeatedly told , my 1992 book on ritual had an important influence on 
the field , then this book on believing , while standing on its own , will also complete the 
argument begun in 1992 about thought and action in the theoretical analyses of religion. 
Although I plan to write at least one more book , on those Chinese morality texts , I see 
Believing as my culminating contribution to the field of Religious Studies. Believing will 
demonstrate that Religious Studies is a multi-disciplinary field focusing on religion 
because religion is out there , that is, religion is widely assumed to be the entity that exists 
so influentially in our world. The field is not based on being covert believers , or the need 
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to rescue religion from the sciences , or because of any 'special' relationship to the Sacred 
(e.g., Eliade , among others) , or due to a misunderstanding of the historicity of a term. 
I hope this argument will both validate the field and redirect it, from semi-theological 
categories to reflective explorations of functional equivalents to what we mean by 
religion in all the cultural forms this will take. 
As I have written elsewhere , any "critical" study must first explain why the object of the 
study is seen as something to be explained in the first place , as a problem. Then it must 
analyze the history of the problem has been defined. That is for starters . 
4 
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Belief: A Classificatory Lacuna and Disciplinary "Problem" 1 
Catherine Bell 
In a curious omission, the Encyclopedia of Religion, both the first and the revised second 
editions, 1986 and 2005 respectively, leaves out the term "belief' as the subject of a distinct 
entry. (Eliade 1986; Jones 2005) This may have been relatively unintentional and simply due to 
organizational problems involved in lining up writers with topics. The largest topics are always 
the hardest to assign and have accepted. And the Encyclopedia is a justifiably award-wining 
achievement by an international crew of major scholars, which has had important if subtle 
ramifications for unification of the study of religion. One should not overemphasize the presence 
of an absence. Yet it is interesting and perhaps important to note to this one. The inquisitive 
reader who turns to "Belief' is instructed to "See Doubt (and Belief)," for what the 2005 edition 
explains is a philosophical discussion of the interrelation of doubt and belief in the Western 
tradition" -- although quite theologically focused for nearly half the essay, with the addition of 
two useful sentences on dharma in India. (Jones 2005: 2423-2427). Belief is indexed in several 
other places in the final volume. The term and even the "Doubt" discussion of it are not in the 
ynoptic Index provided by both editions, which usefully classify "Religious Phenomena" and 
" pecific Religions," like Christianity, with topics related to them. It is not listed as an example 
of "Phenomena of Religion," which does include cats, clowns and cocks, to cite some random 
entries from just one alphabetical section, nor is belief considered under "Methods of Study," 
"Philosophy and Religion," or 'Scholarly Terms." The Index gives greater attention to "Faith," 
but it also fail to appear in most of the preceding synoptical sections. Faith is noted in 
• 
• 
• 
discussions of individual scholars like Peter Berger and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, as well as 
increasingly encompassing entries such as "Calvin," "Experience," and "in" Buddhism, Islam, 
and Judaism. On the whole, faith seems to be a term, if not a topic, which is more regularly 
invoked than belief in encyclopedia articles. One must conclude that belief was of sufficiently 
minor importance, from any angle, to religion as it was conceived by the scholars who organized 
and wrote for this definitive work in the field of history of religions and, one can conclude, 
religious studies in general. 
The "Hastings" Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, which predates the Encyclopedia of 
Religion by some 80 years, includes an extensive and informative article on the topic, while The 
HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion, edited by Jonathan Z. Smith and published about half-way 
between the first and second editions of Eliade' s encyclopedia, also addresses the topic in a entry 
of a comparatively good length. (Hastings 1908-26, reprint 1955; Smith 1995: 107-110) Critical 
Term for the Study of Religion decided it was important, including a provocative chapter on the ' 
term b the Buddhologist, Donald S. Lopez. (Taylor 1998) Yet the Guide to the Study of 
Religion, which came out a few years after Critical Terms with a fuller list of topics, also chose 
to avoid this particular aspect of the popular imagination about religion. (Braun and McCutcheon , 
2000). 
One might also be confused as to the place of the term in anthropology. While any 
number of studies from E. B. Tylor through Emile Durkheim, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Rodney 
eedham, Clifford Geertz, and Talal Asad have specifically addressed the nature of "belief' and 
its place in understanding religion, it can be well represented in a popular anthology on the 
anthropology of religion, but not indexed at all in a reputable general introduction to the subject. 
( ee Lambek 2002; Morris 1987) Still anthropology has a clear record of explicit discussion of 
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the descriptive adequacies of the term belief , while history of religions cannot point to any 
except for the thoughtful work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. As founder of the comparative 
religions program at Harvard Divinity School, he never saw himself , nor was he seen, as a 
member of the so-called phenomenological school of study that generated the encyclopedia. (W. 
C. Smith 1977, 1979) Yet critiques of the theological tendencies in all these non-theological 
attempts at the study of religion rarely made such fine distinctions and Smith might have been a 
logical choice to contribute to the encyclopedia on the topic of belief. (Wiebe 1979) 
The reasons behind decisions to include or exclude a topic in any particular taxonomy of 
religion , as opposed to the empirical sciences , may be nearly impossible to discern reliably. 
Jonathan Z. Smith ' s attention to issues of classification and taxonomy with regard to religion as 
well as botany and the logic of classification in general is not merely a signal contribution to the 
self~awareness of the field, it is nearly legendary in his personal biography. His interest in the 
ordering of categories is the material of autobiographical reminisces of precocious predilections 
rooted in the earliest of childhood pursuits. (J.Z. Smith 2004: 19-25) It is not surprising , therefore , 
that he has articulated a clear rubric to distinguish the intent of a dictionary , handbook , and 
encyclopedia . While his account of each would make the topic of belief especially important to a 
dictionary , and perhaps less demanding of a handbook , it only makes the absence of belief from 
an encyclopedia more intriguing. For Smith, "an encyclopedia is essentially topical ," which 
means delineating something of all the resources and information needed to "explore a topic a a 
whole. " He cite Alexander Manuila ' s "useful" description of an encyclopedia as "a 
comprehensive compilation of information on concepts pertaining to some or all fields of 
knowledge. " (2004: 164) 
• 
• 
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The absence of belief from Mircea Eliade ' s encyclopedic project must be a result , direct 
or indirect , of an editorial perspective imposed on the enormously amorphous subject of religion. 
In his preface to the first edition , Eliade naturally laid out the goals of the encyclopedia , 
"conceived as a system of articles on important ideas , beliefs , rituals , myths , symbols , and 
persons that have played a role in the universal history of religions from Paleolithic times to the 
present day. " (Eliade 1986, vol. 1, xi) His explicit schema for the encyclopedia involved both 
historical descriptions and articles ·expressing contemporary interest in the structure and 
morphology of the "universal sacred." Eliade emphasized myths , symbols and , he notes , due to 
the spur provided by the modem desacralization of Western societies , the value of greater 
knowledge of primal religions. In the "Forward " added after his death , meant to supplement the 
Preface which had been merely drafted by Eliade , Joseph M. Kitagawa very systematically laid 
out further guiding principle of the encyclopedia project , explicitly comparing its focus to the 
earlier Hastings encyclopedia. In the various formulations given by these two editors , belief is 
barel mentioned. Rather the language used most often cites religious ideas , practices , and 
phenomena known to the human race , or the ideas , practices , and persons in the religious 
experience of humankind. In yet another formulation , Kitagawa invokes Joachim Wach ' s three 
expressions of religion , the theoretical ( doctrines , myths , and theologies) , the practical ( cults , 
sacraments , or meditations) , and the sociological (religious groups and ecclesiastical structures) . 
(Eliade 1986, 1 : xiii) Only when specifying the "raw " data of religion , doe Kitagawa , like 
Eliade , mention beliefs alongside "practices , feelings , moods , attitudes. " (1 :xiv) Clearly this 
encyclopedia was meant to highlight the interpretive categories of the study ofreligion rather 
than systematically cataloging the 'raw data " itself. If so, it might be seen less as an 
encyclopedia of religion than an encyclopedia of the study of religion , admittedly a fine splittin g 
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of hairs, but in keeping with the analyses the project has invited. (Smart 1988)2 Of course, J. Z . 
Smith's rubric defines an encyclopedia explicitly in terms of providing the resources that would 
serve as tools for the study of a subject. 
One aspect of the problem presented by this particular lacuna lies in the fact that the 
history of religions does not indulge in an overly esoteric set of interpretive terms as research 
tools. There are those introduced by Eliade, such as the sacred (arguably different from 
Durkheim's), the sacred center, and the cosmogonic myth. The neophyte, moreover, will surely 
work hard to pin down the meanings of hierophany, morphology and hermeneutics. Eliade's 
volume, Patterns in Comparative Religion, identifies sky gods, solar cults, vegetation symbols 
such as the tree of knowledge , ritual orgies, and myths of renewal -- altogether a more compact 
and unoriginal litany than that first developed proposed by his 18th and 19th century predecessors. 
(Eliade 1963) It is not difficult to understand that belief might not be deemed an acceptable 
"interpretive" category, yet its position as "datum" is exactly what concerned anthropologists like 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard , Rodney eedham, Martin Southwald, Richard Shweder , and Malcolm 
Ruel , who provide the fullest discussions. Overall , it is unsettling that history of religions as a 
field has failed to have any discussions of the term. Although it is ignored in all formal senses, 
the field makes nearly constant reference to the idea of belief in nearly every publication. 
Aside from its questionable place in the history of religions, belief appears to be / 
identified and defined in very different ways by such disciplines such as philosophy , 
anthropology , and cognitive theory. Perhaps for reasons endemic to all of their discussions , it has 
become something of a habit to refer to it as "the problem of belief." More than a few scholars 
go so far as to identify belief as the problem of their respective fields. (E.g., Shweder 1989; 
Viswanathan 1998: xvii) It certainly is a problem to attempt to define or analyze something as 
5 
• 
• 
• 
widely referred to as belief. Even the scope of such terms as "love ," "hope ," and "hate" would 
not present as great a challenge since they rarely slip so easily from the position of datum to 
analytic category. In general , few terms have spread themselves so freely across the lexicon of 
European languages as belief , through its Latin derivations from credo or fides , its Greek form, 
pistis , or even the Hebrew heemin (root 'mn). (Ruel 2002:101) Its uses are legion -- and 
bewildering. One can use the term in reference to a god of biblical qualities or one's confidence 
in a particular television weathercaster. That old master of the English language , W. C. Fields , 
may have caught the crux of the dilemma with a characteristic pronouncement: "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I' 11 have another drink." 
As for scholarly analysis of its use, the most significant literature easily stretches from 
David Hume (some argue for Fontenelle) to Donald Davidson , and from W. C. Smith to Slavoj 
Zizek. (Hume 1992 [1777] ; Davidson 1984; W. C. Smith 1977; Zizek 2001) Useful studie 
include the work of Paul Veyne on the historical imagination , Paul Connerton and Danielle 
Hervieu-Leger on cultural memory , Pierre Bourdieu on practical logic , and Michel de Certeau on 
psycho-social interpretations (Veyne 1988; Connerton 1989; Hervieu-Leger 2000; Bourdieu 
1980; de Certeau 1984, 1985) Among the anthropologists noted above , eedham , Southwald , 
and Ruel have been the most explicit and contentious in a long interpretive , and re-interpretive , 
discussion launched by Durkheim. He classified all religious phenomena into "two basic 
categories: beliefs and rites ," defining religious beliefs as the essential element of religion , the 
"representations that express the nature of sacred things " (Durkheim 1969 [1912]: 51, 62). The 
theological tradition is even more extensive , of course , stretching from Tertullian to Tillich , 
Irenaeus to Ralmer, with pertinent commentaries along the way by Alisdair MacIntyre , W. C. 
mith , and Peter Berger , to name a few. (MacIntyre 1957; Berger 1967) Many have insisted that 
6 
• 
• 
• 
Christian categories of belief are so endemic to Euro-American culture that they inevitably 
insinuate themselves into any study of religion, making the "beliefs" of other traditions a 
common but misleading expression. More than 20 years ago, Needham and Southwald took up 
contrasting positions on the ethnographic situation, while Paul Veyne went off in another 
direction completely to discuss the complexities of any history of beliefs among the ancient 
Greeks. (Needham 1972; Southwald 1979, 1983; Veyne 1988) Shweder identified the issue of 
belief as the "fault-line" in the field of anthropology, while in an extended argument against the 
usefulness of the term, Ruel cited W. C. Smith on the Christian presumptions in the term. (Ruel 
2002) These conversations continue, most recently with Donald S. Lopez casting belief as yet 
another example of Christian colonialism in the guise of ultimately obfuscating scholarship. 
(Lopez 1998) At the same time however, belief is the recipient of unqualified attention in new 
work being done in cognitive psychology and bio-evolutionary theory. (Boyer 2000; Barrett 
2004~ Atran 2002) All of these sources of input allow one to conclude that belief is clearly an 
issue in human reasoning and communication, cognition and memory psychological orientation 
and social conditioning, theological reflection, as well as modem analyses of secularism and 
even human evolution. If so central to the work of other fields, the is not unlikely that history of 
religions' lack of theoretical interest lies precisely in our routine reliance on its nebulous status 
as some sort of raw data or biased theoretical tool. 
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the complexity of its presence and absence in 
academic discourse, belief is all over the popular press, which relentlessly simplifies it into 
oppositions such as belief and reason. The popular press is particularly ready to expose the 
problems posed by belief and believers. Several years ago I noted such studies on the silliness of 
religious beliefs as Wendy Kaminer' s Sleeping with Terrestrial : the Rise of Irrationalism and 
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the Perils of Piety and Michael Shermer ' s Why People Believe Weird Things. (Kaminer 1999; 
Shermer 1997; Bell 2002) Since then, reactions to the terrorism of 9/11 in America have come 
into print , soon joined by equally intense reactions to the decision by the state of Kansas school 
board to introduce "intelligent design" along side evolution in the state's science curriculum. 
(See Talbot 2005) Although this decision was successfully challenged in court, and half of the 
school board was subsequently voted out of office , the specter of religion creeping into science 
classes continues to provide grist for the mills of scholarly indignation. Among popular works , 
am Harris has published two that attempt to preach rationalism to the unconverted religious , 
The End of Faith and Letter to a Christian Nation ; but their influence is dwarfed by the similar 
efforts of the specialists , Breaking the Spell by the philosopher of science Daniel Dennett and the 
God Delusion by the well-known Oxford scientist , Richard Dawkins. (Harris 2004, 2006 ; 
Dennett 2006; Dawkins 2006) All extol the value of rationality in a world dangerously misled by 
religious irrationalism. 
These opinions constitute the latest chapter in Western culture ' s perpetual polarization of 
belief and reason , faith and rationality , religion and science. The Enlightenment articulated the 
issue most clearly, of course , in a variety of formal documents and social reorganizations , 
articulating the poles of this dialectic. Yet we are still seeing our culture in terms of faith versu 
reason even though we often seem to live in a very post-Enlightenment world. The 
Enlightenment paradi gm now encodes a wide variety of American ideological if not material 
interests , specifically involving biblical religion versus Darwinian science. Scientists , 
theologians , and hack writers all contribute to a fray that politicians have been very willing to 
exploit. All start from the same stark duality in which science is the natural opposite of religion , 
each pole alert to restrain the power wielded by the other. Only a savvy journalist or two has 
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suggested in passing the degree to which this simplistic view of religion and science is a play of 
shadow puppets manipulated by interest groups on a political playing field. In the end, the 
paradigm of reason versus belief remains deeply ingrained in the discourse of modem culture 
even though it may not be a very good depiction of the actual conditions of modem culture. 
In the academic discipline of philosophy, quite beyond the machinations of the popular 
press , the qualities of belief are not opposed to reason and simplified Enlightenment dichotomies 
have been left behind , although not forgotten. The views of thinkers from Hume to Wittgenstein 
are often surveyed at this point to illustrate a lively philosophical tradition , continued by such 
late 20th century figures as Stuart Hampshire , Gilbert Harman, and Richard Rorty , with Rorty 
evoking the lineage of American pragmatism from William James through John Dewey. In an 
earlier publication I focused at some length on the American philosopher Donald Davidson in 
order to understand better the "problem of belief ' as it figures in current philosophical analyses . 
(Bell 2002) In striking contrast to the popular perspective , his philosophy generally thinks of 
belief as a universal quality , playing an integral role in a basic holism (not a division) interlacing 
thought and action in general. Davidson argues that a level of broad agreement is the condition 
for any linguistic understanding of each other. (Note Godlove , 2002: 10) Asserting that "belief is 
central to all kinds of thought ," he explains that belief is what allows us to take for granted 
general perceptions of the material world that are basic to the formation of thoughts , spoken 
statements , and the conditions needed to understand each other. Belief and meaningfulness are 
dependent on each other and have a formal role in the act of interpretation. More specifically , 
Davidson argues that we have to believe that the statements someone makes are or can be true , 
even if we conclude he or she is lying , mistaken , or crazy. Thus we must infer belief to grant the , 
meanin g needed to make the most basic act of interpreting each other. (Davidson 1984: 156) . 
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This is enough to illustrate the contrast philosophy presents to the popular view opposing belief 
with the meaningfulness of reason; instead of making belief the weak of half of this type of 
dualism , a philosopher like Davidson locates the problem of belief in the universal act of person-
to-person interpretation. 
In the closely intertwined disciplines of anthropology , sociology , psychology and 
cognitive theory , the problem of belief also concerns the degree of holism that is understood as 
basic to social understanding. Yet these fields would not use Davidson's terminology, so 
comparing their views of belief is a more delicate project. It is fair to conclude , however , that for 
most scholars of culture , belief involves the problem of universalism versus particularism , that is, 
on the one hand, what can we assume to be common to all people simply by virtue of our shared 
evolution , history , or simply the human condition ; on the other hand , what should be considered 
culturally particular to a social practice even if subject to forces of diffusion that can push 
practice beyond an original point of germination. Universality may mean common to all social 
life or simply mentally accessible to all. In the latter case, because one is familiar with b lief in 
the God of the Abrahamic religions, one may feel, rightly or wrongly , that one has some mental 
access to how ancient Greeks believed in their pantheon of gods. 
Particularism suggests that we have no such access to the experiences of another religion 
and, indeed can only make sense of what is so foreign by attempting to reconstruct , more or less 
accurately , a ystem of ideas in which specific pieces can be illuminated. By the time any 
universal or particularlist project is underway , it is probably rife with assumptions and precarious 
leaps of logic. Yet, at the same time , it is easy to see a measure of common sense to both 
positions - that we can understand something about other human experiences and we should not 
assume that we can understand any thing about them . 
• 
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As I have noted elsewhere, Shweder conducted an exemplary project to attempt a 
reasonable synthesis to the opposition of universalism and particularism. He clarified all the 
different versions of the arguments for both sides and then developed a resolution, self-
consciously postmodernist in its idealism, in which he argued that opposites need not be opposed! 
Shweder maintained that the discipline of anthropology was itself the product of a collision 
between our notions of universality and particularity, which, like continental plates, created a 
"fault-line" easily illustrated by any number of vexing scenarios that routinely come up for the 
anthropologist. Indeed, he suggested, should anyone truly resolve such scenarios, anthropology 
as we know it would probably not be needed any more; the whole field would collapse. A typical 
"vexing" scenario is what he calls the "witch question" -- which in fact is not that removed from 
the possible experiences of a normal citizen in a multi-cultural society. Accord to Shweder, the 
witch scenario unfolds when your informant, the person on whose judgment you have so greatly 
relied , takes you aside to admit to being a witch, a confidence that might possibly involve some 
personal danger to the one making it. You come from a tradition that does not believe in witche , 
so how do you accept the statement by your informant -- as true or not true? Do you believe it or 
not? (Shweder 1989: 109-110; Bell 2002: 106-07). 
With the argument that the interpretation of beliefs is the central anthropological question 
and the distinctive fault-line of the discipline, Shweder's answer is two-fold: unquestionably , the 
person is a witch (in this way he recognizes the culturally relative and particular), but as the 
anthropologist who must reconstruct the system of ideas that "makes sense" of this belief, he 
claims a type of "transcendence" of the particular and the relative (thereby recognizing the 
universal in some form). Shweder hastens to add that this sense of transcendence must not be 
accompanied by any ense of superiority, since one culture is simply using its categories to 
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interpret another, an operation no doubt being performed by the informant as well. Instead, he 
wants to establish a position of relative "transcendence without superiority" with regard to the 
"realities" that another culture presents to one's own categories.(Shweder 1989: 133) I think that 
Shweder has, in fact, described one of the ways we negotiate the fault-line, not how we might 
resolve it. Anthropology may be safe for another day. While less developed than Shweder's, 
Talal Asad also attempts an anthropology of non-universal, fully particular assumptions and · 
categories, as does Jonathan Z. Smith in several analyses, most notably "Religion, Religions, 
Religious," and "Manna, Mana Everywhere and /u/ u /u" (Asad 1993; J. Z. Smith 1998, 2002) 
In contrast to the parsing of the problem of belief in anthropology, the term presents few 
concerns for cognitive theory, a field that is currently the locus of much excited debate by 
scholars of all types. Composed of psychologists, neurologists, evolutionary biologists and all 
the subfields in between, cognitive theory gives a great deal of attention to why and how people 
believe. One recent title makes this explicit: "Why Would Anyone Believe in God?" (Barrett 
2004) The most general "short" answer identifies believing as a cognitive process selected for its 
adaptive value in the evolutionary task of human beings surviving in stable groups. This makes 
believing part of what created thinkin q' ociable humans, although some cognitive theorists are ' 
quick to point out that it is a vestige of evolution that ill equips us for modern life. Despite its 
focus on the etiology of belief, cognitive theory simply defines it as positing the existence of 
{ what 'counter-intuitive agencies." (Boyer 2001) So, while philosophers regard religious 
believing as just one instance of the larger cognitive phenomenon of belief, the former is the 
main focus of cognitive theory. Most cognitivists are unabashedly "scientific, " intent on 
explaining why the irrational beliefs of religion came into existence and remain long past their 
more obvious adaptive uses . 
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For those in the fields of neurology, the neurophysiology of cognition, or evolutionary 
biology, interest in religion is tied to new research tools like magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
as well as the sheer synergy of these fields coming together around new maps of the brain and 
paradigms of consciousness and neural processing. Their apparent lack of hermeneutical interest 
in the challenges posed by language is in keeping with the style of science generally, but can 
make their work very alien to humanists. When they locate "the problem of belief," they solve it, 
that is, they explain what is going on. Even when their explanations can only be speculative at 
best, the cognitive theorist sounds very reductionist to scholars concerned to interpret (verstehen) 
rather than explain ( eklaren ). Some of these theorists are not blind to the dilemmas of social 
science or even the humanities, but they are unusual "cross-over" figures. (See Atran 2002; 
Pyysiainen 2004; and Turner 2002). 
/ 
The late anthropologist, Roy Rappaport, used cognitive theory, among other methods, to 
develop a speculative but insightful account of the nature of belief. He assumed its biological 
evolution and focused on the dynamics of its social enactment, through which an experience and 
concept of "the sacred" was generated among human beings, functioning in tum to mold them as 
human beings. This social process involved -- as Vico, Comte, and Hume all suggested -- an 
experience of power and an act of submission to the idea of a higher authority. Rappaport 
playfully described the concept of power in this way: "The unfalsifiable supported by the 
undeniable yields the unquestionable, which transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the 
conventional into the correct, the necessary, and the natural." (Rappaport 1999: 405) The process 
of deferring the quality of unquestionableness to the unknown comes to constitute sanctity itself. 
As a form of absolute authority, the sacred makes possible "the foundation upon which the 
human way of life stands." For Rappaport, belief in sanctity enables humanity to evolve social 
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community, intellectual reflexivity, and the experience of transcendence itself. (Rappaport 1999: 
293-97, 395-405) 
The idea that religion may be a selected adaptive feature in human evolution is far from 
new; in some form it goes back to the oldest pre-Darwinian notions of social evolution evinced 
in 18th century writers. Even mid-twentieth century phenomenological theorists of religion, like 
Eliade, who regarded religion as sui generis or non-reducible to other forces, could speculate 
about the evolutionary origins of religion before confining discussion to the "phenomenon" at 
hand, the origins of which should not matter. Yet the phenomenology of religion approach, now 
known as history of religions, has been significantly lax in comparison to its disciplinary 
neighbors in pursuing belief beyond old questions of its origin. Perhaps the more need in the last 
decades to distinguish itself from theology on the one hand and anthropology on the other might 
explain this odd lacuna in centuries of analysis. Perhaps the absence of belief as a discrete entry 
in the Encyclopedia of Religion contributes to the very definition of the borders of the 
phenomenological study of religion. onetheless, with an exception here and there, colleagues in 
the history of religions, when compared to philosophers, anthropologists and even cognitive 
theorists, have not seen any "problem" with belief. In fact, we may need to be prodded to see 
belief at all. 
In 1972 Rodney Needham noted the expedient ease with which many ethnographers 
blithely claimed that such and such people believe in this or that god and gods, comfortable with 
the assumption that the English verb "to believe" captures the particular religious sensibilities of 
a very different people. Of course, as the Shweder discussion made clear, a universal assumption 
about the know-ability of other peoples and cultures has been basic to anthropology. Yet in 
contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham pointed out the close attention to local 
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terms first used by Evans-Pritchard in his study of the Nuer and their theology. Needham himself 
examined the indigenous terms for anything comparable to belief among the Navaho, Hinduism, 
the dialects of the Philippines, and the Penan of Borneo, an exercise that evinced "the 
bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently translated by the English 
'believe'." (Needham 1972: 32-37) 
Most recently, the Bu cdhol ist Donald Lopez analyzed the term belief for its usefulness 
( (;\ft \; { ~~,~ 
in the study ofreligion, challenging the basic assumption of universality. For Lopez, our notion 
of belief as something common to all religions is part of our blindness to difference and our 
willingness to convert the world to one way of thinking. He argues that what we intend by belief 
has a clear historical locus in the matrix of meanings forged by early Christianity and developed , 
in the course of Christian history as it sought to define its theological orthodoxy and institutional 
jurisdiction. (Lopez 1998) In fact, it was during the Inquisition, i t, that belief acquired its 
current distinctive gloss by which outward action is deemed an inadequate indication of the 
views one harbors deep within the heart. Only torture would reveal those sentiments. 
Lopez illustrates his point with the dramatic narrative of Peter of Verona, a 13th century 
preacher asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisition against the Gnostic heresy of the 
Cathars or Albigensians. This early Inquisition actually institutionalized testing a person for his 
or her true beliefs. But Lopez also notes that how deeply the Inquisition was involved in both the 
confiscation of property, which certainly added to the local zeal of the movement, and in the 
struggle between the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor for political control of a great deal of 
southern France. Peter of Verona, early Inquisitor, eventually became a martyr to the cause: the 
story has it that as he was dying from a stab wound, he inscribed "credo," the beginning of the 
orthodox creed of beliefs, on the ground in his own blood. The credo, of course, points back to 
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the long historical importance of oral and public assertion of creeds that arose in the context of 
disputing heresies. However , summing up a great deal of history in this o 
sketch of Peter the Inquisitor and martyr , Lopez concludes that Christianity came o distinguish 
belief not by what a person said publicly , but by "the invisible content of the mind." (Lopez 
1998: 26-27) Since the means for identifying believers from non-believers would give great 
power to the one deciding who had what in their hearts , Lopez also concludes that the idea of 
belief "is neither natural nor universal. It might be described as an ideology , an idea that arises 
from a specific set of material interests. " (Lopez 1998: 28) 
Using a second example , Lopez describes the 1881 Buddhist Catechism with which 
Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Buddhism into the modem world . In 
Olcott ' understanding , Buddhism was a religion and, therefore , a system of beliefs. So he was 
shocked by how poorly the pious monks of Sri Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs 
that early translations had made so familiar to Olcott. He was especially concerned that ill-
prepared Buddhists would not be able to hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries 
who were destroying the indigenous culture. Pointing to Olcott ' s "ideology of belief ," Lopez 
suggests that his assumptions about the universal nature of religion were rooted in Christian 
history and doomed , inadvertently , to obfuscate a true understanding of Buddhism. (Lopez 1998: 
29-33) 
Lopez ' s argument for the cultural particularism of belief is welcome for taking up the 
topic of belief at all, even if his conclusions banish the term for reasons provided by a 
postcolonial perspective. Yet it is not obvious that his analysis actually manages to remove 
Christian assumptions , and agency , from the center of the historical record , rather than further 
crediting Christianity with a religious perspective it may simply have inherited , borrowed , or 
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• patched together. Nor does the subsequent history of Christianity in formerly colonized cultures deserve less study or respect for reasons of an historically explicit act of obfuscation. 
Unfortunately , it is also not clear that Lopez's provocative and exhilarating analysis will have 
much of an impact on the history of religions ' passivity toward the longstanding controversies 
surrounding belief , only a few of which Lopez is able to engage. After all, a fundamental 
assumption about the unity and transparency of believing as a phenomenon has supported the 
whole enterprise of comparative religions and most "world religions " textbooks . Obfuscating 
1 
'--- ideolog y with material interests may be too much of a challenge. Still , Lopez ' s argument about a 
"critical term" puts the right questions to the historical record and effectively challenges the 
history of religions as to the degree of universality we can continue to comfortably assume as 
well as the degree of particularity with which we may want to rewrite our master narratives. 
• 
• 
How the field deals with such a challenge could well predict its ability to survive in the twenty-
first century . 
17 
• 
• 
• 
WORKS CITED 
Asad , Talal. 1993. Genealogies of Religion. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Atran , Scott. 2002. In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Barrett , Justin L. 2004. Why Would Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. 
Bell, Catherine. 2002. '" The Chinese Believe in Spirits': Belief and Believing in the Study of 
Religion. " In Radical Interpretation in Religion. Ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University. Pp.100-116. 
Berger , Peter. 1967. The Sacred Canopy. Garden City: Doubleday. 
Bourdieu , Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Trans. Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Boyer , Pascal. 2001. Religion Explained : The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. ew 
York: Basic Books. 
Braun, Willi and Ru ell McCutcheon, eds. 2002. Guide to the Study of Religion . London: 
Cassell. 
Connerton , Paul. 1998. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Davidson , Donald. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon. 
de Certeau , Michael. 1984. "Believing and Making People Believe. " In The Practice of Everyday 
Life. Trans. Steven Rendall. Berkeley: University of California. Pp. 177-189. 
de Certeau , 1985. "What We Do When We Believe." In On Signs. Ed. Marshall Blonsky. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. Pp.192-202. 
Dennett , Daniel C. 2006 . Breaking the Spell : Religion as a atural Phenomenon. ew York : 
Viking . 
18 
• 
• 
• 
Durkheim , Emile. 1969. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Trans. Joseph Ward Swain . 
New York: Free Press [1912]. 
Eliade , Mircea. 1963. Patterns in Comparative Religion. Trans. Rosemary Sheed. New York: 
New American Library [1958]. 
Eliade , Mircea et al., eds. 1986. Encyclopedia of Religion , 16 vol. New York: Macmillan . 
Evans-Pritchard , E. E. 1965. Theories of Primitive Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Godlove , Terry F. 2002. "Saving Belief: On the New Naturalism in Religious Studies." In 
Radical Interpretation in Religion. Ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University. Pp. 10-24. 
Harris , am. 2004. End of Faith. New York: Norton. 
Harris , am. 2006. Letter to the American People. ew York: Random House. 
Hastings ,. James et aL eds. 1951. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics 13 vols. Edinburgh ; 
reprint: ew York: Charles Scribner ' s Sons [1908-22]. 
Hervieu-Leger Danielle. 2000 [1993]. Religion a a Chain of Memory. Trans. Simon Lee. ew 
Brunswick , J: Rutgers University Press. 
Hume , David. 1992. Writings on Religion. Ed. Anthony Flew. LaSalle , Ill.: Open Court , 1992 
[1777]. 
Jones , Lindsay , ed. 2005. Encyclopedia of Religion , rev. ed., 15 vols. New York: Macmillan. 
Kaminer , Wendy. 1999. Sleeping with Terrestrials: the Rise of Irrationalism and the Perils of 
Piety. ew York: Pantheon. 
Lambek , Michael. 2002. A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lopez , Jr. , Donald . 1998. "Belief. " In Critical Terms for Religious Studies. Ed. Mark C. Taylor. 
Chicago: University of Chicago. Pp. 21-35 . 
19 
• 
• 
• 
MacIntyre , Alisdair. 1957. "The Logical Status of Belief." In Metaphysical Beliefs. With 
Stephen Toulmin and Ronald W. Hepburn. London: SCM Press. Pp. 167-211. 
Morris , Brian. 1987. Anthropological Studies of Religion: An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Needham , Rodney . 1972. Belief Language and Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Pyysiainen , Ilkka. 2004. Magic, Miracles and Religion. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. 
Rappaport , Roy A. 1999. Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ruel , Malcolm. 2002. "Christians as Believers. (Abridged) " In A Reader in the Anthropology of 
Religion. Ed. Michael Lambek. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers [ 1982]. Pp. 99-113. 
Shermer , Michael. 1997. Why People Believe Weird Things. ew York: W. H. Freeman. 
Shweder , Richard A. 1989. "Post-Nietzschian Anthropology: The Idea of Multiple Objective 
Worlds. " In Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Ed. Michael Krauz. Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press. Pp. 99-139. 
Smart , Ninian. 1988. "The Encyclopedia of Religion. " Religious Studies Review 14 (July): 193-
99. 
Smith, Jonathan Z. 2002. "Manna , Mana Everywhere and / u / u / u. " In Radical 
Interpretation in Religion. Ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Pp. 
188-212. Reprinted in Smith, Relating Religion , pp. 117-144. 
Smith, Jonathan Z. 1998. 'Religion , Religions , Religious. " In Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies. Ed. Mark C. Taylor. Chicago: University of Chicago. Pp. CHECK. Reprinted in Smith, 
Relating Religion, pp. 179-196 . 
20 
• 
• 
• 
Smith, Jonathan Z. 2004. Relating Religion: Essays in the Study of Religion. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Smith, Jonathan Z. Smith, ed., et al. 1995. The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion. San 
Francisco: HarperCo llins. 
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1977. Belief and History. Charlottesville, NC: University of Virginia 
Press. 
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1979. Faith and Belief Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Southwald, Martin. 1979. ''Religious Belief." Man (N.S.) , 14: 628-44 
Southwald, Martin. 1983. Buddhism in Life: The Anthropological Study of Religion and the 
Sinhalese Practice of Buddhism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Talbot , Margaret. 2005. "Darwin in the Dock: Intelligent Design Has Its Day," The New Yorker. 
December 5, 2005. Pp. 66-77 . 
Taylor , Mark C. 1998. Critical Terms for the Study of Religion. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Pres . 
Turner , Stephen P. 2002. Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social Theories after Cognitive Science . 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Veyne , Paul. 1988. Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths? Trans. Paula Wissing. Chicago: 
University of Chicago , [1983]. 
Viswanathan , Gauri. 1998. Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity , and Belief Princeton : 
Princeton University Press. 
Wiebe , Donald. 1979. "The Role of 'Belief' in the Study of Religion: A Response to W. C. 
mith." umen 26, fasc. 2: 234-49. Also see Wiebe , Donald. 1992. "On the Transformation of 
21 
• 
• 
• 
'Belief' and the Domestication of 'Faith' in the Academic Study of Religion." Method and 
Theory in the Study of Religion 4, nos. 1-2: 47-67. 
Zizek, Slavoj. 2001. On Belief London: Routledge . 
22 
• 
• 
• 
FOOTNOTES 
1 The author would like to thank Lindsay Jones for his generous assistance with part of this 
project , although the final argument reflects only the opinions of the author. 
2 Religious Studie 24, no. 11 (March 1988) featured seven review articles , while the Journal of 
Religion 70, no.3 (1990) was a special issue dedicated to review articles on the Encyclopedia. 
Also see Smart 1988 . 
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From note (17) In a more recent and distinctly new current within the field, the anthropologist Matthew 
Engelke reminds us that the path breaking anthropologists of the twentieth century, E.E. Evans-Pritchard and 
Victor Turner, who both spent years in the field participating in the elaborate ritual life of the uer and the 
Ndembu, respectively, each converted to Catholicism after a few restless years back in the halls of academe. 
Perhaps after years of close involvement in the highly structured ritual lives of these communities, and then the 
relative sterility of the rationalized modern technocratic state, Catholicism presented the closest answer to a 
ritual life with a similarly embracing complexity. (Matthew Engelke, The Problem of Belief: Evans-Pritchard 
and Victor Turner on 'the inner life"' Anthropology Today 18, no. 6 [December 2002]: 3-8) Engelke also 
wonders if the attempt to understand one religion can leave one in a better position to understand another; in 
this case, Evans-Pritchard's and Turner's understanding of the African religions they documented so well 
might have given them insight and empathy for a religion closer to home. Engelke seems to be innocently 
raising anew an issue that, in a version only slightly different, marked the birth pains of the degree-granting 
discipline of the non-theological study of religion, namely, does one have to be a member ofa religion to truly 
understand it. As just stated, the question implies that outsiders engaged in the formal, secular tudy of religion 
could not really understand Catholicism or uer or any other religion. Today it is easily granted that such a 
scholar would understand the religion differently, indeed, be engaged in answering very different questions 
than those of concern to practicing members of the religious community. Through the 1960s, however, this 
issue involved a lengthy and occasionally contentious process of differentiation as the study of religion carved 
out a place for itself alongside the other disciplines devoted to religion - theology, scripture, and ministerial 
studies, among others. ( ee J Z Smith article [in his folder]and in Relating Religion?) 
from text (19) Ewing describes how the circumstances of her dreams left her wobbling in her 
confidence as an objective ethnographer. To an extent not clear to herself, she became a type a 
believer and, therefore , an insider--someone who understood and was told more. i Yet going 
native can leave one unable to explain any of this insider information to one's professional 
community by virtue of vows of confidence, or simply the inability to convey the convincing 
insider experience. 
i Katherine P. Ewing, ''Dreams from a Saint: Anthropological Atheism and the Temptation to Believe," 
American Anthropologist 96, no. 3 ( eptember 1994): 571-583 . 
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Paradigms Behind ( and Before) the Modern Concept of Religion 
Abstract 
This essay identifies five paradigms, undoubtedly among many more, which are basic to 
understanding the historical emergence and uses of the generic idea of "religion" in the Christian 
cultures of Europe and America. The spread of this concept has been sufficiently thorough in 
recent centuries as to make religion appear to be a "social fact," to use Durkheim's phrase, rather 
than so many cultural expressions and different social practices. The supremacy of Euro-
American culture- and an academy still saturated with Christian ideas-has enjoined other 
cultures and forms of religiosity to conform to this idea of religion~ for these cultures 
contentment with the status quo can vie with the anxieties of influence, including 
"modernization." The key paradigms discussed are the following: Christianity as the prototype~ 
religion as the opposite of reason; the modem formulation of "worl d religions"; the cultural 
necessity ofreligion; and then critical analysis of the Western "construction" ofreligion. These 
paradigms demonstrate the limits on theoretical variety in the field, the difficulty in making real , 
changes in set ways of thinking, and productive foci for interdisciplinary methods of study . 
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Introduction: Paradigms and Religious Studies 
Some projections of current global political and economic forces suggest that religion 
could eclipse nationalism and ethnicity as the source of future friction and fighting. Samuel 
Huntington's much critiqued fear of a coming "clash" ofreligious civilizations may or may not 
prove correct in the end, but there is no question that here and now many local clashes as well as , 
pervasive global tensions are routinely iterated in terms of the different goals of religious cultural 
traditions-from the political speeches of George W. Bush to those of Omar Bin Laden. 1 Yet are 
the multiple social and cultural differences involved in these current clashes adequately, or 
usefully, described as religious? Even before Huntington, of course, ·scholars with historical or 
anthropological backgrounds invoked the notion of "religious cultures" in order to express both 
the power of religious socialization over time and space, as well as the vague inadequacy of the 
idea ofreligion itself in capturing the full scope of the social traditions and mores involved. 2 But 
historians should be wary of any fresh reification of religious identities. The clearest example of 
the many tissue layers that build up into some popular nominalization of a religious tradition can 
be found, I believe, in even a cursory exploration of the paradigms that have constructed the 
notion of religion itself. Such an examination makes clear the obvious, that "religion" is an 
historical term like all other terms and phenomena. That is, it emerged at some point in time with 
a set of uses and was pressed into much wider application when it became useful in naming 
something that previously did not exist or did not need a name. 
The analysis that follows is an initial and therefore somewhat idiosyncratic exercise to try 
to isolate both some key layers among the paradigms that have shaped our notion of religion, as 
well as the variety of explorations emanating from these paradigms that are shaping the field of 
religious studies. However, it must be said that I am not an historian and can show little respect 
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for disciplinary boundaries. In addition, I draw on far too much material to do so well in all cases . 
My goal, however, is some sense of the construction of an evolving term that remains very 
critical today, although with what one suspects must be constant changes of emphasis in the 
facets that unfold. My working premise that this historical process is not necessarily a logical or 
internally directed one may al low for a light touch in repeatedly shuffling through the cards of 
history, trying to catch a glimpse of a partial story line or simply consistency of discontinuities. 
In brief_ my storyline is to explore a handful of key paradigms that have been and still are 
basic to academic understandings of religion in a number of fields. I use the term "paradigm" 
here in its most neutral sense, as a basic tool for advancing knowledge as a social enterprise. 
Moreover, while using the general ethos and particular aspects that Thomas Kuhn's gave the 
term, I am not attempting to invoke any of his specific arguments ( at this time) or to open any 
interpretive fuss about his meanings. 3 Conventionally, we understand paradigms to be those 
overly convenient and under-theorized terms that create the theoretical scaffolding for all sorts of 
other ideas. Eventually, however, people can notice some of the assistance provided by the 
paradigm and even suspect it of having an ideological function. From this perspective, to call 
something a paradigm is already to recognize it as a type of "black box" or ·'knot " of ideas 
operative in our discourse and raises questions about why a paradigm may be so useful to a 
particular subject. I hope the irony of the situation is clear: paradigms are the building blocks for 
systems of knowledge until we are actually perceive the degree to which we assume their support. 
At that point we fear that the linked imagery of the paradigm may constrain thought as much as 
facilitate it. Its efficacy suddenly too apparent, we are bound to inquire why we found this way 
of seeing thing so constructive and whether we should rethink the model and possibly retire it-
ifwe can . 
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To explore paradigms such as those constitutive of the idea religion is like unpacking a 
set of Chinese boxes or Russian dolls , always another within the last one. It might also be 
compared to uncovering archeological strata that provide a picture of geological ages containing , 
perhaps , some of the detritus of human history , like the carbonation of ancient campfires or a 
fossilized set of footprints on an ancient lakeshore. It makes sense to imagine these paradigms as 
historical stages only if it is clearly understood that few facets are ever left behind. Even if the 
outermost cultural carapace of historical style is discarded , the associated ideas , both structured 
and structuring , can remain to hold most of a worldview in place. One easy example is seen in 
the field of Religious Studies today: it is a tent so large that there are all sorts of sub-
communities distinctl y rooted in marginal paradigms of religions still able to thrive in the darker 
corners , often with their own journals , websites , and membership lists. While we may challenge 
the integrity of the edifice , even work to knock down some big sections of it, there are basements 
and rafters of suppositions with annexes of linked structures , all of which hold a great deal of the 
original paradigm together no matter how fully we attack it. Paradigms are anything if not 
redundant. Yet I cannot think of any more serious focus of intellectual exploration in the field. 
Optimistically , tracing some of these boxes within boxes may suggest other major 
constructions and interpretations attending the way we study religion or simply how we talk 
about it. Most of the first part of this paper would be relatively uncontested by my colleagues , 
and some of my points are shortcuts through larger studies underway. Yet I will also try to 
suggest a style of inquiry consistent with the challenge of these paradigms , a challenge that may 
redress the current sense of limited choices and directions in the study of religion. Certainly, I 
can provide examples of the difficulties of trying to undo a paradigm. The smaller models I have 
explored at length include traditional views of the uniqueness of ritual action , the cosmological 
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medium of the text and, currently, our cultural beliefs about beliefs. On the surface the latter may 
seem like a robust, free-for-all economy of ideas, but tensions and increasing rigidity are the 
result, with little relation to traditional sources of authority or discernment. Hints of another 
paradigm lie in an attitude deeply ingrained within scholars in religious studies--or else we 
would be historians--namely, the assumption that religion is fundamentally good, embodying the 
noblest of human ideals and distilled wisdom, if not sacred history and commands, despite the 
obvious human lapses everywhere. Theoretically speaking, the field of religious studies has not 
really moved much beyond such starting assumptions. Even if we have trendier reference points, 
deeply ingrained paradigms are still used to explain us to ourselves, enabling us to invoke a 
common pool of ideas about religion with few attempts to pull aside the curtain. 
Boxes within Boxes 
Christianity as the Prototype 
It is necessary to choose a beginning, a first box, even though the choice may be 
ultimately arbitrary. So I will start with the enduring paradigm created with the solidification of 
Christianity as the prototype for religion in general. The ascendancy of Christianity in Europe-
gradually spread by missionaries, travelers, and a variety of military and cultural colonizers-
made it seem natural that Christianity be taken up in the European cultural milieu as the frame of 
reference for what religion is. As the prototype for religion, Christianity provided all the 
assumptions with which people began to address historically and geographically different 
religious cultures. In other words, as the prototype for the general category of "religion," an idea 
that needed to emerge itself, Christianity was the major tool used to encompass, understand, and 
dominate the multiplicity. Yet there is more to this prototype than any quick nod of 
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understanding. The long and varied history of Christianity that naturally continues into our time 
has been subject to processes of dissemination and appropriation ( or "inculturation," to use 
church language) that created in turn a great many Christianities throughout the world from the 
very beginning. Many have long been lost to history, others seriously understudied, an example 
of how scholarship can aid the often cruel processes by which the history of Christianity has 
appeared so much "neater" for 2000 years than it actually was-or is.4 
onetheless, even as practiced by reservation Sioux, Russian Orthodox, or the 
Independent Churches of South Africa, the fact that so many peoples regard themselves as 
Christian means that, aside from its political and numerical dominance, the Christian prototype 
for "religion in general" to believers, non-believers, and scholars is something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and not likely to change soon despite the tensions accruing in academic circles. 
Chinese and Japanese of the 16th through the 19th centuries would frequently reply to close 
questioning that they did not have any religion because what they did have seemed totally unlike 
the model presented by Christian missionaries. 5 Today these citizens might say they are Buddhi t 
or Confucian, atheistic or involved in one the many "new" religions that have developed in Asia 
in the last 50-100 years. 6 I had the opportunity to discuss the Christian prototype problem with a 
bright young religion scholar bearing a very current example of a globalized personal 
background-native Taiwanese, PhD from UCLA, seeking work in the USA, and an ordained 
minister in a fast-growing Buddhist Theravada sect known as Yi Fo Sheng. But he showed 
surprising little understanding or interest. Of course, he had no alternative terms or models he 
could use within the standard scholarly language that determines admittance into the academic 
community, a version of English he had to work harder than most to mast. However, further 
conversation revealed the a clue-that he had probably absorbed the whole Christian paradigm 
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through the sect's 19th century scholar-founder who explicitly strove to "modernize " Buddhism 
in so many ways that it became a distinct sect , better conforming to Western expectation . 7 
The globalization of Christianity is beginning to get sustained scholarly attention. 8 An 
African was not elected pope in Rome this past spring , but the possibility was talked about. More 
substantively , the Church of England is dealing with a growing number of African and Asian 
Anglican churches joining the list of those threatening to withdraw from the international 
communion over the ordination of an openly gay American minister (the igeria communion has 
recently announced its withdrawal). As more Christianities are explored , the prototype may well 
be challenged in at least two general ways , by us , secular scholars from outside the normal 
definition s of the fold , but also by ministers from within , who are making decisions about what 
Christianity will be in the future-or more specifically , what Anglicanism , Methodism , Roman 
Catholicism , and new independent forms indebted to only their only selective appropriation will 
be. 
In describing the historical rise of Christianity as prototype , one might rightly ask about 
Judaism and Islam , both notably active in European history during the later centuries establishing 
Christian dominance. Yet even these early challenges to the development of the Christian 
prototype were effectively muted as each was given an early and consistent niche in the 
dominant Christian cosmology: Judaism was quickly demoted to those "refuse-niks " who 
rejected the truth , misguided brothers due to the share textual base and common roots (which not 
save failed to save them from the persecution of pogroms, but was served as an historical warrant 
for them) ; while Islam , the barbarians at the gate , were the threat that defined the very physical 
and psychological borders of Christendom. The differences among these three were , in fact , a 
type of proof to Christians of the distinctive Christ story: the eventual appreciation of the 
• 
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monotheistic and textual inheritances in which all three participated were taken as further proof 
that the Christian model could contain and explain religion more widely. That all three 
participated in rather different monotheistic and textual inheritances took Christians until the 
twentieth century to work out. 
Religion as the Irrational 
The Enlightenment is responsible for many congruent cultural shifts, but for my narrow 
purposes, I will simply describe how it amended the previous idea of the Christian prototype 
8 
with the emergence of a fully developed concept and terminology for a more generic notion of 
"religion" in itself, namely, religion as the irrational. Up until the 16th century, as Sam Preus 
nicely demonstrates, there was only the haziest notion of a general category of religion. 9 And the , 
only judgments as to rationality or irrationality, influenced by the discovery of "The 
Philosopher," concerned Christianity in particular: Thomas Aquinas argues that certain Christian 
mysteries, though not all, could not be determined by the use of reason and thus were the result 
ofrevelation. 10 The work of a close contemporary, the putative author of The Travels of Marco 
Polo (1275-92), was bestseller was written and popularized during the ascendancy of 
Christianity in Europe, well before the stirrings of the Enlightenment. For Marco, there were 
only four categories by which to classify and understand all the peoples he met, most of whom 
existed outside the structure of clear-cut nation states: a person was a Christian, Jew, Moor 
(Saracen), or a pagan. 11 Polo's travel memoirs constantly refer to the stereotypes associated with 
each, and seldom was he surprised by any non-stereotypical behavior, except for those pagans, 
the Chinese, who astonished him with their good manners, deep learning, and clearly observed 
social order. 12 In fact, Marco is kindest toward all pagans, noting many humanitarian aspects of 
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their teaching and lives; he is brief on the Jews and unremittingly harsh on the Muslims-due in 
part, suggests Robert Latham, who introduces the Penguin Classic, to the trade rivalry they 
presented to the bold new hopes of Europeans. 13 
9 
The Enlightenment's separation of church and state, on top of Europe's growing 
knowledge about and interaction with other religious cultures ( e.g., Jesuits writing home with 
their version of a rationalized Confucianism) aided the standardization of a common term in 
popular parlance. Even though Christianity structured understanding of the notion of religion 
after itself, the term recognized, with excitement, that there were totally non-Christian religions 
out there. Of course, these foreign encounters led to debates in which the positive properties 
ascribed to the newly discovered religions, such as rational superiority or greater age in history, 
constantly alternated with evidence of their depravity. 14 The Jesuits are particularly interesting to 
read for their unrelenting interpretive efforts to find in Confucianism what they felt just had to be 
there, some ancient evidence of the disclosure of the existence of God the Father and later the 
Son. 15 Those who seized on such foreign examples to demonstrate the possibility of a rational 
religion (morality without metaphysics!), most famously Leibniz and Voltaire, were critiquing 
the Christian churches and working toward the separation of church and state. They and their 
predecessors were also attempting to maintain a natural option between the scientific realism that 
was the context of their interest and traditional religious devotion ( and powerful churches) that 
formed an object of criticism; some sort of "religion" was widely regar_ded as the necessary 
source of morality, needed to hold the rabble to the norms of social order. The emergence of 
Deism, a rationalized Christianity so important for the founders of the independent American 
colonies, is testimony to the difficulty in spanning this divide between rational and institutional 
piety, given the sheer amount of traditional Christianity that Deism had to jettison. It may be that 
• 
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Deism was the closest a Euro-American could come to atheism, an idea that was literally hard to 
think until Darwin's theory of evolution provided another way of thinking , at the very least, 
about how it all began. 1. 6 
As the empirical sciences developed sufficient social capital to tum their gaze on human 
history and social life, the paradigm of the rational in contrast to the irrational became an 
ideological tool with many uses. ot least, the objectification of religion in tandem with the 
expanding delineation of science created the environment for the earliest study of religion as 
religion. In a practice sense, religion became what science was not. The power of this dual 
objectification of religion and science eventually meant that as the irrational , religion was a 
natural object of study for the ··sciences of man," as developed by Hume , Vico and Tyler among ' 
others. Indeed , the interplay of the rational and irrational in definitions of the early sciences of 
religion led to some of the forms of comparative religion still practiced today- one particular line 
of scholars being comprised of the well-known figures of Max Muller , Sir James Frazer , and 
Mircea Eliade, among others- began to search for universals within the family of human 
religions, plural but clearly an ultimately singular entity of a profound sort-the sacred. 
The effort to identify universal patterns among the world ' s religions had the potential to 
displace Christianity as the prototypical religion for comparative purposes, substituting as UR 
religion. This project was continually floated , certainly in Muller , but the UR categories were 
never convincingly foreign or unexpected. Most of the universalists do not seem to have 
imagined putting Christianity aside because they thought they already had. Instead of working on 
insuring that project , they tended to be lured by other visions, such as taxonomy of gods that 
would prove a particular theory of development , an inventory of all the wisdom of the world , or 
• 
• 
• 
11 
even the disclosure of that "sacred" underlying the particular forms of human religi us 
expenence. 
While not threatening the Christian prototype, the era that developed "irrational religion" 
did in fact introduce the means for a rudimentary egalitarianism and relativism when viewing the 
diversity of religions. If one group was alert to the unenlightened primitive still within 
Christianity, the other looked for the Christian mysteries hidden in the historical experience of 
the pagans; the quest to grasp the universals of religion was nothing less than the key to a 
timeless, if vaguely familiar, sacrality expressed in all religious manifestations, making religion 
of this vein the most fully shared forms of human insight. Scholars today, notably the recently 
deceased but much quoted Roy Rappaport, will still echo with confidence the idea that 
uncovering the dynamics of this sacrality would explain the emergence of human-ness itself; 
although for Frazer and Eliade there were always hints that "the sacred" might be more 
ontological than phenomenological, while for Rappaport it is clearly an evolutionary 
development. 17 
Within the paradigm of the Christian prototype, the foregoing search for universals 
behind the irrational wisdom of religion, scholars such as Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) and his 
student Ernest Troeltsh ( 1865-1935), who followed romantic Hegelianism, argued like many 
before them that Christianity was the fulfillment of history, although Troeltsh later modified his 
position: only in Western culture was Christianity truly "'absolute." 18 Likewise, in the 20th 
century, beginning to" devise a phenomenological approach to religion, Eliade could still suggest 
early in his career that in Christianity one found the most logical and fulfilling development of 
the symbolism of the divine ex pres ed in all preceding religions. 19 Christianity as the perfection 
• 
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of the prototype found new ways to triumph even within the innovative context of religion as the 
irrational subject of rational scholars. 
World Religions 
The world religions paradigm has been so extraordinarily popular that it is certainly the 
way most Americans at least have come to see religion and religious multiplicity. Its popularity 
rests on many factors, primarily promotion by the discipline in order to solve so many problems 
of emphasis, logic, and cultural-centrism, when multiple religions are introduced. Even today it 
is still considered indispen able by too teachers in need of pedagogical tools for introducing 
students to a great deal of material in a manner that minimizes traditional suspicions and 
prejudices. Setting up a limited array of world religions-usually five through eight - can make 
the strange less strange; it can also invite effective questions about ideas and structures, the real 
fruits of comparison in any field. 
Yet the paradigm always involves one major problem that readily generates resistance by 
some of the included traditions, namely, the "leveling" implied in making one's religion just 
another in a group of comparable items. While many traditions today, and historically, are 
comfortable with this approach, some are not. Traditional Catholics, conservative Evangelical , 
and conservative Sunni Muslims would certainly hesitate to include this formula in their own 
school curricula; and some resent it completely - usually because of exclusivist claims. Yet 
another more theoretical problem could also be part of their resistance: such formulations make 
each religion fit a gross simplification of the prototype in very neatly explicit ways just in order 
to display the fact that religions are so similar in their basics, that no one of them can dominate 
or act as a prototype. The aura of comparable qualities is, of course, historically and theological 
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misleading for each religion. Finally , what does a list of eight world religions say about the other 
religions not included? That they are simply not large enough in the world? That they are 
confined to national entities and thus do hold the promise of generating a trans-national 
community? Or, that they do not fit the model/prototype used and so many not even technically ' 
qualify as religions after all? 
These problems were painfully brought home to me , in an unexpected way , when the 
theologian and dedicated spokesperson for a "global ethic ," Hans Kung , came to speak at a 
conference on campus , bringing with him his "World Religions - Universal Peace-Global 
Ethic " exhibition , a series of large handsome panels. 20 Each panel identified an explicitly world 
religion , provided a distinctive symbol , posted a recognizable photograph of one of its holy 
places , and then simply listed a series of basic facts such as the founder (or rough equivalent) , 
the main ideas or creeds , and ritual obligations. The overall effect is to demonstrate a 
fundamental unity in the natural tructure of these religions and , more specifically, a con ensu 
on the message of peace that is Professor Kung ' s overriding concern at this point in his career. 
However , Kung ' s panels were drawn into a totally unrelated lecture series sponsored by the 
"Local Religion , Global Relationships '~ project of the Religious Studies Dept at Santa Clara , 
which studies the diversity of religious communities in Silicon Valley. The Project was having 
its first lecture series in which local religious leaders were invited to campus to speak for 
themselves about their communities and how they dealt with the pluralism of the valley. The 
opening reception , held prior to any of the lectures , was in the rotunda displaying Kung ' s World 
Religions panels. I was upset when I first heard about this collision of events , but then decided to 
make it usefuL no matter how difficult: I would ask the local religious leaders (partly using an 
assistant ) just how they felt about representation of their traditions by the panels and the leveling 
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they imposed. Their surprising answers all tended to be "no problem"; on the contrary. they were 
glad to be represented there at all. The fact that Christianity was only one panel among the six 
appeared to be a refreshing leveling to them and they found no significant fault with the 
information displayed. The "world religions" approach, according to the Native American Indian 
shaman who spoke last in the series, could easily be seen as a victory given the ubiquitous 
dominance of Christianity if one's religion was included. I know their views were more than 
mere politeness since a number of their formal presentations of their traditions could easily have ' 
been lifted from Huston Smith's ubiquitous pocket-size anthology, The Religions of Man. 21 
So the popular and over-worked pedagogical view differs from the scholar's eye-rolling 
sense of the inadequacy of the world religions approach. The latter group, however, has not done 
much to discuss the issue in print. In 1962 Wilfred Cantwell Smith raised the problem of the 
inherently poor fit provided by the term "religion" when applied to the pre-modern traditions of 
the East, a disrespect heightened by the West's willingness to invent names ( and jurisdictions) 
for these traditions that do not correspond well at all to how they identify themselves. 22 Jonathan 
Z. Smith has addressed the history and classification difficulties of the term "world religions," 
but the topic had to wait until 2005 for Tomoko Masuzawa's The Invention of World Religions 
for a full historical analysis of the European effects of the emergence of the paradigm. 23 
Masuzawa's book will draw attention to this paradigm, forcing more self-consciousness in using 
it. onetheless, the textbooks on World Religions continue every other month, undoubtedly 
further efforts in a long line that have tried to unseat Huston Smith's claim on the public and the 
junior college markets. In the wake of the Pluralism Project directed by Diane Eck, some are 
now making more use of the Web or CDs.24 some colleagues recently generated an introductory 
textbook, entitled Global Religions, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer. Unfortunately, the textbook 
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does not use the theme of globalization to introduce a critique of the world religions approach, 
which the book follows in a curtailed fashion. Rather it attempts to modify our traditional 
understanding of these religions as neatly associated with particular geographic locales. The 
chapters deftly complicate the histories with diasporas and transnational ways of living, some 
that have been endemic since the earliest days of a community. World religions, global religions: 
what's in a name, we might ask? It may be possible that this book can begin to crack open some 
of the tenets of the world religions paradigm; but it seems more probable, given the introduction 
and the marketing, which the globalization vocabulary will merely update and further secure the 
world religions paradigm for another generation. 25 
Cultural Necessity of Religion 
After the paradigms I have described as the Christian prototype, religion as irrational, and 
world religions, the fourth paradigm can seem unexpected, namely, the "cultural necessity of 
religion." With the emergence of anthropological studies, usually dated to E. B. Tylor (1832-
1917), the attempt to determine the origins of religion ( either prehistorically or as part of a total 
scheme for human history) gave way to analysis of religion's continuing role in social life. 26 In 
fact, the coexistence of (irrational) religious beliefs with scientific rationalism became a major 
question in its own right, one that further cemented the idea of "religion" as uniting all the major 
belief traditions from the most ancient or primitive known to revealed Christianity and all the 
other more or less respectable but, from the point of view of many an early European Protestant 
scholar, still redemption-deprived "faiths." Given the irrational religion paradigm continuing into 
an even more scientific age, these religions were put on the same page, so to speak, just as it 
came to be understood that all religion would probably fade under influence of empirical 
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knowledge. Yet the social sciences asked why people were continuing to believe in great 
numbers when they no longer needed to do so, thereby opening up many new perspectives. 
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Although the encounters forged by early anthropologists got started in painfully uneven 
ways, the results of which we continue to uncover to this day, their comparisons of "primitive" 
and "civilized" societies facilitated the realization of similarities in the practice of religion that 
began to answer questions about its continued role. Emile Durkheim hypothesized that religion 
was intrinsic to the construction of the social group; Franz Boas provided cultural evidence of 
many forms of shared humanity especially in craft and myth; while Sigmund Freud described the 
formation of the modern inner self as embodying the childlike primitive, laboring under the onus 
of civilization. Each of these path breakers found their own rational, post-Enlightenment cu_ltures 
to be built on fundamental-and socially crucial-irrationalities identifying a level of human 
experience shared with all manner of other populations. This diminishment of the distinctions 
that scholars saw among themselves, ancients, natives, and far-off exotics occurred in the age of 
Charles Darwin's Origin of/he Species (1859). If a new unity was introduced, it also brought a 
new disunity between "that old time religion" and the degrading theories of the over-
intellectualized classes. Although some were pleased that Darwin's theory vindicated the model 
of a single creation as suggested by the Bible instead of the racist theories of multiple creations 
used to support a natural ordering of human beings based on their color, it was a theory that 
otherwise appeared to divide as surely as the issues of the America Civil War that preceded its 
dissemination. 27 In Protestant America, Darwin brought science and Christianity to a fork in the 
road. 
As the first truly secular paradigm, the cultural necessity of religion generated a 
distinctive divide within the social sciences between those with theological sympathie or 
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affiliations in contrast to those who clearly foreswore any such loyalty to the non-scientific. 28 
Protestant anthropologists and sociologists had an easier time making their position clear than 
divinity school scholars, usually ordained clerics from an earlier stage of life who slowly 
gravitated to the social sciences; they were constantly accused of allowing the theological to 
degrade their analyses, although it was just as like the universalistic assumptions still so 
important to the social sciences in general as lingering theological ones. Yet scholars of religion 
in divinity schools who founded non-theological programs of studies, i.e., religionswissenschaft 
or history of religions, one of the major venues for the study of religion today, used the secular 
paradigm to create gray areas in which the social sciences and both church history and theology 
influenced each other, creating something that differed from either extreme. This would prove to 
be one angle among many from which the division between rational minds describing irrational 
cultures seemed less clear the more it was probed. Still, popular society was in love with the cold 
scientist, male or female, whom the movies obliged to fall in love with an irrational or 
maddeningly unconventional kook. Just as often the fatherly old scientist would embody both, 
rational to the point of being irrational, even savvy, in real life. By this time, life had imitated art 
as movie goers had become aware of the theories of the scientist of the age. Grandfatherly 
Einstein, father of atomic energy and critic of the bomb, genius of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, represented yet another "marriage" of the rational and irrational in the terms of the 
twentieth century. Of course, the horrific events of the century were killing off many a sacred 
cow owned by both science and religion. 
The model f religion as a universal, indispensable, and non-rational social creation 
would be used by R,Jigious Studies scholars for decades. Even the world religions paradigm was 
made to fit into it a well as support it. A category for the "other" primitive religions of 
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anthropological studies was already tacked on. The leveling equality of the "world religions" 
model, in addition to the social scientific "evidence" for religion as a significant marker for 
shared social qualities of humanity across all races and societies, certainly underscored the 
importance of religion in discussions of the "family of man." But these new humanisms came at 
some cost. Religion was a new socio-cultural bond among the peoples of the world and an 
expectation if not on-going necessity for social life only insofar as its irrationality was most 
pronounced. Indeed, the sciences and emerging social sciences found in religion all the 
irrationalities that they were intent to overcome. Aquinas's tendency to grant the co-existence of 
the rational and the irrational, greatly minimized in the struggles of the Reformation and the 
Counter-Reformation, was nonetheless reflected in many Enlightenment theorists; however, it 
given way to the dominance of science and the humanistic belief in its role in freeing human 
beings from various forms of enslavement (such as described by Durkheim, Freud, Marx, and 
pencer). This was the clearest language in which religion succumbs to history. All of these 
thinkers wondered how society would fare in this new mode, if it could survive at all, and many 
had inklings of pseudo-religions on the horizon--nationalism, industrialization, individualism, 
and free market capitalism, for example. The "cultural necessity of religion," which would 
signify for many the moderating effects of religious values on the moralities of secular 
humanism, in the end haphazardly reinforced fears of these other irrationalities, while backing 
off from pronouncements of the demise of the irrational. Certainly the events the twentieth 
century helped to kill off many sacred cows--secular, religious, rational, and irrational. 
Religion as a Western Construct 
• 
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The last paradigm in the present exercise is the current evocation that religion is a 
Western construct. The discourse of the postmodern critique, within which this paradigm was 
generated , emerged during the later half of the 20th century by developing a simple logic long 
operative within a number of fields. Boas ' s notion of culture alone contains all the sticky seeds 
needed to germinate this perplexed and perplexing perspective. For example , if all people are 
embedded within cultures and inevitably see other cultures through the lens of their own, then it 
stands to reason that scholars cannot see other cultures without the biases , both conscious and 
· unconscious , which their cultural lens inevitably confer on other people ' s reality. This insight 
enabled religion scholars to see and explore aspects of the Christian prototype at work shaping 
Religious Studies for the first time. For decades they had simply focused on accusations of the 
influence of Christian theology on their more historical and sociological efforts , and worked to 
expunge clearly theological tendencies. 29 Yet so many other avenues and dilemmas opened up in 
the last decades of the twentieth century that exploration of the prototypical role given to 
Christianity was not pursued with any sustained energy or direction. Rather , the field developed 
a stream of work particularly preoccupied with deconstructing the idea of religion as universal 
and sui generi , suppositions behind the comparative world religions paradigm as well as the 
earlier ones, of course . Yet the religion-as-irrational paradigm , built by a long line of "'natural " 
oppositions , was the first to begin to stumble. While pushed from many directions, feminist 
critical theory developed strong historical arguments and greater institutional influence. However, 
Edward Said ' s Orienta/i sm (1978) introduced another level of analysis , namely , the misreading 
(some linking colonization to the conferral of feminine and irrational qualities on the colonized ) 
that made scholarly analysis blissfully unaware of its role in maintaining the cultural biases that, 
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in turn, kept communities defenseless against the political encroachment of more powerful 
political entities with their equally powerful, and confident, sense of reality. 30 
Said's work stopped some professors in their tracks. More required a shift in the overall 
zeitgeist to understand the argument and its significance. Orienta/ism was soon complemented 
by a plethora of narrow and broad studies addressing the body, sexuality, notions of the soul, 
rationality, and the place of women, and even the church, in the rise of science-in other words, 
scholars of religion began read widely and together with other disciplines explored many of the 
assumptions that had helped to support the oldest paradigms for so long. Said also, if indirectly, 
provoked greater sensitivity to the assumptions of traditional academic research, such as the 
belief that there was no need to hear from those people, the "others" of their research, affected by 
the assumptions and ultimately the studies. As the past became less familiar territory to more 
than just historians, and other cultures were no longer so easily accessible to analysis, various 
critiques of the culture of science made even the bedrock of institutionalized rationality shift a 
bit.31 Some religionists tried to save the idea ofreligion as a universal by identifying it more fully' 
subsuming it within culture; but the concept of culture had its own deconstructive critiques to try 
to survive. This period is, of course, familiar ground to readers, but the way it has been 
weathered by scholars of religion is still being assessed; indeed, while the concepts that have 
fallen and hit the ground are fairly easy to notice, it is too soon to come to any conclusion about 
exactly what is left standing. Yet some disciplinary history is clear. 
An early and particularly humorous revelation of bias were the examples of Protestantism 
displayed in scholarly studies of 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly in regard to textual 
studies of ancient scriptural traditions whose modern manifestations were disdainfully dismissed 
as Catholic-like corruptions. Donald Lopez describes the story of the Pali text society's search 
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for the earliest, and purest, Buddhism with skill and verve; yet before him, Mary Douglas and 
later Jonathan Z Smith were struck by the clearly Protestant (and, therefore, anti-Catholic) bias 
they were finding in quite different scholarly materials. 32 Still, as noted above, the main target of 
the deconstructive imagination was the field itself, identified with one or two ideas, but never 
identified by the full set of paradigms I have done so here. Titles such as The Ideology of 
Religious Studies, Manufacturing Religion, and The Western Construction of Religion testify to a 
healthy round of critical studies that have made the field much more aware of its complex 
historiography. 33 However, the titles of these books bark louder than their arguments actually 
bite. The most extreme position, swallowed by many a religion writer with an audible gulp, was 
defined early on by Jonathan Z Smith when he wrote "Religion is solely the creation of the 
scholar's study." 34 While waived as a banner by later critical studies of flavors, Smith's assertion 
has not been clearly analyzed or challenged to date. One wonders, for example, what the 
vigorous section of the American population lobbying for religious causes would make of such a 
statement. Indeed, Smith's understanding of "religion" may even underestimate how quickly 
such a term, passing out of the scholar's window, is drawn upon in real encounters of all kinds in 
a variety of borderlands: travel writers composing texts of the distant and exotic; missionaries 
trying to explain their cultural communication problems to the "boards" back home who want 
news of converts~ as well as the many dictionary projects that began soon after first attempts by 
missionaries and anthropologists alike to engage indigenous communities in talk of their 
beliefs. 35 o matter how it was created, the idea of religion came to be was reified in line with 
the Christian prototype of a set of beliefs about God and quickly supplied a variety of needs 
incurred by the cultural diversity encountered, such as the need speak to them and of them in 
terms more complex than simply ·'the saved" and ·'the rest." 36 
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mith also underestimates the extensive influence of the term today. Many Muslims and 
Buddhists would currently be hard pressed to think of their "religions" without the categories 
that we might trace back to a Christian prototype and experiences of Euro-American intrusion. 
Indeed , defining cultural practices as religion ( or vice versa) has had the unexpected result in 
America of protecting them by putting them on an equalizing footing under the law with 
Christianity and other world religions. Ogallala Sioux or Inuit fishing communities will still talk 
about their cultural identity in other terms than religion such as a way of life that has come 
down to them from their ancestors and not just a set of beliefs; but then many of them were 
forced to convert to Christianity and the distinction between their religion and their culture is a 
solution to how to maintain the latter and acknowledge the realities of the former. 37 
In this way the postmodern critique of modernism facilitated numerous inquires into 
assumptions that formed the Christian prototype for religion in general , adding to more long-
standing questions about the comparative aspects of the "world religions " paradigm and 
providing the context for debates that have destabilized the notion of scientific truth determined 
the rational and irrational. The latter debates left both sides of the Enlightenment dichotomy of 
science and religion as historical constructions that do not always, and have not always , fit the 
circumstances with which scholars understood themselves to be dealing. Yet Said ' s 
demonstration of the construction of bodies of knowledge used by Wes tern powers for agendas 
that spoke to cultural progress and political domination on the one hand, and spoke for the 
colonized as their best hope for all the benefits of Western civilization on the other (salvation 
then , trade now?) , inevitably led to a reflexive habit: is Said ' s picture of the power of European 
discourse about the Orient , disorienting as it originally was , just a bit too empowering its 
description of effective agency? What continuities does this black box have with the others 
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identified above? Said's study is old enough that a developed critique of it has moved the 
conversation into more parsed realities that this essay has any business enumerating. Although 
the ruckus over globalization-for, against, reality, mirage, historically "old hat," etc.-it shows 
how difficult it will be to avoid meta-narratives in which the interests of a dominant culture are 
projected as reality, as the future, as the excellent outcome for all who cooperate--or the cause of ' 
unprecedented poverty and even environmental degradation. 
Even a short stretch of service in the scholarly professions today is sufficient to teach one 
that today's corrections (one would have written "truth" twenty-five years ago) are tomorrow's 
examples of short-sightedness. Compare the literature that began about twenty-years ago on the 
scholar's obligation with regard to cultural products of colonized and conquered peoples that are 
plundered to end up in museum collections or the black market that encourages more plunder. It 
was clear that a thoughtful person could not encourage the destructive vandalism of 
archeological sites by buying a truly old museum-quality pot from the Pueblo peoples of New 
Mexico. Yet in a recent essay, Kwame Anthony Appiah, reflecting on the "cultural patrimony" 
of his native Ghana, makes a much more nuanced if unexpected argument for the repatriation 
when goods are looted from people with known names and clear cultural links, but the validity of 
why ·'the British Museum's claim to be repository of the heritage not of Britain but of the 
world." That view strikes him as "exactly right," although Appiah would be more comfortable 
with their continued residence there if the treasures of a vanished civilization are indeed shared 
more widely. 38 Of course, the deadly details will be those arguments about whether a culture has 
truly vanished or continued in some form. 
It is not clear where the study of religion is going, as so many new books are quick to a , 
but the choices have always appeared limited. The field might define "religion" in a narrow 
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manner , reflecting either strict specifics of content or style of practice (belief in a supernatural 
being , which is quite true for all systems of religious-like practice) or historical criteria suiting its 
emergence in the Christian dominated world of late medieval Europe (related to being bound by 
vows in thirteenth century sources). Or it may suppose a universality that could never be proven , 
but posit an open "family of resemblances " with which to describe the commonalities. The field 
may abandon the term as an historical artifact and place analytic weight on "culture" or 
"tradition ," hoping they can do the job. As a fourth alternative , it might agree that the European 
roots of the notion of religion have been transcended by cultural contacts that have spread the 
concept and encouraged a rapidly varying set of nuances in how, why and when it is used. One 
reveals one ' s hand in making any such list , so I acknowledge that this conclusion project is part 
of a current project , although it suggests a project tracing some major main lines of transmission , 
translation and usage that are beyond my plans despite how exciting I find the idea . 
There is, however , yet another option and it is a real one facing the field , even if it is 
currently hard to make sense of. Generated by a diverse set of voices , almost all emanating from 
the sciences , sociology to neurology , there is fresh mobilization to cast "religion " as a universal , 
adaptive, cognitive property in the evolution of the history of the human race. With a seductive 
confidence in the certainty of their claims and frequently embarrassing naivete as to what has 
been said in a century of social scientific work , this broad line of theorizing has enough new 
science at its disposal to be more than a curious diversion , but much less than developed , 
paradigmatic view. Aside from a small group of rational choice theorists , represented by Rodne y 
Stark , the posthumous influence of the anthropologist Roy Rappaport ' s enormous study of ritual , 
and a few books by Ilkka Pyssiainen , who is said to have been trained in theology and 
comparative religion. there is a group of cognitive theorists who see themselves as indebted to 
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Pascal Boyer, and another group who see themselves as more broadly revising the social 
sciences , represented well if not solely by Stephen Turner. 39 
The rational choice and Boyer cognitive theorists are apt to claim "finally" to put the 
study of religion on a scientific footing , with each heralding a new naturalism or taking credit for ' 
a "new science" of religion (there have been so many!). These scholars intend to address religion 
in a more disciplined manner (than whom?) using the newer (really newer?) tools of economic or 
cognitive precision. Yet so far the confidence of both rational choice and cognitive theory has 
rested in great part on a total reluctance to address any definitions beyond the most self-
evident- and self-serving- ones. The referents for religion , capital , and piety , for example, are 
all clear-cut and unexamined - as is the method ' s location in any ideological paradigm. They 
distinguish themselves with small modifications of their definition of religion as belief in 
supernatural beings , Superhuman Agency , or Counter-Intuitiveness. The works of Daniel 
Dennett , David Wilson Sloan and Stephen Turner appear to engage in little of the ideological 
shadow boxing with traditional scholars of religion that mars the scholars who follow in the 
footsteps of Boyer. 40 With exceptions here and there , the more enthusiastic scientists tend to 
ignore previous classics in the study of religion , ready to start out fresh with what they do-
evolutionary biology or neurology , cognitive psychology , and so on. The popularity of these 
theorists at conferences at least signals interest in more constructive ways of thinking that are not 
excessively self-reflexive and bring , perhaps , the certainty of "that old time science." 
In general , as this fresh mobilization of science wrests the study of religion from its 
traditional handlers , most of those handlers have moved on themselves , notably with work on 
social memory a developed by Paul Connerton and Danielle Hervieu-Leger , as well as the 
social ramifications of agency or cognitive programming on religious experience as seen in 
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studies by Ann Taves and Robert N. McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson. 41 Using practice and 
performance theory, others have focused less on the mental states long thought to define religion 
and more on the creative activities. All of these groups have opened up just some of the most 
identifiable fronts in the study of religion. It is an open question to what extent they will avoid 
some of the knots that have defined that study for so long. A vowed atheism or scientific 
precision is certainly not going to do it. In too many of these theorists , there is a palpable 
eagerness to overcome the pesky challenges of postmodernist paradigm's view of the Western 
construction of religion. To the extent that it is not taken seriously , the new fronts in religion 
may turn out to be very familiar; certainly the popularity at conferences of those cognitive 
theorists who are each inventing a new science of religion signals interest in ways of thinking 
that are not excessively self-reflexive and bring, perhaps, the certainty of "that old time 
science. " 
Tilting at Paradigms 
In one form or another , the five paradigms described above are constants in the discipline 
of History as well as Religious Studies. They demonstrate the staying power of major models 
over centuries , the type of enduring resiliency that has created fields of study, absorbed repeated 
challenges , and stubbornly resisted abandonment. Feuerbach, that 19th century theologian-turned ' 
Hegelian-turned philosophical anthropologist of religion , put it with a simplicity that Marx 
would echo: "man does not dominate his fundamental conception of the world; on the contrary , it 
is it that dominates him, animates him, determines , and governs him."42 We do not have ideas 
about the world so much as they have us. But Feuerbach ' s nineteenth century pessimism 
eventuall y gave way to twentieth century confidence that if we cannot change things we can 
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repeated challenges, but they morph more regularly to avoid such challenges. 
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So how does one deal with the paradigms I have isolated? The process of going from a 
paradigm important to the discipline to a problematic way of thinking that should be left behind 
(no parallel to the career span of a professor intended!) is not encouraged by Feuerbach or even 
Kuhn. Kuhn's analysis of the replacement of scientific paradigms may not be completely 
descriptive of the more diverse methods and interests of the humanities and social sciences, but I 
do not think it seriously misleads. In brief, he argued that an old paradigm is not an old paradigm 
until there is a new one to replace it, one that already has substantial support. People do not 
throw out a way of thinking to leave themselves dependent on one person's method; they 
certainly will do nothing to make their own previous work suddenly retrograde. A challenge to 
an aging paradigm will be viewed as something more promising than tilting at windmills only if 
it entails a clearly developed alternative way of thinking already constructively productive for 
more than a few. And that would only be the beginning: whoever started the paradigm toppling 
would probably not recognize, or enjoy, the working result. 
It might be interesting to illustrate the difficulties of challenging a paradigm with a 
personal example. My projects on ritual, textuality and, most recently, belief, are not a set of 
integrated arguments, but they are analogous examples of engagements with reigning 
assumptions and they present some amusing lessons. 
My work on ritual is my most complete challenge since it even included an attempt at a 
constructive alternative. I tried to dismantle the 19th century construction of ritual as a universal 
phenomenon, considered utterly distinct in its structural mode of action and, inevitably, 
dependent on all of our unexamined assumptions about thought and action. I wrote two books on 
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the topic before I realized that there was a deeper, core paradigm shaping the notion of ritual that 
made my study into a set of wooden arrows bouncing harmlessly off a steel tank , namely , the 
idea of sacrifice. 43 Sacrifice is the endlessly mystifying act of violence at the heart of religion 
( especially with Christianity as the model) and , in theory , the fount of all other modes of ritual 
action , such as initiation , offerings , prayers , and sacred dramas. Not realizing that sacrifice was 
the thread to pull , I simply addressed it in passing to avoid giving it the traditional degree of 
attention. Intent on challenging the basic assumption of the uniqueness of ritual , I took the 
contrary view- analyzing at ritual activities as fully within the context of all other forms of 
social action. If ritual is not a uniquely different way of acting , that is, lacking a particular 
universal structure , then the questions shift to what is the difference between ritual and other 
ways of acting and , very key to my mind , when and why would people decide to do ritual acts 
instead of something else. I depicted ritual as one type of social praxis , namely , "practices of 
ritualization ," and even used a "control ," so to speak , by comparing a ritual way of acting to 
"theorizing " as y t another type of social action. In the end , this all meant that I defined general 
characteristic principles of practice , and then explored how ritual distinctly played with these 
principle (as did theorizing ). I emerged with examples of how people effectively ritualize a et 
of otherwise normal actions and explain why that can be a strategic way of acting in particular 
types of some situations. In addition , I tried to account for the mythic view of "unchanging " 
tradition (which is the preferred focus or context for most ritualizing) as well as all the many ad 
hoc ritual activities - religious , civic , and familial - that people consciously and unconscious! 
deplo y in their lives. 
eedless to say, I was not successful in single-handedly providing a new understanding 
of sacrifice. The attraction of the concept may be hard to convey , but it crops up in some widel y 
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popular form almost every decade. My career alone has seen three sacrifice fads. There recently 
was Rene Girard's psycho-theological theory of the murdered scapegoat, and a decade and a half, 
before him, Georges Bataille's notion that the profane, when taken to transgressive extremes 
such as sacrificial killing ( or self-mutilation), mystically transforms itself into an experience of 
the sacred. 44 On the basis of those ideas alone , I should have gone back to take on sacrifice 
explicitly. The concept is certainly relevant in public religious and political life, for example, the 
ritualization of terrorism in orchestrated acts by which Palestinian "sons" are sacrificed , instead 
of the ram, in acts of terrorism against Jews. The ritual can be seen as an attempt to sacralize the 
political struggle for "the land" in a manner that undermines the sacralization claimed by Jewi h 
settlers and, indeed , the government of Israel. 
Meanwhile , in a third style , studies of sacrifice as the classic example of unique ritual 
action continue to be written. Invited to join a prestigious anthology of terms , the editors gave 
me the topic of "performance ," included "sacrifice ," leaving ritual out altogether. 45 The recent 
vogue is exemplified by the late anthropologist , Roy Rappaport , in a lengthy posthumous volume 
that describes ritual as "the social act basic to humanity ," the act that at the dawn of human 
history , and even today , that socializes the merely human into true humanity. 46 This formulation 
has begun to appear in many popular forms. Surprisingly , Robert Bellah has given an exceptional 
show of support for Rappaport ' s nearly mystical and ultimately apocalyptic paean to the power 
of ritual. His defense of Rappaport is eventually followed by a critique of my analysi of 
'•ritualizing " as fundamentally nihilistic as if I were denying the existence of real acts of ritual 
simply by challenging the idea of a uniquely-structured entity behind the name. 47 Ritual 
(sacrifice) , as the cornerstone of human evolutionary adaptation , will be around awhile as a 
trendier version of the previous ideas . 
• 
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Overall, therefore, I am not impressed with any ground gained in my first extended bout 
with a paradigm. I have learned to take the romanticism of ideas for scholars much more 
seriously; my understanding of theorizing is leading, I hope, to a fuller analysis. However, I also 
tried to explore the shape of paradigm in a project on the nature of textuality in China. I saw 
textuality as invoking distinct cosmological structures, although the focus on Chinese texts was 
due to my own love of their aesthetic materiality, as well as the conviction, now commonplace, 
that the particular form of written language would generate a different text-supporting cosmos 
than that of the European Bible. In the historical saga of the latter, one of the main themes is the 
story of how the writing conquers orality, the priests defeat the prophets, the messiah dies to Ii e 
on in the Reformation Biblical text. In Chinese history, an early divinatory cosmos and spoken 
words of the masters become bound in commentary until new sources of texts were found in new 
layers of the cosmos, an imaginative development that followed the introduction of Buddhism. 
Printing affected both Europe and China quite differently at first, but more similarly over time. 
What is the significance in all this, I wondered, for the medium, the message, the power structure, 
and competition of cosmological visions? I could go on to link these issues to the introduction of 
the Bible in China and the profound effect of the first Western books in a culture in which 
community groups would collect stray bits of scrap paper, especially with writing on them, and 
bring them baskets to burn at the temple for "merit," a notion that appeared in the cosmos of 
China's earliest scribes. An account of the religious text in China would show up the influence of 
a paradigm about the Biblical cosmos and its effect on the nature and authority of texts even into 
the modern era-that is, through the Reformation, which made the text everything and in the 
proces gave birth to the sciences of textual analysis. Protestantism and our cultural paradigm 
involve the tension between the sacred and the analyzed text. There is a master narrative in 
• 
• 
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which the history of writing and printing in Europe is basically taken to describe how it happens 
elsewhere. This narrative led Benedict Anderson to remark: "I was startled to discover~ in many 
notices of Imagined Communities, that this Eurocentric provincialism remained quite 
undisturbed." 48 
I am currently exploring another set of paradigms within the concept of belief, in part as 
an effort to keep my scholarship in tune with how most religious people today see themselves 
and define their practices. However, other colleagues probing the field have focused on the 
discourse surrounding the "cultural necessity of religion" paradigm and noted the stubborn 
tendency of religion scholars to treat religion as always a good thing. Of course, religion scholar 
are not fools; we know that religion is not always doing good, but assumptions about its 
fundamental moral nature is certainly another black box that convolutes our thinking. 49 Over the ' 
years there has been talk about self-imposed constraints or censoring due to the institutions 
sponsoring our scholarship or even our own earliest loyalties. Striking a very basic note, 
Jonathan Z. Smith argued, in connection with his study of Jonestown, that we should study 
religions we did not like; others echoed and pushed this unaccustomed perspective. 50 Recently, 
however, Robert Orsi offered a very simple critical formulation, saying that scholars of religion 
are wedded to the idea that religion is good. 51 Whenever it is not acting well, we explain it away 
until the incident is no longer religion but something else-political extremism, a personality cult, 
degenerate or demented discontents, and so on. Orsi analyzes this tendency in an argument about 
the moral responsibilities of a researcher, and proposes a new formulation for the stance of the 
participant-observer studying religion acting badly. His point may be the beginning of a fuller 
challenge to a paradigm that may be even more basic than the one with which I began, 
Christianity as the prototype . 
• 
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Historians surely have other paradigms particular to their perspective, which bring their 
own tricks of vision while generating the scholarship we study and teach--such as the box behind 
the truism that not knowing history dooms one to repeat it. One historian tells me that this adage 
it is wrong, wrong, wrong; situations are never really alike--Iraq is not Vietnam. Yet it all 
depends on the point to be made, the frame that is imposed, the context created by the discourse 
underway. Taking the long view, paradigms are born and surely some fade away in time. It 
seems proper that our disciplinary resources get past second-guessing the latest intellectual fad 
and, using all tools, work to keep the larger picture in view. This is best done now as it has 
always been, with the thick description of cross-cultural studies and the cross-disciplinary 
interaction of scholars . 
• 
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Religion - Constructing the West 
(But What about the Rest?) 
Catherine Bell 
Santa Clara University 
Since I do not know my audience , it might be tactful to preface this talk with a friendly 
warning about the sort of thing you are going to get. Recently an eminent sociologist of religion 
used the conclusion of a short survey of new theories on society and culture to single me out for 
a position of which he wanted no part , namely , a trendy skepticism that bordered on complete 
nominalism (actually I think he meant nihilism given the critique). Of course , to me, his was a 
fairly thorough misreading of my argument , but we all know "every reading is a misreading ," 1; I 
• am guilty of misreadings too , but not nominalism , skepticism but not nearly young enough to be 
trendy. My argument here is an historical one about cultural definitions. I want to unwrap , as 
accurately as I can, how the idea of religion -- that this is religion but that is something else , 
magic or civic duty -- was constructed in Western culture , a construction that few would deny 
was , in many ways , constitutive of Western culture. It is an argument that has some application 
to current realities. 
The prominent part that religion is playing in the news- from stories about global threat 
of terrorism to the local politics of state school board decisions (Intelligent Design vs 
Evolution)-is such that one can conclude that religions are cultures , even quite distant cultures 
despite the radical proximity - or impingement - that is so casual in this era. Samuel 
Huntington ' s has been much-critiqued for his suggestion of a coming "clash" of religious 
• civilizations. Well , he may probably prove incorrect in the long term ; but in the short term we 
• 
• 
• 
are certainly caught up in smaller clashes now almost every where there are religious subcultures, 
even within populations that have many other ties uniting them. 
According to the history we teach, with the 18th century Enlightenment religion became 
formally distinct from the state, and that distinction curtailed its control over society. This 
curtailment allowed social developments that had been previously seen, at times, as anti-
Christian, such as early scientific pursuits and civic citizenship for those of other religions or 
sectarian groups -- ultimately what we know as secular society itself. But today it is said that we 
are seeing "fundamentalist" movements rising to reject these secular arrangements, to challenge 
the containment of religion and refuse modernity as Europe and America have developed it. And 
should these fundamentalisms have their way, creating an evangelical Christian America or a 
subdivided Iraq, clashing with its neighbors, then how long before there would be global size 
clashes? Religion might even succeed in accomplishing the horror that the cold war avoided . 
When I start ruminating along these lines I run smack into an old "confusion" - like a 
mes y room that one tries to avoid seeing. It is a basic confusion about the very meaning 
"religion " has come to have in the world and I fear there can be no neat map for understanding it. 
As a "seasoned " professor of the subject, you might not expect me to have a profound perplexity 
about the very subject of my expertise, but who better?. I don't particularly want to hand you my 
confusions (in fact, I would rather like to think yours are further along than mine) , but I do want 
to make sure you understand how the global situation you and I have to deal with relies to a great 
degree on the meanings we give religion. 
I do not think that there is going to be a great global clash of civilizations, but I do think 
there will be constant clashes among any number of subcultures , spurred by religious idealism or 
conservativism at least as much as the protection of economic or national interests. They will 
happen again with school boards here in the States, they will build up in a demographically 
2 
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changing Europe, and they will define much of life in the Middle East and Africa. The stakes in 
these clashes will involve resources like oil, water, farmland, or sheer political leverage; but 
many the arguments and some of the long-term goals will hinge on people's understanding of 
their religions. 
So, in a nutshell, the point of my talk today is to try to provide a description of the 
historical-conceptual background that Euro-Americans carry in regard to religion. My 
description is an argument for what the term religion has come to mean for us and how that has 
happened. The argument also suggests that these Euro-American meanings might differ from or 
influence others. I have to believe, when my confusion threatens to get out of hand, that the more 
self-understanding we bring to any cultural clash, the more we will engage the people and the 
issues, not the rhetoric that packages things. So, you see, academics are always caught in a 
dialectic of idealism and skepticism . 
I. Paradigms 
There are, I believe, a handful of paradigms or sets of assumptions that one can 
demonstrate the history and structure of our understanding of religion. I use the term paradigm in 
its most neutral sense. While often blamed for constraining thought, paradigms clearly function 
as our most basic tool for advancing knowledge as a social enterprise. Paradigms are those 
overly convenient and under-theorized sets of terms that create the scaffolding for a whole litany 
of interconnected ideas.2 Eventually, however, we notice this very opportune assistance and 
become suspicious that reality could so neatly fit our needs; we suspect that the inner scaffolding 
may have its own history of construction and even ideological uses. From this perspective, to call 
something a paradigm is to recognize it as a type of "black box" operating in our discourse; and 
we are obliged catch hold of such boxes and inquire "what are you and why are you here?" I 
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RADICAL INTERPRETATION IN RELIGION 
By Nancy Frankenberry 
C Bell 
'"The Chinese Believe in Spirits': Belief and Believing in the Study of Religion" 
/t;v- !/0 
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Chinese Believe In Spirits Summary 
Spate of recent books 
Field ' s lack of involvement 
Rodney Needham 
Commonplace: belief is sooo Christianity-centered; comparison is distortion 
Belief =culture , problems left 
Philosophical uses: more individual oriented than anthro 
Needham: Hume to Harnack 
Davidson ' s radical interpretation: interconnectedness of beliefs and meaning 
Their relationship to interpretation , need to infer them 
Granting others reason /truth simply to decide about truth about them 
Level of sentence 
Threat to multiple truths 
Universal and particular 
Davidson trie to hold on to both: 
truth dependent on language /culture vs shared rationalism that enables us to interpret the 
meaning of statements 
Same project in philosophical ethics 
Richard Schweder: relavativism vs universalism => all the diff positions 
In order to elucidate a post-modernist anthropology 
Answer: transcendence w/o superiority 
HR=tension betw universalism and particularism 
Scholarship as a vehicle for identifying particularism and forging abstract 
Universal isms 
Belief: recent def of rel as an over-reaching folk category that misreads & does violence 
to other cultures: corrective yes , leaves problems 
First , we have by now created "religion " in general and it is out and about 
Second , even cultures like China can find examples of belief 
"Our language about belief and meaning is part of an understanding of religion that keep 
reasserting itself because a tense relationship universalism and particularism may be integral to 
all theoretical projects as we culturally construct them " 105 (tho some projects do try to undo our 
cultural assumptions about knowledge) 
=our characterization of the specific illusions of others ; shorthand for that which is most culture-
bound , determined , particular. Three assumptions: 
I) cultural beliefs explained (not be ref to a universal!) by reconstructing the system in which 
they "mean "; do not exist in our views , so no other route for meaning ; thus a coherent sys tem of 
beliefs creates the meaningful structure , religion (106) Circularity of all this makes it work for us 
2) deeply held mental orientation or conviction: all or nothing 
Both assumptions basic to chweder ' s treatment of the "witch " questions ,= central anth ro 
question and faultline , no more anthro if every answered. Reconstructing the system of ideas in 
which his statement makes sense means what in the end? That he is a witch , right? 
3) we grant belief a priority to action (discussed elsewhere) 
Coherence - recent quality for the meaningfulness of a system (Berger) , also what religion should provide , 
that is, meaningful coherence (but students have not found it; nor clergy-
Beliefs as specific sets of actions , as social practice versus a T/F linguistic statement or 
• 
• 
• 
mental conviction 
Looking at how people are religious: very little coherence , instead 
"Bundles of behaviors " or ' habits of action " by which most situations are dealt with 
Meaningfulness more a matter offamily , jobs , or service projects; religion used merely to 
buttress them ; of course , just a particular expectation of religion 
Articulating the similarities and differences among how groups expect religion to provid e 
meaning - how is this possible? Davidson ' s "principle of charity " behind interpretation 
Chinese Believe in Spirits 
Like Long Island residents , much variation in types and degrees of beliefs 
Historical examples 
Individual aware of variation & have a sense of choice & no coherence 
Chinese society is quite diverse , history of cultural traffic 
Contrasts w Rosaldo ' s isolated Ilongot (really , no debate over heads?) 
Religion 
People constantly asking themselves what to believe , how much , with what degree of investmen t, 
questions that we ask about religion , but everyone asks them about stocks , politicians , school 
boards , etc. Still , these questions concern cultural boundaries of religion , always in flux. 
Examples: Wolf's crazy non-shaman ; Falungong on rel or exercise 
In fact , a coherently organized system of beliefs is a very deliberate creation , a product prepared 
for a purpose. Shanshu stress coherence in their project to present a universal system 
Test of hypothesis: A Wolfs ethnography of grades of spirit currency as corresponding 
to a culturally deep understanding mirroring the social landscape ... but suggestive at best. 
Little coherence among beliefs hold , accdg to few studies. [Even though we tend to 
believe about believers that what they want most is a sense of systematic coherence in the cosmos 
Of course , my own research , finds beliefs not prior to religious action , but sort ot parallel , 
or resulting from. 
Religion implies a false coherence or systematization: "We cannot appeal to belief to describe 
how people exi st within their cultures ; yet without belief , it is not clear what we mean b)' 
religion. " 115 
"Bundle of behaviors " known as feng-shui? Traveled to American culture very easily , w which 
its congruence is minimal at best. Cp martial arts , taiqi , zen 
Appreciation historicity of our categories: If notion ofreligion seems to fall apart in one 
place , it resurfaces in another: Christian evangelicals 
Conclusion: coherence or incoherence can be explored on a more realistic footing if scholarship can let go 
of the transcendence status still clutched by Schweder or the logically prior theory of interpretati n sought 
by Davidson. But we will have to spend more time figuring out how to situate ourselves. 
[A discipline , like philosophy or religious studies , exists primarily to save us the work of figurin g out 
where and how we can situate ourselves. It lets us take it for granted that we have a vista , a place to stand , 
and a small soap box from which to expound in ways that do not seem ridiculous , at least to thos e 
sharing most of the same cultural caegories.] 
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"The Chinese Believe In Spirits": Belief and Believing 
in the Study of Religion 
Catherine Bell 
Santa Clara University 
A recent round of books, both popular and scholarly, reveal that as a society we are, once 
again, fascinated with the issue of belief. While the more popular books tend to adopt a fairly 
straightforward and uncomplicated notion of believing and then find major problems of 
rationality, the more scholarly books readily accept a type of rati ality to beliefs while 
problematizing the act of believing in other, more involuted way .1 oth types of argument 
remind the scholar of religion that the academic dis · line of religious studies has not 
contributed much to this discussion for quite awhil 2 'As described in Rodney Needham's 1972 
work, Belief, Language and Experience, which was both a fulsome anthropological treatment of 
the problems and a cautionary tale for further studies, the concept of belief poses particular 
problems for comparative analysis since belief does not appear to be identifiable or similarly 
important in religions we want to compare and from which we want to abstract more general 
descriptions. Moreover, it is a commonplace that many of our assumptions about the centrality of 
belief in religion have e erged in a decidedly Christian context, making comparison a distortion 
of other religious view ~nthropological studies since Needham have tended to collapse belief 
into 'culture', which has worked well enough most the time, but it not only avoids the explicit 
problem of why and how 'beliefs' and 'believing' become prominent in the way in which many 
people participate in a culture, it also retreats from the problem of various ways in which any one 
person may appropriate parts of the culture. Recourse to the concept of culture not only leaves 
many of these questions to popular writers, it also tends to push anthropology into an extreme 
cultural relativism that is painfully dependent upon the fragile and often unarticulated nature of 
this idea of culture. Scholars ofreligion, on the other hand, generally want to use the language of 
belief to say that members of such- and-such a religion generally hold such-and-such conceptions 
that motivate their activities. While people have pointed to the overriding need for such an 
abstract language despite ongoing revelations of its weaknesses, we also know that a term like 
belief keeps tying ar~neta-language to assumptions that are more culturally constrained than 
really care to defenct/ 
Another reason for the field's hesitation about belief may also lie in philosophical u s 
of the term. Philosophical usage tends to emphasize a more individualistic version of ~4~ 
anthropology's 'culture,' and in so doing deals at least in passing, with the possibility of / W ufit 
idiosyncrasy, madness, or the intent to delud .5 hilosophers seeking a language with which to 1> 1)£~ 
analyze how human beings go about interpreting their world, particularly the linguistic 
communications within it, often make use of the concept of belief to link it to, or play it off, a 
notion of truth. Needham discussed th~ and distinctions drawn between belief and truth in 
the philosophical tradition stretching from Hume to Wittgenstein, Hampshire, and Harnack. 
More recently, Donald Davidson has made liberal use of belief in his theory of "radical 
mterpretation." 6 He argues that we cannot make sense of a person's utterances without 
understanding something of their intentions and beliefs, but "we cannot infer the belief without 
knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief." 7 His 
theory of radical interpretation, therefore, assumes the interconnectedness of belief and meaning 
as well as their formal role in interpretation. For the sake of his larger argument, essentially a 
theory about a theory, Davidson focuses on the belief (or 'preference), integral to interpretation, 
that the statements made by another are or can be true. In fact, he points out, we must grant other 
speakers, however aberrant or idiosyncratic, a great deal of reason and truth, or else we would 
have no way to conclude they are being unreasonable or untrue. David~o goes on to propose a 
theory of how we infer belief and meaning , arguing that the inference at statements can be held 
to be true cannot be separate from this basic theory of interpretation. 8 owever , philosophical 
discussions like Davidson's , which relate belief and meaning to truth , however truth is 
understood , not only seem to threaten religious studies' post-theological emphasis on the validity 
of different world views , they also appear to threaten to push analysis to the level of the sentence , 
from where is appears hard to come to any conclusions about religion in general. 
Despite these fears , the question of how to use the concept of belief and how to identify 
/t he types of phenomenon potentially illuminated by such a concept remain an inescapable aspect 
of studying religion within the language traditions that the field of religious studies inherits. This 
essay , which is for me both an initial and perhaps belated foray into the topic , will explore some 
unarticulated tendencies in the our use of the notion of belief , and tie our use of this concept to a 
particular way of thinking about religion. In the end , I will sketch a possible way to approach 
these issues from a rather different direction. 
Universal and Particular 
A particularly provocative dimension of Davidson's analysis of interpretation is the 
attempt to hold on to two positions that are usually polarized in such a way as to force a choice 
of one over the other. On the one hand , he invokes truth (or reality) as clearly dependent on 
language (or culture) , a stance that supports many current understandings of cultural pluralism 
and relativism , which are compelling and popular positions these days . On the other hand , 
Davidson also points to a type of shared rationalism that enables us to recognize and interpret the 
meaning of statements made by others even when the linguistic or cultural overlap is very thin. 
By holding on to both positions , Davidson attempts to find something of a middle way or , rather , 
as he puts it, to place theories of interpretation on a new footing. I have read Davidson primarily ;;t-
for this struggle to hold on to both positions in ways that make sense of what we are lookin · 
the study ofreligion: sometimes it feels like we are encountering very different realities that lead 
us to question our own ; at other times , we experience , and point to , a great deal of similarity , 
although we can get nervous about that too. In both cases , we wonder what is inevitably 
particular and what , if anything , i , has been , or is becoming universal. 
When reduced to this formulation , however , Davidson's project is one that is widely 
shared at the moment. Philosophical ethics , in particular , may be doing the most explicit work on 
how to think about cultural relativism without endorsing complete relativism , but there are and 
have been other engagements. 9 Among anthropologists , few have tried to imagine a more explicit 
convergence of relativism and universalism than Richard Shweder. In several studies in the 
1980s, he groped to identify all the presuppositions of these polarized positions by delineating 
and classifying a wide variety of formulations of each. 10 By making transparent what he saw as 
the main tensions in the field , Shweder hoped to elucidate the basic stance and components of a 
~e
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post-positivist , postmodern anthropology. I do not think his conclusion - that anthropological ~:~v; ~o l theorists should adopt a "transcendence without superiority" from which they should "take ~1 L 'literally' (as atter of belief) those reality-posits so alien in ord~l!i jscover other realities 
~:;~f:/ within the sel - is eit~er satis ing or successful. 11 Yet the effort was ~ ating , instructive , 
~ and bold. ~ ,- J t1 .A...v L 
Religious studies , e pecially the history of re igions , has also addressed the issue of 
universalism and particularism and , like most academic fields , it has probably been formed by 
t ension between them. 12 The differentiation of the study of religion from theology more than 
fifty ears ago was one early engagement of the issue , by which an emerging "history of 
re 1gions" approach felt it way to what was arguably a type of universalized theolo and a > -/'tr-o 
fresh , if incomplete , particularization of Christianity and its siblings. When the field began to 
focus more on methods of comparison , it took another angle on these polarized options , asking 
several related questions: if all religions are comparable manifestations of some type of 
? . 
Q 
([J 
universal , such as homo religiosus or the sacre@ should we be comparing to illuminate the 
universal or the particular or, somehow, both?~ nd what can be adequately compared to what for 
what end? With the more recent emergence of linguistic and cognitive theories , as well as studies 
effectively deconstructing universal narratives , one wonders if there is any other issue so 
responsible for what we do and how we do it today. In no small way, scholarship understands 
itself as both a vehicle for identifying particularism we sometimes regarded ourselves as 
'liberating' it) and forging formulations of an underlying or abstract universalism. The emphasis 
may hiftf back and forth, but each, as David on might suggest, is impossible to infer without the 
other. 
Belief 
According to recent critiques , 'r r ion' is an over-reaching folk category that misreads 
and even does violence to other cultures. 13 This is, of course, a corrective , and undoubtedly a 
slightly exaggerated one, which has the merit of addressing the many liberties we have taken 
with the m for so long. Yet these critiques leave two concerns unanswered. 
First, veral centuries of talking about 'religion in general' has created a sense of 
religion in many places that might, arguably, have categorized things differently without such 
influence. It i not so easy to recontain the term 'religion' at this point in history. It may be just 
another form of hegemonic imperialism to claim, for example, that the Chinese today are wrong 
or deluded in using the word 'religion' to describe either past or current practices in their culture. 
If we are to be clear about the historicity of such terminology , we must follow through and track 
how the concept is being u ed today beyond our own theorizing. We know there are no platonic 
theoretic~"""'"ti::•rrories, but we keep thinking we can freeze them for this study or that critique. 
( Second work in the materials of a culture that has long constituted a good exam e of 
classifications that do not fit the Euro-American understanding of religion, namely China I et 
if one looks beyond the careful slices of Chinese culture that are usually chosen as 
repre entative , one can find much that is not completely alien to any definition of 'religion,' 
medieval, enlightenment , or postmodern. It can be refreshing, of course, to drop the notion of 
religion out of the picture as completely as possible, and either explore the variety of Chinese 
categories that have b en used or fish for oth r ways of identifying what is either comparable or 
distinguishable among practices. 
These concerns notwithstanding , the attempt to demote 'religion' from a universal (the 
"consensus of nations") , a biological facility, or a cognitive structure to a theory of the specific 
cla ificatory organization of a particular culture helps to illuminate some of the problems 
attending our language of belief and meaning. In the same way, I want to suggest, our language 
about bj ief and meaning is part of an understanding of religion that keeps reasserting itself 
_;;;;:? becaus~ ten e relationship between universalism and particularism - whether or not it is the 
~ type of olution ought by Davidson and Shweder, among others , may be integral to theoretical 
projects as we have culturally cast them. Even if we pay full attention to the historicity of the 
social system examined as well as the historicity of the project of examining it, it is not clear that 
we secure a footing for scholarship that drops the allure of transcendence as another version of J 
the particularism-univer alism polarity .15 fl 
While we have tended to u e 'religion' to denote a dimension of open-ended 
commonality , omething found in most if not all human cultures , we have used the term 'belief in 
---,>::, the highly tailored , supporting role of denoting the culturally particular foci of a religion --
specifically tho thing that we hold to not exist in fact. If a group 'believes' in less particular or 
empmcally problematic things like love or the tragic dimensions of life, we tend to refer to these 
not a beliefs, but as cultural values , attitudes , or dispositions. If a group ho)d convictions about 
astrological destiny , we are very willing to describe such attitudes as belie~ s oo·t-a-:s;CJ~;we. 
() Belief is our characterization of the specific illusions of others. But the distinction between belief --
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and culture is not dramatically demarcated: belief is also our shorthand for the epitome of what D 
we see as being encultured , culture-bound , or culturally determined. 
----v:fe explain a culturally particular belief , and that is a very redundant phrase , by its place 
in a structured sy tern of ideas that we assemble. In this way we see what the belief 'means .' 
Since the objects of the beliefs do not actually exist in our view , there is no other route for 
meaning ; so the meaningfulness of beliefs is dependent upon rendering them coherent within a 
sy tern of idea . Coherent ystems of belief create a mean in ful structure , namely 'religion ,' 
which makes sense to u f the articular and the illusionar . This can be a very circular way to 
work. - -
In connection with this tendency to identify belief with extremes of cultural particularism 
and determinism , we also talk about belief as a type of deeply-held mental orientation or 
conviction. That is, belief is described as one type of thing , an all-or-nothing on-or-off state. 
There is little ev1 ence to warrant such a view outside of certain specific confessional practices. 
Both formulations of belief , as the illusion rendered meaningful when made part of a larger 
coherent system understood as religion and as a state of deeply-held convictions , emerge in 
~ Shweder's argument that the interpretation of beliefs is the central anthropological question - and 
~ its fault-line. He evokes the 'witch' question that lies at the root of anthropology , namely , if your 
t1 A a/ ~ informant tell you , perhaps at some risk of negative consequences , that she or he is actually a 
V~J witch , what can you make of this statement when your own reality makes clear there are no 
witches ? 16 Generally , we must reconstruct the system of ideas that rationalize and render such er tatements coherent if we are to " interpret " them. This is an true advance , of course , on the 
{F-. (t earlier view that such statements are proof of some sort of "primitive mentality. " 17 Yet it is hard 
X to be convinced that an interpretation in which a belief , taken as a designated illusion that is nonetheless a ' type ' of truth that i , as having its own particular reality , is all that different from interpretations based on a primitive mentality. either do I think anything is solved by 
concluding , as Shweder does , that unquestionably the informant is a witch. 18 
A third problematic assumption , which I have addressed at length elsewhere , is the ease 
with which we grant belief a prior existence in order to cast it as the a priori shaper and 
instigator of action. 19 While belief may well work this way some of the time , we have no 
evidence that this happens most of the time. Such an assumption , however , does allow us to 
'explain' action by connecting it to its motivating beliefs , and from there to a larger reconstructed 
system , understood to be ' the ' relevant system by its coherence and ability to explain the 
particulars with which the interpreter started. 
Coherence 
It is relatively recent thing for scholars to emphasize meaningful and systemic coherence 
in relation to what religion is all about. Only in the second half of the 20th century , for the most 
part , has the provision of coherence been seen as the defining role of religion , that is, what we 
theorists think it should do when religion clearly can no longer explain the nature of the universe 
or act as the authoritative ource of morality. 20 And this is not just the stance of theorists. When I 
quiz my students , completely unread in the relevant anthropological literature , meaningful 
coherence is what they also have absorbed as the expected role and real contribution of religion. 
Th am that they have not found it or a sufficiently steady experience of it.21 They are 
rticularly a are of , and appalled by, what they see as the rampant incoherence -- the 
ragmentation , 1ypocrisy , or compromises - in the lives of adults around them. For these 
ents , as fo most scholars of religion , religion should have a holistic coherence that delivers 
meaning u xperiences. Yet even those who have devoted their lives to religion - the clergy of 
many different persuasion -- rarely find those qualities in their religious experience if you ask 
them. 22 Coherence can be found only in some explicit self-presentations by persons , texts , or 
institutions. We can argue for the existence of a 'deeper' coherence , of course , either in the 
organization of the brain , the personal psyche , the social structure , or the dynamics of culture --
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all universalizations that support the major theories and disciplines of the 20th century. Awkward 
to use today, but still regularly invoked, these approaches contrast with attempts to see beliefs 
and believing as a matter of spedfic sets of actions or situations , that is, approaching believing as 
a.type of social practice rather than a (true or false) linguistic statement or mental conviction. 23 
To indulge an autobiographical example, I originally thought to study religion because I 
wa interested in how most people -- that is, folks not schooled in the language and history of 
phi lo ophy -- made sen e of their lives and worlds. I have not been heavily invested in any 
particular formulation of this focus, just in the general human project implied, which has to 
include how readily people get by without giving much attention to making any larger sense of 
thing . It was clear to me growing up among the natives of Long Island in the 1950s and 60s -
indeed, it was a striking feature of the religious attitudes there -- just how little coherence 
religion actually seemed to provide or was even expected to provide. Later , in the 1970s, 
c oherence became a more explicitly stated expectation , but as before, religiosity within the 
; spectrum of conventional lifestyles seemed to hinge on internalizing a complex array of 
\ epartmentalizations and disassociations. 
On Long Island, and in other places I have come to know well, what is thought of as 
religion by the natives is more a matter of loose ackaged sets of behaviors - what we can also 
call "bundles of behaviors" or "habits of action. '24 or Long Islanders , these packaged sets of 
distinct behaviors were used to deal with such events as death, serious illness, perverse 
misfortune , and occasionally life-crises like birth, marriage or divorce , as 
well as, naturally, the ritual life of defined communities gathered at the church, synagogue, house 
meeting, prayer circle , or meditation group. In actual fact, family, jobs , and personal projects of 
service to others were more obvious over-arching systems of meaning; religion appeared to be 
invoked simply to support them. Long Islanders' delineation and expectations of religion are not 
the ame as other places that could be described. Yet neither are these other places so different 
that we cannot articulate imilarities and differences. The commonality that allows for such 
articulations is the 'principle of charity' defined by Davidson , a particularly felicitous if 
provocative basis for any new take on interpretation. 25 
The Chinese Believe" 
In even the most sophisticated literature on Chinese religion and culture , it is readily 
stated that the Chinese believe in spirits. Some Chinese will say something like that too, as I 
learned at a shamanic exorcism down the block from where I lived in Taipei. After the bloodied 
shaman was through with his spectral combat, and everyone was relaxing, the apartment owner 
complained that she had heard there were no ghosts in America , which seemed so unfair since 
large number of them kept bothering people in Taiwan. Analogously , there is the eloquent essay 
by the early 20th century sociologist , Fei Xiaotong , entitled "The World Without Ghosts," where 
he recounts growing up surrounded by ghosts who were as real to him as his many relatives. 26 
Fei u ed the gho t theme to set up a thoughtful contrast between Chinese and American cultures. 
A beliefs go, believing in spirits is not a particularly strange example , and we are very 
accu tomed to the holistic construction known as Chinese religion, which can make such beliefs 
coherent among themselves and understandable as a type of meaningful truth. 
Yet if the Chinese 'believe' in spirits in anything like the way my Long Island community 
believed in papal authority , or even the way Christian colleagues believe in a central doctrine like 
the divinity of Jesus Christ, then the statement that the Chinese believe in ancestral spirits is, at 
best, a very vague generalization that ignores everything interesting.27 It ignores the great 
differences from one person to another , awareness of the possibility of other positions , the 
individualized inner juggling and tensions , as well as pragmatic non-judgments and refusals to 
engage. Most language about belief, and about Chinese religion in general , leaves little room for 
the e features and certainly does not begin to account for them.28 
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There are , as you would imagine , many Chinese positions on spirits. Just a sampling of 
the most famous and familiar ones can demonstrate the complexity of believing , at least in regard 
to this one topic in Chine e history. In the fifth century BCE , for example , the sage Mo Tzu 
argued that the degeneration of civilization since the sage-kings was due to only one thing , doubt 
about the existence of ghosts and spirits. Those who say "of course there are no spirits ," he 
argued , bewilder the people and bring disorder to the empire. In fact , he continued , people can 
know that spirits exist in exactly the same way that they know anything exists - through reliable 
testimony , the con sens s of textual sources that have proven their authority in other matters , and 
personal experience e senses .29 Several centuries later , the Han dynasty writer , Wang 
Ch ' ung , made the opposite argument in order to refute Taoist teachings. With what has been 
characterized by later readers as admirable rationalism , Wang argued that "man is a creature. His 
rank may be ever so high ... , but his nature does not differ from other creatures. There is no 
creature who does not die" and soon become dust. 30 Hence , for Wang Ch ' ung , there can be no 
ghosts , pirits , or gods. In the medieval period , Han Yti (768-824 CE) admonished the emperor 
for his public attentions to the "bone of the Buddha" in an essay that became ell 1own among 
the literate. 31 More widespread were the ubiquitous tales of the supernatural , such as those 
collected by Hung Mai in the 12th century , which all turned on the moment when someone who 
\ did not believe in spirits personally experienced their intervention and came to realize the truth 
... J of their existence. 32 
) ~ Any village or urban neighborhood in China , Taiwan or Hong Kong also yields a wide 
() 
spectrum of positions on pirits. What is important about the variety , I think , is the evidence that 
individuals are very aware of the number of possible opinions and thus have located their own 
position -- if it is clear enough to be called that -- as a matter of some choice and deliberation. 
These people know that others hold different ideas that many reject the whole thing , that people 
may act contradictorily , or some feign belief fo11 sle serving reasons. There is little to suggest 
1
; ~ that belief in spirits comes with the culture or)b a_~Y qne sort of belief. There is, in other words , 
..J , very I ittle systematic coherence. J ~ 
As interpreters of texts and cultures , scholars of religion know that a Chinese text 
preaching filiality to one's ancestral spirits cannot be taken as descriptiv of the actual state of 
cultural affairs in China , any more than a Long Island sermon about loving the poor can be taken 
as descriptive of Catholic life as it is really lived there. It is much more accurate , and certainly 
more interesting , to read admonishments and affirmations as argumentative practices , perhaps 
involving some complex sharing of ideals , but not as representations of a static or coherent 
situation. 
If we argue that a person's options are still culturally limited in the forms and degrees of 
belief possible , clearly the limit is much further out or more blurred than we usually 
acknowledge. Of course , Chinese culture is extremely diverse and even by the medieval period it 
had seen a great deal of cultural trafficking . Perhaps this plurality influenced the boundaries of 
what could be thought in the culture , let alone what constituted belief and its systemic coherence. 
{ 
A po ible counter-example dealing with a relatively more isolated society is suggested by 
Renato Rosaldo's account of headhunting among the Ilongot. 33 He implies little or no debate , 
doubt , or discussion among the Ilongot about the efficacy , and meaningfulness , of headhunting ; 
but he does note discussions of its necessity and periods when young men did not take heads 
prior to marriage. If there is no evidence of various shades of conviction and degrees of 
involvement in headhunting practices , then that would seem to be an unusual situation 
warranting study as such. 
Religion 
All native statements about belief can be seen as concerned with the nature (classifying 
and boundaries) of religion in the sense that people on Long Island and in Beijing are constantly 
asking themselves what to believe , how much to believe it, and with what specific investments or 
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' commitment . This is true not just for so-called religious ideas , of course , but also for personal 
affairs or economic and political matters. People regularly ask questions that deal with what we 
might call the cultural boundaries and defi~n of reTigion. There ares~ familiar examples , 
'tuclia s the famous Rites Controversy provoked by the Jesuits in 17th century China , which 
revolved around the question whether ancestor worship was relig~ ch and had to be 
abandoned by converts , or whether it was an aspect of customary~etfquette and no more 
threatening to converts than th ow iven in greeting. 34 Of course , this was a more critical 
question for the foreign mis ionaries than for most~ Chinese. A careful 
ethnography by Margery Wolf details the extended deliberations in a small village in Taiwan 
over the question of whether a particular woman was a shaman-to-be called by the spirits or an 
batty and un ympathetic outsider to be shunned. 35 Drawing on more recent examples , members 
of the recently outlawed group , the Falundafa (Falungong) , ~offls ~mtei,t like other qigong 
societies in China since the 1960s , have had to decide to what extent their practices are religious 
or simply therapeutic physical exercises that do not threaten other religious affiliations or fall 
under government control of religion. For various political reasons and agendas , their 
deliberations and articulated positions are carefully calibrated to keep the line between religion 
and therapeutic exercise more unclear than clear. 36 
When a coherently organized systemization of be! iefs is proposed by a Chinese source , 
then a very specific argument is being made about the way things really are. The creation of a 
broadly designed system of coherence is a particular rhetorical project , one undertaken 
m igenous ya well as by outside scholars. And the difference between the practices of these 
two groups is, perhaps , one of the many distinctions that should lose its importance in our 
analyses. 37 For example , coherence is an important part of the argument made by a subset of 
Chinese texts known as morality books (shanshu) , which emerged in 1 i 11 century China among 
the opportunities of easy wood-block printing , inexpensive paper , and manageable distribution ; 
they are still produced and circulated today. These texts are explicitly engaged in an enormous 
polemical effort to provide a totally comprehensive and coherent understanding of the workings 
of the world , both visible and invisible , in terms of universal and inexorable laws of cosmic 
retribution -- despite evidence available to all that appears to contradicts such a system. In this 
project , these morality books reinterpret a wide variety of local and regional practices in terms of 
a sy tern said to underlie the otherwise incoherent or incomplete cosmologies attributed to 
Buddhism , Taoism , Confucianism and folk religion. 38 As such , this project often echoes 
scholarly studie that present a coherent overview , at least more coherent than the last scholarly 
attempt , of a definable cultural tra · ton, although such overviews can be found particularly 
unhelpful come a real encounte ith son e aspect of the said tradition. · 
As a type of test oft e h pothesi I am proposing , one can look again at a well-known 
example of an underlying and app re determinative cultural structure , namely , Arthur Wolfs 
ethnographic account of the different grades of spirit currency burned to ghosts , ancestors , and 
gods -- coarse yellow paper , paper with a silver applique , and finer paper with a gold applique , 
re pectively. Although focusing on one part of Taiwanese rural society , Wolf argued that this 
system of paper types demonstrates a more basic and wider cultural understanding of the 
organization of the cosmo , one "that mirrors the social landscape of its adherents." 39 His 
ethnography is often cited as evidence of a latent structure in Chinese folk practice , in reference 
to which a particular belief , such as the existence of ancestral spirits , makes sense to people and 
accounts for a variety of related actions. Hawver , it is equally persuasive , and correct to argue 
that Wolf represented thi practice as more coherent and routine than it really was o is. 
Extended ethnographic observation adds so many qualifications and regional differ ces that the 
original assertion can be regarded , at best , as heavily generalized , that is, as much sug estive 
than descriptive. 40 
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f) 
Several sociological studies have attempted to assess the degree of coherence among the 
beliefs to which people are willing to attest , and their results reinforce each other: there is 
sur risin I little coherence among people ' s formulated beliefs and it decreases as one moves 
from more educate an art,cu ate people , comforta le with narrative or abstract categories , to 
the less-educated , who are not as apt to use them. 4 1 Two of these studies also inquired into the 
"meaning " of various ritual practices and found little consensus among the explanations given , 
even when people were asked about ritual features that had well-known , even memorized , 
doctrinal explanations associated with them. Instead of these formalized and accessible 
explanations of belief , which informants could volunteer when pressed , people routinely 
preferred to use their own , fairly personal 'takes ,' which used very loosely related ideas and 
claimed to be rooted in experience. 
My own research into ritual activity makes me tend to think of beliefs not as something 
prior to or separate from action , that is, not as something mental , cognitive , or linguistic in 
oppo ition to the physical or active. If there are habits of the body , there can be habits of thought 
and expression as well as speech and self-presentation. They are all social activities. While I use 
terms like 'religion' - albeit with all the historical qualifications and hesitations shared by others -
- when talking about Chinese materials , the language of belief seems more distorting , in 
particular , by specifically imposing a false sense of coherence , conviction , systemization , and 
meaning. We cannot appeal to 'belief to describe how people exist within their cultures ; yet 
without 'belief' it is not clear what we mean by 'religion.' If it seems easier to talk about Chinese 
religion , rather than Chinese beliefs , it may be imply because one is more comfortable today 
attributing a working coherence among cultural phenomena rather than implying the illusion and 
falsity of specific ideas. 
This problem brings up an interesting association , namely , the strange fortunes of what 
would seem to be a particularly Chinese "bundle of behaviors ," the prognostications of fengshui 
(wind and water) , which are ubiquitous in California and becoming familiar elsewhere in the 
United States. Going beyond the dabbling of "new-agers" or the concerns of transplanted 
Chine e,f engshui is al o being used by all sorts of serious people as a type of back-up system of 
cosmic control and in urance. It is possible that one day , we may compare its global spread to 
such other cultural practices as food spicing and tea drinking. A similar phenomenon can be seen 
in the enduring popularity of the Asian martial arts , especially taiqi , begun in the late 1970s and 
early 80s , or Japanese Zen meditation , begun in the 1930a. Fengshui , taiqi and zazen are closely 
tied to ritual po tures considered very basic to Chinese and Japanese culture , yet they have been 
readily translated to the more pluralist sections of American society . The viable translatability 
and subsequent longevity of these sets of practices indicate the existence of something not 
readily caught in either universals or particulars , something both more durable and mutable and 
much less hindered by incoherence with other sets of practice. 
In short , such packaged sets of behaviors blur 'religion' as such. As a feature of a global 
society and culture , the translatability of fengshui , taiqi and zazen is evidence of cultural 
properties going in many directions - perhaps too many for our notions of religion and culture to 
track. In the end , religion may vanish as any sort of empirical entity in one place , only to emerge 
in another , as attested by the growing numbers of Christian evangelicals in Beijing as well as the 
government officials trying to control them with a stretched classification schema. To appreciate 
these issues is to be more fully historical in our understanding and use of theoretical categories. 
Fengshui is not particularly illuminated by being regarded as a belief or part of a more 
comprehensive religion , terms that return to the defining polarities of universalism and 
particularism. Nor do the activities of members of the Falundafa fit traditional theories of 
religion , although they do evoke many older models in Chinese history. Theorists do not need to 
stop using the terms belief and religion , but their l:)jstoricalireigbt must be made art of the . 
And theorists do not need to stop theorizi ~ course - a er a , 1t 1s a distinct cultural practice 
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to seek universal explanations and doing so must be as legitimate as offering incense to one's 
ancestors -- as long as no one gets hurt. But the coherence or incoherence of practices can be 
explored on a more realistic footing if scholarship can let go of the transcendent status still 
clutched by Shweder and the quest for a logically prior theory of interpretation still sought by 
Davidson. Without the panorama provided by these perspectives, we will have to spend a lot time 
figuring out how to situate ourselve ~ h11t thP ,;i l+a ...... - .... __ ~v • , o tak "" "Pr~ L f,;ir Q_it!'\~f. 
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Belief, Beliefs, Believing: 
Declensions of "The Problem" 1 
It is impossible to be nonchalant about the fact that the topic of belief has 
been addressed at this university for about as long as universities as such have 
existed. As home base for centuries of theologians, philosophers, linguists, and 
anthropologists, who have constantly redefined the so-called "problem of belief " 
one is automatically humbled, if not crushed, by the weight of the history of all 
these opinions. Is there anything left to be said? Of course. Knowledge is not a 
• glass one can fill up or a wall that is built, brick by brick, generation by generation , 
to be judged someday as sufficient, if not complete. Knowledge is a constant 
exercise of interpretation in which all the components - the interpreter, the 
interpreted, and the contextual reasons to bother in the first place - are always 
shifting . So, pinned , perhaps , but not crushed by the weight of history, let me give 
belief yet another try. 
• 
Belief is identified in different ways by philosophers, anthropologists, and 
cultural theorists, but it has become something of a habit to refer to the issue as 
"the problem." Even across the· full spread of academic disciplines, there are 
scholars who will identify belief as the problem of their respective fields .2 In the 
time I have with you today , I would like to explore the problem status that belief 
• 
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for the formal study of religion in particular. I wish in doing so I could expose the 
vacuous triviality or sententious cynicism of the current research trajectories, and 
then map a brilliant route through the problem. But I can only work to make an 
argument for a line of thinking that may allow us to ask some fresh and pertinent 
questions; it will not solve all the problems identified with belief and certainly 
would not satisfy any of my predecessors in the preceding centuries of lectures on 
this topic. In an area like this one, an additional perspective cannot improve on the 
work of others in any absolute sense; but it may have the virtue of supplying more 
effective words for the questions of this generation or a more effective approach to 
• work with such questions in a clearer fashion. 
• 
It should be noted at the outset that few terms in any discipline spread 
themselves across the lexicon of the European languages as broadly as belief. Its 
uses are legion. One uses the term in reference to the God of biblical qualities and 
one's confidence in a particular television weathercast. That old master of the 
English language , W. C. Fields, captured the crux of the dilemma when he 
characteristically pronounced that "Everyone should believe in something. I 
believe I'll have another drink." 3 Fields aside, the relevant literature stretches from 
David Hume to Donald Davidson and from Wilfred Cantwell Smith to Slavoj 
Zizek. 4 One is informed by the work of Paul Connerton and Danielle Hervieu-
Leger on memory; Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau on practice; Rodney 
• 
• 
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Needham on the significant anthropological issues; Paul Veyne and Donald Lopez 
have been historical and theoretical touchstones. 5 And the theological tradition is 
indispensable, of course, from Tertullian to Tillich, Irenaeus to Rahner. Belief is 
clearly an issue in human reasoning and communication, cognition and memory, 
3 
psychological orientation and social conditioning, religious reflection, and analyses 
of secularism. I want to cobble together a rather simple direction using my ideas 
about their ideas primarily to foster a long overdue discussion in my own field, the 
history of religions, spurring it with an exploration of the value of the term as an 
analytic tool in the study of religion . 
I. Surveying "The Problem" 
The popular press is very ready to see particular problems posed by belief 
and believers. Several years ago I could note studies on the silliness of religious 
beliefs , such as Wendy Kaminer's Sleeping with Terrestrials: the Rise of 
lrrationalism and the Perils of Piety and Michael Shermer' s Why People Believe 
Weird Things.6 Since then, reactions to the terrorism of 9/11 in America have come 
into print, examining not just extreme Islamists, but the religious radicalism seen in 
American politics. Most recently, Sam Harris has won much attention for his 
stinging critique of all forms of religious belief in The End of Faith: Religion, 
Terror and Future of Reason. 7 However, such strong reactions are also due to the 
• 
• 
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decision by the state of Kansas school board to introduce "intelligent design" along 
side evolution in the state's science curriculum. 8 Although their decision was 
successfully challenged in court, and half of the school board was subsequently 
voted out of office, the specter of religion creeping into science classes is 
providing much grist for the mills of indignant scholars. It would be hard to be 
more iconoclastic than the book by the distinguished philosopher of science, 
Daniel Dennett. In Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, he 
compares religion to a virus that can thrive in the body of a receptive host, whose 
subsequent (irrational) behavior enables the propagation of the virus species. 9 
These opinions constitute the latest chapter in Wes tern culture's perpetual 
polarization of belief and reason, faith and rationality, religion and science. 10 These 
issues were articulated most clearly, of course, in the social reorganizations and 
formal documents of the Enlightenment, where the poles of this dialectic were set. 
Yet we are still seeing our culture in terms of faith versus reason even though we 
clearly live in a very post-Enlightenment world. Indeed, the Enlightenment 
paradigm now encodes a wide variety of ideological if not material interests, 
specifically, in America, biblical religion versus Darwinian science. Scientists, 
theologians, hack writers all contribute to the fray that politicians have been very 
willing to exploit. All start from the same stark duality in which science is the 
natural opposite of religion, each pole constantly alert to contain the power wielded 
• 
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by the other. Only a savvy journalist or two has suggested the degree to which this 
simplistic view of religion and science is a play of shadow puppets manipulated by 
a variety of interest groups on the political playing field. In the end, the paradigm 
of reason versus belief is deeply ingrained in the discourse of modem culture even 
though it is not a very good depiction of the conditions of modern culture. 11 
In the discourse community of philosophy, quite beyond the machinations of 
the popular marketplace of ideas, the qualities of belief are not opposed to reason 
and simplified Enlightenment dichotomies have been left behind, although not 
forgotten. The views of thinkers from Hume to Wittgenstein could be surveyed at 
• this point to illustrate a lively philosophical tradition, continued by such late 20th 
century figures as Stuart Hampshire, Gilbert Harman, and Richard Rorty; with 
Rorty one also evokes the lineage of American pragmatism from William James 
through John Dewey. 12 In an earlier publication I focused on the American 
philosopher Donald Davidson, at some length, to understand better the "problem of .. 
belief' as it figures in current philosophical analyses. In striking contrast to the 
popular perspective, philosophy generally thinks of belief as a universal quality, 
playing an integral role in a basic holism (not a division) interlacing thought and 
action in general. Davidson's "principle of charity," a name appreciated especially 
by the novice, argues that broad agreement is the condition for any linguistic 
• understanding of each other. 13 Asserting that "belief is central to all kinds of 
• 
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thought," he explains that belief is what allows us to take for granted general 
perceptions of the material world that are basic to the formation of thoughts, 
spoken statements, and the conditions needed to understand each other. 14 Belief 
and meaningfulness are dependent on each other, and have a formal role in the act 
of interpretation. 
To give a more specific example, Davidson argues that we have to believe 
that the statements someone makes are or can be true, even if we conclude he or 
she is lying, mistaken, or crazy. Thus we must infer belief to grant the meaning 
needed to make the most basic act of interpreting each other. This is probably 
6 
• enough Davidson to illustrate the contrast he presents to the popular view opposing 
belief with the meaningfulness of reason; instead of making belief the weak of half 
of this type of dualism, a philosopher like Davidson locates the problem of belief 
• 
in the universal act of person-to-person interpretation. 
In the set of closely intertwined disciplines -- anthropology/sociology, 
cognitive theory, and the study of religion -- the problem of belief is conceived in 
quite distinct ways, but in each case the fundamental issue concerns the degree of 
holism that is understood as basic to social understanding. Still, these fields would 
not use Davidson's terminology, so comparing their views of belief is rather 
difficult. But for most scholars of culture, belief is the problem of universalism 
versus particularism: that is, what can we assume to be common to all people 
• 
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simply by virtue of our common roots in evolution, history, or even the human 
condition, and what is culturally particular to a social practice even while subject 
to forces of diffusion that can push certain activities well beyond an original point 
of germination. However, universality can sometimes mean common to all social 
7 
life and sometimes simply "mentally accessibility to all." In the latter case, because 
one may be familiar with belief in the God of the Abrahamic religions, one may 
feel - rightly or wrongly - that one has some access to how ancient Greeks 
believed in their pantheon of gods. 
Particularism suggests that we have no such access to the experiences of 
• another religion and, indeed, can only make sense of what is so foreign by 
attempting to reconstruct, only more or less accurately, a system of ideas in which 
specific pieces can be illuminated. By the time any universal or particularlist 
project is underway , it is probably rife with assumptions and precarious leaps of 
logic. Yet, at the same time, it is easy to see a measure of common sense to both 
positions - that we can understand something about other human experiences and 
we should not assume that we can understand anything about them. 
• 
Few have tried as hard as the anthropologist Richard Shweder to find a 
reasonable synthesis to the opposition of universalism and particularism. In a series 
of studies in the 1980s he tried to clarify all the different versions of the arguments 
on both sides, and then he attempted to elucidate a self-consciously post~positivist , 
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postmodernist position. Shweder argued that the discipline of anthropology was the 
product of a collision between our notions of universality and particularity. This 
collision created a "fault-line," he argued, using the metaphor of continental plates, 
which can be illustrated by various vexing scenarios that come up routinely for the 
anthropologist. Indeed, Shweder suggests, were anyone able to resolve such 
scenarios, anthropology as we know it would probably not be needed any more; 
the whole field would collapse. A typical scenario is the "witch question," which is 
actually not so removed from the possible experience within a multi-cultural 
society. Accord to Shweder, the witch scenario unfolds when your informant, the 
• person whose judgment you have so greatly relied upon, takes you aside one day 
and admits, possibly at some degree of danger to himself, that he is really a witch. 
You come from a tradition that does not believe in witches, so do you accept this 
statement by your informant as true or not true? 15 
• 
With the argument that the interpretation of beliefs is the central 
anthropological question and the distinctive fault-line of the discipline, Shweder's 
answer is two-fold: unquestionably, the person is a witch (in this way Shweder 
recognizes the culturally relative and particular), but as the anthropologist who 
must reconstruct the system of ideas that "makes sense" of this belief, he can claim 
a type of "transcendence" of the particular and the relative (thereby recognizing a 
capacity to perceive the universal in some form). Shweder hastens to add that this 
• 
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sense of transcendence must not be accompanied by any sense of superiority, since 
one culture is simply using its categories to interpret another -- and the same 
operation is no doubt being performed by the informant. Shweder wants to 
establish a position of relative "transcendence without superiority" with regard to 
the "realities" that another culture presents to one's own cultural categories. 16 I 
think that Shweder has, in fact, described one of the ways we negotiate the fault-
line; he does not describe how to resolve it. Anthropology may be safe for another 
d 17 ay. 
The respected anthropologist Katherine Ewing provides a curious postscript 
• to Shweder's fault-line "witch" question. 18 Ewing's works on Sufism, particularly 
the highly secret relationship between disciple and Sufi master, and she contributed 
a remarkable account of personal experience in the journal, American 
• 
Anthropologist. Subtitled "The Temptation to Belieye," Ewing used her own 
experiences with a Sufi master, who seemed to be directing her dreams, to 
articulate a common experience among anthropologists thoroughly embedded in a 
culture, the drift into a generally vague but sporadically more explicit form of 
belief in the ideas they are studying, often derided as "going native." Ewing 
describes how the circumstances of her dreams left her wobbling in her confidence 
as an objective ethnographer. To an extent not clear to herself, she became a type a 
believer and, therefore , an insider--someone who understood and was told more. 19 
• 
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Yet going native can leave one unable to explain any of this insider information to 
one's professional community by virtue of vows of confidence, or simply the 
inability to convey the convincing insider experience.20 
In contrast to the fine parsing of the problem of belief in anthropology, the 
term presents few concerns for cognitive theory, a field that is currently the locus 
of much excited debate by scholars of all types. Composed of psychologists, 
neurologists, evolutionary biologists and all the subfields in between, cognitive 
theory gives a great deal of attention to why and how people belief. One recent title 
is explicit -- "Why Would Anyone Believe in God?"21 The most common "short" 
• answer identifies believing as a cognitive process selected for its adaptive value in 
the evolutionary task of human beings surviving in stable groups. This makes 
believing part of what created thinking, sociable humans, although some cognitive 
theorists are quick to point out that it is a vestige of evolution that ill equips us for 
modem life. 
• 
Despite a focus on etiology of belief, cognitive theory is a bit quick to define 
it as the religious act of positing the existence of what they call "counter-intuitive 
agencies. "22 So, while philosophers regard religious believing as just one instance 
of the larger cognitive phenomenon of belief, so far that is the main interest to 
cognitive theory. Most cognitivists are unabashedly scientific, intent on 
• 
• 
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"explaining" ( eklaren, not verstehen) why irrational beliefs, or religion, came into 
existence and remained long past its most obvious adaptive uses.23 
For those in the fields of neurology, the neurophysiology of cognition, or 
evolutionary biology, their interest in religion is tied to new research tools like 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) as well as the synergy of these new fields 
coming together around new maps of the mind and paradigms of consciousness 
and neural processing. 24 Their apparent lack of hermeneutical interest in the 
challenges posed by language is in keeping with the style of science generally, but 
it makes their work feel very alien to humanists. When they locate "the problem of 
belief, they solve it, that is, they explain what is going on. Even when their 
explanations can only be speculative, they sound very reductionist to scholars 
concerned to interpret (verstehen) rather than explain (eklaren). 25 
However, the late anthropologist, Roy Rappaport, used cognitive theory, 
among other things, to develop a speculative account but insightful and popular 
analysis of the nature of belief. He assumed its biological evolution and focused on 
the dynamics of its social enactment, through which an experience and concept of 
"the sacred" was generated among human beings and functioned, in turn, to mold 
them as human beings. This social process involved, as Vico, Comte, and Hume al 1 
suggested, an experience of power and an act of submission to the idea of a higher 
authority. Rappaport playfully describes the concept of power in this way: "The 
• 
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unfalsifiable supported by the undeniable yields the unquestionable, which 
transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the conventional into the correct , the 
necessary, and the natural." The process of deferring the quality and significance 
unquestionableness to the unknown comes to constitute sanctity itself; it is as a 
form of absolute authority that the sacred makes possible "the foundation upon 
which the human way of life stands." For Rappaport, belief in sanctity enables 
humanity to evolve social community, intellectual reflexivity, and the experience 
of transcendence itself. 26 
12 
The idea that religion may be a selected adaptive feature in human evolution 
• is far from new; it goes back to many pre-Darwinian notions of social evolution. In 
mid-twentieth century phenomenological theories of religion, an approach based 
on religion as sui generis or non-reducible to other forces, scholars such as Mircea 
Eliade would even speculate about evolutionary origins before confining 
discussion to the "phenomenon" at hand, the origins of which should not matter. 27 
The phenomenology of religion approach, otherwise known as the history of 
religions, has been significantly derelict , compared to its disciplinary neighbors , in 
discussing belief. Perhaps the need to distinguish itself from theology explains the 
odd lacuna in their decades of analysis. Yet it is surprising that belief, as a separate 
entry , was left out of the multi-volume Encyclopedia of Religion edited by Eliade 
• and published in 1986.28 Instead, the reader is told to "See Doubt (and Belief)," 
• 
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which provides a thoughtful but very theological engagement of the top ic. Belief 
may have been ceded to the theologians in order to help define the borders of the 
phenomenological study of religion. With an exception here and here, my 
colleagues in the history of religions -- compared to philosophers, anthropologists 
and cognitive theorists -- have not seen a "problem" with belief. In fact, they do 
not seem to see belief at all, although they refer to it all the time. 29 
II. Universal and Particular 
The preceding discussion has been a brief scurry through some background 
• for the problem of belief. Let me now focus on one of the most central is ues and 
illustrate it with materials more germane to historical studies - and that is, the 
universality or particularity of our references to belief. In other words, can we say 
that all people believe in religious entities? Can we describe all religious ideas as 
beliefs? Or does "believing" imply a very specific type of self-conscious 
relationship with specific types of divine entities? The ethnographic evid e ce 1s 
mixed. In 1972 Rodney Needham noted the expedient ease with which many 
ethnographers blithely claimed that such and such people believe in this and that 
god or gods, comfortable with the assumption that the English verb "to believe" 
captures the particular religious sensibilities of a very different people. 30 Of course, 
• as the Shweder discussion made clear, a universal assumption about the know-
• 
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ability of other peoples and cultures has been basic to anthropology. Similarly, a 
fundamental assumption about the unity of believing as a phenomenon has 
supported the whole enterprise of comparative religions and most "worl d 
religions" textbooks. 
14 
In contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham point ed out the 
close attention to local terms first used by Evans-Pritchard in his study of the Nuer 
and their theology. Needham himself examined the indigenous terms for a ything 
comparable to belief among the Navaho, Hinduism, the dialects of the P ilippines , 
and the Penan of Borneo. The exercise gave evidence, he suggested, of '' he 
• bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently transla t d by the 
English 'believe'. "31 
• 
Most recently, the Buddhologist Donald Lopez analyzed the term belief for 
its usefulness in the study of religion, challenging the assumption of un i ,ersality. 
For Lopez, our notion of belief as something common to all religions is part of our 
blindness to difference and willingness to convert the world to one way of thinking.' 
He argues that what we intend by belief has a clear historical locus in the matrix of 
meanings forged by early Christianity and developed in the course of Ch istian 
history as it sought to define its theological orthodoxy and institutional 
jurisdiction. 32 It was during the Inquisition, in fact, that belief acquired it current 
distinctive gloss by which outward action is deemed an inadequate indication of 
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the views one harbors deep within the heart. Only torture can reveal tho._:e 
sentiments and elicit true repentance, if needed. 
15 
Lopez illustrates his point with the dramatic narrative of Peter of V rona, a 
13th century preacher asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisitio n against 
the Gnostic heresy of the Cathars or Albigensians. This early Inquisitio n 
institutionalized testing a person for one's true beliefs, while defining the errors 
and punishments associated with the sin of heresy against the church. But Lopez 
notes that the Inquisition was also deeply involved in the confiscation of property, 
which added to the local zeal of the movement, and in a struggle for political 
• control of a great deal of southern France between the pope and the Holy {oman 
Emperor. Peter of Verona, early Inquisitor, eventually became a martyr t the 
cause: the story has it that as he was dying from a stab wound, he inscr ibe 
"credo ," the beginning of the orthodox creed, on the ground with his o, n blood. 
• 
The credo , of course, points back to the long historical importan ce of oral 
and public assertion of one's beliefs, although all the creeds of the earl ' drn rch 
arose in the context of disputing heresies. However, summing up a great deal of 
history in this one brief historical sketch of Peter the Inquisitor and maii_,T. Lopez 
concludes that Christianity came to distinguish belief not by what a person said 
publicly , but by "the invisible content of the mind." 33 Since the means 01· 
identifying believers from non-believers would give great power to the ~ 1 1~ 
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deciding who had what in their hearts, Lopez also concludes that the ides of belief 
"is neither natural nor universal. It might be described as an ideology, '"'n idea that 
arises from a specific set of material interests." 34 
Lopez develops a second example describing the 1881 Buddhist Catechism 
with which Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Bud hism into 
the modern world. In Olcott's understanding, Buddhism was a religion and, 
therefore, a system of beliefs. So he was shocked by how poorly the pioLs monks 
of Sri Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs that early transl ai:1J1s had 
had made so familiar to Olcott. He was especially concerned that Budd hi ~ LS be able 
• to hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries who were de::,t .. oying 
the indigenous culture. Pointing to Olcott's "ideology of belief," Lopez suggests 
that his assumptions about the universal nature of religion were rooted in Christian 
history and doomed to obfuscate real understanding of Buddhism. 35 
• 
Although Lopez's argument for the cultural particularism of belief i -
welcome for taking up the topic of belief at all, I cannot fully agree with 11is 
conclusions. Still , in a publication of my own not long after his, I indirec t ' 
supported a similar position by challenging the frequently quoted formul a that "the 
Chinese believe in spirits." In fact, the closer one tried to pin down such a 
generalization , the more complicated became the ideas of "the Chinese" l .- well as 
"believe in spirits. "36 
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My arguments supplemented those that Lopez invoked when he countered 
the assumed "universality" of belief by pointing to the cultural particularit y of the 
concept's origins. But Lopez was convinced that the concept of belief ori ·nated in 
the matrix of Christianity and that its onslaught obfuscated the real dynam .cs of 
local Singhalese Buddhism. I would question Lopez's analysis in these tw ) areas. 
First, does the concept of belief that we have today, which went out to conquer the 
world in the 1 t century and, he suggests, again in the 16th, really originate in 
• Christianity? Paul Veyne's study of belief among the ancient Greeks comvlicates , 
the picture, as does a new study of the legacy of Pythagoras and several studies of 
1st century BC/AD Judaism. 37 38The more we learn about how the Christia n matrix 
of belief fits into the full historical mosaic of social forces at the time of ib 
supposed creation, the less originality we can automatically ascribe to that ery 
successful religion. In other words, I am not convinced its so Christian. 
• 
Second, although Lopez focus on just this one encounter of Olcott and turn 
of the century Singhalese Buddhism, he knows better than I that the Britis h were 
far from the first Europeans in Sir Lanka, that the Europeans were not the 1irst to 
conquer and colonize the island, and that the island had been swept by the winds of 
other cultural influences for several millennia. It is also well accepted that rhe Sri 
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Lankans had the right to appropriate colonial categories, such as the idea of beliefs 
one learns by heart, in whatever way they wished. And they did. In fact, great parts 
of the world today increasingly understand themselves in terms of religiou s 
movements involving what Lopez describes as the Christian ideas of choic e, 
conversion, and commitment that make up the Western notion of belief. If the three 
fastest growing religions are Catholicism, Islam and Christian evangelicali sm, then 
belief is not a category we can dismiss for its checkered ideological past in the 
hands of papal Inquisitors or colonial catechists. It has meaning to many today. 
Two short studies by de Certeau are provocative for rethinking the issue of 
• belief. He suggests , perhaps unwittingly, that most modem European languages 
allow sufficient looseness to the idea of belief to justify the very general se se in 
which we might interpret the term, that is, as the understanding that more often 
than not human beings think of themselves as coexisting in the cosmos with other 
invisible beings , usually sacred or superhuman, and this coexistence involv es 
certain interactions with them. De Certeau himself assumes universality in his 
• 
analysis of how believing sets up a temporally defined contractual relation ship, 
marked by the investment of one party with the clear sense of something 
eventually due in return. 39 Yet he is a sociologist of modern industrial soci ty, 
suggesting that today we . can never really understand belief. It is a wary modern 
• 
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conclusion, based on the popular view, he suggests, that for us now there are "too , 
many things to believe and not enough credibility to go around." 40 
De Certeau actually dips in and out of two understandings of belief, ones 
that would be familiar to Needham. In one line of analysis he cleverly desc ribes 
belief as what we have when we no longer believe. 41 Yet in pointing to this 
"fallen" state, de Certeau assumes a disruptive change in some automatic c 1ltural 
moment, a change that came with degrees of choice about what to believe or how 
much to believe it. When the cultural status quo is rocked by change, then Hbeliefs" 
are apt to be formulated or clarified. They may even be compared, the new with the 
• old, if only to attempt to dismiss the influence of a visiting anthropologist r 
missionary. In this discussion de Certeau seems to imply the existence of a11 
innocent, pre-choice, unself-conscious mode of transaction with the gods, ho are 
not formulated in concepts any more than they need to be. Stories, titles, distinctive 
ritual greetings or offerings - these are the ways such innocents believe; certainly 
not in reasoned concepts. Only when the missionaries arrive, the Phoenicians land, 
the Jews conquer Canaan, or cultures clash, are presented with choices, wh ich, as a 
break from the old, must be accompanied by an extra show of commitment. Then 
we are no longer dealing with the gods; we are dealing just with our belief:.. _-n 
IV. Rejection 
• 
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In contrast to Lopez and de Certeau, Paul Veyne does not make argu;nents 
about the universal and the particular; he talk about "modalities" of belief nd the 
effect of choices. He describes one modality as coming into being when the option 
of doubt opens up a new type of choice, the unprecedented social position f being 
in a position to doubt. Veyne describes Pausanius, laboring over his compilation of ' 
the stories of local gods, deciding that a "kernel of truth" must reside in the many 
redundant tales he had amassed. Before him, of course, Herodotus reported what 
many different people told him with the amused distance of one not closely 
attached to a particular version. And Thucydides researched the stories he \vas told, 
• to create one clear narrative of the Peloponnesian war that, being the most reliable 
version he could determine, he believed in. These are not the triumph of logos over 
mythos, Veyne suggests, but the development of mythos, and history, and 
criticism-all modalities of belief, co-existing modalities of truth. 
• 
Several elements come together in Veyne' s account that will not be asily 
undone in Western culture (creating a limit to what can co-exist). First, the ultural 
pluralism seen in the plethora of local tales that Pausanius gathers, the soci·-1 
shaded perspectives compared by Thucydides, the culturally varied materia I 
reported by Herodotus. Secondly, the process of comparison and choice: dt ... to the 
pluralism that he stumbled upon, Pausanius chose to assume a so-called "hi :tori cal 
kernel" of truth in all the myths, while entertaining a new type of doubt ab t the 
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details, especially the repetitive mythic themes. It is a familiar modality of both 
believing and doubting. Thucydides took the other extreme, to leave out th 
fantastic altogether in favor of a distinctly non-mythic realism demonstrate by the 
internal logic of the narration itself. In this choice, mythos is defined as the 
incredible and doubtful, irrelevant to the type of critical history in which 
Thucydides now believed. 43 
By the time Christianity developed in the long simmering melting po ~ of the 
Mediterranean world, if you got around a bit beyond your own village, you1 beliefs 
would identify and locate you; if you got around a lot more, they were apt t,J 
• involve some personal choices, whether it was Mithraism, attachment to a 
particular Roman god, convictions about the Christ in any of the various ve sions 
of his significance, or involvement in some sect of Jewish nationalism. When 
personal choice entered the picture, believing was always seen as a type of 
conversion away from the rule of reason, which would never be more than t e rule 
of the familiar, the status quo, simple common sense; exercising choice wa ... an 
acceptance of the incredible, remaking your old identity by the choosing as well as 
by what was chosen. A set of beliefs to which one orally testified became the crux 
of being Christian , or a follower of Mithra, a devotee of Jupiter, and so on. 
• Textual culture -- seen in the different enterprises of Pausanius, the Essenes, or the letter-writing Christian Paul -- could make its own claims as a mediff n, that 
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is, develop its own modalities of belief and doubt. The gathering together of a 
canonical set of scriptures, the way so many Christianities were weeded out of the 
early Church and history, established some of its authority by the attribution s to 
attributed to people who had been there as witnesses. While this made the t xts a 
great source of authority for the revelation of Christ, oral and public recitati n of 
the credo made one a Christian. 44 Continuing to work Veyne' s generous term, 
further modalities of belief would open up between scriptural testimony, on the one 
hand, and the institutionalization of apostolic succession claiming authority ver 
them, on the other. This early distinction would to ripen into the great divide of the 
• 16th century Reformation. 
• 
Lopez might be analyzed historically a bit further. In which case, early 
Christianity pulled together many influences to imbue the practices of believing 
with its own particular set of meanings. As with every winner on the historical 
stage, Christianity developed to define the parameters of believing for so much 
subsequent European history, although other local models always existed, if with 
difficulty. Within the Christian matrix, belief was premised on individual choice 
and, as such, could always vie with the traditions of tribe, city, or family. It was a 
matter of choice, conversion, commitment, with doubt of the other firming up into 
rejection of all else, at times even repulsion. This process was ritualized early on in 
the institution of the catechumenate. At the same time, the succession of creeds 
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articulated by the early churches continued to ritualize entrance into the rightful 
"house" through the oral profession of the doctrines of one's faith. 
Lopez mentions the feature of rejection in passing; and I think he is very 
right to note this aspect of the Christian model. Its modality of choice clearly 
meant a concomitant rejection: I believe in this, not that; I am a Christian, not a 
Roman, not a Jew. Choice does not require rejection, but it became the final 
component for the emergent Christianity that cast and recast itself in those early 
centuries. Indeed, after so much time modem Christians have had to learn how 
commitment and rejection can relax into choice and mere doubt, otherwise real 
23 
• tolerance would be inconceivable. 
• 
V. Believing 
Yet Lopez's analysis raises some questions. 
First, is Christianity really the model of believing in the many of cultures of 
Europe as well as its colonial legatees? Has the model remained fixed in nuance 
and emphasis? And, can a certain historical set of Christian assumptions indelibly 
shape our sense of the term in all the European languages for all time? Christians 
certainly fit the traditions of the Jews, Muslims and various pagans into their own 
model and what did not fit could not be easily thought. Lopez is undoubtedly 
correct in his characterization of the substance of that model for some of medieval 
• 
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history, but since the Enlightenment, and probably the Renaissance, that model has 
been tweaked and refitted and subject to interpretation. As a small example, I have 
known Catholic institutions for a good part of my life, in one connection or another, 
and I know that up close 20th century Roman Catholic believing has changed 
dramatically in a mere half century in most places in Europe and America. I think 
the question of historical homogeneity impacts how we view the probable origins 
of the model.45 Were the really Christian? 
Second, an easy contrast to the religious matrix of choice, conversion, 
commitment and rejection would be the religious cultures of the primarily oral 
• peoples Europeans encountered. Yet the assumption that such peoples were all 
sufficiently isolated to afforded no real socio-cultural choices to individuals until 
the Christian missionary arrived is probably overstated and in danger of 
propagating, under the table, so to speak, more of a Christian-centered 
understanding of history. As an assumption, this theoretical isolation and lack of 
choice among indigenous peoples is probably very dependent on a Protestant 
tendency to misunderstand orality itself as inherently primitive; this view made it 
very difficult for the earliest ethnographers to even refer to indigenous spiritualities 
as "religions" - and when they could, the implied continuity across cultures 
implied was not appreciated by European religious, and academic, authorities. We 
• are increasingly learning that indigenous cultures in the past were rarely so isolated 
• 
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or marked by consensus that the individual had no choices to make, such as --
trading further afar, joining the cults that would arise at times of stress, absorbing 
more quickly the influence of conquering tribes whose enlarged kingdoms would 
evolve more complex religious patterns, or simply the decision to assume a larger 
role in the ceremonial life of the community -- like the blinded hunter, Ogotemmeli, 
who was the keeper of the Dogon sacred lore imparted to Marcel Griaule. 46 No 
matter how small and isolated, everyone in a community would not be involved 
with their spirits and cultural lore to the same degree or in the same way.47 This is , 
not to deny that some communities appear to engage in whole-sale rejections of 
• outside influences, such as the missionaries, in favor of their own traditions. But I 
do question the uniqueness of the "choice and conversion of the individual" model. 
• 
These are not technical quibbles aimed at Lopez's argument; I think they are 
inherently challenges to the degree of "particularity" to which we think we can 
resort when jettisoning master narratives and grand universalities. If the Christian 
model of belief described by Lopez really has older roots and many varietals, and 
oral cultures do not prevent the presence of some of the components of this so-
called Christian model, then an even more central - methodological -- question 
looms. Is the historical freight of the notion of belief in the European world so set 
and insurmountable that the term has not or cannot evolve to be used - with care 
and imagination -- to describe other ways of believing? To say it cannot could 
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suggest that other cultures do not believe in anything like the sense of the term. Do 
we really want to be so particular that we are thrown back on another form of 
ethnocentrism? 
I do not think that stretching our term belief to attempt to describe very 
differently constructed relationships with the supernatural is demanded by the 
hermeneutics of suspicion that drives a good post-modernist historian. Neither can 
I imagine any usage that would allow us to cease examining the baggage the term 
might still carry or take on. 48 
I am suggesting that, contra Lopez's anti-universalism (understood more as 
• colonialism), we might want to press our basic terminology beyond its usual 
culture-reinforcing channels, avoiding universalism as well as excessive 
• 
particularism. We would so do to have a basic analytical tool with which to explore 
real similarities as well as real differences, thereby allowing us to revise our tools 
even further to create ones more capable of multi-cultural purposes. Although the 
methodological channels for pursuing this approach are not obvious, I think the 
language of practice theory provides some basic guidelines. With a practice 
approach, we would ask about believing, not belief or beliefs. First of all, we could 
not assume that there is any one way of believing. Then we would ask how 
believing is constructed in the "semantic system" of particular cultural settings: 
what inner logic distinguishes it in Dogon or Buddhist cultures from other forms of ' 
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thinking, philosophizing, etc. To explore how believing is constructed would 
involve laying out the semantic field in which it is locally distinguished -- to 
whatever extent it may actually be distinguished. This is more complicated than 
simply determining what is believed and the forms believing takes. In addition, a 
practice approach would not let us assume that believing is a purely internal state 
of any kind, nor a personal understanding of ritualized relationships with divine 
powers. 
27 
Practice theory is based on a "critical" methodology, which first demands 
that we deconstruct the issue to determine exactly why we are interested in it, why 
• it is a problem to be explored or explained. In other words, we must uncover the 
implicit expectations, the assumptions at stake, the crown jewels in the pocket of a 
particular view of reality, that is, the value that is endangered if some assumption 
of our reality is unveiled. Practice theory also expects critical analysis to include an 
explicit rationale for the usefulness of the rethought term or issue. To analyze 
modes of believing, therefore, should not yield the same analysis as ritualizing or 
textualizing, to use some topics I have addressed before with practice theory; nor 
should it yield the same descriptions as 19th century theories of animism, 
monotheism, polytheism, pantheism, etc. 
De Certeau' s work is the oldest and clearest 'practice-like' theory around, to 
• date, but provocative resources lie in the ideas of Connerton and Hervieu-Leger on 
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memory (which attempt to shake up our premises and explore other cultural issues 
that may be involved in believing), and in some cognitive theories of the socially 
adaptive value of agency. 
I cannot lay out for you today a "practice theory of believing" - much as I 
wish my work were at that stage. I am confined to a "gadfly" role for today. I do 
want to suggest, however, that exploration of believing among Greeks and Romans 
would have to begin as an historical analysis of a non-essentialized lineage of 
people, groups, stories, texts, and rites both public and private over varying 
amounts of time and place. Such a study could arguably isolate some particular 
• cultural strategies at work in the different ways Greeks, and Romans, believed --
what I would call a strategic way of acting that enabled a certain type of meshing , 
• 
of constructed expectations, understood cosmology, and reinforcing personal 
experience , a meshing that would accomplish personalized socio-cultural ends, 
however political or even aesthetic they might be, however incomplete in any 
particular instance. I suggest that, for starters, choice, commitment, and rejection is 
not at all what Christian believing it about. That is what Christians like to think 
they are doing, and while not irrelevant by any means, it is only half the story. 
Most likely, believing most generally is likely to involve the ways in which 
contradictions are maintained, not truths affirmed. 49 
Thank you. 
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close involvement in the highly structured ritual lives of these communities, and then the relative sterility of 
the rationalized modern technocratic state, Catholicism presented the closest answer to a ritual life with a 
similarly embracing complexity. (Matthew Engelke, The Problem of Belief: Evans-Pritchard and Victor 
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sociologist, Fei Xiaotung, entitled "A World without Ghosts." Fei Xiaotung describes growing up in a large 
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community of which he felt a part. Fei compares such a boyhood to the American model of growing up under 
the influence of comic books about an endless stream of superheroes. How these two mindsets could not result 
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American child, Fei concludes he would not trade his floating spectral family and quieter, subsumed 
individuality. ow, to what extent can we assume that Fei, writing as a sociologist so many years removed 
from boyhood, believes in spirits? The essay form, the simple but insightful comparison, his tender nostalgia-
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professional is not the boy; he became quite self-conscious and distant in regard to believing it all. Do the 
Chinese believe in spirits only when they are young? When they are older, some may but others do not? Still 
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37 
Christine Joost-Gaugier, Measuring Heaven: Pythagoras and His Influence on Thought and Art in Antiquity , 
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40 de Certeau 177-179 
4 1 de Certeau 
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42 It is easy to recognize that people who have never been exposed to any world view but that of their own 
isolated culture probably do not generally hold the sense of coexistence in the world with their deities that one 
can find in a worldly sav ant like Augustine of Hippo , who was aware of many ways of looking at a more or 
less meaningful universe . lndeed , the first type of society offers its people limited options , nothing more than 
greater or lesser involvement in the various cultic activities that are not mandated , as initiations or ancestral 
rites might be. The more cosmopolitan society provides many more and dramatic distinct options , such as 
those faced by Augustine , who , according to his not totally reliable Confessions , saw two worlds , two 
cosmologies, fundament ally opposed to each other , demanding that he choose. In fact he had chosen many 
times , but the demand for a choice never left his purview. He would make a melodramatic choice to believe 
something specific , to turn from the cultural tradition of Terence and Virgil , to the biblical Christ of the North 
African Christianity of his day. His was a choice to engage in a new and specific set of relationships with the 
divine that brought a set of responsibilities accompanied generated by a very human community to which he 
was now tied. Mick McCarthy paper. 
43 Veyne , chapter 
44 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (Chicago, 19 ), foreskin account. 
Eisenstein ' s detailed explanation of the rise and ramifications of printing in Europe chronicles its association 
with the growth of a monastic industry advertising relics. Pilgrimage grew as people read , or heard from those 
who did, about these marvels and their purported cures , giving rise to the hospices run by the monasteries to 
house the wayfaring pilgrim and the wealthy cathedrals that grew up at the end off their routes. The relics and 
the hospices that went with them were important sources of income , not only enabling a monastery to build 
itself a great cathedral bL1t also to undertake the copying of manuscripts , an activity so important for the life-
blood of Christian cultur e and even the reappearance of Greek. So the printing of simple advertising circulars 
depicting the relics and miracles to be had at any particular place was among the immediate uses for the new 
technology. Yet , Eisenst ein contains the account of one vexed male pilgrim, complaining, after having gone to 
visit a seventh reliquary displaying the foreskin of Jesus. Like Pausanius , he was struck by doubt. But rather 
than grant a kernel of tru th, or hope , to any one of them , he seems to have ditched his previous piety to 
sarcastically question the whole business. Eisenstein ' s example describes the circulation of people around 
Europe and the holy land , the circulation of texts that encouraged them and then described their experiences , 
presenting them with a variety of competing holy items , even competing notions of holiness. Perhaps not many 
were as disposed to cyni cism as the writer of the complaint about a few too many foreskins; they may simply 
have refused to select , continuing to put their hope in one relic after another. But surely economic limits and 
the ability of some displ ays and stories to exert their influence would make choices inevitable-and some 
monasteries died while others prospered into major centers. In any case , plural options , or choices , could 
induce the faithful to acc ept much in the name of believing or reject it all for more critical stances. The 
diversity that Greek and ~oman culture presented , especially the alternatives presented to Jews or Christians 
should they travel throu gh Rome or beyond , forced choices on people at every tum. CHECK 
45 Christianity itself was never so homogenous that it could represent a unified modality or matrix, without 
variations in every possible component. The Christian matrix lived within the religion as well, as the 
Inquisition itself too clearly reminds us. Lopez ' s presentation of the role of the Inquisition in definin g the 
nature of belief represent s a very historically defined moment in church history and one that sounds like a 
conceptual prelude to the Refonnation. In the early Christian communities, we know that the nature of belief as 
well as the exact focus of belief were very much up for debate. What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem , 
asked Tertullian ; Origen took up the same question roughly a century later. But a century after Origen , he was 
a declared heretic as the church came to define more clearly its place in a Greco-Roman empire , even if it 
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fought off all Gnostic rationalizations of the particular divine-human revelation that Jesus Christ was thought 
to represent. The matri x is assembled slowly , and as it did , more corners and centers of Christendom 
experienced fewer choic es or conversions , the rejections mere proforma condemnations of distant heretics and 
fii~:s·in turn amazed Europe with their sophistication. Griaule's earliest books called these ideas African 
philosophy; but it was years later that the Dogon elders decided to tell him the real story.See Marcel Griault , 
Conversations with Ogotemmeli: An Introduction to Dogan Religious Ideas (London: Oxford, 1975 [ 1965]). 
47 Bell in Frankenberry , ed., Radical Interpr etation. 
48 In Lopez ' s quickly dra wn example , late 19th century Sinhalese Buddhism acts as a type of polar opposite to 
Christianity. In this sket ch, Theravada Buddhism is not built around beliefs, and certainly not the confessional , 
doctrinal or theological exploration of them; it is a practice , entirely moral at first , intent on distinct forms of 
physical and mental self -restraint at the more demanding level of the monk, with the explicit goals of a better 
rebirth and eventual tran cendence (to use a Western term). Of course, the first Buddhists were probably 
converts of a sort; they cl1ose commitment to a different path , perhaps not rejecting others so much as 
prioritizing the options , and maybe the differences were minor. But choice is exercised repeatedly in the stories 
of Buddhism. As you may know , the questions ' 'do Buddhists believe? " evokes the very old, and tired , 
question once endemic to comparative and world religion enterprises as to whether Buddhism could properly 
be called a religion or n r. This tempest in a teapot hails from the days when Buddhist practice was less 
defining of the tradition t Westerners than Buddhist scriptural teachings; clearly , Buddhism violated most of 
the definitional "norms" that religions believe in a transcendent being or benign force corresponding to a type 
of eternal soul. Ninian mart , among others , was convinced that ifwe let Buddhism in to the 'religio n' categor y, 
and he did (it certainl y meant textbooks sold better) , then why not communism , that other great example of a 
soul-less ideology qua r lig ion. So his cold war textbooks , and a few others , usually did include som e 
discussion of communi 111 and treated Buddhism as a religion with odd parameters - until it got to Mahayana 
of course. 
49 To suggest an answer would be to suggest what is distinctive about the modality of believing that the Greek s , 
evinced toward their god.; before too much critical analysis had piled up as a cultural option and all the stories 
were gathered to be reve;·ed as myths. Whatever it was earlier and later , it was different from believin g among 
the Romans, whose mytl-iic narrative was standardized earlier on and remained a bit separate from many 
activities of cultic worsh ip. The ''problem of belief' may be something different in every disciplinar y field , 
given their particular hi tori es of research and research materials. But for the study of religion , the problem of 
belief is clearly a meani rg less dead end. What can we ever say about belief in general? We can talk about 
beliefs , which are many, all had or held in different ways. Like any discipline , including Shweder 's fault-lined 
anthropology , we are concerned with the limits of what we know , the differences that we see and imagine, as 
well as the commonaliti that we cannot help but assume. This means that religious studies must focus on the 
practice of believing, on 110w people believe , construct believing relationships ... Through critical anal ysis we 
must leave the Christian aggage behind , which it can do only when we know it, as best we can at this point in 
history , but committed to continually plumbing the depths. Looking at the practice of believing, relativizing 
believing , emphasizin g the activitie rather than a hypothetical mindset, may enable us to do this. While is it 
another paper to lay out a full analysis of what it means to focus on the practice of believing , I think the simple 
change in wording open ~ the imagination to allow new and different questions. It may not take us as far as we 
need to go ; we may still find ourselves caught, like an oversize fish, in yet another fine netting of cu 't ural 
assumptions. But for the post-colonial anti-Christian dilemma that Lopez would leave us in, or de Ce11eau' s 
romantic having it both ways , or Veyne ' s generative classicism of myth to analysis, but all truths - these do 
not allow us to go furthe r a field , they beach us on dry land. They confine us to an impossibility, or a Christian 
ideology defined to seize goods and land; or a nai've mythic truth compared to the critical truth , all th ~ gift of 
the Greeks. Yes , the Greeks became self-conscious about their gods , but so did the Romans while being as 
bound to them as to the city and their history and their fortunes ; but a far traveled people, there was always an , 
odd element of doubt. The special qualities of believing for the Greeks and the Romans -- that is somet hing 
this seminar will be add re sing. I simply hope to have sketched out enough to indicate the main issue behind 
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questions to ask ... 
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11. 
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J 
• Berkeley Institute of Buddhist Studies (October 5, 2006) 
I prepared the bulk of this paper for a group of Oxford-Princeton classicists, 
who are offering an annual seminar, the topic this time being the issue of faith ( or 
belief) in the ancient world. In ten pages I am leaving out, I take them on a very 
quick tour of the "problem of belief' as it have been defined in several key 
disciplines in the humanities and social sciences -- notably philosophy, 
anthropology, cognitive theory, and my own field, the history of religions. That is 
the first section. I want to pick up here, with some adaptations for a Buddhalogical 
audience, with the specific issue so important to the study of religion, namely, the 
• universality or particularity of what we mean by belief. 
• 
In other words, can we say that all people believe in religious entities? Can 
we describe all religious ideas as beliefs, or might "believing" imply a very 
specific type of con cious or unconscious relationship to particular entities? The 
ethnographic evidence for going in all these directions is mixed. In 1972 Rodney 
Needham noted the expedient ease with which many ethnographers blithely 
claimed that such and such people believe in this and that god or gods, comfortable 
with the assumption that the English verb "to believe" captured the particular . 
religious sensibilities of a very different culture. 29 Of course, a universal 
assumption about the know-ability of other peoples and their cultures has been 
basic to anthropology. Similarly, a fundamental assumption about the unity of 
11 
• 
• 
• 
believing as a phenomenon has supported the whole enterprise of comparative 
religions and most "world religions" textbooks. But it may also be responsible for 
much of what is unsatisfactory with such projects as well. 
In contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham pointed out the 
close attention to local terms first seen in Evans-Pritchard' s study of the Nuer and 
their theology. Needham himself examined the indigenous terms for anything 
roughly comparable to belief in Navaho religion, Hinduism, the dialects of the 
Philippines, and the religious ideas of the Penan of Borneo. The exercise gave 
evidence of "the bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently 
translated by the English 'believe'. "30 
Most recently, the Buddhologist Donald Lopez launched a very targeted 
attack on the assumption of universality in our notion of belief. He argues that the 
term has a clear historical locus in the matrix of meanings forged by early 
Christianity and developed in the course of Christian history as the Church sought 
to define theological orthodoxy and institutional jurisdiction. 31 It was in the 
Inquisition, Lopez suggests that belief acquired its current distinctive gloss, namely, 
that outward action is an inadequate indication of the views one harbors deep 
within the heart. Only torture, if needed, can reveal those sentiments and elicit true 
repentance. 
Lopez uses a dramatic narrative, the story of Peter of Verona, a 13th century 
preacher, who was asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisition against the 
12 
• Gnostic heresy of the Cathars ( or Albigensians ). It was the Inquisition, Lopez notes, that institutionalized testing a person's true beliefs and defined the errors and 
punishments associated with the sin of heresy against the church. But the 
Inquisition was also deeply involved in the confiscation of property, which added 
to the local zeal of the movement, and in the struggle for political control of a great 
deal of southern France being waged between the pope and the Holy Roman 
Emperor. Peter of Verona was eventually deemed a martyr; his story has it that as 
he was dying from stab wounds, he inscribed the credo, the beginning of the 
orthodox creed, on the ground with his own blood. With a tad less evidence than 
one might want for a very complicated chapter in medieval history, the story of 
• Peter and subsequent Inquisitions lets Lopez conclude that Christianity, in this 
period at least, disf nguished belief not by what a person said, but by "the invisible 
content of the mind." 32 Since the means for identifying believers from non-
believers gave great power to the one deciding who had what in their hearts, Lopez 
pushes this conclusion further: the idea of belief" is neither natural nor universal. .. 
It might be described as an ideology, an idea that arises from a specific set of 
• 
. 1 . ,,33 matena mterests. 
Lopez gives a second example describing the 1881 Buddhist Catechism with 
which Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Buddhism into the 
modern world. In Olcott's understanding, Buddhism was a religion and, therefore, 
a system of beliefs. So he was shocked by how poorly the pious monks of Sri 
13 
• Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs that the translated textual sources had taught so well to Olcott. He was especially concerned that Buddhists be able to, 
hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries destroying the indigenous 
culture. Lopez argues that the "ideology of belief," assumed by Olcott to be the 
universal nature of religion, was rooted in nothing more than the assumptions of 
Christian history. 34 
Although Lopez's argument for the cultural particularism of belief is a 
striking one, I cannot fully agree with his conclusion. Nonetheless, in a 2002 
publication I presented data that indirectly supports a similar position. Arguing 
with the frequently quoted formula that "the Chinese believe in spirits," I noted 
• how reality got more complicated the closer one came to any particular situation. 35 
Chinese historical literature contains a variety of explicit positions on spirits, 
although the famous anti-spirit arguments are also admissions of the popularity of 
the pro-spirit view. But a corresponding discomfort attends the sheer enormity of a 
generalization like "the Chinese," a particularly heterogeneous group outside the 
early, semi-mythical ancestry of the Han people. At least one classic ethnographic 
study, based just in Taiwan but generalizing to broad conclusions about the unity 
• 
of Chinese popular religion, has been cited as authoritative for three decades. Yet 
wider fieldwork can now, unfortunately, deflate the author's long accepted 
claims.36 It seems that when regional practices are seriously analyzed, the variety is 
so great that there is no obvious cultural coherence whereby the cosmos reflects 
14 
• social categories, and vice versa. 37 The supposed unity of "the Chinese" at the dynamic level of folk culture is not something that can be assumed. 
More subtle issues are captured in a lovely essay by the early 20th century 
sociologist, Fei Xiaotung, entitled "A World without Ghosts." 38 Fei Xiaotung 
describes growing up in a large house with closed-off wings, all said to be 
populated by an endless number of ancestral ghosts. He shivered and shook at 
times, but in retrospect it was a closely populated world that made home a large 
and interesting community of which he felt a part. Fei compares such a boyhood to 
the American model of growing up under the influence of comic books about an 
endless stream of superheroes. How could these two mindsets not result in very 
• different people and cultures, he asks; but for all the confidence in facing the future 
• 
instilled in the American child, F ei concludes he would not trade his floating 
family and more subsumed individuality. Now, to what extent can we assume that 
Fei, writing as a sociologist so many years removed from boyhood, believes in 
spirits? The essay form, the simple but insightful comparison, his tender nostalgia 
- they all suggest that his beliefs were culturally automatic and unquestioned at 
one time, but the worldly professional is not the boy; he became quite self-
conscious and distant in regard to believing it all. Do the Chinese believe in spirits 
only when they are young? When they are older, some may but others do not? All 
told, to say "the Chinese believe ... " in any particular thing can be an entertaining 
but hardly scholarly generalization. 
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III Choice 
My arguments generally supported those of Lopez when he countered the 
assumed "universality" of belief by pointing to the cultural particularity of the 
concept's origins. But the main issue for Lopez, convinced that belief originated in 
the matrix of Christianity, was the onslaught of a foreign and ideological category 
that obfuscated the real dynamics of local Singhalese Buddhism. Here, I think, 
Lopez's analysis should be challenged in two ways. 
First, does the concept of belief that we have today, which went out to 
conquer the world in the 1st century and again in the 16th, really originate in 
Christianity? Paul Veyne' s study of belief among the ancient Greeks complicates 
the picture, as does a new study of Pythagoras and his cult/legacy, and several 
studies of 1st century BC/ AD Judaism. 39 40 The more we learn about what Lopes 
called the Christian matrix of belief and how it fitted into the full historical mosaic 
of social forces at the time of its supposed creation, the less originality we can 
automatically ascribe to this very successful religion. 
Second, in his monograph Lopez is historical only about this particular East-
West colonial encounter. But we know he does not mean to imply that Singhalese .. 
culture was free of colonizing influences until Olcott arrived. The British were not 
the first Europeans in Sir Lanka, not by far; and Europeans were not the first to 
conquer and colonize the island. In other words, the island had been swept by the 
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winds of outside cultural influence for several millennia. Lopez would also agree 
that Sri Lank.ans had the creative right to appropriate certain colonial categories, 
such as the idea of beliefs that one knows by heart (note the phrase and what rote 
memorization has meant in our culture). In fact, the forces represented by Olcott 
were incredibly successful and great parts of the world today increasingly 
understand themselves in terms of religious movements involving choice, 
conversion, and commitment - all implicit in Lopez's Western notion of belief. 
Now the three fastest growing religions are Catholicism, Islam and Christian 
evangelicalism, so belief is not a category we can dismiss for its checkered past in 
the hands of papal Inquisitors or colonial catechists. Explorations of the ways in 
which belief is now working in a mostly post-colonial world would undoubtedly be 
quite interesting. 
[Story of UCLA Buddhologist; ordained in Yi Fo Sheng (Theravada)?] 
In addition to Lopez's chapter on belief, two short studies by Michel de 
Certeau are also very provocative for rethinking the issue of belief. De Certeau 
leaves me wondering if most modem European languages do not allow sufficient 
looseness to the idea of belief to justify the very general sense in which we might 
interpret the term -- as the understanding that more often than not human beings 
think of themselves as coexisting in the cosmos with other invisible beings, usually 
sacred or superhuman, and this coexistence involves certain interactions with them . 
De Certeau himself assumes a universality to belief in his analysis of how 
• believing sets up a temporally defined contractual relationship, marked by the investment of one party with the clear sense of something eventually due in return 
(perhaps a version ofMauss's theory of the gift). 41 Yet as a sociologist of modem 
industrial society, he also discusses how little we know, or can ever know, about 
belief. It is a wary modem conclusion, based on the popular view, he suggests, that 
for us now there are "too many things to believe and not enough credibility to go 
around." 42 De Certeau actually seems to dip in and out of two understandings of 
belief, ones that would be familiar to Needham. In one line of analysis he cleverly 
describes "beliefs" as what we have left when we no longer believe. 43 Yet in 
pointing to that "fallen," post-indigenous state in which cultural options become 
• available, de Certeau assumes a disruptive change in some automatic cultural 
• 
moment, a change that comes by offering a degree of choice about what to believe 
or how much to believe it. Whenever the cultural status quo is rocked by such 
change, beliefs are apt to be formulated more clearly or fully. They may even be 
compared, new with old, if only to attempt to dismiss the influence of a visiting 
trader, anthropologist, or missionary. So, at times, de Certeau seems to imply the 
existence of an innocent, pre-modem, unself-conscious mode of transaction with 
the gods, who are not formulated in concepts any more than they need to be. 
Stories, titles, distinctive ritual greetings or offerings - these are the ways such 
innocents believe; not in reasoned concepts. Only when the missionaries arrive, the 
Phoenicians land, the Jews conquer Canaan, or cultures clash and are presented 
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• with choices. These, to justify the break from the old, must be accompanied by an · extra show of personal commitment. Then we are no longer dealing with the gods; 
we are dealing with our beliefs. 44 
IV. Rejection 
In contrast to Lopez and de Certeau, Paul V eyne does not make any 
universal/particular-style arguments; he uses the more subtle, and obscure, 
language of "modalities" of belief. He clearly describes one modality that comes 
into being when the option of doubt opens up a new type of choice, along with the 
unprecedented social position of being one in a position to doubt. Veyne describes 
• Pausanius, laboring over his compilation of the stories of local gods, deciding that 
a "kernel of truth" must reside in the many redundant tales he had amassed. 
Herodotus reported what many different people had told him with the amused 
distance of one not closely attached to a particular version - another modality of 
belief, write Veyne. Thucydides researched particular types of the stories and 
retold one clear narrative of the Peloponnesian war -- in his way, as the most 
reliable version he could determine. This is not the triumph of logos over mythos, 
Veyne suggests, but the development of mythos, history, and then criticism-all 
modalities of belief, modalities of truth. 
• Several elements come together in Veyne' s account that will not be easily undone in Western culture. First, cultural pluralism -- in the plethora of local tales , 
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• that Pausanius gathers, in the culturally wider answers to the curiosity of Herodotus, then in the different accounts compared and analyzed by Thucydides. 
Secondly, Veyne outlines a process of comparison and choice -- due to the 
pluralism that he stumbled upon, Pausanius chose to assume a so-called "historical 
kernel" of truth in all the myths, while entertaining a new type of doubt about the 
details, especially the repetitive mythic themes. It is a familiar modality of both 
believing and doubting. At the other extreme, Thucydides chose to leave out the 
fantastic altogether in favor of a distinctly non-mythic realism that demonstrates an 
internal logic within the narration, further defining mythos as the incredible and 
doubtful, irrelevant to the type of critical history in which he now believed and 
• wrote - as another modality of belief. 45 
• 
By the time Christianity developed in the long simmering melting pot of the 
Mediterranean world, if you got around a bit beyond your own village, your beliefs 
would identify and locate you; if you got around a lot more, they were apt to taken 
on as a personal choice, whether it was Mithraism, a particular Roman god, the 
new Christ in any of the various versions of his significance, or some sect of 
Jewish nationalism. When personal choice entered the picture, believing was 
always came to be seen as a conversion away from the rule of reason, which is, of 
course, simply the rule of the familiar, the status quo, common sense; such choices 
were an acceptance of the incredible, a remaking of one's old identity by the 
choosing as well as by what was chosen. A set of beliefs to which one orally ( and 
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• ritually) testified became the crux of being Christian, or a follower of Mithra, a devotee of Jupiter, and so on. Textual culture, seen in the early efforts of Pausanius 
through Thucydides, could make its own claims as a medium of critical thought, 
that is, develop its own modalities of belief and doubt. The gathering together of a 
canonical set of scriptures, which was the way so many Christianities were weeded 
out, with the resulting texts attributed to people who were reputed witnesses, made 
the texts a source of authority for the central message--revelation of Christ. But 
oral and public recitation of the credo made one a Christian. 46 To keep working 
Veyne' s generous term, further modalities of belief would open up between 
scriptural testimony and the institutionalization of apostolic succession that 
• claimed the authority to guarantee them, and ripen into great divide of the 15th 
• 
century Reformation. 
It seems correct to me, just as Lopez has argued, that early Christianity 
pulled together many influences to imbue the activity of believing with a particular 
constellation of meanings. Like every winner on the historical stage, Christianity 
defined the parameters of believing for so much subsequent European history, 
although some other local models were able to hang on in places. Within the 
Christian modality, belief was built on individual choice and, as such, could always 
vie with the traditions of tribe, city, or family: choice, conversion, commitment, 
with 'doubt of the other' firming up into 'rejection' (even repulsion) of all else . 
Ritualized early on in the catechumenate, the succession of creeds articulated by 
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the early churches continued to ritualize entrance of individuals into the rightful 
house of Christ with the oral profession of faith. 
Lopez mentions the feature of rejection in passing; but I think he is very 
right to note this feature of the Christian model. It's type of choice always meant a 
concomitant rejection: I believe in this, not that; I am a Christian, not a Roman, not 
a Jew, ideally, not master nor slave, male nor female. Being Christian was meant 
as the all-encompassing signifier. Indeed, after so many centuries of this style, 
modern Christians have had to learn how commitment and rejection can relax into 
personal choice (perhaps some doubt of others) merely in order for social tolerance 
to become conceivable . 
V. Believing 
Yet Lopez's analysis raises some questions. 
First, is Christianity really the model of believing in the many of cultures of 
Europe as well its colonial legatees? Has the model remained an historically fixed 
matrix? And -- can a certain set of Christian assumptions indelibly shape our sense ' 
of the term in all the European languages for all time? Christians certainly fitted 
the traditions of the Jews, Muslims and various pagans into their own models, and 
what did not fit was so other it was hard to even see. Lopez is undoubtedly correct 
in his characterization of the substance of that model or modality at many points 
points in our history, but how homogeneous must the model be over time to 
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• include recent history and future trajectories, in all the main languages of study? For example, I have known Catholic institutions for a good part of my life, in one 
connection or another, and I know that up close Roman Catholic believing has 
changed dramatically in a mere half century in most places in America and Europe. 
This has been the subject of much analysis by Catholics and a few sociologists. I 
think the question of homogeneity does not only impact how we see the history of 
the West, and Christianity itself, it also impacts how we evaluate the probable 
origins of the modality. 47 Were they really so Christian? 
Second, an easy contrast to the religious matrix of choice, conversion, 
commitment and rejection would be the religious practices of the primarily oral 
• cultures of the indigenous peoples Europeans encountered - as we even assume 
them to be today, of course. Yet the somewhat buried assumption that such peoples 
were all sufficiently isolated to afforded no real socio-cultural choices to 
individuals until the Christian missionary arrived is probably overstated and in 
danger of propagating, under the table, so to speak, more of a Christian-centered 
understanding of history. As an assumption, the theoretical isolation and lack of 
choice of indigenous peoples probably depends greatly on the Protestant 
misunderstanding of orality itself as inherently primitive, a view that made it very 
difficult for the earliest ethnographers to even refer to indigenous spiritualities as 
• "religion" (the continuities across cultures implied by the term religion were not at first particularly appreciated by European religious and academic authorities). We 
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• are learning that indigenous cultures in the past were rarely so isolated or marked by consensus that the individual had no choices to make, such as -- trading further 
afar, joining the cults that would arise particularly at times of stress that split larger 
communities into factions with different histories, absorbing more quickly the 
influence of conquering tribes whose enlarged kingdoms would evolve more 
complex religious patterns, or simply the personal choice to take a bigger role in 
the ceremonial life of the community -- like the blinded hunter, Ogotemmeli, who ~ 
gradually revealed Dogon religious ideas to Marcel Griaule, who in tum amazed 
Europe with their sophistication. [Griaule's earliest books called these ideas 
African philosophy; it was only years later that the Dogon elders decided to tell 
• him the real story].48 No matter how small and isolated, everyone in a community 
would not be involved with their spirits and cultural lore to the same degree or in 
the same way. 49 This is not to deny that, based on some very thorough 
ethnographies, some communities appear to engage in whole-sale community 
rejections of some outside influences, such as the missionaries, in favor of their 
• 
own traditions. But I do challenge the uniqueness of the "choice and conversion of 
the individual" model. 
These are not technical quibbles aimed just at Lopez; I think they inherently 
challenge the degree of "particularity" to which we think we can resort when 
jettisoning master narratives and grand universalities. If the Christian model of 
belief described by Lopez really has older roots and many varietals, and oral 
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cultures do not prevent the presence of some of the components of this so-called 
Christian model, then an even more central - methodological -- question looms. Is 
the historical freight of the notion of belief in the European world so set and 
insurmountable that the term cannot be used- with care and imagination -- to 
describe other ways of believing? To say it cannot could suggest that other 
cultures do not believe in any like the sense of the term. Do we really want to be so 
particular that we are thrown back on to another form of ethnocentrism? 
I do not think that stretching our term belief to attempt to describe very 
differently constructed relationships with the supernatural - shared ritual relations 
ones or quite personal psychological ones - is demanded by the hermeneutics of 
suspicion that drives a good post-modernist historian. And it goes without saying 
that neither can I imagine any usage that would allow us to cease examining the 
baggage the term might still carry, or take on. 
In Lopez's quickly drawn example, late 19th century Sinhalese Buddhism 
acts as a type of polar opposite to Christianity. In this sketch, Theravada Buddhism 
is not built around beliefs, and certainly not the confessional, doctrinal or 
theological exploration of them; it is a practice, entirely moral at first, intent on 
distinct forms of physical and mental self-restraint at the more demanding level of 
the monk, with the explicit goals of a better rebirth and eventual transcendence (to .. 
use a Western term). Of course, the first Buddhists were probably converts of a 
sort; they chose commitment to a different path, perhaps not rejecting others so 
25 
• much as prioritizing the options, and maybe the differences were minor. But choice is exercised repeatedly in the stories of Buddhism. 
As you may know, the questions "do Buddhists believe?" evokes the very 
old, and tired, question once endemic to comparative and world religion enterprises 
as to whether Buddhism could properly be called a religion or not. This tempest in 
a teapot hails from the days when Buddhist practice was less defining of the 
tradition to Westerners than Buddhist scriptural teachings; clearly, Buddhism 
violated most of the definitional "norms" that religions believe in a transcendent 
being or benign force corresponding to a type of eternal soul. Ninian Smart, among 
others, was convinced that if we let Buddhism in to the 'religion' category, and he 
• did (it certainly meant textbooks sold better), then why not communism, that other 
• 
great example of a soul-less ideology qua religion. So his cold war textbooks, and 
a few others, usually did include some discussion of communism and treated 
Buddhism as a religion with odd parameters - until it got to Mahayana of course. 
I am, of course, simply suggesting, contra Lopez, that we might want to 
press our basic terminology beyond its usual culture-reinforcing channels, avoiding 
universalism as well as excessive particularism, but giving us a tool with which to 
explore real similarities as well as real difference among historical ways of being; 
so doing helps to revise our categories even further into ones more capable of 
multi-cultural purposes. Still, the methodological channels for pursuing this 
approach are not obvious, though I think we have in the language of practice 
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theory so basic guidelines. Taking a practice approach, we would ask about 
believing, not belief or beliefs; we would ask how believing is constructed, with 
what imagery that distinguishes it in Dogon or Buddhist culture from other forms 
of thinking, philosophizing, etc. To explore how believing is constructed would 
involve laying out the semantic field in which it is distinguished, to whatever 
extent it may be distinguished. This is more complicated than simply determining 
what is believed and the forms believing takes. From the start we could not assume 
that there was any one way of believing, but if a comparable mode of religiosity 
existed, there would be a spectrum of distinguished forms or positions. In addition, 
I should add, it would be central to a practice approach to make sure that believing 
was not assumed to be a purely internal state, personal understanding of the 
cosmos, a private relationship that when put into words already succumbed to a 
relatively alien medium. [That has been the reigning assumption about belief, 
undergirding any description of modality. In fact, of course, nothing that is 
assumed to be a purely personal reality is ever actually dealt with as such or even 
formally studied as such. Think of Freudian theory, its theory of the self and its 
practice of treating, that in, reaching into, the self.] 
Practice theory is also based on the notion of a critical methodology, which .. 
first demands that we deconstruct the so-called issue to determine exactly why we 
are interested in it; in other words, we must uncover the implicit expectations, the 
assumptions at stake, the crown jewels in the pocket of a particular view of reality, 
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that is, the value that is endangered if some aspect of our assumed reality proves to 
be less absolute. Practice theory also demands that the resulting analysis illuminate 
real applications inadequately by earlier methods. That is, it expects the critical 
analysis to include an explicit rationale for the usefulness of the rethought term or 
issue. To analyze modes of believing should not yield the same analysis as 
ritualizing, or textualizing, to use some topics I have addressed before with 
practice theory; nor should it yield the same descriptions as 19th century theories of 
animism, monotheism, polytheism, pantheism, etc. Though I think those analyses 
paved the way for our approach to believing to leave behind some of the 
assumptions of the Christian culture is which the study of religion arose . 
De Certeau's work is the oldest and clearest practice-like theory around, to 
date, but provocative resources lie in the ideas of Connerton and Hervieu-Leger on 
memory ( which attempt to shake up our premises and explore other cultural issues 
that may be involved in believing), and there are also resources in some cognitive 
theories of the socially adaptive value of agency. I cannot lay out for you today a 
"practice theory of believing" - much as I wish my work was at that stage. I am 
confined to a more "gadfly" role for now. I do want to suggest, however, that 
exploration of believing among Buddhists -- or the Greeks and Romanss -- would 
have to begin as an historical analysis of a non-essentialized lineage of people, 
groups, stories, rites, and books over varying amounts of time and place. Such a 
study could arguably isolate some particular cultural strategies at work in the way a 
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Buddhist or a Greek believed, what I would call a strategic way of acting that 
enabled a certain type of meshing of constructed expectations, understood 
cosmology, and reinforcing personal experience - one that would accomplish 
personalized socio-cultural ends, however political or aesthetic they might be 
deemed to be, however incomplete in any particular instance. I would suggest that 
choice, commitment, and rejection is not at all what Christian believing it about; 
that is what it wants one to think it is doing, not what it is really doing. Probably 
believing is more likely to be a way in which contradictions are maintained, not 
truths affirmed. 
In the case of Buddhist studies in particular, scholars have been very 
respectful of the scriptural assumptions, and monastic disclaimers in the face of 
missionary onslaughts. Even the disproven theories of the strategy behind Chinese 
popular religious beliefs are far more concrete than anything I have ever read for 
Buddhism. In effect, we have never really subjected Buddhism to such an analysis 
of Buddhist believing, even though I have seen Thai Buddhist catechisms, joined 
Buddhist chants for world peace, and marveled at medieval art depicting the role of 
the bodhisattva who makes itself available to be entreated by a devotee. Is this 
believing? I really want to ask you. On one level of course, on another level why 
should it be, on yet another level, what is going on? What do the Buddhologists say? 
Thank you . 
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Extra text 
To suggest an answer would be to suggest what is distinctive about the modality of 
believing that the Greeks evinced toward their gods before too much critical analysis had piled 
up as a cultural option and all the stories were gathered to be revered as myths. Whatever it was 
earlier and later, it was different from believing among the Romans , whose mythic narrative was 
standardized earlier on and remained a bit separate from many activities of cultic worship. 
The "problem of belief ' may be something different in every disciplinary field, given 
their particular histories of research and research materials. But for the study of religion , the 
problem of belief is clearly a meaningless dead end. What can we ever say about belief in 
general? We can talk about beliefs , which are many , all had or held in different ways. Like any 
discipline , including Shweder ' s fault-lined anthropology , we are concerned with the limits of 
what we know , the differences that we see and imagine , as well as the commonalities that we 
cannot help but assume. This means that religious studies must focus on the practice of believing , 
on how people believe , construct believing relationships ... Through critical analysis we must 
leave the Christian baggage behind , which it can do only when we know it, as best we can at this 
point in history , but committed to continually plumbing the depths. Looking at the practice of 
believing , relativizing believing , emphasizing the activities rather than a hypothetical mindset , 
may enable us to do this. 
While is it another paper to lay out a full analysis of what it means to focus on the 
practice of believing , I think the simple change in wording opens the imagination to allow new 
and different questions. It may not take us as far as we need to go; we may still find ourselves 
caught , like an oversize fish, in yet another fine netting of cultural assumptions. But for the post-
colonial anti-Christian dilemma that Lopez would leave us in, or de Certeau ' s romantic having it 
both ways , or Veyne ' s generative classicism of myth to analysis , but all truths - these do not 
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allow us to go further a field, they beach us on dry land. They confine us to an impossibility , or a 
Christian ideology defined to seize goods and land; or a nai've mythic truth compared to the 
critical truth , all the gift of the Greeks. Yes, the Greeks became self-conscious about their gods, 
but so did the Romans while being as bound to them as to the city and their history and their 
fortunes ; but a far traveled people , there was always an odd element of doubt. The special 
qualities of believing for the Greeks and the Romans -- that is something this seminar will be 
addressing. I simply hope to have sketched out enough to indicate the main issues behind the 
well trodden paths and the reasons to look to another route where the adventuresome will find 
different questions to ask ... 
Thank you . 
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Davidson' main ideas on belief in regard to some of the debates in the study ofreligion. 
13 Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (NY: Oxford 1984), p. 156. 
14 Richard A. Shweder, ''Post-Nietzschian Anthropology: The Idea of Multiple Objective Worlds," in Michael 
Krauz, ed., Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontration (Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 109-110. 
15 Richard Schweder, "Post-Nietzschian Anthropology,'' 133 . 
16 
Less developed but also interesting arguments for an anthropology of non-universal, fully particular 
assumptions and categories is also sketched out by Talal Asad, and Jonathan Z. Smith. Asad, Genealogies of ' 
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Religion (Johns Hopkins 1993); Jonathan Z. Smith, "Religion, Religions, Religious," in Taylor, ed., Critical 
Terms, makes a similar argument for the History of Religions. 
17 In a more recent and distinctly new current within the field, the anthropologist Matthew Engelke reminds us 
that the path breaking anthropologists of the twentieth century, E.E. Evans-Pritchard and Victor Turner, who 
both spent years in the field participating in the elaborate ritual life of the Nuer and the Ndembu, respectively, 
each converted to Catholicism after a few restless years back in the halls of academe. Perhaps after years of 
close involvement in the highly structured ritual lives of these communities , and then the relative sterility of 
the rationalized modern technocratic state, Catholicism presented the closest answer to a ritual life with a 
similarly embracing complexity. (Matthew Engelke, The Problem of Belief: Evans-Pritchard and Victor 
Turner on 'the inner life'" Anthropology Today 18, no. 6 [December 2002]: 3-8) Engelke also wonders if the 
attempt to understand one religion can leave one in a better position to understand another; in this case, Evans-
Pritchard ' s and Turner's understanding of the African religions they documented so well might have given 
them insight and empathy for a religion closer to home. Engelke seems to be innocently raising anew an issue 
that, in a version only lightly different, marked the birth pains of the degree-granting discipline of the non-
theological study of religion, namely, does one have to be a member of a religion to truly understand it. As just 
stated, the question implies that outsiders engaged in the formal, secular study of religion could not really 
understand Catholicism or Nuer or any other religion. Today it is easily granted that such a scholar would 
understand the religion differently, indeed, be engaged in answering very different questions than those of 
concern to practicing members of the religious community. Through the 1960s, however, this issue involved a 
lengthy and occasionally contentious process of differentiation as the study of religion carved out a place for 
itself alongside the other disciplines devoted to religion - theology, scripture, and ministerial studies, among 
others. ( See J Z Smith article [in his folder] and in Relating Religion?) 
18 Katherine P. Ewing, "Dreams from a Saint: Anthropological Atheism and the Temptation to Believe," 
American Anthropologist 96, no. 3 (September 1994): 571-583. 
19 In another depiction of the fault-line , Susan Harding, an anthropologist , has called the intellectual 
community to account for its demonization of so-called "fundamentalist" Christians (or conservative 
evangelicals , as they call themselves), which deliberately created the distance that was then bemoaned by 
social science. According to Harding. she would remain locked out of their worldview and locked in her own 
prejudices unless she could let down her professional-personal defenses and accept these believers on their 
own terms. [See Engelke for Harding, also The Book of Jerry Falwell ... ] Robert Orsi, a scholar of American 
folk religion, author of several remarkable studies of immigrant Catholicism, facing similar issues, describes 
negotiating a major ethical challenge encountered when he went to study the famous snake handlers of 
Tennessee. [Orsi, Heaven and Hell ... ] Theirs was a whole culture and he was admitted to it, but did taking 
them on their own terms mean suspending his previous, and still active, ethical norms? The problem of belief 
has been at the heart of where different cultures meet with each other with interest while clashing in value , 
where they meet with a sense of shared humanity only to diverge in shock when particular beliefs contest 
flrtic~lar beliefs. . . 
- Justm Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe m God? 
21 See Pascal Boyer, for example, ... 
22 These paradigms are .... 
23 While some of these theorists are not blind to the dilemmas of social science, and even those of the 
humanities, they can be unusual "cross-over" figures. Noteworthy is this regard: Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust, 
and Justin Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? More challenging, the work of Stephen P. Turner, 
Brains/Practices /Relativism and Ilkka Pyysiainen, Magic , Miracles and Religion. 
24 Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity (Cambridge, 1999): 406-429, 450. 
25 Compare Pyysiainen's comments on phenomenology and his turn to science in Magic , Miracles , and 
Religion, pp. xiii-xvi, which have a "born-again" style that does not inspire confidence in his objectivity. 
26 But this stance has now fallen by the wayside as questions of origins became were irrelevant to the project of 
interpretation. 
27 See the 2005 second edition as well, ed. Lindsay Jones. J. Z. Smith dates the field to the 1960s, see 
··Religious Studies: Whither (wither) and Why?" Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 7, no. 4 (1995): 
407-414. W. C. Smith has consistently addressed belief(see ... ). Also the otherwise dated Hasting' 
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Encyclop edia of Religion and Ethics, 1908-26, reprinted in Edinburgh, 1955. Mircea Eliade, ed. Encyclopedia 
f{ Religfon 16 vols,_ ( Y Macmillan 1_986), republished in 2005,_ ed. Lindsay Jones. . 
- Important exceptions are W. C. Smith, Donald Lopez (to be discussed), and challenges by Donald Wiebe, 
etc ... 
29 Needham, Belief Language and Experience. 
30 Needham, Belief Language and Experience , pp. 32-37, 37. 
3 1 Lopez, "Belief' 
32 Lopez, 26-27. 
33 Lopez, p. 28. 
34 Lopez, We can supplement Lopez' s argument with the well known history that the church inherited, among 
so much else, the dialectical poles of both Greek rationalism and Hebraic revealed monotheism. Tertullian 's 
cutting inquiry, "What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?" would be echoed less and less in early 
Christian history as Greek apologias, such as that of lrenaeus, were joined by the Hebraic view of revelation 
contained in the creeds, which defined orthodoxy just as they diagnosed heresy. After centuries when Greek 
culture was more or less lost to Europe, it revived (via Islamic scholarship) bringing the back something of the 
same early debate: for Thomas Aquinas it meant what weight to accord revelation and reason in corning to 
know God. His answer, which inscribed reason into the heart of the Latin church, was the scholastic theology 
(and cosmology) lasted in the Roman Catholic Church until the mid-20th century, affirm the power of reason 
and revelation. But the 16th century, already influenced by the Renaissance, the affirmation of dependence on 
faith alone, although it ultimately introduced the modern sciences located in study of the book. Yet reason and 
revelation were both individual apprehensions of the mind and heart; no matter in what the proportion given to 
each, Christian belief was not an act, not a work, but a state of the mind, with ramifications for the individual 
soul, not to be fully known by anyone, beyond a confessor, until the Day of Judgment. (unmodified, see notes) 
35 Bell, in Frankenberry, ed., Radical Interpretation, pp. 100-116. 
36 As an example I cited a famous ethnographic study by Arthur Wolf (''Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors . .. " See 
Bell, in Fenn, ed, Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion) that revealed different grades of spirit money 
were burned as offerings to three grades of spirits--gods, ancestors, and ghosts (my ancestors could be your 
ghosts, of course}--denoting, he suggested, a cultural organization of the cosmos that specifically mirrored the 
social landscape and vice versa, a society that mirrored the cosmos. Wolf based his study on Taiwanese rural 
society, but generally widened the scoped and ramifications of his results. For years his study was widely cited 
to demonstrate what scholars wanted to assume, namely, the coherence and even structured nature of Chine e 
folk society. Yet thirty years later, his results appear terribly inflated. 
37 Argument developed in Bell Critical Terms, pp. 205-24 or Sociology of Religion, ed. Fenn? 
38 Arkush and Lee, eds., The Land Without Ghosts, 1989, 175-81 
39 Christine Joost-Gaugier, Measuring Heaven : Pythagoras and His Influence on Thought and Art in Antiqui ty 
and the Middl e Age (Ithaca: Cornell, 2006) 
40 See the review article by Jeremy Zwelliing, entitled "The Fictions of Biblical History," in History and 
Theory 39, vol. 1 (February 2000): 117- 141, which begins with Thompson ' s The Myth Past : Biblical 
Archaelogy and the My th of Isra el, but goes on to discuss the work ofMieke Bal and Daniel Boyarin among 
others. 
4 1 Michel de Certeau, "What Do We Do When We Believe," in Marshall Blonsky, ed., On Signs, pp. 192-202. 
42 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Bekeley: University of California, 
1984), pp. 177-179 
43 de Certeau, ibid. 
44 It is easy to recognize that people who have never been exposed to any world view but that of their own 
isolated culture probably do not generally hold the sense of coexistence in the world with their deities that one 
can find in a worldly savant like Augustine of Hippo, who was aware of many ways of looking at a more or 
less meaningful universe. Indeed, the first type of society offers its people limited options, nothing more than 
greater or lesser involvement in the various cultic activities that are not mandated, as initiations or ancestral 
rites might be. The more cosmopolitan society provides many more and dramatic distinct options, such as 
those faced by Augustine, who, according to his not totally reliable Confessions, saw two worlds, two 
cosmologies, fundamentally opposed to each other, demanding that he choose. In fact he had chosen many 
times, but the demand for a choice never left his purview. He would make a melodramatic choice to believe 
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something specific, to turn from the cultural tradition of Terence and Virgil, to the biblical Christ of the North 
African Christianity of his day. His was a choice to engage in a new and specific set of relationships with the 
divine that brought a set of responsibilities accompanied generated by a very human community to which he 
was now tied. Mick McCarthy paper. 
45 Veyne, chapter 
46 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Pres as an Agent of Change (Chicago, 197 ). Eisenstein's detailed 
explanation of the rise and ramifications of printing in Europe chronicles its association with the growth of a 
monastic industry advertising relics. Pilgrimage grew as people read, or heard from those who did, about these 
marvels and their purported cures, giving rise to the hospices run by the monasteries to house the wayfaring 
pilgrim and the wealthy cathedrals that grew up at the end off their routes. The relics and the hospices that 
went with them were important sources of income, not only enabling a monastery to build itself a great 
cathedral but also to undertake the copying of manuscripts, an activity so important for the life-blood of 
Christian culture and even the reappearance of Greek. So the printing of simple advertising circulars depicting 
the relics and miracles to be had at any particular place was among the immediate uses for the new technology. 
Yet, Eisenstein contains the account of one vexed male pilgrim, complaining, after having gone to visit a 
seventh reliquary displaying the foreskin of Jesus. Like Pausanius, he was struck by doubt. But rather than 
grant a kernel of truth, or hope, to any one of them , he seems to have ditched his previous piety to sarcastically 
question the whole business. Eisenstein's example describes the circulation of people around Europe and the 
holy land, the circulation of texts that encouraged them and then described their experiences, presenting them 
with a variety of competing holy items, even competing notions of holiness. Perhaps not many were as 
disposed to cynicism as the writer of the complaint about a few too many foreskins; they may simply have 
refused to select, continuing to put their hope in one relic after another. But surely economic limits and the 
ability of some displays and stories to exert their influence would make choices inevitable-and some 
monasteries died while others prospered into major centers. In any case, plural options, or choices, could 
induce the faithful to accept much in the name of believing or reject it all for more critical stances. The 
diversity that Greek and Roman culture presented, especially the alternatives presented to Jews or Christian 
should they travel through Rome or beyond, forced choices on people at every turn. CHECK 
47 Christianity itself was never so homogenous that it could represent a unified modality or matrix, without 
variations in every possible component. The Christian matrix lived within the religion as well, as the 
Inquisition itself too clearly reminds us. Lopez's presentation of the role of the Inquisition in defining the 
nature of beliefrepresents a very historically defined moment in church history and one that sounds like a 
conceptual prelude to the Reformation. In the early Christian communities, we know that the nature of belief as 
well as the exact focus of belief were very much up for debate. What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem, 
asked Tertullian; Origen took up the same question roughly a century later. But a century after Origen, he was 
a declared heretic as the church came to define more clearly its place in a Greco-Roman empire, even if it 
fought off all Gnostic rationalizations of the particular divine-human revelation that Jesus Christ was thought 
to represent. The matrix is assembled slowly, and as it did, more corners and centers of Christendom 
experienced fewer choices or conversions, the rejections mere pro forma condemnations of distant heretics and 
pagans. 
48 See Marcel Griault , Conversations with Ogotemmeli: An Introduction to Dagon Religious Ideas (London: Oxford , 
1975 [ 1965]). 
49 Bell in Frankenberry, ed., Radical Interpretation. 
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Prayer & Notes 
Thesis --
Religion , Belief and Prayer are, for analytical purposes , three distinct entities - so 
some sort! 
Analytic Move -
Breaking the automatic connection with religion allows fresh perspectives , 
particularly in view of the bind 'religion ' is in when approached /defined ' scientifically ' . 
This is not to diss such efforts. But they do not allow us to unwrap religion , which is 
taken as a given, definitely a sociological , historical , psychological "thing" out there. 
Historical Move -
There is a long history of sciences of man, sciences of religion , sciences of the 
social , etc, which have brought me and my various colleagues here today of course as a 
discourse community. These sciences revise and redo each other, but that is the nature of 
research , analysis , testing - and both our institutions of learning and the short-term 
historical memory of disciplines with increasing numbers of trunks of such written 
endeavors in our attics. And in an age of inter-disciplinary discussion , represented by the 
bestseller at least (the book that everyone is reading , must be read) , a very welcome 
development in ages of specialization , we feel free to dip in and out of other fields 
without getting too bogged down by their historical luggage. I do it, you do it; we should 
be called on it at times. 
Are Vico and Tyler so forgottern? Yes and no. We don 't build in American 
culture , we recreate , which requires razing the ground with dim remembering of any of 
its historical features , rarely acknowledging historical orientations that have delivered us 
to this moment. We ' remember ' when we have other purposes. 
Personal Identifications -
Sciences and cognitive theory are not my main resources /opponents /contexts , etc. 
for reasoning about religion and religion issues. 
I use the evolving history of our thinking about religion - from the pre Christian 
elements of theology to the postmodern critiques of any such category as religion ( or 
belief , etc) 
• 
• 
In addition to this diachronic axis , I also use the more synchronic resources of 
modern (18-21 st century) anthropology. ( Sociology and psychology less thoroughly?) 
Added to a specialization in Chinese culture and history , this latter set of resources 
enables me to distance myself to some extent from aspects of debates revolving around 
English terms , Christian categories , and even the customs of the Euro-American 
academy. I am not unique in this background , nor more privileged(?) than that brought 
by others. 
Verstehen and eklaren were basic to my education - with all the debates on the 
side of how to best verstehen , and the ramifications of the projects so envisioned. 
Postmodernism was not really challenging the full deck of cards here , due to its own 
sympathies toward verstehen. 
Challenges -
Cognitive theory' s new universalism 
Anthropology ' s/area studies ' particularism 
The persistent , because useful , divide between the social and the personal 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
otes from Tomoko conversation about Genealogies of the Study of Religion 
1-734-332-0164 Home 
A genealogy of a subfield that is part of a larger effort to explain the field to outsiders 
(need seen in conversations with the Social Science Research Council) and perhaps to be 
the first product of a Mellon-sponsored conference on setting up rel depts. at UMichigan, 
UCBerkeley and JohnsHopkins, only major research universities without them (just 
programs at best). Outsiders do not understand about 'divinity' school programs, 
academic thrust of subfields like Biblical studies, or the major issues that drive the field 
in all its formations. 
ot a survey of literature, not a history of major figures. More angled to explain the 
scholarship, what does the area stand for, what type of scholarship does it produce, how 
to understand the field. Issue-oriented. A book for orienting outsiders (unlike Critical 
Term which addressed insiders somewhat provocatively). 
My a signment: omething about cognition, but not to be limited to cognitive theory as 
that has been recently defined. Not psychology of religion either. But because of my 
belief work, and my "deft' handling of cognitive theory in my UChicago alum of the year 
talk. 
Cognition and Performance: Study of the Religious Imagination 
Cognition and Action in Studying the Religious Imagination 
Cognitive States and Performative Activities 
Questions of Cognition and Belief 
Cognition and Belief 
Cognitive Questions on Religiou Dispositions 
Cognition 
EED TOK OW WHAT PHIL OF REL (MC TAYLOR) IS GOING TO COVER 
She did not ask for anything on ritual and performance. Someone doing Anthropology of 
Religion~ two on theology (i.e., Greely and David Tracey on catholic imagination; Veyne 
on historical/cultural imaginations; even JZS's Imagining Religions: Babylon to 
Jone town [ what does into say about imagining, who does it, scholar or native?]); one on 
the Philosophy of Religion (which covers belief, hopefully religious language ... ); but no 
one the creation of art and no 'sociology' tho the highlights would be in anthropology . 
• 
• 
• 
--Marx? Feuerbach? 
--Otto? 
--Wm James 
--Freud and Jung? 
--Adaptive mechanism (Burke1i; Boyer; ); softer Atran, Barrett, Andresen 
--Rappaport ( developing Durkheim, and more .. ) 
--Belief: Wittgenstein, more philos, to Veyne more histo-cultural 
--Geertz - cultural ideology, moods & motivations ( cognition is the personal realm?) 
--R. Needham 
--Mysticism? Transcendence? (Underhill; lots of phil ofrel on this; also Eliade) vs 
rationalism?? 
--Faith and Knowledge = phil of rel (justification as in Audi and Basil Mitchell [Klemke 
text 618 
--Experience (W Proudfoot; Bob Sharf; Taves in ERel'05; also Wach Types of Religious 
Experience '51 and Max Weber's Sociology of Religion) 
--Prayer? 
--The sacred? 
--Ritual as example of cog turn, via the attentions of Lawson and McCauley 
--Why people believe outrageous things .... (Kaiminer, Shermer) 
All these, but the study of religion - while ready to see religion in psycho-social-cultural 
terms - is not ready to reduce it to economics, frontal lobe anamolies, evolutionary 
adaptive mechanisms, but it is ready to see all these as part of the picture. Not religion as 
• sui generic,' a position that was staked out by Eliade but not strongly picked up by the 
major figures or developments in the field, but a conflagration of forces and mechanisms, 
which could make it increasingly less relevant for large portions of society or, 
conversely, still playing a vital if historically different role in various cultural contexts . 
I Catherine Bell - Genealogies.doc 
Book Proposal 
Genealogies of the Study of Religion 
Edited by Tomoko Masuzawa 
Preface: 
example?) 
Craig Calhoun (for 
Introduction: Tomoko Masuzawa 
[includes discussions of (1) idiosyncratic and often multiple usages of terms, e.g., "history of 
religion(s)," ''theological," etc.; (2) prevalence of subfields "religion and ... " (dialogic fields 
and cognate fields); (3) relation-overlap, tension-among the subfields; (4) institutional 
backdrop to the relation between scholarly and confessional interests/activities] 
1. Comparative Religion [Eliade, Tillich, W.C. Smith] 
[ fold in "Religion and ... " / dialogic fields] 
2. Biblical Studies 
3. History of Christianity 
[Christian origins, Patristics, church history] 
4. Historical Theology (?) 
[ medieval to early modem history of Christian thought] 
5. Systematic Theology 
[ modem & contemporary philosophical theology] 
6. Philosophy of Religion 
7. History of Religions 
[non-western and/or non-Biblical religions] 
8. Anthropology of Religion 
9. Cognitive Theory (?) 
[ fold in / touch on psychology of religion] 
10. Religion and Society (?) 
[ emphasis on legal studies] 
11. Theory and Method 
Jonathan Z. Smith 
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Mark C. Taylor 
Donald S. Lopez 
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BELIEVING 
And the Practice of Religion 
Catherine Bell 
* *DO NOT DISTRIBUTE* * 
FOR COPYRIGHT PERMISSION, PLEASE 
CONTACT STEVEN GELBER AT 
s111gelber@g111ail.co111 
Frontispiece 
-- Wittgenstein: "The meaning of prayer is the activity of praying." (Phillips '65:3 
Concept of Prayer) 
-- Macy: "belief' does not exist, just beliefs. (No! Just acts of believing) 
-- Zizek: belief the structuring priniciple of socially bound lives and deepest yearnings 
-- (Based on Mark Lilla, NYTMag art-> book) To more scholars, religion in its fullness 
is unfamiliar, more easily romanticized. The more society today, thinking to contain religion, 
emphasizes the secularity of our society, the more unfamiliar religion becomes, the more 'other.' 
Secular and religious mutually define each other, just as does science and religion. For many 
religions, secular West is all that is godless. But are we really so secular; or just degrees of 
difference, not along a spectrum but multiple dimensions (gov't, individual, etc). 
Frontispiece 
-- Wittgenstein: "The meaning of prayer is the activity of praying." (Phillips '65:3 
Concept of Prayer) 
-- Macy: "belief' does not exist, just beliefs. (No! Just acts of believing) 
-- Zizek: belief the structuring priniciple of socially bound lives and deepest yearnings 
-- (Based on Mark Lilla, NYTMag art-> book) To more scholars, religion in its fullness 
is unfamiliar, more easily romanticized. The more society today, thinking to contain religion, 
emphasizes the secularity of our society, the more unfamiliar religion becomes, the more 'other.' 
Secular and religious mutually define each other, just as does science and religion. For many 
religions, secular West is all that is godless. But are we really so secular; or just degrees of 
difference, not along a spectrum but multiple dimensions (gov't, individual, etc). 
To 
Steven 
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Preface 
/ 
Introduction. The1>roblem of Belief 
--~lfy Belief is a probl€m for~ 
--/Problem status i v"arious fields ;: 
-- researching thi; book has t~: Hume to Dennett to the new pragmatism 
of Rorty and literary-criticism ofHe~ste~~,mith or continential criticism of Foucault; 
t.v anthropology from Evans-Pritchard thro gh Needham and Rappaport; historically 
Pelikan Amo d ~tc· wm James to Wini .. ; sociology; cognitive and evolutionary 
neuroscience hurchland as ~L ~e ·1aly growing field of cognitive anthropology- '7 
psychology Boyer Whitehouse. M~ of these lines of thinking link to the each other and 
are regularly tapped by scholars of religion. So I will focus as much as possible on the 
study of religion and the field of religious studies, which will bring in so much more in 
the course of the discussion. This processual decision is not meant to be ontologically or 
historically desciptive, simply a tactic for dealing with the plethora of material in regard 
to the goals of this book. 
-- Goal= Not aiming at a theory (see Bauerlein), but a conversation, less about 
how we think of ourselves (reigning conversations about religion???) and more about 
how we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories ... Hope to introduce the 
possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that does not violate too much entrench 
linguistic habits of the world in which we live -- which would doom any ~ew attempt --
but attempts simply to heighten awareness and shift the emphasis of certain relationships 
in that world. So will not seek to condemn or advocate a ban on language of belief, but 
change where our confidence lies when using it. Quine on how pragmatic analysis 
undertakes "the task of making explicit what had been tacit, and precise what had been 
vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing kinks, lopping off vestigial 
growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) 
-- Section by section precis 
Chapter One. Belief, Beliefs, Believing 
-- [this section can be fitted into the beginning of the next one] the definitional 
morass, in English and beyond: versions of the folk category an what is debated in it; 
more formal attempts in neuroscience, cognitive science, anthropology? Philosophy ... ); 
going beyond English ( are there beliefs where there are not words for such things?) 
-- Universalism vs Particularism ~
- Argument against Christian universalism: Lopez, Pouillon, Ruel, Wiebe? 
- Cult semantics & Hist linguistics: Pelikan, Needham, Veyne? WCSmith? 
- Hist and Cult utility ie 'social fact': Arnold, Shweder, Southwald 
- Cognitive and Evolutionary arguments: Boyer, Rappaport 
Or Biological here and Cognitive in next subgroup? 
(/Jt 
Chapter 1: Introduction: The problem; Belief, Beliefs, Believing; o~~~ ~ 
a) Main problems identified: Universal or particular; mental or performative; private or 
social. This is the supposed universality given Christian assumptions; the problem of implied 
individual/private existence, as well as the historical, political cultural "social fact." 
[Durk on rel as beliefs and rites suggestes that these two categories may be the founding 
assumptions of universality in the study of religion.] 
b) Many (all anthrop?) declare they cannot use the term (Ruel, Pouillan, Needham, Wulff, 
Lopez), tho others have productively done so (Southwold, Arnold, phil of rel ... ?). 
c) History of religions/rel studies has not examined its use; in fact, it appears to deny its 
importance per se, but such unexamined assumptions can be very misleading, ill serving (leaving 
our discourse more theological?). Unexamined use of the term does make arguments rest on 
inherently theological (or about theology) grounds (distance from or ally with Wiebe?): 
-- historical exp of Christian credo formulation 
--faith rooted in individual experience [cp 'science' explaining cognitive/biology of 
belief] 
-- ignoring how belief is used ethnically, politically, role of polls (census already noted); 
Viswanathan, Lilla, etc 
-- Theorization of belief in theology (Reckwitz) 
d) The problems resulting from or just accompanying the, current particularism (when a 
theological-universal is rejected for particularistic; eg Needham; Evans Pritchard, etc) and post-
colonial analysis (Lopez); benefits of particularism too, of course! Namely, 
-- the subtle reintroduction of universalist assumptions endemic to any posturing of 
"study." Need to grapple with that! 
-- ramifications for any definition of "religion" and methods for its study, e.g. religious 
studies 
["Religion": Paradigms plus: use Chidester on West slow to call others' "religion"; also add JZS 
to argument about Christianity as prototype (see Guide to SofRel 41, Drugery 90) and his world 
religions research (before Masuzawa) Guide 11-42, Map 295?, Harvard Theo Rev '96:295-6.] 
e) Practice theory: value of a focus on believing and construction of a focus on practice; 
later look at multiple examples of believing from a comparative practice stance ... 
-- Mental Private Experience vs Performative Social Representation 
Wm James, Hume, Wulff, Needham, Reckwitz?, Zizek 
Also Boyer as anti Social Representation 
Chapter Two. 
-- Thinking. Social History of Belief - how bodies of theological doctrines arise 
(Izutsu); oral vs written (Pelikan, Good); Language of Comparative Religion (WHSmith, 
Wiebe) 
-- Traditions of Western Rel or how once Christians Came to Believe (not 
the first?) they decided others do or should; Pagans, Primitives and all those "other" 
religions; Description of Islamic orthodox development. Pelikan and WC Smith 
--Feeling. Experience= Psychological Center - explaining mysticism, collective 
representations, cultural symbols 
--[Socio-]Biology of Belief or Cognitive Naturalism 
Chapter Three. Believing - A Doing not a Thinking or a Feeling 
Mechanisms that are psycho-social focus on individual 
Prayer as agency (vs the lack of agency in most social and critical theory views 
that would have social structuring lead to embodied ideology 
Cosmologies for action 
Compartments vs coherence 
But It Feels Better: Your Truth, My Truth 
Performative practices for constructing a formulaic psycho-social identity 
Role of the marginal & imaginative (aka hope) 
4. Constituencies with a Stake, Some Suggestions for the Study of Believing 
Scientists, Religionists, Scholars, and the Rest 
Let Me Count the Ways ( we believe) 
Who are we trying to convince 
Breaking out of the Us/Them's: Scholars have no purchase, just interest 
Chapter 2: Theorizing Belief: Three Exclusive Angles 
a) The Social History of Belief: Take the above-mentioned emergence of theological 
doctrine and find in it a purely social historical explanation (Izutsu-ish; Veyne) Greek world -
early Christian social/theological heritage - involves a theory of belief as developing in response 
to social challenges from within or without, so very likely in plural environment, even midst 
'orthopraxy', that is, more isolated society, where there are still challenges that occasion some 
degree of formulation of resolve and practice, even if it is simply reason for greater or lesser 
participation; so all cultures are involved in this approach to belief-formation even when 
minimally in formal ideas. Lilla, Ruel, Izard 
b) The Psychological Analysis of Belief: Take the psychological theme and find in it an 
historical recasting in terms of experience (Christian -post-Reformation w/ a contrast w 
Enlightenment rati~nality yielding the irrational, and Arnold-type explanation of personal 
reflection on (or against); role of empirical reality, social influence, etc. WJames, Wulff, 
Needham 
c) The Biology of Belief #3: cognitive theories of neurophysiology, neuroscience, 
evolutionary adaptation, incl. Barrett , Atran and Rapaport, Fuller notes 
Chapter 3: Believing: A Practice Theory 
a) Makes non-dualist activities the main focus, not secondary to some mental orientation. 
Enables the exploration of the mentalities of performance; focus on expressions, not 
representations; 
b) Universals that accompany all theorizing are theoretical categories not data; what this 
angles hides is outweighed by what it affords: access to components of world construction, 
individual/social from another perspective; a wider characterization based on power 
arrangements 
c) The cosmological (w/wo coherence) and the contradictory (as power structuring, 
empowering) in the independent and the plural societies, doctrinal and non-doctrinal traditions 
d) Practice theory approach w/ 4 features; 
Southwold, Arnold, Cameron , Bourdieu 
Chapter 4: Believing -- Case Studies in How Practice Approach Informs ... 
Responding to polls; Praying for money; Healing; Evangelical face-to-face witnessing; 
Abiding by the book; Ritual grazing; Chinese morality? Magic? 
Conclusion: 
Role of theory in 'conferring', not presuming, universalism -- even as it involves 
uncovering and recovering particularism (how differs from Shweder?); how this meets the post-
colonial critique. Using the terminology of believing . 
[Draft: Preface] 
Preface 
As she was approaching ninety years of age, my mother began to talk more directly 
about God, what she believed, and whether she could be found wanting. As the 
child who studied religion, I got all her hard questions. Invariably, however, she 
would structure the conversation around the same points and what I had to say, 
whether challenging or soothing, never really mattered. "I'm not sure I believe or 
not. I certainly don't think it's likely there's the sort of God I was--iver taught to 
believe in. It's hard to believe there is a God who cares about us ,~h I can do is 
hope that if God exists, he'll accept that I tried to understand and tlllit<L-tried to live ----\ ' 
a good life -- I did what I could." My mother did not want a theologicafrlsponse 
and she certainly had no use for any historical or comparative framing. She was 
trying to make things right, work out who she had been, in her own estimation, and 
clarify what she could believe and what was too uncomfortable to invoke even at 
this late moment in her life. She inevitably wanted the comfort of being true to 
herself and, naturally, being on the right side of God should he exist. After all, she 
repeated, she was a believer "in her own way." However, my mother would 
regularly begin and end these predominantly one-sided discussions with the "hard" 
questions: "Am I a believer or not? What counts as belief?" 
There are many reasons to address my mother's specific and more general 
questions of my mother. This book, however, will not even make the attempt. It is 
an effort quite different, limited and, from my mother's perspective, hopelessly 
abstract. Aside from the fact that I would hesitate to discuss topics for which I have 
such a poor track record of useful contributions, my agenda is shaped by other 
issues. Yet I take up the topic of belief, in my own way, quite aware that for many 
people questions about belief are very personal and often complicated. Hopefully, 
my more abstract perspective will not lose sight of this fact. 
I address the phenomenon of believing for several reasons, none of them quite so 
motivationally distinct as they might appear here. For starters, I was reminded of a 
/ challenge to myself contained in the opening page of my first book on thinking 
/ about ritual to return some day to give equal attention to that other component of 
religion identified in the simple Durkheimian definition of religion of ritual and 
belief. In an short effort in that direction, I was surprised that this ubiquitous term 
among scholars of religion had received so little attention by the comparativists, 
those most exposed to other ways of believing. Some discussions certainly exist 
and they will be fully mined here. Yet they are all quite polemical, usually limited 
1 
in scope, and rarely invoke the more expansive treatments of the topic available in 
related disciplines such as anthropology, history, and philosophy. New 
/ developments were the goad that made the enormous challenge irresistible. On the 
one· hand, a spate of books on the rationality of religious belief by some eminent 
/ scholars and writers, among others, staked out some highly ludicrous/questionable 
positions given much attention by the popular press. On the other hand, new 
theoretical and empirical developments in cognitive neuropsychology ( cognitive 
theory) were introducing the perspective, and fruits, of a new rationalism to the 
study of religion. Their various studies of religious belief appeared to redefine the 
topic that was so rarely addressed by more traditional scholars of religion. 
There are, of course, even broader reasons to inquire into our ideas about believing . 
. This is a contradictory time. For many, secular and religious boundaries have never 
been as clear and important. Yet for others, confidence in the exorable spread of 
secular modernity is giving way to a new examination of the self-interested 
assumptions underlying this European and American ideology; the door is open for 
~ scholars of all persuasions to take religious beliefs with a new seriousness. Today 
religious strife, the form in which secular society generally notices religion, does 
not appear as simply another form of class struggle, colonial resistance, or 
opposition to modernization. Rather, a fragile consensus is forming that ideas 
matter, cultures matter, religion matters. But at this time of opportunity, the 
developments of the last thirty years leave many scholars of religion unable to pass 
through that door, let alone help explain what is on the other side. Stimulating 
scholarship on embodiment and performance, as well as more highly nuanced 
discussions of older distinctions between oral literate cultures, or tribal and creedal 
religions make it uncomfortable to return to the term belief. And the insights of 
postmodernist and postcolonial studies give us an aversion to char?,cterizing 
( essentializing) large entities such as Islam or global Christian evangelicalism in 
terms of their beliefs. We are effectively sidelined for the very discussion to which 
we could be particularly relevant. 
These reasons reasons for a book on such a huge, amorphous and contentious topic 
as belief lead me, first of all, to impose some order on our resources for addressing 
it and our past patterns of engagement. New sources of information, either ignored 
or overly embraced by scholars of religion, also demand incorporation. And the 
book does argue a thesis; while clear, in the spirit_ of the age it affirms this, 
problematizes that, ultimately suggesting a shift of perspective to afford a 
reasonable, and effective way to deal with competing scholarly goals. 
2 
Preface 
When I first decided to study religion so many years ago there were a number of clear issues on 
--c--
my mind, topics that I wanted to understand and that possible to understand. Foremost among 
~
these topics was the question of belief. If I had articulated it then I might have put it something 
like this: Are there effective ways to understand the reasons for types and degrees of belief such 
as those I had encountered in my admittedly limited ~Given the background was ------
bring to my studies, I would have continued, I am set to take belief seriously but unsure how to ,---_ 
bring all of its dimensions under the light of objective examinationf eading on this topic had 
1 
intrigued me and drew me to study religion, but my own experience with religion convinced me 
that solving the question of belief, .whatever "solving" might mean, it, would involve the attempt 
to address something very profoundly human. Graduate studies and the demands of an academic 
- ---o--.. 
career, however, d~ not §!l.COu~ge anything but the most delineated questions and projects, 
always with the assumption that the larger issues are more properly addressed "later" as one 
matured in knowledge and experience. t has been gratifying in my 'mature' years to see a few 
colleagues shift their focus to consider more encompassing formulations that ultimately animate 
the study of religion. More often we are apt to stay in the small field we have plowed for years, 
digging a little deeper, widening one's contribution, but always trying to get the specifics of a 
discrete set of phenomenon as right as possible. Those big, floppy questions with which we 
began usually looked a bit nai've as they were stowed in the closet of old artifacts. 
For me this book is a return to my early over-sized queries. It is a grateful but anxious return. 
Despite the some satisfaction of addressing the bigger questions around which the intellectual 
~ details of my career might possibly be rendered more coherent, I have known that the probability 
of a satisfying set of answers if very slim. This long delayed feat of gestation might give birth to 
a mere mouse, that is, a morsel of well-meant effort wrapped up wordy explications of what ~ 
never quite the right question to begin with. But armed with various protective dissemblings, I 
rose to the bait provided by the sheer size and promi ence ~f th~ void, the void that is the 
L -
absence of any real attention to the concept of belie n the most definitive tool of the trade, the 
Encyclopedia of Religion. In both the original 1986 edition and the revision of 2005, there is no 
entry for the term belief. An inquisitive reader is instructed to" ee Doubt
1
(an9 Belief)" for what 
1l)W)I· 11 f ,• twnuo )() ··c 
the revised edition explains is a philosophical discussion of the interrelation of doubt and belief 
in the Western tradition (get a quote here). It is in fact more theological than philosophical; it is 
certainly not a social scientific analysis of the term or the phenomenon. [More on references to 
belief in EofR as developed in Smith Festschrift] 
j Such a lacuna at the heart of religious studies is intriguing in any number of ways. Oversights 
2 
have the own peculiar logic which, as Freud suggested, may reveal the contrivances that keep a ~ 
particular logical struc~oat as an effective discourse. Perhaps the explicit unease the term ( 
has caused a handful of ethnographers (from Needham to Ruel?) and historians (Lopez) is the ) 
cause of this lacuna. Or it might be that the signature discussion of belief and faith by an L 
eminence of a particular school of religious studies (W C Smith, D Wiebe) suggests a narrowing 
specificity to any further treatment. Yet, however much these arguments might also constitute 
material for more encompassing engagement, the sheer fact that hardly a page can be turned in 
the Encyclopedia of Religion, or most other books in the field, without seeing the author's 
recourse to the term from one angle or another itself demands a more self-conscious and 
critically reflexive analysis. 
Scholars of religion are insignificant in the dynamic popular engagement of the phenomenon. In 
this decade the question of belief has been the subject of volleys of mass-market publications. 
The decade began with Michael Shermer's Why People Believe Weird Things (1997) and Wendy 
Kaminer' s Sleeping with Extra-Terrestials (1999). More recently a stir has greeted The God 
Delusion by Richard Dawkins, Breaking the Spell by Daniel Dennett, and The End of Faith by 
Sam Harris. Yet the foregoing authors see themselves are merely responding to the popularity 
and assertive styles of American religion. There has been a remarkable growth of religious 
publishing, effectively epitomized by the success of Huston Smith's The World Religions and the 
Christian fundamentalist novel, Going Beyond. Simultaneously, biological and evolutionary 
accounts of the roots and rise of religion, introduced by Dawkins' s The God Gene by Richard 
Dawkins, have been equally numerous, with such titles as Why God Won't Go Away: Brain 
Science and the Biology of Belie/by A. Newburg et al., and The _God Part of the Brain by 
Matthew Alper. The level of interest in religion and belief in this post-millennial era is 
unquestionably high. While scientists have weighed in on the problems of religiosity despite how 
I 
3 
our evolutionary heritage makes us biologically prone to believe, and the specter of religious 
terrorism has made all thinking people try to better understand religious dispositions, scholars of 
religion have generally been very slow to engage the bigger question at the root of these 
discussions. not engaged any particular part of the wide-ranging interest in what it is to believe. 
While not nearly as entertaining as some of the aforementioned titles, this book is a small 
contribution to effort to locate and animate this discussion within the formal study of religion. 
Materials included here were first developed for three conferences and subsequently published, 
in part, under the aegis of those events: a small conference sponsored by Dartmouth College in 
1v/ / 2000, which subsequently published the papers as Radical Interpretation in Religion, edited by 
Nancy K Frankenberry; a joint Princeton-Oxford seminar on "Faith in the Ancient World" held 
✓ 
/ 
I 
in 2006-07, with my presentation subsequently developed in part for publication in Introducing 
Religion: Essays in Honor of Jonathan Z. Smith (2007) and a volume of seminar papers currently 
under development .... ; and .finally a small conference on religion held by the journal History 
and Theory at Wesleyan College, which published the papers in a 2006/7 special issue of the 
journal. I am grateful to my colleagues at these events for their generous responses to my initial 
efforts in this area and their permissions to reproduce sections of that material. 
I am indebted to the generosity of the College of Arts and Sciences at Santa Clara University for 
the time to work on the early stages of this book and to a research fellowship from the National 
Endowment for Humanities (2007-2008) during which time it was put into its final form. Finally, 
I want to thank my husband, Steven Gelber, who prodded me to continue to work on this book 
despite many physical distractions: he believed in me and this project and would brook no 
heretical objections. 
Catherine Bell 
2007 
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I 
Introduction - "The Problem of Belief' 
1/'. 
An investigation of a topic should begin with an ~planation of why that topic warrants 
one's interest in the first place. In other words, an investigator should understand why the topic 
constitutes a 'problem' - at least for her. Of course, many scholarly investigations, indeed some 
of the best, focus on pies that most neople do not consider problem; only a small pool'of 
~~ ~ F , ,, ~ 
--- ✓ .., -
similarl -focused colleagues would pay any attention. Analysis of the type of problem posed by 
--✓ f 
I 
the topic is also not really a preliminary step so much as the initial stage of an argument that will 
, 
permeate all subsequent stages. In the same vein, any answer as to why the topic constitutes a 
:;;, 
problem worthy of.study is usually not the whole of it; the reasons to research a topic are usually 
not the research itself .Although why something strikes us as needing to be accounted for often 
goes far to explain how that topic might be more effectively understood. 
I entered graduate school with a history of on-again off-again believing, a set of 
expe,riences that made me v ry aware of the intricacies of religious belief and its powerful role in 
\...J- \M.-..k::,r.:,;.,--l,.~ r ~ 
shaping how a person acts. hat could bermqre basic to study? I was eager to ~ssemble a fuller,1 
tfaJlj}tho ·o~ lij objective picture of wha ~ ppens wn~n people believe, why they believe, or 
what makes them continue to believe. Admittedly., these were questions that .even a first-year 
!/II"- r ,(,. 
graduate student understood as shaped by large historical forces: clearly, at-one timl and m 
I, 
other places, people may not be aware of themselves as believers; and questions about belief , ~,e..,.1'-e--1.; 
,,JlL- ~~-k, ~t--L µ . . . ~ . --·7 
~ndetfulB ge.n~ bett-1: rel.1g10n as some sort of clear cut phenomenon . !when os belief w.- ~  \_,.VV l 
is not iri re igiori so much as it is in such and such a deity or doctrine or practice; And then there 
are all the beliefs t at hive littly to do ~ li_gion in o r Sec,~lar si c;eties1 -;-vcd, M !?17 ec,,:_/ t.-d'~ l1J 
,,, ( 
1 
• The efffct o graduate :J oot reo;i~ t;tions and specializations is such that only now do I 
, ' 
have the time and inclination to return to such an U?Wi~ldy topic. kld it is also one of the effects 
of graduate sch 1 q,;a c ee,r,...in the scholarly community, that one ends up primarily interested 
JU'? ( I \ 
in how scholars Q Q1bers5 ~ put ttogethet\ this categery and proceeded to use it- or igore ·1 --
even more than how the phenomenon might exist t in the world. I do not doubt that in so far as 
our words mean anything belief does exist~ hough its aram~ters may be :H."t1:1.t.Y:.""'1r less large, e en 
I 
less clearly demarcated ; wJine the problem of its effective characterization will ?e_ the h~ ~ -iy- 1f-
this book. , t the topic of belief has al ays been a 'problem' t9 those who would ch, ge the / ~(,_/ f-t 
way in which another people were religious; 01 those for whom a secular separation® the 
µ,()h✓ I -J.~ 
N 3 
,. lw1~d 
sphere of rational discourse was fairly distinct from discourse of various religiously-minded 
~ 
, communities, woup that would include · scholar{ focused on that other great category ~'religion'; 
, ..... ,r/W""v,··t{- .J.,,, \ r,,:_ ..... 
r even lthose hose theological or pastoral instincts, shaped by this modem differentiation of 
~ lrt r, - r,. -
spheres, wis : o address themselves to the religiosity . of those in their care, beino-woht to talk 
. / (. t:> .. 
as much about hat belie , should be believeq.. From the cross-;cultural contact of 
missionaries and ethnologists, through the intelligentsia's mapping of social facts, to the 
immersed theologians reflecting the relevant categories - all speak of beliefs. 
-f~ 1 l,< /~1~ ·,}2 J Yl ~r;: rrJ ? I tll) 1 t1..A._, it,c_, '------~ . ~ , fl 
<7'{t~ L . ~ . 1· . G . . .c- h ?)_. , 1\-,... l. ~ ... ci Iii 1 · . b 1 · f 
~ . , m.11, ti-1es e ust 1-g10.u f>P 1e-at1QRS-O-i. emi. w1 - stuuy o ij re 1g1ous e 1e 
7
° ?, · d · 1t pi' Vt maintain the border:J, of the secular/religious world t ~ 1 - While one might 
~ l,,v'-''tf:/1.. -o lf.x? {Ii}, . ~ 'Ii>-·r (f l , f- i r ---~ ,(_ r/ .J 
imagine a-scholarly warrior .,.-r: • g~ent-h~nCltttlS; battling the e 'ioence of 
r · 1 I"· (. Lfr ,t(t t'),,J : -
<{ encroachment or lack of clear wall s°- we call all name se~4,~ may be more likely tite--hi 
~s defending religion as a scholarly focu~) i ce it is th7f field in ~h ~ any ofus hold 
our credentials and receive-our salaries. 1 Y e_!,,--rlfls does not explain the ~ in which a large swath' 
of scholars of religion ignore the topic: not philosophers or psychologists of religion, but 
- ~ historians of religion (phenomenologists?), comparativists, and specialists in particular traditions. 
f v u ~~ 
~ 
I ~ , ' ' ' ~ . / /,,z,t (..f,.,- ·( • C , /f,p 
J. · ~ ~ T , \ f h h. . ~11 '7.~ f\£1 f. d h? I " · · · lo..t,,, c,7
1
11'-" o a awareness o t e 1stonca y prov1s10na nature o any s~u . ar quest1onmg_ 1s .,_ t 
routinely cons·dered part of the 'problem' identified with the topic. As an individual scholar with 
I 
,....j the training generally expected of an academician I share a perspective with other disciplinary 
I 1 
approaches the distinctive biases which we are not expected to transcend / ut we are certainly 
V I s~ 
) 
encouraged to explore. When such biases are made the subject of scrutiny they can lead the 
A ~ I 
inve~tigator in circles of self-examimi,tion .... The compensatio d, adequate or inadequate, 
(_ ~ ~ ~-/ 
depends on ~e the study locates its dominant bias , as in th~ 
1
bias of secularism, defined as 'not 
J 
including' oi 'opposed to' religion, or the bias of colonialism : argued to propagate distortions 
I 
deriving from one culture's assumptions about belief. 
j J / 
1 Needham notes the definitions of religion that depend on belief: Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown , Geertz, etc. pp 21. 
"standard acceptation of belief as the distinctive feature ofreligion ... " E-P appears convinced that the lack of "a 
system of nomenclature " enabling the "wide comparative study of phenomena" hindered his presentation of Zande 
religion, and if provided would be of great service . (EP p8) 
,, :y/ 
~lctcr 
~ 
>. e s of religion, however, have always addressed belief! as well as beliefs in science and 
3 
\_ 7 
secularism. Nonetheless, for them as well as the lar e o ulation, belief is commonly O • 1 · , , ~C11 J ~ ) •• et~)'./~ tl tt,,v'-4~ 
understood to be the essential feature of religio However, few in Religious Studies have 
explored the pertine t ambiguties of the term._ onald Lopez was a welcome voice on the matter, {_ /. ,Y../i{ ) .,;,_ I 
following-by-man-y-year h ork-of W C Smith) d his critic Donald Weibo/ ~
Encyclopedia of Religion editie b Mircea Eliade, did not even include a distinct entry for 
~ ~----'--·--------- -./ 
elief'; ~r that h~gi.ding the. reader is told to "See Doubt (And Belief)." · J ~d 
~ ,,,.. ....-"\.. , - ,,,. - ~-. ( 7/ d,,, ( 0 
,<) z~ ~ VJt ... 
The ambitious goal of this book is, simultaneously, to propose an analysis of the tangle of history 
/ and current motivation that might influence a tendency to think of religious belief.as clear entity, 
f. or a clear problem; to analyze how constructions of religious belief have governed our thinking 
3 about religion; and to propose a way to enable our ingrained linguistic patterns to lead to 
translations of allow for a wider variety of experience than older patterns have generally allowed. 
It became something of a reflex of "the problem" of belief, a problem first identified by Hume, 
who suggested that particular "operation of the mind" constitutes "one of the greatest mysteries 
of philosophy." 2 Bertrand Russell added a serious emphasis, avering that "belief ... is the central 
problem in the analysis of mind. "3 Its status as a problem in philosophy continues. 
7 
. On another front, the anthropologist ·E. E. Evans-Pritchard was the first to broach the idea that 
I 
categories like belief, as with the process of cultural translation in general, may not be able to 
convey type of spiritual relationships in Zande have, the mystical notions (kwoth) they find 
supported by their own experience [N 29: a verbal concept of belief does exist in Nuer ... ngath; 
E-P distinguishes faith from belief, tho N does not, no reference]. His student, Rodney Needham, 
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the idea, and determined that its Inda-European roots 
made it inadequate to translate concepts and interior experiences from cultures that never saw 
any need to generate a comparable concept. N Donald Lopez depicts the internalization of belief 
2 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 
3 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 (Russell, 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham, p. 7. It was to become important to Pierce and Quine, Hartshorne and 
Wittgenstein, even among more recent . 
1 
in the historical circumstances of the Inquisition and its role in cross-cultural obscurantism in the 
colonial reach of its Christian biases. N Rejecting the conclusions of his disciplinary forebearers, 
the anthropologist ~weder finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ... _ ... (1989).4 
But Rodney Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and 
anthropologically, argued that it could not be restricted to any particular academic disciplines 
since it "has to do with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 5 Talal Asad's 
"genealogy" of religion argue that an critical erpphasis on belief as the internal psychology of 
individuals, (Needham conclusion) enabled marginalization of religion in the modern world. 6 
(1998: xvii). In the context of postcolonial literary criticism, Gauri Vivswanathag_extends Asad's -
argument to the role of conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of 
the modem state as it opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil 
rights. (?) 7 
In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to s~cularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and polarized 
by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
_ unpr§~~vdepted social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naYve 
misunderstanding" ofboth. 8 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
4 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
5 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), xiv. 
6 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 46. 
7 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 
xvi. 
8 Although a decade earlier the philosopher of religion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a nai've misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science_ of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (1989): 149 [-168]. 
I 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion. "9 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses of religion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots o its modern conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. S eer semantic spread 
sugg~sts a ·f/ w problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
I ,.. 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) his study will simply probe the 
' ) 
issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study ofreligion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation, that is, it will attemptto indicate all tne 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this..most basic of categories. 
. , 
The goal of this study is not a new theory of belief. Such a project would cement the 
'J reification that is already enshrined in this concept. No, the goal is to contribute to a conversation 
,\ about how we think of ourselves ( already underway in regard to the category of religion ???) and 
{,. 
how we think about what we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories. This is a 
. pragmatic analysis that, in the words of Quine, emulates "the task of making explicit what had 
been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing 
kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) I hope 
to suggest and support the possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that neither so 
violates entrench linguistic habits of the world in which we live that it is doomed from the 
beginning nor shuns the real work task of heightening heighten awareness that leads to a shift in 
the emphasis of certain relationships in this world. Therefore I will not seek to condemn or 
9 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001 ), p. 2. 
{
advocate a ban on language of belief, however trendy that might seem, but instead aim at 
changing where our confidence lies when using it. 
Few terms are more broadly scattered across the palette of Western languages than ... rough 
equivalents of the noun and verb, belief and believe. The definitional morass, in English and 
beyond: versions of the folk category an what is debated in it; more formal attempts in 
neuroscience, cognitive science, anthropology? Philosophy ... ); going beyond English ( are there 
beliefs where there are not words for such things?). Least read book: Needham 
Some describe the difficulties of defining belief and then getting at the experience described 
(Arnold 19: Needham argues that one cannot get at the diffbetw belief, its expression in 
language and its experience in lived reality) 
Today the topic of religious belief fills the popular press of the secular world. Global and 
regional terrori§mgener ,/ate numerous attempts to explain the political and redemptive logic of 
religious bel' efs. (nb M' Lilla 2007) The 200(?) decision by the Kansas State School Board to 
include 'intelligc;nfdesign' in the high school(?) science curriculum occasioned more blanket 
critiqu fof relrgious beliefs by distinguished scientists among others, even though the decision 
was reversed when a new school board was voted in the following year. (Dennett, Dawkins, 
Hafris,/et alia). Overall, the story of Western secularism is being rewritten due to the unexpected 
.::{ole!of religious belief in shaping events. 
For Anthropology, however, the issue was the subject of an extended exploration that included E 
E Evans-Pritchard, Rodney Needham, Martin Southwold and Richard Schweder .... among 
others. It appec!,r(that the field most dependent upon the concept of belief is the most reluctant to 
fully engage its complexities. 
/ 
'\ Chapter one addresses the various tensions that have contradictorily shaped discussions of belief. 
I Foremost is the impasse between the forces ·ofuniversalism on the one hand and particularism on 
the other. It has been a working assumption throughout the history of discussions of religion that 
belief is universal; it is an assumption that continues to prop up the whole explanative framework 
of"comparative religion," ~'world religions," and "global religions." Yet a handful of impressive 
t voices have long argued for the particularism of belief, notably, its embeddness in the Christian 
identity that was forged in the early centuries of anno domino. To use a term so coined by and 
f ·saturated with a Christian outlook is only to handicap further any scholarly rags of objectivity. 
An equally powerful tensions exist between thinking of belief as mental or physical, private or 
social. Is belief something that the individual embraces in his or her heart and mind, on the basis 
of which the individual participates in a social community marked by rites and customs; or is 
/ belief the product of one's social involvement in such a community and it exists only as a 
performative disposition and bodily experience that is instigated as much in a social context as 
private one? The study of religion has tracked in different directions based on how they favor 
one set of tensions over another. Certain Catholic or Protestant tendencies lace these choices, but 
f many other factors have become equally important. 
Chapter Two takes us the historical treatment of belief. Not simply how it came to be associated 
l with Christian identity, but whether it predates Christianity, without assuming universality. one 
( of the lower key tensions surrounding belief is whether it should be reserved for personal 
) commitment to a set of doctrines or used more loosely to fit the evidence that people made 
) choices about the nature, degree and object of their commitments. Further, there are several 
~ 
studies that argue for the social conditions in which 'believing' comes to be expected of 
followers and the nature of that belief is very much shaped by the questions that emerged in 
these communities and how they came to be answered -- by formalizing doctrine, sectarian 
( division, or emering authority structures. 
) 
) 
\ 
I 
Universalism vs Particularism 
- Argument against Christian particularism/universalism: Lopez, Pouillon, Ruel, Wiebe? 
- Cult semantics & Hist linguistics: Pelikan, Needham, Veyne? WCSmith? 
- Hist and Cult utility ie 'social fact': Arnold, Shweder, Southwald 
- Cognitive and Evolutionary arguments: Boyer, Rappaport 
Or Biological here and Cognitive in next subgroup? 
[Beware the universalism of theoretical language and its wielders] 
Mental Private Experience vs Performative Social Representation 
Wm James, Hume, Wulff, Needham, Reckwitz?, Zizek 
f Also Boyer as anti Social Represen 



mysteries of philosophy." 4 Bertrand Russell add emphasis, avering in 1921 that "belief ... is the 
central problem in the analysis of mind." 5 It became important to Pierce and Quine, Hartshorne 
and Wittgenstein. 
On another front, the anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard was the first to broach the idea 
that categories like belief, as with the process of cultural translation in general, may not be able 
to convey type of spiritual relationships in Zande have, the mystical notions (kwoth) they find 
supported by their own experience [N 29: a verbal concept of belief does exist in Nuer ... ngath; 
E-P distinguishes faith from belief, tho N does not, no reference]. His student, Rodney Needham, 
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the idea, and determined that its Inda-European roots 
made it inadequate to translate concepts and interior experiences from cultures that never saw 
any need to generate a comparable concept. N Donald Lopez depicts the internalization of belief 
in the historical circumstances of the Inquisition and its role in cross-cultural obscurantism in the 
colonial reach of its Christian biases. N Rejecting the conclusions of his disciplinary fore bearers, 
the anthropologist Richard Shweder finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ...... (1989).6 
But Rodney Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and 
anthropologically, argued that it could not be restricted to any particular academic disciplines 
since it "has to do with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 7 Talal Asad's 
"genealogy" of religion argue that an critical emphasis on belief as the internal psychology of 
individuals, (Needham conclusion) enabled marginalization ofreligion in the modern world. 8 
(1998: xvii). In the context ofpostcolonial literary criticism, Gauri Vivswanathan extends Asad's 
argument to the role of conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of 
the modem state as it opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil 
rights. (?)9 
In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to secularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and' polarized 
4 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 
5 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 (Russell, 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham, p. 7. 
6 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
7 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), xiv. 
8 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 46. 
9 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 
xvi. 
by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
unprecendented social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naYve 
misunderstanding" of both. 10 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion." 11 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses of religion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots to its modem conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. Sheer semantic spread 
suggests a few problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) This study will simply probe the 
issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study of religion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation, that is, it will attempt to indicate all the 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this most basic of categories. 
10 Although a decade earlier the philosopher of religion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a naiVe misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (1989): 149 [-168]. 
11 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 2. 
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The goal of this study is not a new theory of belief. Such a project would cement the 
reification that is already enshrined in this concept. No, the goal is to contribute to a conversation 
about how we think.of ourselves (already underway in regard to the category ofreligion ???) and 
how we think about what we are doing with our inherited interpretive categories. This is a 
pragmatic analysis that, in the words of Quine, emulates "the task of making explicit what had 
been tacit, and precise what had been vague; of exposing and resolving paradoxes, smoothing 
kinks, lopping off vestigial growths, clearing the ontological slums." (Bauerlein 2, see ff) I hope 
to suggest and support the possibility of a new way of speaking about belief that neither so 
violates entrench linguistic habits of the world in which we live that it is doomed from the 
beginning nor shuns the real work task of heightening heighten awareness that leads to a shift in 
the emphasis of certain relationships in this world. Therefore I will not seek to condemn or 
advocate a ban on language of belief, however trendy that might seem, but instead aim at 
changing where our confidence lies when using it. 
Section by section precis 
J 
Introduction - "The Problem of Belief' 
-7 
j 
one's interest in the first place. In other words, an investigator should understand why the topic { 
constitutes a problem -- for her at least. Afterall, most scholarly investigations, indeed some of ( 
the best, focus on topics that many people do not consider a problem. Further, this analysis of the_j 
~r.,,,, 
problem posed by the topic is not a preliminary step but an initial stage of analysis that will 
permeate subsequent stages. Yet an answer to why the topic constitutes a problem worthy of 
study is usually not the whole of it, in other words, the reasons to research a topic are usually not 
the research itself, although why something strikes us as needing to be accounted for often go far 
to explain how that topic might be more effectively understood. 
A personal longstanding reason for a book inquiring into the phenomenon of religious 
belief is simple. Once I was a believer, thoughtfully and intimately committed, and then I was no 
longer one, with a different set of thoughts and emotions. While I was able to 'explain' my 
believing and my not-believing in the popular Freudian patois of the day, I wanted to understand 
more fully what had happened and why and whether what was true for me is useful for 
understanding others. These were among the circumstances that led me to the study of religion. 
1 J 
But there are also more immediate triggers for this project on belief. For example, my first book 
addressed ritual and I noted at the time that a full study of religion would demand a 
corresponding analysis of belief, following the great Durkheim in the simple definition of 
religion as a matter of beliefs and rites. This definition remains a working, first-level description 
of religion, so for both scholarly and popular ways of slicing of religion, belief would be a 
natural topic to follow work on ritual. Another spur to engage the topic in some way lay in the 
realization that my discipline, the history of religions, has given short shrift to the whole issue of 
belief even as it remains a major purveyor of the term. The Encyclopedia of Religion, in both 
first and second editions, fails to include a discrete entry for such a basic concept. 1 The oversight, 
ifit is that, was greatly redressed with Donald S. Lopez's 1998? essay on belief in Mark Taylor's 
Critical Terms for the Study of Religion, to which this study will constantly refer.2 Taking these 
motivating circumstances together, one might conclude that I will understand belief to be an 
1 The first 1986? edition edited by Mircea Eliade, the 2005 edition by Lindsay Jones 
2 Taylor 1998? 
1 
essential yet too easily ignored topic in the study of religion. Yet question about the way in 
which it might be essential to investigating religion as ethnographic phenomenon or analytic 
concept is probably more accurate. The fact that belief- especially the irrationality of having it -
has become the focus of a recent spurt of publications by scientists, philosophers, and cultural 
critics may make any study of terms a useful exercise. The increase in the potential stakes for 
religion that this extra public attention brings is not further motivation for this book, but it might 
be the salvation of what feels at this stage to be a quixotic foray into a very live minefield. 
? Questions about personal experience with belief as well questions about how it should be 
approached loom over the study of religion generally. And together these concerns replicate 
familiar ·stances rooted in the secular Enlightenment. The secular scholar inquiring into belief, a 
task imagined by the scholar more than the believer, must fear acting the part of an 
Enlightenment homunculus. Further, to stand in the position of a non-believing secularist is, we 
know, to look at religion from a very particular perspective, one that may seem very foreign to 
the practitioner's self-consciousness. So any answers I might entertain to my questions about 
belief might constitute answers only from some angles not others, and perhaps not to believers. 
With that awareness, Enlightenment constraints on the questions it allows become as clear as the 
liberties it affords. 
? Today awareness of the historically provisional nature of any such secular questioning is 
routinely considered part of the 'problem' identified with the topic. As an individual scholar with 
the training generally expected of an academician I share a perspective with other disciplinary 
approaches the distinctive biases which we are not expected to transcend, but we are certainly 
encouraged to explore. When such biases are made the subject of scrutiny they can lead the 
investigator in circles of self-examination .... The compensation, adequate or inadequate, 
depends on where the study locates its dominant bias, as in the bias of secularism, defined as 'not 
including' or 'opposed to' religion, or the bias of colonialism, argued to propagate distortions 
deriving from one culture's assumptions about belief. 
The ambitious goal of this book is, simultaneously, to identify the bias that casts religious 
belief as a problem, to analyze how constructions of belief have governed our studies of religion, 
and to propose a way to enable ingrained linguistic patterns to lead to translations of a wider 
variety of experience than such patterns have generally allowed. 
2 
I am certainly not the first/alone? in the last few decades to isolate the idea of belief and 
find it a problem. It has been consistently approached that way in various disciplines and even 
something of a reflex for some scholars to speak of 'the problem of belief,' even to see this 
problem as central to scholarship or the cultural-political landscape itself. In philosophy, any 
number of scholarly efforts continue with the emphasis proposed by Hume, that belief as an 
'operation of the mind' constitutes 'one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy." 3 Bertrand 
Russell suggested in 1921 that "belief ... is the central problem in the analysis of mind." 4 The 
anthropologist Richard Shweder, who inherits an articulate tradition of concern about the 
language of belief, finds that belief?? embodies the "faultline" ...... (1989). 5 But Rodney 
Needham's invaluable analysis of the concept, both philosophically and anthropologically, 
argued that it could riot be restricted to any particular academic disciplines since it "has to do 
with the fundamental premises of any humane discipline." 6 Talal Asad's "genealogy" ofreligion 
argue that an critical emphasis on belief as the internal psychology of individuals, (Needham 
conclusion) enabled marginalization ofreligion in the modem world. 7 (1998: xvii). In the context 
of postcolonial literary criticism, Gauri Vivswanathan extends Asad's argument to the role of 
conversion, an intense experience for believers, central to the narrative of the modem state as it 
opposes the emotional subjectivity of minorities to the politics of their civil rights. (?)8 
· In one form or another, belief is also prominent on the current landscape of popular life in 
America. Not confined to secularists, belief has become an explicit problem for many citizens 
over the last decade in which they have been haunted by acts of Islamist terrorism and polarized 
by the political influence of the Christian right. In a series of high profile books, the biologist 
Richard Dawkins decries the "God Delusion"; the philosopher Daniel Dennett seeks to "Break 
the Spell"; while the .... Christopher Hitchins pulls no punches in decrying the "poison" of belief 
in the supernatural. Hence the popular press finds belief to be a contentious topic at a time of 
unprecendented social polarization between so-called believers and atheists. At the same time, 
however, some postmodern writers suggest that the religious believer/secular atheist dichotomy 
3 Hume, p. 628, cited in Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 
4 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), p. 7 (Russell, 'The Analysis of 
Mind' 1921, p. 231. who echoed in Needham, p. 7. 
5 Richard A. Shweder 1989 
6 Rodney Needham, Belief, Language and Experience (University of Chicago, 1972), xiv. 
7 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 46. 
8 Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 
xvi. 
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is effectively transcended. Wayne Proudfoot, eminent philosopher of religion, writes that any 
conflict between religious belief and scientific concepts is now simply "a naYve 
misunderstanding" ofboth. 9 The philosopher John Caputo more whimsically argues that in this 
"post-secular" age, religion and science are not opposites, rather "the opposite of a religious 
person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon." Anyone who loves 
something madly is evidence of a "religion without religion." 10 
Historically, of course, belief has been the focus of analyses ofreligion stretching from 
Irenaeus to Karl Rahner, David Hume to Donald Davidson, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith to 
Slavoj Zizek. To explore the concept of belief from its earliest roots to its modem conundrums 
would, of course, be an enormous, and therein quite scattered, survey. Sheer semantic spread 
suggests a few problems inherent to belief in popular usage. For example, the term is used for 
religious commitment to sacred truths as well as one's degree of confidence in a weather report 
or intention to take even a trivial action (that old master of the language, WC Fields's "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I'll have another drink.) This study will simply probe the 
issues attending belief that seem most relevant to how the study of religion conducts itself today. 
Its purpose is less systematicity than provocation, that is, it will attempt to indicate all the 
problems and resources by which to generate a conversation within the study of religion about 
this most basic of categories. 
9 Although a decade earlier the philosopher ofreligion Wayne Proudfoot could write "The idea that religious beliefs 
might conflict with scientific hypotheses is now widely viewed as evidence of a nai've misunderstanding of both 
religion and science." WP, "From Theology to a Science of Religions: Jonathan Edwards and William James on 
Religious Affections," Harvard Theological Review 82:2 (1989): 149 [-168]. 
10 John D. Caputo, On Religion (London: Routledge, 2001 ), p. 2. 
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Chapter One. The Problem of Universality 
Lopez: Belief= historical and cultural Christian particularity 
Discuss the evidence for the liberal assumption of universality, seen in Huston Smith, missionary 
history .... 
Role of emphasis of symbol in anthropology and HR's Eliade. (Asad?) 
First to suggest that the assumption that everyone believes something is a holdover from 
Christianity? Who? Hume? Evans-Pritchard 
5 
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religious person is a loveless person" or a "selfish and pusillanimous curmudgeon"; anyone who 
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The Problem of Universality 
A discrete number of scholars ha e struggled with the nature and distribution, both historical and 
culturally, of belief. While then ture of~ .. rob. lem may ;ppear straight-forward, it is 
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actually approach quite distinctly for all. The most salient parts of their arguments are an 
inescapable way of demonstrating a broad dissatisfaction with the implications of universality -
that all people can believe and do so in the same way -- easily attributed to the term. 
A review of the literature, recent, reveals very similar concerns. On the one hand, there are 
philosophical concerns rising from an analysis of language and communication: Wittgenstein 
was particularly straightforward, wondering if believing was an interior experience, and whether 
it was constituting by the thinking component or the doing. Other philosophers .... culminating 
in Donald Davidson (see Frankenberry) who explicitly argues for the universality of believing as 
the basis for communication (?). On the other hand, a body of more ethnographically-oriented 
studies looks at the meaning of belief in cross-cultural communication and representation. It is 
mostly this second group that addresses religious behavior. And they generally question three 
assumptions about belief, namely that belief is universal, that it is a mental state, and therefore 
that it is the personal experience of the individual. In questioning these categories, particularly 
the first, studies have stressed examples that demonstrate the particula;rity of belief (location in 
specific times and places; instability of meaning over time). References have also suggested that 
believing may be better thought of residing in doing rather than thinking and that a persistent 
sociocultural dimension to belief negates a focus on the psychological experience of the 
individual. 
The challenge to universality primarily rests on the apparent misapplication of the term to the 
relationship that people in tradition societies have to their gods. Needham opens his study with 
the experience of the impossibility of rendering "I believe in God" in Penan. Likewise Evans 
Pritchard is loath to describe Azande feelings about .... with belief. Lopez takes the case furthest 
showing how use of the category was a colonial distortion of indigenous culture. None of these 
studies makes a formal point that traditional societies as some sort of group are not well served 
by representing their relations to or thoughts about their deities in terms of belief; nor do these 
studies conclude that non-traditional - e.g., modem, industrial, dominating- societies do have 
religions in which belief is an appropriate term. To make these points begs many questions, such 
as exactly what do you mean by belief, other than it is a Christian term? do all so-called modem 
and traditional societies fall neatly on either side of the belief /non-belief divide? The French 
anthropologist Jean Pouillon has dealt with these issues most theoretically and succinctly ... 
Several scholars have explicitly attempted to describe what it means to believe, namely de 
Certeau, V eyne and Izutsu - usually in route to another goal. 
The consistent reaction of ethnographers against use of the term is part of a new sensitivity to the 
distortionrs possible in translation and to fundamental differences in. cultural constructions of 
religious cosmologies and divine interactions. Not new in the sense that only postmodern 
scholars of the late 1990s evidence this sensitivity. E-P writes in the 1930s. This sensitivity is 
new with regard to an earlier quandary in anthropological assimilation of diverse cultures. It was 
once asked if tribal, traditional societies actually had religion as such, since what they had 
appeared to differ substantively from religion a:s it was extrapolated from the Christian 
experience. The weight of history shifted to favor an expansion of the term to include more types 
of religiosity than ever before, with a simultaneous theorizing on the nature of religion beyond 
the historical conditioning of Christianity. David Chidester for one notes how long it took for 
Africans to be deemed religious, that is, as possessing religion. Accepting the wide use of the 
term religion, the next stage of collective concern about categories was reluctant to apply such a 
Christianized category as belief, or to de-christianize the category sufficiently starting either with 
a theoretical redefinition or by simply flooding/inflating the category with new examples. These 
latter efforts do appear in some works: Southwold writing on belief in Sri Lankan Buddhism 
works to refine the category as well as the religious activities in question so that he can include 
them as believers; the medieval historian Philip Arnold wants to recognize multiple mode of 
religiosity (specifically popular religion) that had long been deemed un-Christian as sincere 
sources of belief; not tampering with the nature of belief as a category, he suggests the belief-like 
nature of these popular religious arts and the vacuity of the historical criteria used to determine 
what counted. 
While Hume is a natural place to start because of his exterior and critical position in trying to 
explain religion, but there is not an unbroken line of scholars so much as a question that had kept 
popping up. Hume is a resource for latter investigators, but their projects often differed the 
questions about belief per se have been considerably similar. In A Treatise of Human Nature 
(l 739-40), Hume writes that belief as "an act of mind has never yet been explained by any 
philosopher." (1888: 97n, edited ed.) Moreover, "this operation of mind, which forms the belief 
of any fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy" (Hume, 
1888, p. 628) (Needham, p. 7 for Hume quotes) . 
. When Durkheim broke religion down into the components beliefs and rites, he effectively 
established the basic sociological 'fact' that the supposed universality of religion extends to each 
of its constituitive elements. Was Durkheim influenced by the overlooked history of belief as an 
elemental and explicitly universal Christian category? Not long after Durkheim, but in another 
world of face-to-face ethnographic encounters, E.E. Evans-Pritchard weighted the ability of the 
term to translate Azande religious ideas. For E-P the Christian assumptions behind the term 
made it a distorting lens through which to get a true picture of .... 
Features of the Christianization ( does not predate Christianity?) of belief: universal, mental or 
interiority (not practice/performative), and therefore individual (not social). Does not have to be 
real early Christian understanding, just what critics ascribed to it as Christian features. 
[Durkheim] on beliefs in more primitive forms of religion: find how he uses it as universal, 
mental and individual. .. 
Evans-Prichard '3 Os ( see Needham too) 
Rodney Needham '70s 
Needham opens his book with two questions that drive the comparative ethnographic 
investigation he launches, recasting Wittgenstein's questions "is belief an experience" in more 
anthrological terms, he asks whether "the capacity for belief constitutes a natural resemblance 
r 
among men" so as to require it be considered as a "human" faculty. (xiii) In other words, for his 
analysis, belief is tested as to whether it is a matter of a psychological state or experience, and if 
so does it take the form of an individual interiority or social constructed collective 
representations, or both. And in any of these forms is belief not universally human. He finds 
quite diverse ethnographic and analytic accounts have relied on the term. If 
Malcolm Ruel 80s? 
Pouillan 80s? 
Lopez 
,.ll,JI// ' . =~U,j/V(, ~ 
(J) ~-----(?:,) 
a) Main problems identified: Universal or particular; mental or performative; private or 
~-- . ~ ➔ ~-' ·W"~~~·~~ ~
social. This is the supposed universality given Christian assumptions; the problem of implied ----~ 
individual/private existence, as well as the historical, political cultural "social fact." 
b) Many (all anthrop?) declare they cannot use the term (Ruel, Pouillan, Needham, Wulff, 
....-0:: -
Lopez), tho others have productively done so (Southwold, Arnold, phil of rel ... ?, ). Engelke and 
what- 's-her-name? 
c) History of religions/rel studies has not examined its use; in fact, it appears to deny its 
importance per se, but such unexamined assumptions can be very misleading, ill serving (leaving 
our discourse more theological?} Unexamined use of the term does make arguments rest on 
inherently theological ( or about theology) grounds ( distance from or ally with Wiebe?): 
-- historical exp of Christian credo formu~ation 
--faith rooted in individual experience [cp 'science' explaining cognitive/biology of 
belief] 
-- ignoring how belief is used ethnically, politically, role of polls (census already noted); 
Viswanathan, Lilla, etc 
-- Theorization of belief in theology (Reckwitz) 
d) The problems resulting from or just accompanying the current particularism (when a 
theological-universal is rejected for particularistic; eg Needham; Evans Pritchard, etc) and post-
colonial analysis (Lopez); benefits of particularism too, of course! Namely, · 
-- the subtle reintroduction of universalist assumptions endemic to any posturing of 
"study." Need to grapple with that! 
-- ramifications for any definition of "religion" and methods for its study, e.g. religious 
studies 
["Religion": Paradigms plus: use Chidester on West slow to call others' "religion"; also add JZS 
to argument about Christianity as prototype ( see Guide to SofRel 41, Drugery 90) and his world 
religions research (before Masuzawa) Guide 11-42, Map 295?, Harvard Theo Rev '96:295-6.] 
e) Practice theory: value of a focus on believing and construction of a focus on practice; 
later look at multiple examples of believing from a comparative practice stance ... 
Challenging the Category of Belief 
Universalism/particularism 
The literature as a whole contains a two-stage critique of the category of belief, with 
linguistic/semantic scribbles about the terminology at both stages. At the outset there is the 
argument that this "universalizing" category cannot apply to those societies that do not formulate 
what they 'do' in concepts or reified in representations as Christianity has always done. The 
Christian baggage attending the concept of belief comes from its original and on-going context of 
religious diversity and contestation in which concepts or representations were clearly articulated 
( doctrines and creeds being the finished products) so as to define the precise object of belief and, 
by the same exercise, those objects of disbelief. Examples of this anti-universal particularism are 
the arguments by Donald Lopez, Rodney Needham, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Martin Southwold, and 
Jean Pouillon, etc. They ultimately imply the minimal integrity of nothing more than thick 
description (with any categories?), challengi~g ~sic assumptions in the meta-narratives of .. r;--. 
anthropology. ~,,.s;i:J--~ ~ ~ ,. 'r , 
B 1. f/d. b 1· f d . / 1· · 
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At a second stage, the context of diversity and contestation is seen as so intrinsic to the concept of 
belief that the concept forever carries the ambiguity of its own negation (what is formulated as 
that which is believed clearly implies that is can also be rejected, in disbelief), lodging the 
experience of doubt within the imagination of every believer. The possibility of doubt creates the 
demand for complete commitment and practices of constant affirmation; some analyses find that 
believers' belief/commitment sets up a type of contractual relationship with the deity in which the 
believer expects a return on the commitment. Generally, however, it is argued that social scientist 
inevitably cast believers as the irrational other; moreover, the context of diversity and 
contestation leaves no position that is not a position of belief and disbelief, including science and 
political ideologies which demand their own types of commitments in tum. From this perspective, 
and others too, science and religion are meta-phenomena that effectively define each other by the 
beliefs and disbeliefs to which they commit. Not able to recognize this defining relationship, it is 
argued, social scientists by their own self-definitions attempt to grasp what they will be unable to 
grasp (until they allow true self-knowledge?), namely, the 'other' of religious belief which is not 
other, or the rationality ofreligious practice; so they persist in the ascription of beliefs to the other 
that are what they imagine they would believe if they were not unbelievers. In other words, 
religious belief is not grasped in its own rationality, on its own terms, only in the language of 
negating assumptions of those who define themselves by their disbelief. Strands of this argument 
- ~1/f /1 I ~1 /2L,f , 
are found in Jean Pouillon, Micheal deCerteau, Susan Harding... /5, ~ ~ 
My generation of scholars was probab~ which the majority had some first hand 
experience of religion. As believers turned disbelievers, we created as social science very 
concerned to maintain the boundaries. (E.g., the field of religious studies is not theological, it is 
the objective study ofreligion as a social and psychological phenomenon .... ). Increasingly social 
scientists are people with no prior experience of religion, to whom the boundary is clear but just 
asking to be transgressed .... They are able to be more than participant-observers: instead of 
translating the experience of the other, they put themselves in the shoes of the other and then 
translate their own experiences back. 
Universal argument and counterargument =assumptions of the universality of 
belief (more or less) in contrast to arguments for its culture-laden 
provinciality/limitations. The latter extended into a fear that its use is a distortion, 
easily promoted by the interests of colonialism. 
Evidence for universality of a term like belief is thin at best. Arguments against it 
are limited but compelling. However, the whole collision of views (not a debate!) 
evokes the issue of the status of analytical language. 
Can folk categories ever be used? Refined for use? Is an analytical language (just 
terms that are constantly challenged?) desirable? If not, we can learn about each 
other only on a very limited way, since even to describe the culture of others, one 
needs to use culture-laden terms. 
Those terms can be 'refined' by purposive historical and linguistic analysis BUT 
could end up with a set of terms far removed from standard use and thus a very 
esoteric discipline. Or terms can be refined, at least to some degree, simply be 
constant extensions of their use, as when cross-cultural interactions appropriate 
religion to cover practices that might not have figured in any more original sense 
of the term. 
Terms are never frozen in history. They carry their history but they are not always 
passive to that history. When a term is adopted as a useful analytical term, all 
limitations noted, it continues its history. 
Analytically languages run twin dangers: adhering too ~losely to folk meanings 
and become too far divorced from them. Fears of the hegemonic ambitions of an 
analytical language can be overstated, but not always, and surely the unwittingly, if 
colonially useful, effects are many. 
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America is a nation of "believers," we are told by one poll after another. The beliefs 
about which the population is polled conflate doctrinal tenets about the Bible with political 
positions on abortion and social views about the family. Since the emergence of the evangelical 
right in politics, the language of belief has become central to political discourse and, increasingly, 
social analysis. However, going back further in history to the Scopes trial, it is clear that "belief' 
- or not-then and there became central to the main fi A erican ',dent·ty. 
Over the last ten years, a new wave of studies addressing 'belief has appeared, a rich if 
often ragtag collection earnestly pulling in predictably contrary directions. Some studies don the 
mantle of traditional rationalism, explaining with horror or studied sympathy the unnatural 
persistence of religious or truly "weird" beliefs; others take up the guise of historical, social or 
postmodern examinations of the cultural, even economic, factors behind the dynamics of belief 
and unbelief. Despite the magnitude of the current fray, scholars of religion, specifically 
historians of religions, have not been effective contributors to the conversation. Apparently 
preceding generations of religion scholars conceded the idea of belief to theology, which would 
be in keeping with their efforts to distance the study of religion from the theological world in 
which it was born. So, for example, the 1986 and 2005 editions of the magisterial 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, first edited by Mircea Eliade, one of the main figures in the 
History of Religions, do not even carry an entry for "belief." The reader is referred to "Doubt 
(and belief)" for an uncompromisingly specific theological discussion. Although the concept was 
then influentially deconstructed to its Christian roots (Lopez 1998), the term is widely used in 
every monograph in the field and related fields. Historians of religion do not know how to 
analyze the issue of belief as a working idea. 
My project will first anal:xze the manner in which the concept of belief is cu~ently 
addressed in order to demonstrate both a personal thesis about how to modify our concept of 
believing as well as a revised theoretical basis for doing so. I judge that the latter will encourage 
historians of religion to pursue methodologically coherent historical and cultural studies of the 
phenomenon--especially if they disagree with the former thesis. That thesis will cente the 
question of the relative value of defining belief in terms more um versa than its Christian origins 
ofctefining it as~ articularit of perfo~~~e that carin:otbe- --·-urned be ·ond the_s ___ ere or-· 
Ciirisfian 1rifluence. Ultimately, current use·s o e term appear to require both approaches. -- During my current sabbatical leave I planned the larger project and began the research. 
Given the enormity of the written sources pertaining to belief, this has been an exercise in 
determining which areas I must address and which I can avoid due to their more secondary, and 
all-consuming, nature ( e.g., analytic philosophy). A published article, developed at a small 
weekend conference with Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, Maurice Bloch, Terry Godlove, Jonathan 
Z. Smith and several others, helped me clarify how to use the rich store of analytical philosophy 
on belief/truth statements, such as pursued by Donald Davidson (Frankenberry, 2002). A more 
recent paper to appear in HISTORY AND THEORY contains an analysis of the construction of 
"religion" by Christian Euro-American culture that will be the groundwork for the rest of the 
project. The work I have done on cognitive theory, economic analyses, historical studies, and 
methodological analyses now enable me to shape a mature project and hazard a thesis. 
I have worked for over twenty years with the larger issues of how to think about religion, 
which Durkheim defined so simply as a matter of rites and beliefs. My work on ritual theory is, 
of course, the best evidence of my qualifications to wade into this companion issue. My 
reputation is primarily based on my theor~tical contributions to understanding ritual and religion, 
and I am constantly learning that this work has been picked up in other disciplines, most recently, 
history, classics, and archeology. My Sino logical work exploring aspects of the "medium" in the 
message of Chinese religious texts, the topic of an earlier NEH grant, is also important 
preparation for the more material dimensions of how and what people believe. While drawing on 
this broad background in research, and years of teaching, I plan to refine my understanding of 
particular topics (e.g., the "will to believe," according to Nietzsche and Wm James) and broaden 
my grasp of some very recent developments ( cognitive theory). However, I want this study of 
belief to return to themes that the history ofreligions has ignored since the rise of Eliade's 
, phe11omenology of religion, namely, the highlymateriafistic·concerris· ong asso·ciate~th 
refigfonm its so-callea-''piimitive" forms--the quest for health, wealth, and life after death. 
1 Hence, my study aims not only to sort through the crowd of conflicting current work, and 
d~_yel~-~ _tpethodologi_cal framework and the~is a~d_r_~-~ing_ the ph~n(!~_I!2.~ 2{9eli~yjng, it also 
intends to brinfbacfTnto formal consideration the easily observable events in which a 
I congregation prays f<ir'monef,-expecKhea ings, or communicates with those on the other side. 
At somJ,point, as the discipline increasingly focused on so-called "world religions" (Masuzawa 
2005);\ wJ et these ways of being religious fall from consideration. Anthropology has been better 
at seeing them in religions abroad, while sociology has been better at tracking the middle-class 
search for spirituality. 
I expect to spend the year completing my research in the areas noted below as well as 
fully drafting the most critical formulations and major thesis. The book will be finalized in a 
second year. In conversations with religion editors at Oxford and Princeton University presses, I 
have described this as a two-year project; due to the reputation of my previous work (and 
contimied sales), each has pressed me on the manuscript. They also urged me to keep it 
accessible to the general reader. The success of Karen Armstrong's books make clear that an 
educated readership is hungry to understand religion better and they appreciate the association 
between our religious history and the current international environment. While my first book on 
ritual (1992) would not be considered generally accessible, even though it has been assigned to 
undergraduates, my second book was deliberately written in a more straightforward style. This 
"belief' project crystallized in the wake of the last two presidential elections, so I am intent on 
writing a book that can address both my colleagues in academe and the educated reader. But 
most of all, I want to do what I think I do best, namely, open up an area theoretically, inviting all 
comers to take the discussion further. 
My particular strength in dealing with theory has made my work both distinctive and 
directly challenging to studies that have reigned in the field of history of religions. My rethinking 
ofritual overturned the supremacy, if not the enduring utility, of Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, 
and Jonathan Z. Smith on the topic of ritual. Likewise, by building on Donald Lopez's influential 
deconstruction of our historical assumptions about belief, I expect to establish fresh ground on 
which to re-engage both the concept and the phenomenon we now mean to define with it. A 
study that redefines religion through an analysis of the overly familiar featur~..§ o beliei.Ylill 
contribute~ the ~neral discourse ~ith ~4.!~G";~" di~u ss~ politics:~values:;~d human diversity. 
This is an ambitious statement. I make it with a humility born of long experience in projects that 
never go in the direction one expects. At present it is, of course, an objective and an aspiration, 
but it is one that I believe I have the experience to pursue--and even presume in this description. 
In its scope this project is in keeping with the editor's call in the March 2006 issue of the 
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION asking the field to "not just 
produce more disconnected, atomistic goblets of knowledge p, • 1.vledge," leaving their 
"implications untouched." (74:5) My hope to contribute beyond religious studies may not be 
unrealistic. I have been invited to participate in two events that show the interest of other areas, a 
Classics seminar at Oxford University on "faith" and a Sociology conference on "prayer" at 
Princeton University. 
Aside from those events, I do not plan any travel. Languages are not an obstacle and I 
expect to draw on my familiarity with texts in Chinese popular religion. Beyond the excellent 
interlibrary loan services at my institution, I can use the nearby libraries at Stanford and Berkeley. 
Finally, the book is currently sketched out in chapters that are likely to slim down as my 
thesis takes on a more precise formulation. The following is a tentative table of contents: 
I. Introduction: Praying for wealth, expecting the "last days," thanking God that you were 
spared when others were not - the questions raised by these familiar scenarios are a place to 
begin in looking at what and how people believe affects the study of religion. 
II. How Christians Came to Believe and Found Other Religions Believe Also (Don't 
They?)--locating "belief' in enduring Christian paradigms of religion; the fundamental challenge 
of non-Christian "belief systems" 
III. What about Truth? Current Arguments concerning "Belief' 
A. Traditional Rationalism-contrasting belief with the mindset of empirical proof; 
the Aristotelian heritage in Biblical studies; Enlightenment naturalism; American pragmatism; 
philosophy on belief statements and truth claims; the cultural context of scientific realism since 
Darwin; rational choice theory; the therapeutic psychology of belief 
B. The Rationalism of Cognitive Theory--evolutionary speculation; psychology of 
religious experience; neurological theories of the naturalness of belief; studies of the counter-
intuitive 
C. Socio-Culturalism-the fate of classic theories; explorations of social memory; 
historical studies of power relations in belief/truth; postmodern critiques of belief and how 
religious studies pose its questions. 
IV. The Critical Question: Is Believing a Form of Universal Cognition or a Culturally 
Particular Performative Action?--returning to the oldest and widely shared dimensions of 
religion, namely, praying for health, wealth and life after death; community and morality; 
individual and social frames; the perception of religious similarities and differences 
V. Believing: a cultural way of thinking about a universal cognitive activity occurring iq 
(
-~J)erformative practices in which a cosmol~ and a social identity is acted/constructed ~ough ~ J 
~as of word and..dgd; the dynamics of believing in religion, science, the marginal, 
analytic language for talking about beliefs one does not share ---
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Preface 
As she was approaching ninety years of age, my mother began to talk more directly 
about God, what she believed, and whether she would be found wanting. As the 
child who studied religion, I got all her hard questions. Invariably, however, she 
would structure the conversation around the same points and what I had to say, 
whether challenging or soothing, never really mattered. "I'm not sure I believe or 
not. I certainly don't think it's likely there's the sort of God I was ever taught to 
believe in. It's hard to believe there is a God who cares about us. All I can do is 
hope that if God exists, he' 11 accept that I tried to understand and that I tried to live 
a good life -- that I did what I could." My mother did not want a theological 
response and she certainly had no use for the historical or comparative framing. 
She was trying to make things right, work out who she had been, in her own 
estimation, clarify what she could believe and what she was not comfortable 
invoking even at this late moment in her life. She inevitably wanted the comfort of 
being true to herself and, naturally, being on the right side of God should he exist. 
After all, she was sort of a believer "in her own way." She would begin and end 
these predominantly one-sided discussions with some simple questions: "Am I a 
believer or not? What counts as belief?" 
There are many reasons to address the specific, and implied, questions of my 
mother. This book, however, will not even make the attempt. This book is 
something quite different, limited and, from my mother's perspective, hopelessly 
abstract. I would not presume to discuss topics for which I have no particular 
qualifications -- or track record of useful contributions. Yet I take up the topic of 
belief, in my own way, quite aware that for many people questions about belief are 
very personal and complic~ted. Hopefully, my more impersonal perspective 
confined to scholarly discussions does not lose sight of this. I decided to address 
the phenomenon of believing for several reasons, none of them quite so clearly 
distinct in my motivation as I can make them on paper. In the wake of my earlier 
work on ritual, I was reminded of a challenge to myself contained in the opening 
page of my first book on thinking about ritual, namely, to return some day to 
consider how the other component of religion identified in the simple Durkheimian 
definition of religion might yield to an analysis similar to the one in that work. 
Pursuing this, another reason for this book emerged: the surprising paucity of 
attention to this ubiquitous topic or categpry or phenomenon by scholars of 
religion. Some discussions exist -- counting on one hand, a finger or two is left 
over - and they will be fully mined here. But they are quite polemical and often 
limited in scope, rarely invoking the more expansive treatments of the topic in 
related disciplines of anthropology, history, and philosophy. Finally, the silliness 
of the recent public positions staked out by well-known writers and some eminent 
scholars, fully convinced of the obvious rationality of their own reasoning, are the 
mere top of a scholarly food chain. The new rationalism, however, better 
repres_ented by many more careful studies in the fast-paced flourishing of what has 
come to be grouped as "cognitive theory," may overfill the void with its own 
distinctive manner of defining (away) the topic. 
There are more general reasons to inquire into our ideas about believing. At a time 
when European and American confidence in the exorable spread of secular 
modernity is giving way to a new examination of the assumptions underlying that 
self-interested·ideology of Europe and America, the door has opened to take 
religious beliefs more seriously. Religious strife, since that is the form in which 
society generally notices religion, appears today not simply as another form of 
class struggle, colonial liberation, or resistance to modernization. Rather, there is a 
bit of a general consensus forming that ideas matter, cultures matter, religion 
matters. At the same time, the insights of postmodernist and postcolonial studies 
leave scholars of religion unable to pass through that door, let alone widen it or 
explain what is on the other side, due to our resistance to essentializing those large 
entities such as Islam and global Christian evangelicalism of current discourse. We 
are effectively sidelined for the very current discussion to which we might actually 
be relevant. We may also be hesitant to join in any general discussion of 'beliefs' 
per se due to the decades of scholarship on the body and embodiment or 
performance and practice, as well as the highly nuanced discussions of what were 
once cruder debates about oral versus literate cultures, or tribal versus creedal 
religions. 
These reasons for attempting a book on the huge and amorphous topic of belief 
lead me to try to impose some order on our resources for addressing it. This book 
does have a thesis; while clear, it is, in the spirit of the age, a bit of an anti-thesis: 
affirming this, problematizing that, ultimately suggesting a shift of perspective to 
afford a reasonable, and effective, way to deal with competing scholarly goals. 
Catherine Bell, Santa Clara University 
NEH Project Narrative 
May 1, 2006 
1768 words ( expanded format) 
America is a nation of "believers," we are told by one poll after another. The beliefs 
about which the population is polled conflate doctrinal tenets about the bible, with political 
positions on abortion and social views about the family. Since the emergence of the evangelical 
right in politics, the language of belief has become central to political discourse and, increasingly, 
social analysis. However, going back further in history to the Scopes trial, it is clear that "belief' 
- or not-then and there became central to the main forms of American identity. 
Over the last ten years, a new wave of studies addressing 'belief has appeared, a rich if 
often ragtag collection earnestly pulling in predictably contrary directions. Some studies don the 
mantle of traditional rationalism, explaining with horror or studied sympathy the unnatural 
persistence of mild and extreme beliefs; others take up the guise of historical, social or 
postmodern examinations of the cultural, even economic, factors behind the dynamics of belief 
and unbelief. Despite the magnitude of the current fray, scholars ofreligion, specifically 
historians of religions, have not been effective contributors to any part of the conversation. 
Apparently the preceding generation of religion scholars ceded the idea of belief to the realm of 
theology; that would be in keeping with their efforts to keep distancing the study of religion from 
the theological world in which it was born. So, for example, the 1986 and 2005 editions of the 
magisterial ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, first edited by Mircea Eliade, one of the main 
figures in the History of Religions, do not even carry an entry for "belief." The reader is referred 
to "Doubt (and belief)" for an uncompromisingly narrow, theological discussion. Historians of 
religion do not know how to address the issue of belief. Although formally ceded to theology and 
influentially deconstructed to its Christian roots, the term is still widely used in every monograph 
in the field and related fields where the problems are noted but not resolved. 
My project will first analyze the manner in which the concept of belief is currently 
addressed in order to demonstrate both a personal thesis about how to modify .our concept of 
belief as well as a revised theoretical basis for doing so. I think that latter will encourage 
historians of religion to pursue methodologically coherent historical and cultural studies of the 
phenomenon, especially if they disagree with the thesis. The thesis of the project will center, I 
believe, on the question of the relative value of defining belief in terms more universal than its 
Christian origins or defining it as a particularity of performance that cannot be presumed beyond 
the sphere of Christian influence. Ultimately, current uses of the term require both. 
During recent sabbatical leaves I planned the larger project and began the research. Given 
the enormity of the written sources pertaining to belief, this has been an exercise in determining 
which areas I can address and which I can avoid due to their more secondary, if all-consuming, 
nature (e.g., analytic philosophy). A published article, developed at a small weekend conference 
with Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, Maurice Bloch, Terry Godlove, Jonathan Z Smith and several 
others, helped me clarify the logic for avoiding the rich store of analytical philosophy on 
belief/truth statements, such as pursued by David Davidson (Frankenberry, 2002). A paper to 
appear in History and Theory contains an analysis of the construction of 'religion' by Christian 
Euro-American culture that will be the groundwork for the rest of the project. Work I have done 
on cognitive theory, economic analyses, historical studies, and methodological critiques of the 
field of religious studies now enable me to shape the project and hazard a rough thesis. 
I have worked for over twenty years with the larger issues of how to think about religion, 
which Durkheim defined so simply as a matter of rites and beliefs. My work on ritual theory is, 
of course, the best evidence of my qualifications to wade into this companion issue. My 
reputation is primarily based on my theoretical contributions to understanding ritual and religion, 
and I am constantly learning that this work has been picked up in other disciplines, most recently, 
history, classics and archeology. My Sinological work exploring aspects of the "medium" in the 
message of Chinese religious texts, the topic of an earlier NEH grant, is also important 
preparation for the more material dimensions of how and what people believe. While drawing on 
this broad background in research, and years of teaching, I plan to refine my understanding of 
particular topics (e.g., the "will to believe," according to Nietzsche and William James) and 
broaden my grasp of some very recent developments ( cognitive theory). However, I want this 
study of belief to return to themes that the study of religion has ignored since the rise of Eliade's 
phenomenology of religion, namely, the highly materialistic concerns long associated with 
religion in its so-called "primitive" forms-the quest for health, wealth, and life after death. 
Hence, my study aims not only to sort through a crowded and conflicting set of current work, 
and develop a methodological framework and thesis addressing the phenomenon of belief, it also 
intends to bring back into formal consideration the easily observable events in which a 
congregation prays for money, expects healings, or communicates with those on the other side. 
At some point, as the discipline increasingly focused on "world religions" (see Masuzawa), we 
let these ways of being religious fall from consideration. Anthropology has been better at seeing 
them in religions abroad, while sociology has been better at tracking the middle-class search for 
spirituality. 
I expect to spend the year completing my research in the areas noted below as well as 
fully drafting the critical formulations and major thesis. The book will be finalized in a second 
year. In conversations with the religion editors at Oxford and Princeton University presses, I 
have described this as a two-year project; due to the reputation of my previous work (and 
continued sales), each pressed me to offer the manuscript to their press. They also urged me to 
keep the manuscript accessible to the general reader. It is clear from the success of Karen 
Armstrong's books that an educated readership is hungry to understand religion better and they 
appreciate the association between our religious history and the current international 
environment. While my first book on ritual (1992) would not be considered generally accessible, 
even though it has been assigned to undergraduates, my second book was deliberately written in 
a more straightforward style. This "belief' project crystallized in the wake of the last two 
presidential elections, so I am intent on writing a book that can address both my colleagues in 
academe and the educated reader. But most of all, I want to do what I think I do best, namely, 
open up an area theoretically, inviting all sorts of readers to take the discussion further. 
My particular strength in dealing with theory has made my work both distinctive and 
directly challenging to studies that have reigned in the field of history of religions. My rethinking 
of ritual overturned the supremacy, but not the enduring utility, of Victor Turner, Clifford Geertz, 
and Jonathan Z. Smith on the topic ofritual. Likewise, by building on Donald Lopez's influential 
deconstruction of our many assumptions about belief, I expect to establish fresh ground on which 
to re-engage both the concept and the phenomenon we mean to define with it. A study that 
redefines religion through an analysis of the overly familiar feature of belief will contribute to 
the general discourse with which we discuss politics, values, and human diversity. This is an 
ambitious statement. I make it with a humility born of long experience in projects that never go 
in the direction one expects. It is, of course, an objective and an aspiration, but it is one that I 
believe I have the experience to pursue--and even presume in this description. In its scope this 
project is in keeping with the editor's call in the March 2006 issue of the JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION, asking the field to "not just produce more 
disconnected, atomistic goblets of knowledge of knowledge," leaving their "implications 
untouched." (74:5) Contributions beyond religious studies may not be unrealistic. I have been 
invited to participate in two events that show the interest of other areas, a Classics seminar at 
Oxford University on "faith" and a Sociology conference on "prayer" at Princeton University. 
Aside from these events, I do not plan any travel. Languages are not an obstacle and I expect to 
draw on my work in Chinese popular religion. Beyond the excellent interlibrary loan services at 
my institution, Stanford and Berkeley libraries are in my general area and I have used them 
frequently. 
Finally, the book is currently sketched out in chapters that are likely to slim down as my 
thesis takes on a more precise formulation. The following is a tentative table of contents: 
BELIEVING 
Catherine Bell 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction: .Praying for wealth, expecting the "last days," thanking God that you were spared 
when ot_hers were not - how these familiar scenarios raise questions about what and how people 
believe that affect much of the study of religion. 
II. How Christians Came to Believe, And Found Other Religions Believe Also (Don't They?) --
locating "belief' in enduring Christian paradigms of religion; the fundamental challenge of non-
Christian "belief systems." 
III. What about Truth? Current Arguments Concerning "Belief' 
A. Traditional Rationalism - contrasts belief with the mind-set of empirical proof; the 
Aristotelian heritage in Biblical studies; Enlightenment naturalism; American pragmatism; 
philosophy on belief statements and truth claims; the cultural context of scientific realism since 
Darwin; rational choice theory; therapeutic psychology of belief. 
B. The rationalism of Cognitive Theory: evolutionary speculation; psychology of 
religious experience; neurological theories of the naturalness of belief; studies of the counter-
intuitive. 
C. Socio-Culturalism - fate of classic anthropological theories; explorations of social 
memory; historical study of belief/truth in terms of power relations; postmodern critiques of 
belief and how religious studies poses its questions. 
IV. The Critical Question: Is Believing a Form of Universal Cognition or a Culturally Particular 
Performative Action? returning to the oldest and most widely shared dimensions of religion: 
praying for health, wealth, and life after death; community and morality; individual or social 
frames; the perception of religious differences; 
V. Believing- a cultural way of thinking about a universal cognitive activity occurring in 
performative practices in which a cosmology and a social identity is acted out through formulas 
of word and deed; the dynamics of believing in religion, in science, in the marginal, in hope; 
analytic language for talking about beliefs one does not share. 
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Proposal 
BELIEVING: 
FURTHER EXPLORATIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Catherine Bell 
[Projected October 2007] 
Fueled by the recent presidential elections and the longer-standing controversies over 
teaching evolution and intelligent design, there has been a fresh spate of books on belief 
and an increase in the venues in which this notion is bandied about. Scholars of religion, 
however, have practically avoided the term. The latest edition of the Encyclopedia of 
Religion (2005) makes no change in the earlier one's (1986?) omission of a separate entry 
for belief. The reader is directed to the entry for "Doubt ( and Belief)," which is fully 
theological in its purview and assumptions. Two non-theological attempts to analyze the e. 
term (Lopez, "Belief' in Taylor's Critical Terms for the Study of Religion, 1998 and .J...// 
Robert Campany's article in History of Religion, 2000) suggest that any discussion of the (1.ff 
it will quickly break down due to a variety of semantic problems; while Lopez sees no 
way to overcome these problems, and no particular reason to try, Campany optimistically 
predicts useful avenues for cross-cultural discourse. However, neither attempts to comes 
to terms with the way the notion of belief currently functions in the debates of our day, or 
whether the study of religion is avoiding the term as a way to avoid those same debates or 
preserve some paradigm. 
The field of religious studies has been generated and propelled by a series of paradigms. 
The most central paradigm for all academic disciplines has been the Enlightenment's 
distinction between the rational world of empirical study and logical argument versus 
what they understood as the traditional cosmology of belief in God and acceptance of 
divine truths on faith alone. This paradigm.has been beset, of course, by a number of 
ambiguities, not least of which is the role played by Biblical Studies in the emergence of 
European scientific and linguistic scholarship, among other areas, which did so much to 
bring about the Enlightenment. With reason versus faith ( or belief) as the mental 
infrastructure of the modern world's understanding of science and religion, then 
postmodernist analyses of the cultural ism of the sciences, which demand as much belief 
from the normal citizen as many of the wares religion offers, present yet another 
ambiguities underlying the modernist mindset. Cognitive science, relentlessly 
antagonistic to postmodernism, is still contributing to the project in both positive and 
negative ways. The work of Pascal Boyer differs greatly from the apocalyptic vision of 
Roy Rappaport, just as the breezy common-sense style of Justin Barrett differs_ from the 
density of McCauley and Lawson's work. Yet the new ways of mapping mental states 
explored in this scholarship lends continues to approach belief as a way of thinking while 
blurring the lines by which the mental is opposed to the physical. 
The multi-disciplinary scholars of religious studies have more to offer. Aside from the 
few studies laying some groundwork, religious studies has the various empirical results 
of specific work in cognitive science, all the work in cultural anthropology, and the 
potential analytic data on the idea of belief in both popular and theoretical discourse. 
However, the most exciting material since Malinowski's treatment of religion, magic and 
science has been several disconnected studies by linguists and anthropologists exploring 
people's verbal activity in their construction of the social identity of "a believer," most 
notably Susan Harding's The Book of Jerry Falwell (2001). Since Paul Veyne's Did the 
Greeks Believe their Myths? (1988) and Paul Connerton's How Societies Remember 
(1989), anthropologists have also been exploring cultural transmission is ways that also 
unpack reliance on specific behavioral dynamics, notably architecture as much as oral 
tales. 
I have published one essay to date on this enormous topic (in Nancy Frankenberry's 
Radical Interpretation [Cambridge, 2002], '"The Chinese Believe in Spirits': Belief and 
Believing in the Study of Religion," which was a paper presented to a small weekend 
seminar that included Richard Rorty, Maurice Bloch, Jonathan Z. Smith and Jeffery Stout, 
among others. Since the seminar was predicated on the work of the philosopher Donald 
Davidson's idea of "radical interpretation," my paper was able to engage the significance 
of the heavy load of philosophical studies of the verb "to believe" in order to design an 
approach that considers such philosophizing more as data for cultural study than a history 
of insights. Since then, I have pushed the project forward in a number of papers, notably 
a study of paradigms in Religious Studies to be published in History and Theory. 
In planning the book manuscript, I am cognizant of the fact that the unexpected success 
of my first book, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (1992), which has been repeatedly cited 
for its major contribution to the field, was based on redefining the conversation about 
ritual in two steps. First, I demonstrated why the main theories of ritual (Durkheim, 
Turner and Geertz) appeared so useful, but were ultimately dead ends due to the 
circularity with which they played with the polarization of thought and action. Second, I 
suggested a fresh direction in which ritual was not a fundamentally distinct mode of 
human activity, but a strategic form of cultural practice like so many others. Its similarity 
to and its difference from other modes of practice, and the reasons why people would 
choose to ritualize a situation rather than deal with it another way provided unexpectedly 
rich ways of describing the ritual practices in their context. [During my years of work on 
ritual I also studied the ways in which printed Chinese morality books constructed a 
specific belief system (that is, cosmologically described morality) that was assimilated in 
a highly diverse culture offering many alternative systemizations.] 
The Believing manuscript I am working on begins by tracing the role of the belief 
concept within the main paradigms constituting the modern study of religion, including 
the many verbal constructions that use the term in English (notably, W. C. Field's line --
"What do I believe? Well, I believe I'll take a walk."), as well as who-and what are served 
by current uses. For example, Religious Studies depends on a number of interlocking 
paradigms, such as (i) Christianity is the de facto prototype for all religions, (ii) religion 
is fundamentally irrational, (iii) there are comparable "world religions," where the 
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"beliefs" are similarly described, (iv) religion is a cultural necessity, at least with regard 
to social morality, (v) the idea ofreligion is just a Western construct, and (vi) and perhaps 
the most diffuse and persistent, an underlying assumption, based on the foregoing, that 
religion is intrinsically good (when something awful occurs concerning religion it is 
usually ascribed to something like extremism or derangement). These paradigms are 
maintained by the "either/or" political-religious arguments that posit a false clarity 
between religion and science, on the one hand, and the political-religious agendas based 
on a false confusion of knowing and believing, on the other. In other words, continued 
understanding of believing as a mental state weak Qn real knowing (but perhaps rooted in 
a fundamentally humanizing experience something greater) serves purposes that must be 
unraveled to understand the perpetuation of the term. In their support of the preceding 
paradigms, popular notions of belief do not only support theology and religious studies, 
as we have known them, they also maintain ideas that are basic to the assumptions about 
modem science. 
In a more positive light, the book will go on to develop a new model for understanding 
what it means to be a believer. I do not care to reject popular usage for some esoteric 
terminology; on the contrary, popular usage is more of a guide than theory. However, I 
do want to provide scholars with an approach to the idea, and its history, that gives them 
a more analytic, if less participatory, basis for study. My approach will analyze 
"believing" as an active, performative practice of social identification- not primarily a 
private, mental state of commitment to religious ideas. There is sufficient data available 
to be used creatively in this regard, particularly in developing the idea of "social 
identification" in a broader sense that mere group belonging. Going beyond Durkheim, 
therefore, I want to focus primarily on the main ways people demonstrate or act out belief 
to themselves and others, which involve a modest set of linguistic and performative 
actions that tend to revolve around particularly basic human concerns (not theological 
abstractions): concern with the dead, insuring the health and well-being of the living; and 
the desire to seek greater wealth by virtue of demonstrating religiosity to supernatural 
powers. These "basics" have fallen out of focus due to a concern with "the Sacred" and 
the complexity of ritual and theological detail afforded us by the accessibility of data 
from many disciplines. 
This project will be the substance of the prestigious Gates lecture at Grinnell and the 
Eliot lecture at Reed College which I will deliver in March and April of 2007. Thus the 
heart (gist?) of the book could be complete by the end of this academic year, with another 
six months to elaborate a full manuscript for dissemination to outside readers. 
If, as I have been repeatedly told, my 1992 book on ritual had an important influence on 
the field, then this book on believing, while standing on its own, will also complete the 
argument begun in 1992 about thought and action in the theoretical analyses of religion. 
Although I plan to write at least one more book, on those Chinese morality texts, I see 
Believing as my culminating contribution to the field of Religious Studies. Believing will 
demonstrate that Religious Studies is a multi-disciplinary field focusing on religion 
because religion is out there, that is, religion is widely assumed to be the entity that exists 
so influentially in our world. The field is not based on being covert believers, or the need 
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to rescue religion from the sciences, or because of any 'special' relationship to the Sacred 
(e.g., Eliade, among others), or due to a misunderstanding of the historicity of a term. 
I hope this argument will both validate the field and redirect it, from semi-theological 
categories to reflective explorations of functional equivalents to what we mean by 
religion in all the cultural forms this will take. 
As I have written elsewhere, any "critical" study must first explain why the object of the 
study is seen as something to be explained in the first place, as a problem. Then it must 
analyze the history of the problem has been defined. That is for starters. 
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Belief: A Classificatory Lacuna and Disciplinary "Problem" 1 
Catherine Bell 
In a curious omission, the Encyclopedia of Religion, both the first and the revised second 
editions, 1986 and 2005 respectively, leaves out the term "belief' as the subject of a distinct 
entry. (Eliade 1986; Jones 2005) This may have been relatively unintentional and simply due to 
organizational problems involved in lining up writers with topics. The largest topics are always 
the hardest to assign and have accepted. And the Encyclopedia is a justifiably award-wining 
achievement by an international crew of major scholars, which has had important if subtle 
ran1ifications for unification of the study of religion. One should not overemphasize the presence 
of an absence. Yet it is interesting and perhaps important to note to this one. The inquisitive 
reader who turns to "Belief' is instructed to "See Doubt (and Belief)," for what the 2005 edition 
explains is a philosophical discussion of the interrelation of doubt and belief in the Western 
tradition" -- although quite theologically focused for nearly half the essay, with the addition of 
two useful sentences on dharma in India. (Jones 2005: 2423-2427). Belief is indexed in several 
other places in the final volume. The term and even the "Doubt" discussion of it are not in the 
Synoptic Index provided by both editions, which usefully classify "Religious Phenomena" and 
"Specific Religions," like Christianity, with topics related to them. It is not listed as an example 
of "Phenomena of Religion," which does include cats, clowns and cocks, to cite some random 
entries from just one alphabetical section, nor is belief considered under "Methods of Study," 
"Philosophy and Religion," or "Scholarly Terms." The Index gives greater attention to "Faith," 
but it also fails to appear in most of the preceding synoptical sections. Faith is noted in 
discussions of individual scholars like Peter Berger and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, as well as 
increasingly encompassing entries such as "Calvin," "Experience," and "in" Buddhism, Islam, 
and Judaism. On the whole, faith seems to be a term, if not a topic, which is more regularly 
invoked than belief in encyclopedia articles. One must conclude that belief was of sufficiently 
minor importance, from any angle, to religion as it was conceived by the scholars who organized 
and wrote for this definitive work in the field of history of religions and, one can conclude, 
religious studies in general. 
The "Hastings" Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, which predates the Encyclopedia of 
Religion by some 80 years, includes an extensive and informative article on the topic, while The 
HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion, edited by Jonathan Z. Smith and published about half-way 
between the first and second editions of Eliade's encyclopedia, also addresses the topic in a entry 
of a comparatively good length. (Hastings 1908-26, reprint 1955; Smith 1995: 107-110) Critical 
Terms for the Study of Religion decided it was important, including a provocative chapter on the ' 
term by the Buddhologist, Donald S. Lopez. (Taylor 1998) Yet the Guide to the Study of 
Religion, which came out a few years after Critical Terms with a fuller list of topics, also chose 
to avoid this particular aspect of the popular imagination about religion. (Braun and McCutcheon, 
2000). 
One might also be confused as to the place of the term in anthropology. While any 
number of studies from E. B. Tylor through Emile Durkheim, E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Rodney 
Needham, Clifford Geertz, and Talal Asad have specifically addressed the nature of "belief' and 
its place in understanding religion, it can be well represented in a popular anthology on the 
anthropology of religion, but not indexed at all in a reputable general introduction to the subject. 
(See Lambek 2002; Morris 1987) Still, anthropology has a clear record of explicit discussion of 
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the descriptive adequacies of the term belief, while history of religions cannot point to any 
except for the thoughtful work of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. As founder of the comparative 
religions program at Harvard Divinity School, he never saw himself, nor was he seen, as a 
member of the so-called phenomenological school of study that generated the encyclopedia. (W. 
C. Smith 1977, 1979) Yet critiques of the theological tendencies in all these non-theological 
attempts at the study of religion rarely made such fine distinctions and Smith might have been a 
logical choice to contribute to the encyclopedia on the topic of belief. (Wiebe 1979) 
The reasons behind decisions to include or exclude a topic in any particular taxonomy of 
religion, as opposed to the empirical sciences, may be nearly impossible to discern reliably. 
Jonathan Z. Smith's attention to issues of classification and taxonomy with regard to religion as 
well as botany and the logic of classification in general is not merely a signal contribution to the 
self.:awareness of the field, it is nearly legendary ·in his personal biography. His interest in the 
ordering of categories is the material of autobiographical reminisces of precocious predilections 
rooted in the earliest of childhood pursuits. (J.Z. Smith 2004: 19-25) It is not surprising, therefore, 
that he has articulated a clear rubric to distinguish the intent of a dictionary, handbook, and 
encyclopedia. While his account of each would make the topic of belief especially important to a 
dictionary, and perhaps less demanding of a handbook, it only makes the absence of belief from 
an encyclopedia more intriguing. For Smith, "an encyclopedia is essentially topical," which 
means delineating something of all the resources and information needed to "explore a topic as a 
whole." He cites Alexander Manuila's "useful" description of an encyclopedia as "a 
comprehensive compilation of information on concepts pertaining to some or all fields of 
knowledge." (2004: 164) 
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The absence of belief from Mircea Eliade's encyclopedic project must be a result, direct 
or indirect, of an editorial perspective imposed on the enormously amorphous subject of religion. , 
In his prefac~ to the first edition, Eliade naturally laid out the goals of the encyclopedia, 
"conceived as a system of articles on important ideas, beliefs, rituals, myths, symbols, and 
persons that have played a role in the universal history of religions from Paleolithic times to the 
present day." (Eliade 1986, vol. 1, xi) His explicit schema for the encyclopedia involved both 
historical descriptions and articles· expressing contemporary interest in the structure and 
morphology of the "universal sacred." Eliade emphasized myths, symbols and, he notes, due to 
the spur provided by the modem desacralization of Western societies, the value of greater 
knowledge of primal religions. In the "Forward" added after his death, meant to supplement the 
Preface which had been merely drafted by Eliade, Joseph M. Kitagawa very systematically laid 
out further guiding principles of the encyclopedia project, explicitly comparing its focus to the 
earlier Hastings encyclopedia. In the various formulations given by these two editors, belief is 
barely mentioned. Rather the language used most often cites religious ideas, practices, and 
phenomena known to the human race, or the ideas, practices, and persons in the religious 
experience of humankind. In yet another formulation, Kitagawa invokes Joachim Wach's three 
expressions ofreligion, the theoretical (doctrines, myths, and theologies), the practical (cults, 
sacraments, or meditations), and the sociological (religious groups and ecclesiastical structures). 
(Eliade 1986, 1: xiii) Only when specifying the "raw" data of religion, does Kitagawa, like 
Eliade, mention beliefs alongside "practices, feelings, moods, attitudes." (1 :xiv) Clearly this 
encyclopedia was meant to highlight the interpretive categories of the study of religion rather 
than systematically cataloging the "raw data" itself. If so, it might be seen less as an 
encyclopedia of religion than an encyclopedia of the study of religion, admittedly a fine splitting 
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of hairs, but in keeping with the analyses the project has invited. (Smart 1988)2 Of course, J. Z. 
Smith's rubric defines an encyclopedia explicitly in terms of providing the resources that would 
serve as tools for the study of a subject. 
One aspect of the problem presented by this particular lacuna lies in the fact that the 
history of religions does not indulge in an overly esoteric set of interpretive terms as research 
tools. There are those introduced by Eliade, such as the sacred (arguably different from 
Durkheim's), the sacred center, and the cosmogonic myth. The neophyte, moreover, will surely 
work hard to pin down the meanings ofhierophany, morphology and hermeneutics. Eliade's 
volume, Patterns in Comparative Religion, identifies sky gods, solar cults, vegetation symbols 
such as the tree of knowledge, ritual orgies, and myths of renewal -- altogether a more compact 
and unoriginal litany than that first developed proposed by his 18th and 19th century predecessors. 
(Eliade 1 963) It is not difficult to understand that belief might not be deemed an acceptable 
"interpretive" category, yet its position as "datum" is exactly what concerned anthropologists like 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Rodney Needham, Martin Southwald, Richard Shweder, and Malcolm 
Ruel, who provide the fullest discussions. Overall, it is unsettling that history of religions as a 
field has failed to have any discussions of the term. Although it is ignored in all formal senses, 
the field makes nearly constant reference to the idea of belief in nearly every publication. ,,..- /\~ . /'o\' 
Aside from its questionable place in the history of religions, belief appears to be ,,,/_,,.,,. Of .. t'·-L ,.- ' 
_..,,,,,,·· 
,,,,,, 
identified and defined in very different ways by such disciplines such as philosophy, 
anthropology, and cognitive theory. Perhaps for reasons endemic to all of their discussions, it has 
become something of a habit to refer to it as "the problem of belief." More than a few scholars 
go so far as to identify belief as the problem of their respective fields. (E.g., Shweder 1989; 
Viswanathan 1998: xvii) It certainly is a problem to attempt to define or analyze something as 
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widely referred to as belief. Even the scope of such terms as "love," "hope," and "hate" would 
not present as great a challenge since they rarely slip so easily from the position of datum to 
analytic category. In general, few terms have spread themselves so freely across the lexicon of 
European languages as belief, through its Latin derivations from credo orfides, its Greek form, 
pistis, or even the Hebrew heemin (root 'mn). (Ruel 2002:101) Its uses are legion -- and 
bewildering. One can use the term in reference to a god of biblical qualities or one's confidence 
in a particular television weathercaster. That old master of the English language, W. C. Fields, 
may have caught the crux of the dilemma with a characteristic pronouncement: "Everyone 
should believe in something. I believe I' 11 have another drink." 
As for scholarly analysis of its use, the most significant literature easily stretches from 
David Hume (some argue for Fontenelle) to Donald Davidson, and from W. C. Smith to Slavoj 
Zizek. (Hume 1992 [1777]; Davidson 1984; W. C. Smith 1977; Zizek 2001) Useful studies 
include the work of Paul Veyne on the historical imagination, Paul Connerton and Danielle 
Hervieu-Leger on cultural memory, Pierre Bourdieu on practical logic, and Michel de Certeau on 
psycho-social interpretations (Veyne 1988; Connerton 1989; Hervieu-Leger 2000; Bourdieu 
1980; de Certeau 1984, 1985) Among the anthropologists noted above, Needham, Southwald, 
and Ruel have been the most explicit and contentious in a long interpretive, and re-interpretive, 
discussion launched by Durkheim. He classified all religious phenomena into "two basic 
categories: beliefs and rites," defining religious beliefs as the essential element of religion, the 
"representations that express the nature of sacred things" (Durkheim 1969 [1912]: 51, 62). The 
theological tradition is even more extensive, of course, stretching from Tertullian to Tillich, 
Irenaeus to Rahner, with pertinent commentaries along the way by Alisdair Maclnty~e, W. C. 
Smith, and Peter Berger, to name a few. (MacIntyre 1957; Berger 1967) Many have insisted that 
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Christian categories of belief are so endemic to Euro-American culture that they inevitably 
insinuate themselves into any study of religion, making the "beliefs" of other traditions a 
common but misleading expression. More than 20 years ago, Needham and Southwald took up 
contrasting positions on the ethnographic situation, while Paul Veyne went off in another 
direction completely to discuss the complexities of any history of beliefs among the ancient 
Greeks. (Needham 1972; Southwald 1979, 1983; Veyne 1988) Shweder identified the issue of 
belief as the "fault-line" in the field of anthropology, while in an extended argument against the 
usefulness of the term, Ruel cited W. C. Smith on the Christian presumptions in the term. (Ruel 
2002) These conversations continue, most recently with Donald S. Lopez casting belief as yet 
another example of Christian colonialism in the guise of ultimately obfuscating scholarship. 
(Lopez 1998) At the same time, however, belief is the recipient of unqualified attention in new 
work being done in cognitive psychology and bio-evolutionary theory. (Boyer 2000; Barrett 
2004; Atran 2002) All of these sources of input allow one to conclude that belief is clearly an 
issue in human reasoning and communication, cognition and memory, psychological orientation 
and social conditioning, theological reflection, as well as modem analyses of secularism and 
even human evolution. If so central to the work of other fieldS: the is not unlikely that history of 
religions' lack of theoretical interest lies precisely in our routine reliance on its nebulous status 
as some sort of raw data or biased theoretical tool. 
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the complexity of its presence and absence in 
academic discourse, belief is all over the popular press, which relentlessly simplifies it into 
oppositions such as belief and reason. The popular press is particularly ready to expose the 
problems posed by belief and believers. Several years ago I noted such studies on the silliness of 
religious beliefs as Wendy Kaminer's Sleeping with Terrestrials: the Rise of Irrationalism and 
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the Perils of Piety and Michael Shermer's Why People Believe Weird Things. (Kaminer 1999; 
Shermer 1997; Bell 2002) Since then, reactions to the terrorism of 9/11 in America have come 
into print, soon joined by equally intense reactions to the decision by the state of Kansas school 
board to introduce "intelligent design" along side evolution in the state's science curriculum. 
(See Talbot 2005) Although this decision was successfully challenged in court, and half of the 
school board was subsequently voted out of office, the specter of religion creeping into science 
classes continues to provide grist for the mi11s of scholarly indignation. Among popular works, 
Sam Harris has published two that attempt to preach rationalism to the unconverted religious, 
The End of Faith and Letter to a Christian Nation; but their influence is dwarfed by the similar 
efforts of the specialists, Breaking the Spell by the philosopher of science Daniel Dennett and the 
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God Delusion by the well-known Oxford scientist, Richard Dawkins. (Harris 2004, 2006 1 ; 
Dennett 2006; Dawkins 2006) All extol the value of rationality in a world dangerously misled by 
religious irrationalism. 
These opinions constitute the latest chapter in Western culture's perpetual polarization of 
belief and reason, faith and rationality, religion and science. The Enlightenment articulated the 
issues most clearly, of course, in a variety of formal documents and social reorganizations, 
articulating the poles of this dialectic. Yet we are still seeing our culture in terms of faith versus 
reason even though we often seem to live in a very post-Enlightenment world. The 
Enlightenment paradigm now encodes a wide variety of American ideological if not material 
interests, specifically involving biblical religion versus Darwinian science. Scientists, 
theologians, and hack writers all contribute to a fray that politicians have been very willing to 
exploit. All start from the same stark duality in which science is the natural opposite of religion, 
each pole alert to restrain the power wielded by the other. Only a savvy journalist or two has 
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suggested in passing the degree to which this simplistic view of religion and science is a play of 
shadow puppets manipulated by interest groups on a political playing field. In the end, the 
paradigm of reason versus belief remains deeply ingrained in the discourse of modem culture 
even though it may not be a very good depiction of the actual conditions of modem culture. 
In the academic discipline of philosophy, quite beyond the machinations of the popular 
press, the qualities of belief are not opposed to reason and simplified Enlightenment dichotomies 
have been left behind, although not forgotten. The views of thinkers from Hume to Wittgenstein 
are often surveyed at this point to illustrate a lively philosophical tradition, continued by such 
late 20th century figures as Stuart Hampshire, Gilbert Harman, and Richard Rorty, with Rorty 
evoking the lineage of American pragmatism from William James through John Dewey. In an 
earlier publication I focused at some length on the American philosopher Donald Davidson in 
order to understand better the "problem of belief' as it figures in current philosophical analyses. 
(Bell 2002) In striking contrast to the popular perspective, his philosophy generally thinks of 
belief as a universal quality, playing an integral role in a basic holism (not a division) interlacing 
thought and action in general. Davidson argues that a level of broad agreement is the condition 
for any linguistic understanding of each other. (Note Godlove, 2002: 10) Asserting that "belief is 
central to all kinds of thought," he explains that belief is what allows us to take for granted 
general perceptions of the material world that are basic to the formation of thoughts, spoken 
statements, and the conditions needed to understand each other. Belief and meaningfulness are 
dependent on each other and have a formal role in the act of interpretation. More specifically, 
Davidson argues that we have to believe that the statements someone makes are or can be true, 
even if we conclude he or she is lying, mistaken, or crazy. Thus we must infer belief to grant the ' 
meaning needed to make the most basic act of interpreting each other. (Davidson 1984: 156). 
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This is enough to illustrate the contrast philosophy presents to the popular view opposing belief 
with the meaningfulness of reason; instead of making belief the weak of half of this type of 
dualism, a philosopher like Davidson locates the problem of belief in the universal act of person-
to-person interpretation. 
In the closely intertwined disciplines of anthropology, sociology, psychology and 
cognitive theory, the problem of belief also concerns the degree ofholism that is understood as 
basic to social understanding. Yet these fields would not use Davidson's terminology, so 
comparing their views of belief is a more delicate project. It is fair to conclude, however, that for 
most scholars of culture, belief involves the problem of universalism versus particularism, that is, 
on the one hand, what can we assume to be common to all people simply by virtue of our shared 
evolution, history, or simply the human condition; on the other hand, what should be considered 
culturally particular to a social practice even if subject to forces of diffusion that can push 
practices beyond an original point of germination. Universality may mean common to all social 
life or simply mentally acce sible to all. In the latter case, because one is familiar with belief in 
the God of the Abrahamic religions, one may feel, rightly or wrongly, that one has some mental 
access to how ancient Greeks believed in their pantheon of gods. 
Particularism suggests that we have no such access to the experiences of another religion 
and, indeed, can only make sense of what is so foreign by attempting to reconstruct, more or less 
accurately, a system of ideas in which specific pieces can be illuminated. By the time any 
universal or particularlist project is underway, it is probably rife with assumptions and precarious 
leaps of logic. Yet, at the same time, it is easy to see a measure of common sense to both 
positions - that we can understand something about other human experiences and we should not 
assume that we can understand anything about them. 
As I have noted elsewhere, Shweder conducted an exemplary project to attempt a 
reasonable synthesis to the opposition of universalism and particularism. He clarified all the 
different versions of the arguments for both sides and then developed a resolution, self-
consciously postmodernist in its idealism, in which he argued that opposites need not be opposed! 
Shweder maintained that the discipline of anthropology was itself the product of a collision 
between our notions of universality and particularity, which, like continental plates, created a 
"fault-line" easily illustrated by any number of vexing scenarios that routinely come up for the 
anthropologist. Indeed, he suggested, should anyone truly resolve such scenarios, anthropology 
as we know it would probably not be needed any more; the whole field would collapse. A typical 
"vexing" scenario is what he calls the "witch question" -- which in fact is not that removed from 
the possible experiences of a normal citizen in a multi-cultural society. Accord to Shweder, the 
witch scenario unfolds when your informant, the person on whose judgment you have so greatly 
relied, takes you aside to admit to being a witch, a confidence that might possibly involve some 
personal danger to the one making it. You come from a tradition that does not believe in witches, 
so how do you accept the statement by your informant -- as true or not true? Do you believe it or 
not? (Shweder 1989: 109-11 0; Bell 2002: 106-07). 
With the argwnent that the interpretation of beliefs is the central anthropological question 
and the distinctive fault-line of the discipline, Shweder's answer is two-fold: unquestionably, the 
person is a witch (in this way he recognizes the culturally relative and particular), but as the 
anthropologist who must reconstruct the system of ideas that "makes sense" of this belief, he 
claims a type of "transcendence" of the particular and the relative (thereby recognizing the 
universal in some form). Shweder hastens to add that this sense of transcendence must not be 
accompanied by any sense of superiority, since one culture is simply using its categories to 
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interpret another, an operation no doubt being performed by the informant as well. Instead, he 
wants to establish a position of relative "transcendence without superiority" with regard to the 
"realities" that another culture presents to one's own categories.(Shweder 1989: 133) I think that 
Shweder has, in fact, described one of the ways we negotiate the fault-line, not how we might 
resolve it. Anthropology may be safe for another day. While less developed than Shweder' s, 
Talal Asad also attempts an anthropology of non-universal, fully particular assumptions and 
categories, as does Jonathan Z. Smith in several analyses, most notably "Religion, Religions, 
Religious," and "Manna, Mana Everywhere and /u/ u /u" (Asad 1993; J. Z. Smith 1998, 2002) 
In contrast to the parsing of the problem of belief in anthropology, the term presents few 
concerns for cognitive theory, a field that is currently the locus of much excited debate by 
scholars of all types. Composed of psychologists, neurologists, evolutionary biologists and all 
the subfields in between, cognitive theory gives a great deal of attention to why and how people 
believe. One recent title makes this explicit: "Why Would Anyone Believe in God?" (Barrett 
2004) The most general "short" answer identifies believing as a cognitive process selected for its 
adaptive value in the evolutionary task of human beings surviving in stable groups. This makes 
believing part of what created thinkin~ociable humans, although some cognitive theorists are 
quick to point out that it is a vestige of evolution that ill equips us for modem life. Despite its 
focus on the etiology of belief, cognitive theory simply defines it as positing the existence of 
what /counter-intuitive agencies." (Boyer 2001) So, while philosophers regard religious 
believing as just one instance of the larger cognitive phenomenon of belief, the former is the 
main focus of cognitive theory. Most cognitivists are unabashedly "scientific," intent on 
explaining why the irrational beliefs of religion came into existence and remain long past their 
more obvious adaptive uses. 
) 
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For those in the fields of neurology, the neurophysiology of cognition, or evolutionary 
biology, interest in religion is tied to new research tools like magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
as well as the sheer synergy of these fields coming together around new maps of the brain and 
paradigms of consciousness and neural processing. Their apparent lack of hermeneutical interest 
in the challenges posed by language is in keeping with the style of science generally, but can 
make their work very alien to humanists. When they locate "the problem of belief," they solve it, 
that is, they explain what is going on. Even when their explanations can only be speculative at 
best, the cognitive theorist sounds very reductionist to scholars concerned to interpret (verstehen) 
rather than explain (eklaren). Some of these theorists are not blind to the dilemmas of social 
science or even the humanities, but they are unusual "cross-over" figures. (See Atran 2002; 
Pyysiainen 2004; and Turner 2002). 
/ 
The late anthropologist, Roy Rappaport, used cognitive theory, among other methodsr to 
develop a speculative but insightful account of the nature of belief. He assumed its biological 
evolution and focused on the dynamics of its social enactment, through which an experience and 
concept of "the sacred" was generated among human beings, functioning in turn to mold them as 
human beings. This social process involved -- as Vico, Comte, and Hume all suggested -- an 
experience of power and an act of submission to the idea of a higher authority. Rappaport 
playfully described the concept of power in this way: "The unfalsifiable supported by the 
undeniable yields the unquestionable, which transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the 
conventional into the correct, the necessary, and the natural." (Rappaport 1999: 405) The process 
of deferring the quality of unquestionableness to the unknown comes to constitute sanctity itself. 
As a form of absolute authority, the sacred makes possible "the foundation upon which the 
human way of life stands." For Rappaport, belief in sanctity enables humanity to evolve social 
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community, intellectual reflexivity, and the experience of transcendence itself. (Rappaport 1999: 
293-97, 395-405) 
The idea that religion may be a selected adaptive feature in human evolution is far from 
new; in some form it goes back to the oldest pre-Darwinian notions of social evolution evinced 
in 18th century writers. Even mid-twentieth century phenomenological theorists of religion, like 
Eliade, who regarded religion as sui generis or non-reducible to other forces, could speculate 
about the evolutionary origins of religion before confining discussion to the "phenomenon" at 
hand, the origins of which should not matter. Yet the phenomenology of religion approach, now 
known as history of religions, has been significantly lax in comparison to its disciplinary 
neighbors in pursuing belief beyond old questions of its origin. Perhaps the more need in the last 
decades to distinguish itself from theology on the one hand and anthropology on the other might 
explain this odd lacuna in centuries of analysis. Perhaps the absence of belief as a discrete entry 
in the Encyclopedia of Religion contributes to the very definition of the borders of the 
phenomenological study of religion. Nonetheless, with an exception here and there, colleagues in 
the history of religions, when compared to philosophers, anthropologists and even cognitive 
theorists, have not seen any "problem" with belief. In fact, we may need to be prodded to see 
belief at all. 
In 1972 Rodney Needham noted the expedient ease with which many ethnographers 
blithely claimed that such and such people believe in this or that god and gods, comfortable with 
the assumption that the English verb "to believe" captures the particular religious sensibilities of 
a very different people. Of course, as the Shweder discussion made clear, a universal assumption 
about the know-ability of other peoples and cultures has been basic to anthropology. Yet in 
contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham pointed out the close attention to local 
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terms first used by Evans-Pritchard in his study of the Nuer and their theology. Needham himself 
examined the indigenous terms for anything comparable to belief among the Navaho, Hinduism, 
the dialects of the Philippines, and the Penan of Borneo, an exercise that evinced "the 
bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently translated by the English 
'believe'." (Needham 1972: 32-37) 
Most recently, the Buqcdhol~gist Donald Lopez analyzed the term belief for its usefulness 
l~r~~~~ 
in the study of religion, challenging the basic assumption of universality. For Lopez, our notion 
of belief as something common to all religions is part of our blindness to difference and our 
willingness to convert the world to one way of thinking. He argues that what we intend by belief 
has a clear historical locus in the matrix of meanings forged by early Christianity and developed , 
in the course of Christian history as it sought to define its theological orthodoxy and institutional 
jurisdiction. (Lopez 1998) In fact, it was during the Inquisition, i f~t, that belief acquired its 
current distinctive gloss by which outward action is deemed an inadequate indication of the 
views one harbors deep within the heart. Only torture would reveal those sentiments. 
Lopez illustrates his point with the dramatic narrative of Peter of Verona, a 13th century 
preacher asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisition against the Gnostic heresy of the 
Cathars or Albigensians. This early Inquisition actually institutionalized testing a person for his 
or her true beliefs. But Lopez also notes that how deeply the Inquisition was involved in both the 
confiscation of property, which certainly added to the local zeal of the movement, and in the 
struggle between the pope and the Holy Roman Emperor for political control of a great deal of 
southern France. Peter of Verona, early Inquisitor, eventually became a martyr to the cause: the 
story has it that as he was dying from a stab wound, he inscribed "credo," the beginning of the 
orthodox creed of beliefs, on the ground in his own blood. The credo, of course, points back to 
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the long historical importance of oral and public assertion of cteeds that arose in the context of 
disputing heresies. However, summing up a great deal of history in this one brief historical 
sketch of Peter the Inquisitor and martyr, Lopez concludes that Christianity came o distinguish 
belief not by what a person said publicly, but by "the invisible content of the mind:" (Lopez 
1998: 26-27) Since the means for identifying believers from non-believers would give great 
power to the one deciding who had what in their hearts, Lopez also concludes that the idea of 
belief "is neither natural nor universal. It might be described as an ideology, an idea that arises 
from a specific set of material interests." (Lopez 1998: 28) 
Using a second example, Lopez describes the 1881 Buddhist Catechism with which 
Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Buddhism into the modem world. In 
Olcott's understanding, Buddhism was a religion and, therefore, a system of beliefs. So he was 
shocked by how poorly the pious monks of Sri Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs 
that early translations had made so familiar to Olcott. He was especially concerned that ill-
prepared Buddhists would not be able to hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries 
who were destroying the indigenous culture. Pointing to Olcott's "ideology of belief," Lopez 
suggests that his assumptions about the universal nature of religion were rooted in Christian 
history and doomed, inadvertently, to obfuscate a true understanding of Buddhism. (Lopez 1998: 
29-33) 
Lopez's argument for the cultural particularism of belief is welcome for taking up the 
topic of belief at all, even if his conclusions banish the term for reasons provided by a 
postcolonial perspective. Yet it is not obvious that his analysis actually manages to remove 
'2,.vvv1.,.,,-
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Christian assumptions, and agency, from the center of the historical record, rather than further 
crediting Christianity with a religious perspective it may simply have inherited, borrowed, or 
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patched together. Nor does the subsequent history of Christianity in formerly colonized cultures 
deserve less study or respect for reasons of an historically explicit act of obfuscation. 
Unfortunately, it is also not clear that Lopez's provocative and exhilarating analysis will have 
much of an impact on the history of religions' passivity toward the longstanding controversies 
surrounding belief, only a few of which Lopez is able to engage. After all, a fundamental 
assumption about the unity and transparency of believing as a phenomenon has supported the 
() whole enterprise of comparative religions and most "world religions" textbooks. Obfuscating 
''---- . ideology with material interests may be too much of a challenge. Still, Lopez's argument about a 
"critical term" puts the right questions to the historical record and effectively challenges the 
history of religions as to the degree of universality we can continue to comfortably assume as 
well as the degree of particularity with which we may want to rewrite our master narratives. 
How the field deals with such a challenge could well predict its ability to survive in the twenty-
first century. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The author would like to thank Lindsay Jones for his generous assistance with part of this 
project, although the final argument reflects only the opinions of the author. 
2 Religious Studies 24, no. 11 (March 1988) featured seven review articles, while the Journal of 
Religion 70, no.3 (1990) was a special issue dedicated to review articles on the Encyclopedia. 
Also see Smart 1988. 
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From note (17) In a more recent and distinctly new current within the field, the anthropologist Matthew 
Engelke reminds us that the path breaking anthropologists of the twentieth century, E.E. Evans-Pritchard and 
Victor Turner, who both spent years in the field participating in the elaborate ritual life of the Nuer and the 
Ndembu, respectively, each converted to Catholicism after a few restless years back in the halls of academe. 
Perhaps after years of close involvement in the highly structured ritual lives of these communities, and then the 
relative sterility of the rationalized modern technocratic state, Catholicism presented the closest answer to a 
ritual life with a similarly embracing complexity. (Matthew Engelke, The Problem of Belief: Evans-Pritchard 
and Victor Turner on 'the inner life"' Anthropology Today 18, no. 6 [December 2002]: 3-8) Engelke also 
wonders if the attempt to understand one religion can leave one in a better position to understand another; in 
this case, Evans-Pritchard's and Turner's understanding of the African religions they documented so well 
might have given them insight and empathy for a religion closer to home. Engelke seems to be innocently 
raising anew an issue that, in a version only slightly different, marked the birth pains of the degree-granting 
discipline of the non-theological study of religion, namely, does one have to be a member of a religion to truly 
understand it. As just stated, the question implies that outsiders engaged in the formal, secular study of religion 
could not really understand Catholicism or Nuer or any other religion. Today it is easily granted that such a 
scholar would understand the religion differently, indeed, be engaged in answering very different questions 
than those of concern to practicing members of the religious community. Through the 1960s, however, this 
issue involved a lengthy and occasionally contentious process of differentiation as the study of religion carved 
out a place for itself alongside the other disciplines devoted to religion - theology, scripture, and ministerial 
studies, among others. ( See J Z Smith article [in his folder]and in Relating Religion?) 
from text (19) Ewing describes how the circumstances of her dreams left her wobbling in her 
confidence as an objective ethnographer. To an extent not clear to herself, she became a type a 
believer and, therefore, an insider--someone who understood and was told more. i Yet going 
native can leave one unable to explain any of this insider information to one's professional 
community by virtue of vows of confidence, or simply the inability to convey the convincing 
insider experience. 
i Katherine P. Ewing, "Dreams from a Saint: Anthropological Atheism and the Temptation to Believe," 
American Anthropologist 96, no. 3 (September 1994): 571-583. 
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Paradigms Behind (and Before) the Modern Concept of Religion 
Abstract 
This essay identifies five paradigms, undoubtedly among many more, which are basic to 
understanding the historical emergence and uses of the generic idea of "religion" in the Christian 
cultures of Europe and America. The spread of this concept has been sufficiently thorough in 
recent centuries as to make religion appear to be a "social fact," to use Durkheim's phrase, rather 
than so many cultural expressions and different social practices. The supremacy of Euro-
American culture-and an academy still saturated with Christian ideas-has enjoined other 
cultures and forms of religiosity to conform to this idea of religion; for these cultures 
contentment with the status quo can vie with the anxieties of influence, including 
"modernization." The key paradigms discussed are the following: Christianity as the prototype; 
religion as the opposite of reason; the modern formulation of "world religions"; the cultural 
necessity ofreligion; and then critical analysis of the Western "construction" ofreligion. These 
paradigms demonstrate the limits on theoretical variety in the field, the difficulty in making real , 
changes in set ways of thinking, and productive foci for interdisciplinary methods of study. 
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Introduction: Paradigms and Religious Studies 
Some projections of current global political and economic forces suggest that religion 
could eclipse nationalism and ethnicity /as the source of future friction and fighting. Samuel 
Huntington's much critiqued fear of a coming "clash" of religious civilizations may or may not 
prove correct in the end, but there is no question that here and now many local clashes as well as , 
pervasive global tensions are routinely iterated in terms of the different goals of religious cultural 
traditions-from the political speeches of George W. Bush to those of Omar Bin Laden. 1 Yet are 
the multiple social and cultural differences involved in these current clashes adequately, or 
usefully, described as religious? Even before Huntington, of course, ·scholars with historical or 
anthropological backgrounds invoked the notion of "religious cultures" in order to express both 
the power of religious socialization over time and space, as well as the vague inadequacy of the 
idea of religion itself in capturing the full scope of the social traditions and mores involved. 2 But 
historians should be wary of any fresh reification of religious identities. The clearest example of 
the many tissue layers that build up into some popular nominalization of a religious tradition can 
be found, I believe, in even a cursory exploration of the paradigms that have constructed the 
notion of religion itself. Such an examination makes clear the obvious, that "religion" is an 
historical term like all other terms and phenomena. That is, it emerged at some point in time with 
a set of uses and was pressed into much wider application when it became useful in naming 
something that previously did not exist or did not need a name. 
The analysis that follows is an initial and therefore somewhat idiosyncratic exercise to try 
to isolate both some key layers among the paradigms that have shaped our notion of religion, as 
well as the variety of explorations emanating from these paradigms that are shaping the field of 
religious studies. However, it must be said that I am not an historian and can show little respect 
for disciplinary boundaries. In addition, I draw on far too much material to do so well in all cases. 
My goal, however, is some sense of the construction of an evolving term that remains very 
critical today, although with what one suspects must be constant changes of emphasis in the 
facets that unfold. My working premise that this historical process is not necessarily a logical or 
internally directed one may allow for a light touch in repeatedly shuffling through the cards of 
history, trying to catch a glimpse of a partial story line or simply consistency of discontinuities. 
In brief, my storyline is to explore a handful of key paradigms that have been and still are 
basic to academic understandings of religion in a number of fields. I use the term "paradigm" 
here in its most neutral sense, as a basic tool for advancing knowledge as a social enterprise. 
Moreover, while using the general ethos and particular aspects that Thomas Kuhn's gave the 
term, I am not attempting to invoke any of his specific arguments ( at this time) or to open any 
interpretive fuss about his meanings. 3 Conventionally, we understand paradigms to be those 
overly convenient and under-theorized terms that create the theoretical scaffolding for all sorts of 
other ideas. Eventually, however, people can notice some of the assistance provided by the 
paradigm and even suspect it of having an ideological function. From this perspective, to call 
something a paradigm is already to recognize it as a type of "black box" or "knot" of ideas 
operative in our discourse and raises questions about why a paradigm may be so useful to a 
particular subject. I hope the irony of the situation is clear: paradigms are the building blocks for 
systems of knowledge until we are actually perceive the degree to which we assume their support., 
At that point we fear that the linked imagery of the paradigm may constrain thought as much as 
facilitate it. Its efficacy suddenly too apparent, we are bound to inquire why we found this way 
of seeing things so constructive and whether we should rethink the model and possibly retire it-
if we can. 
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To explore paradigms such as those constitutive of the idea religion is like unpacking a 
set of Chinese boxes or Russian dolls, always another within the last one. It might also be 
compared to uncovering archeological strata that provide a picture of geological ages containing, 
perhaps, some of the detritus of human history, like the carbonation of ancient campfires or a 
fossilized set of footprints on an ancient lakeshore. It makes sense to imagine these paradigms as 
historical stages only if it is clearly understood that few facets are ever left behind. Even if the 
outermost cultural carapace of historical style is discarded, the associ~ted ideas, both structured 
and structuring, can remain to hold most of a worldview in place. One easy example is seen in 
the field of Religious Studies today: it is a tent so large that there are all sorts of sub-
communities distinctly rooted in marginal paradigms of religions still able to thrive in the darker 
comers, often with their own journals, websites, and membership lists. While we may challenge 
the integrity of the edifice, even work to knock down some big sections of it, there are basements 
and rafters of suppositions with annexes of linked structures, all of which hold a great deal of the 
original paradigm together no matter how fully we attack it. Paradigms are anything if not 
redundant. Yet I cannot think of any more serious focus of intellectual exploration in the field. 
Optimistically, tracing some of these boxes within boxes may suggest other major 
constructions and interpretations attending the way we study religion or simply how we talk 
about it. Most of the first part of this paper would be relatively uncontested by my colleagues, 
and some of my points are shortcuts through larger studies underway. Yet I will also try to 
suggest a style of inquiry consistent with the challenge of these paradigms, a challenge that may 
redress the current sense of limited choices and directions in the study of religion. Certainly, I 
can provide examples of the difficulties of trying to undo a paradigm. The smaller models I have 
explored at length include traditional views of the uniqueness of ritual action, the cosmological 
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medium of the text and, currently, our cultural beliefs about beliefs. On the surface the latter may 
seem like a robust, free-for-all economy of ideas, but tensions and increasing rigidity are the 
result, with little relation to traditional sources of authority or discernment. Hints of another 
paradigm lie in an attitude deeply ingrained within scholars in religious studies--or else we 
would be historians--namely, the assumption that religion is fundamentally good, embodying the 
noblest of human ideals and distilled wisdom, if not sacred history and commands, despite the 
obvious human lapses everywhere. Theoretically speaking, the field of religious studies has not 
really moved much beyond such starting assumptions. Even if we have trendier reference points, 
deeply ingrained paradigms are still used to explain us to ourselves, enabling us to invoke a 
common pool of ideas about religion with few attempts to pull aside the curtain. 
Boxes within Boxes 
Christianity as the Prototype 
It is necessary to choose a beginning, a first box, even though the choice may be 
ultimately arbitrary. So I will start with the enduring paradigm created with the solidification of 
Christianity as the prototype for religion in general. The ascendancy of Christianity in Europe-
gradually spread by missionaries, travelers, and a variety of military and cultural colonizers-
made it seem natural that Christianity be taken up in the European cultural milieu as the frame of 
reference for what religion is. As the prototype for religion, Christianity provided all the 
assumptions with which people began to address historically and geographically different 
religious cultures. In other words, as the prototype for the general category of "religion," an idea 
that needed to emerge itself, Christianity was the major tool used to encompass, understand, and 
dominate the multiplicity. Yet there is more to this prototype than any quick nod of 
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understanding. The long and varied history of Christianity that naturally continues into our time 
has been subject to processes of dissemination and appropriation ( or "inculturation," to use 
church language) that created in tum a great many Christianities throughout the world from the 
very beginning. Many have long been lost to history, others seriously understudied, an example 
of how scholarship can aid the often cruel processes by which the history of Christianity has 
appeared so much "neater" for 2000 years than it actually was-or is.4 
Nonetheless, even as practiced by reservation Sioux, Russian Orthodox, or the 
Independent Churches of South Africa, the fact that so many peoples regard themselves as 
Christian means that, aside from its political and numerical dominance, the Christian prototype 
for "religion in general" to believers, non-believers, and scholars is something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and not likely to change soon despite the tensions accruing in academic circles. 
Chinese and Japanese of the 16th through the 19th centuries would frequently reply to close 
questioning that they did not have any religion because what they did have seemed totally unlike 
the model presented by Christian missionaries. 5 Today these citizens might say they are Buddhist 
or Confucian, atheistic or involved in one the many "new" religions that have developed in Asia 
in the last 50-100 years. 6 I had the opportunity to discuss the Christian prototype problem with a 
bright young religion scholar bearing a very current example of a globalized personal 
background-native Taiwanese, PhD from UCLA, seeking work in the USA, and an ordained 
minister in a fast-growing Buddhist Theravada sect known as Yi Fo Sheng. But he showed 
surprising little understanding or interest. Of course, he had no alternative terms or models he 
could use within the standard scholarly language that determines admittance into the academic 
community, a version of English he had to work harder than most to mast. However, further 
conversation revealed the a clue-that he had probably absorbed the whole Christian paradigm 
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through the sect's 19th century scholar-founder who explicitly strove to "modernize" Buddhism 
in so many ways that it became a distinct sect, better conforming to Western expectations. 7 
The globalization of Christianity is beginning to get sustained scholarly attention. 8 An 
African was not elected pope in Rome this past spring, but the possibility was talked about. More 
substantively, the Church of England is dealing with a growing number of African and Asian 
Anglican churches joining the list of those threatening to withdraw from the international 
communion over the ordination of an openly gay American minister (the Nigeria communion has 
recently announced its withdrawal). As more Christianities are explored, the prototype may well 
be challenged in at least two general ways, by us, secular scholars from outside the normal 
definitions of the fold, but also by ministers from within, who are making decisions about what 
Christianity will be in the future-or more specifically, what Anglicanism, Methodism, Roman 
Catholicism, and new independent forms indebted to only their only selective appropriation will 
be. 
In describing the historical rise of Christianity as prototype, one might rightly ask about 
Judaism and Islam, both notably active in European history during the later centuries establishing 
Christian dominance. Yet even these early challenges to the development of the Christian 
prototype were effectively muted as each was given an early and consistent niche in the 
dominant Christian cosmology: Judaism was quickly demoted to those "refuse-niks" who 
rejected the truth, misguided brothers due to the share textual base and common roots (which not 
save failed to save them from the persecution of pogroms, but was served as an historical warrant 
for them); while Islam, the barbarians at the gate, were the threat that defined the very physical 
and psychological borders of Christendom. The differences among these three were, in fact, a 
type of proof to Christians of the distinctive Christ story: the eventual appreciation of the 
monotheistic and textual inheritances in which all three participated were taken as further proof 
that the Christian model could contain and explain religion more widely. That all three 
participated in rather different monotheistic and textual inheritances took Christians until the 
twentieth century to work out. 
Religion a_s the Irrational 
The Enlightenment is responsible for many congruent cultural shifts, but for my narrow 
purposes, I will simply describe how it amended the previous idea of the Christian prototype 
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with the emergence of a fully developed concept and terminology for a more generic notion of 
"religion" in itself, namely, religion as the irrational. Up until the 16th century, as Sam Preus 
nicely demonstrates, there was only the haziest notion of a general category of religion. 9 And the ' 
only judgments as to rationality or irrationality, influenced by the discovery of "The 
Philosopher," concerned Christianity in particular: Thomas Aquinas argues that certain Christian 
mysteries, though not all, could not be determined by the use of reason and thus were the result 
ofrevelation. 10 The work of a close contemporary, the putative author of The Travels of Marco 
Polo (1275-92), was bestseller was written and popularized during the ascendancy of 
Christianity in Europe, well before the stirrings of the Enlightenment. For Marco, there were 
only four categories by which to classify and understand all the peoples he met, most of whom 
existed outside the structure of clear-cut nation states: a person was a Christian, Jew, Moor 
(Saracen), or a pagan. 11 Polo's travel memoirs constantly refer to the stereotypes associated with 
each, and seldom was he surprised by any non-stereotypical behavior, except for those pagans, 
the Chinese, who astonished him with their good manners, deep learning, and clearly observed 
social order. 12 In fact, Marco is kindest toward all pagans, noting many humanitarian aspects of 
their teaching and lives; he is brief on the Jews and unremittingly harsh on the Muslims-due in 
part, suggests Robert Latham, who introduces the Penguin Classic, to the trade rivalry they 
presented to the bold new hopes of Europeans. 13 
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The Enlightenment's separation of church and state, on top of Europe's growing 
knowledge about and interaction with other religious cultures ( e.g., Jesuits writing home with 
their version of a rationalized Confucianism) aided the standardization of a common term in 
popular parlance. Even though Christianity structured understanding of the notion of religion 
after itself, the term recognized, with excitement, that there were totally non-Christian religions 
out there. Of course, these foreign encounters led to debates in which the positive properties 
ascribed to the newly discovered religions, such as rational superiority or greater age in history, 
constantly alternated with evidence of their depravity. 14 The Jesuits are particularly interesting to 
read for their unrelenting interpretive efforts to find in Confucianism what they felt just had to be 
there, some ancient evidence of the disclosure of the existence of God the Father and later the 
Son. 15 Those who seized on such foreign examples to demonstrate the possibility of a rational 
religion (morality without metaphysics!), most famously Leibniz and Voltaire, were critiquing 
the Christian churches and working toward the separation of church and state. They and their 
predecessors were also attempting to maintain a natural option between the scientific realism that 
was the context of their interest and traditional religious devotion ( and powerful churches) that 
formed an object of criticism; some sort of "religion" was widely regar_ded as the necessary 
source of morality, needed to hold the rabble to the norms of social order. The emergence of 
Deism, a rationalized Christianity so important for the founders of the independent American 
colonies, is testimony to the difficulty in spanning this divide between rational and institutional 
piety, given the sheer amount of traditional Christianity that Deism had to jettison. It may be that 
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Deism was the closest a Euro-American could come to atheism, an idea that was literally hard to 
think until Darwin's theory of evolution provided another way of thinking, at the very least, 
about how it all began. 1. 6 
As the empirical sciences developed sufficient social capital to tum their gaze on human 
history and social life, the paradigm of the rational in contrast to the irrational became an 
ideological tool with many uses. Not least, the objectification of religion in tandem with the 
expanding delineation of science created the environment for the earliest study of religion as 
religion. In a practice sense, religion became what science was not. The power of this dual 
objectification of religion and science eventually meant that as the irrational, religion was a 
natural object of study for the "sciences of man," as developed by Hume, Vico and Tyler among ' 
others. Indeed, the interplay of the rational and irrational in definitions of the early sciences of 
religion led to some of the forms of comparative religion still practiced today-one particular line 
of scholars being comprised of the well-known figures of Max Muller, Sir James Frazer, and 
Mircea Eliade, among others-began to search for universals within the family of human 
religions, plural but clearly an ultimately singular entity of a profound sort-the sacred. 
The effort to identify universal patterns among the world's religions had the potential to 
displace Christianity as the prototypical religion for comparative purposes, substituting as UR 
religion. This project was continually floated, certainly in Muller, but the UR categories were 
never convincingly foreign or unexpected. Most of the universalists do not seem to have 
imagined putting Christianity aside because they thought they a~ready had. Instead of working on 
insuring that project, they tended to be lured by other visions, such as taxonomy of gods that 
would prove a particular theory of development, an inventory of all the wisdom of the world, or 
even the disclosure of that "sacred" underlying the particular forms of human religious 
experience. 
11 
While not threatening the Christian prototype, the era that developed "irrational religion" 
did in fact introduce the means for a rudimentary egalitarianism and relativism when viewing the 
diversity of religions. If one group was alert to the unenlightened primitive still within 
Christianity, the other looked for the Christian mysteries hidden in the historical experience of 
the pagans; the quest to grasp the universals of religion was nothing less than the key to a 
timeless, if vaguely familiar, sacrality expressed in all religious manifestations, making religion 
of this vein the most fully shared forms of human insight. Scholars today, notably the recently 
deceased but much quoted Roy Rappaport, will still echo with confidence the idea that 
uncovering the dynamics of this sacrality would explain the emergence of human-ness itself; 
although for Frazer and Eliade there were always hints that "the sacred" might be more 
ontological than phenomenological, while for Rappaport it is clearly an evolutionary 
development. 17 
Within the paradigm of the Christian prototype, the foregoing search for universals 
behind the irrational wisdom of religion, scholars such as Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) and his 
student Ernest Troeltsh (1865-1935), who followed romantic Hegelianism, argued like many 
before them that Christianity was the fulfillment of history, although Troeltsh later modified his 
position: only in Western culture was Christianity truly "absolute." 18 Likewise, in the 20th 
century, beginning to· devise a phenomenological approach to religion, Eliade could still suggest 
early in his career that in Christianity one found the most logical and fulfilling development of 
the symbolism of the divine expressed in all preceding religions. 19 Christianity as the perfection 
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of the prototype found new ways to triumph even within the innovative context of religion as the 
irrational subject of rational scholars. 
World Religions 
The world religions paradigm has been so extraordinarily popular that it is certainly the 
way most Americans at least have come to see religion and religious multiplicity. Its popularity 
rests on many factors, primarily promotion by the discipline in order to solve so many problems 
of emphasis, logic, and cultural-centrism, when multiple religions are introduced. Even today it 
is still considered indispensable by too teachers in need of pedagogical tools for introducing 
students to a great deal of material in a manner that minimizes traditional suspicions and 
prejudices. Setting up a limited array of world religions-usually five through eight - can make 
the strange less strange; it can also invite effective questions about ideas and structures, the real 
fruits of comparison in any field. 
Yet the paradigm always involves one major problem that readily generates resistance by 
some of the included traditions, namely, the "leveling" implied in making one's religion just 
another in a group of comparable items. While many traditions today, and historically, are 
comfortable with this approach, some are not. Traditional Catholics, conservative Evangelicals, 
and conservative Sunni Muslims would certainly hesitate to include this formula in their own 
school curricula; and some resent it completely - usually because of exclusivist claims. Yet 
another more theoretical problem could also be part of their resistance: such formulations make 
each religion fit a gross simplification of the prototype in very neatly explicit ways just in order 
to display the fact that religions are so similar in their basics, that no one of them can dominate 
or act as a prototype. The aura of comparable qualities is, of course, historically and theological 
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misleading for each religion. Finally, what does a list of eight world religions say about the other 
religions not included? That they are simply not large enough in the world? That they are 
confined to national entities and thus do hold the promise of generating a trans-national 
community? Or, that they do not fit the model/prototype used and so many not even technically ' 
qualify as religions after all? 
These problems were painfully brought home to me, in an unexpected way, when the 
theologian and dedicated spokesperson for a "global ethic," Hans Kung, came to speak at a 
conference on campus, bringing with him his "World Religions-Universal Peace-Global 
Ethic" exhibition, a series of large handsome panels. 20 Each panel identified an explicitly world 
religion, provided a distinctive symbol, posted a recognizable photograph of one of its holy 
places, and then simply listed a series of basic facts such as the founder (or rough equivalent), 
the main ideas or creeds, and ritual obligations. The overall effect is to demonstrate a 
fundamental unity in the natural structure of these religions and, more specifically, a consensus 
on the message of peace that is Professor Kung' s overriding concern at this point in his career. 
However, Kung's panels were drawn into a totally unrelated lecture series sponsored by the 
"Local Religion, Global Relationships" project of the Religious Studies Dept at Santa Clara, 
which studies the diversity of religious communities in Silicon Valley. The Project was having 
its first lecture series in which local religious leaders were invited to campus to speak for 
themselves about their communities and how they dealt with the pluralism of the valley. The 
opening reception, held prior to any of the lectures, was in the rotunda displaying Kung' s World 
Religions panels. I was upset when I first heard about this collision of events, but then decided to 
make it useful, no matter how difficult: I would ask the local religious leaders (partly using an 
assistant) just how they felt about representation of their traditions by the panels and the leveling , 
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they imposed. Their surprising answers all tended to be "no problem"; on the contrary, they were 
glad to be represented there at all. The fact that Christianity was only one panel among the six 
appeared to be a refreshing leveling to them and they found no significant fault with the 
information displayed. The "world religions" approach, according to the Native American Indian 
shaman who spoke last in the series, could easily be seen as a victory given the ubiquitous 
dominance of Christianity if one's religion was included. I know their views were more than 
mere politeness since a number of their formal presentations of their traditions could easily have ' 
been lifted from Huston Smith's ubiquitous pocket-size anthology, The Religions of Man.21 
So the popular and over-worked pedagogical view differs from the scholar's eye-rolling 
sense of the inadequacy of the world religions approach. The latter group, however, has not done 
much to discuss the issue in print. In 1962 Wilfred Cantwell Smith raised the problem of the 
inherently poor fit provided by the term "religion" when applied to the pre-modem traditions of 
the East, a disrespect heightened by the West's willingness to invent names (and jurisdictions) 
for these traditions that do not correspond well at all to how they identify themselves. 22 Jonathan 
Z. Smith has addressed the history and classification difficulties of the term "world religions," 
but the topic had to wait until 2005 for Tomoko Masuzawa's The Invention of World Religions 
for a full historical analysis of the European effects of the emergence of the paradigm. 23 
Masuzawa' s book will draw attention to this paradigm, forcing more self-consciousness in using 
it. Nonetheless, the textbooks on World Religions continue every other month, undoubtedly 
further efforts in a long line that have tried to unseat Huston Smith's claim on the public and the 
junior college markets. In the wake of the Pluralism Project directed by Diane Eck, some are 
now making more use of the Web or CDs.24 some colleagues recently generated an introductory 
textbook, entitled Global Religions, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer. Unfortunately, the textbook 
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does not use the theme of globalization to introduce a critique of the world religions approach, 
which the book follows in a curtailed fashion. Rather it attempts to modify our traditional 
understanding of these religions as neatly associated with particular geographic locales. The 
chapters deftly complicate the histories with diasporas and transnational ways of living, some 
that have been endemic since the earliest days of a community. World religions, global religions: 
what's in a name, we might ask? It may be possible that this book can begin to crack open some 
of the tenets of the world religions paradigm; but it seems more probable, given the introduction 
and the marketing, which the globalization vocabulary will merely update and further secure the 
world religions paradigm for another generation. 25 
Cultural Necessity of Religion 
After the paradigms I have described as the Christian prototype, religion as irrational, and 
world religions, the fourth paradigm can seem unexpected, namely, the "cultural necessity of 
religion." With the emergence of anthropological studies, usually dated to E. B. Tylor (1832-
191 7), the attempt to determine the origins of religion ( either prehistorically or as part of a total 
scheme for human history) gave way to analysis ofreligion's continuing role in social life.26 In 
fact, the coexistence of (irrational) religious beliefs with scientific rationalism became a major 
question in its own right, one that further cemented the idea of "religion" as uniting all the major 
belief traditions from the most ancient or primitive known to revealed Christianity and all the 
other more or less respectable but, from the point of view of many an early European Protestant 
scholar, still redemption-deprived "faiths." Given the irrational religion paradigm continuing into ' 
an even more scientific age, these religions were put on the same page, so to speak, just as it 
came to be understood that all religion would probably fade under influence of empirical 
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knowledge. Yet the social sciences asked why people were continuing to believe in great 
numbers when they no longer needed to do so, thereby opening up many new perspectives. 
Although the encounters forged by early anthropologists got started in painfully uneven 
ways, the results of which we continue to uncover to this day, their comparisons of "primitive" 
and "civilized" societies facilitated the realization of similarities in the practice of religion that 
began to answer questions about its continued role. Emile Durkheim hypothesized that religion ~ 
was intrinsic to the construction of the social group; Franz Boas provided cultural evidence of 
many fonns of shared humanity especially in craft and myth; while Sigmund Freud described the 
formation of the modern inner self as embodying the childlike primitive, laboring under the onus 
of civilization. Each of these path breakers found their own rational, post-Enlightenment cu.ltures 
to be built on fundamental-and socially crucial-irrationalities identifying a level of human 
experience shared with all manner of other populations. This diminishment of the distinctions 
that scholars saw among themselves, ancients, natives, and far-off exotics occurred in the age of 
Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species (1859). If a new unity was introduced, it also brought a 
new disunity between "that old time religion" and the degrading theories of the over-
intellectualized classes. Although some were pleased that Darwin's theory vindicated the model 
of a single creation as suggested by the Bible instead of the racist theories of multiple creations 
used to support a natural ordering of human beings based on their color, it was a theory that 
otherwise appeared to divide as surely as the issues of the America Civil War that preceded its 
dissemination. 27 In Protestant America, Darwin brought science and Christianity to a fork in the 
road. 
As the first truly secular paradigm, the cultural necessity of religion generated a 
distinctive divide within the social sciences between those with theological sympathies or 
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affiliations in contrast to those who clearly fores wore any such loyalty to the non-scientific. 28 
Protestant anthropologists and sociologists had an easier time making their position clear than 
divinity school scholars, usually ordained clerics from an earlier stage of life who slowly 
gravitated to the social sciences; they were constantly accused of allowing the theological to 
degrade their analyses, although it was just as like the universalistic assumptions still so 
important to the social sciences in general as lingering theological ones. Yet scholars of religion 
in divinity schools who founded non-theological programs of studies, i.e., religionswissenschaft 
or history of religions, one of the major venues for the study of religion today, used the secular 
paradigm to create gray areas in which the social sciences and both church history and theology 
influenced each other, creating something that differed from either extreme. This would prove to 
be one angle among many from which the division between rational minds describing irrational 
cultures seemed less clear the more it was probed. Still, popular society was in love with the cold 
scientist, male or female, whom the movies obliged to fall in love with an irrational or 
maddeningly unconventional kook. Just as often the fatherly old scientist would embody both, 
rational to the point of being irrational, even savvy, in real life. By this time, life had imitated art 
as movie goers had become aware of the theories of the scientist of the age. Grandfatherly 
Einstein, father of atomic energy and critic of the bomb, genius of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, represented yet another "marriage" of the rational and irrational in the terms of the 
twentieth century. Of course, the horrific events of the century were killing off many a sacred 
cow owned by both science and religion. 
The model of religion as a universal, indispensable, and non-rational social creation 
would be used by Religious Studies scholars for decades. Even the world religions paradigm was 
made to fit into it as ~ell as support it. A category for the "other" primitive religions of 
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anthropological studies was already tacked on. The leveling equality of the "world religions" 
model, in addition to the social scientific "evidence" for religion as a significant marker for 
shared social qualities of humanity across all races and societies, certainly underscored the 
importance ofreligion in discussions of the "family of man." But these new humanisms came at 
some cost. Religion was a new socio-cultural bond among the peoples of the world and an 
expectation if not on-going necessity for social life only insofar as its irrationality was most 
pronounced. Indeed, the sciences and emerging social sciences found in religion all the 
irrationalities that they were intent to overcome. Aquinas's tendency to grant the co-existence of 
the rational and the irrational, greatly minimized in the struggles of the Reformation and the 
Counter-Reformation, was nonetheless reflected in many Enlightenment theorists; however, it 
given way to the dominance of science and the humanistic belief in its role in freeing human 
beings from various forms of enslavement (such as described by Durkheim, Freud, Marx, and 
Spencer). This was the clearest language in which religion succumbs to history. All of these 
thinkers wondered how society would fare in this new mode, if it could survive at all, and many 
had inklings of pseudo-religions on the horizon--nationalism, industrialization, individualism, 
and free market capitalism, for example. The "cultural necessity of religion," which would 
signify for many the moderating effects of religious values on the moralities of secular 
humanism, in the end haphazardly reinforced fears of these other irrationalities, while backing 
off from pronouncements of the demise of the irrational. Certainly the events the twentieth 
century helped to kill off many sacred cows--secular, religious, rational, and irrational. 
Religion as a Western Construct 
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The last paradigm in the present exercise is the current evocation that religion is a 
Western construct. The discourse of the postmodern critique, within which this paradigm was 
generated, emerged during the later half of the 20th century by developing a simple logic long 
operative within a number of fields. Boas' s notion of culture alone contains all the sticky seeds 
needed to germinate this perplexed and perplexing perspective. For example, if all people are 
embedded within cultures and inevitably see other cultures through the lens of their own, then it 
stands to reason that scholars cannot see other cultures without the biases, both conscious and 
· unconscious, which their cultural lens inevitably confer on other people's reality. This insight 
enabled religion scholars to see and explore aspects of the Christian prototype at work shaping 
Religious Studies for the first time. For decades they had simply focused on accusations of the 
influence of Christian theology on their more historical and sociological efforts, and worked to 
expunge clearly theological tendencies. 29 Yet so many other avenues and dilemmas opened up in 
the last decades of the twentieth century that exploration of the prototypical role given to 
Christianity was not pursued with any sustained energy or direction. Rather, the field developed 
a stream of work particularly preoccupied with deconstructing the idea of religion as universal 
and sui generis, suppositions behind the comparative world religions paradigm as well as the 
earlier ones, of course. Yet the religion-as-irrational paradigm, built by a long line of "natural" 
oppositions, was the first to begin to stumble. While pushed from many directions, feminist 
critical theory developed strong historical arguments and greater institutional influence. However, 
Edward Said's Orienta/ism (1978) introduced another level of analysis, namely, the misreadings 
(some linking colonization to the conferral of feminine and irrational qualities on the colonized) 
that made scholarly analysis blissfully unaware of its role in maintaining the cultural biases that, 
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in turn, kept communities defenseless against the political encroachment of more powerful 
political entities with their equally powerful, and confident, sense of reality. 30 
Said's work stopped some professors in their tracks. More required a shift in the overall 
zeitgeist to understand the argument and its significance. Orienta/ism was soon complemented 
by a plethora of narrow and broad studies addressing the body, sexuality, notions of the soul, 
rationality, and the place of women, and even the church, in the rise of science-in other words, 
scholars of religion began read widely and together with other disciplines explored many of the 
assumptions that had helped to support the oldest paradigms for so long. Said also, if indirectly, 
provoked greater sensitivity to the assumptions of traditional academic research, such as the 
belief that there was no need to hear from those people, the "others" of their research, affected by 
the assumptions and ultimately the studies. As the past became less familiar territory to more 
than just historians, and other cultures were no longer so easily accessible to analysis, various 
critiques of the culture of science made even the bedrock of institutionalized rationality shift a 
bit.31 Some religionists tried to save the idea of religion as a universal by identifying it more fully .. 
subsuming it within culture; but the concept of culture had its own deconstructive critiques to try 
to survive. This period is, of course, familiar ground to readers, but the way it has been 
weathered by scholars of religion is still being assessed; indeed, while the concepts that have 
fallen and hit the ground are fairly easy to notice, it is too soon to come to any conclusion about 
exactly what is left standing. Yet some disciplinary history is clear. 
An early and particularly humorous revelation of bias were the examples of Protestantism 
displayed in scholarly studies of 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly in regard to textual 
studies of ancient scriptural traditions whose modern manifestations were disdainfully dismissed 
as Catholic-like corruptions. Donald Lopez describes the story of the Pali text society's search 
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for the earliest, and purest, Buddhism with skill and verve; yet before him, Mary Douglas and 
later Jonathan Z Smith were struck by the clearly Protestant (and, therefore, anti-Catholic) bias 
they were finding in quite different scholarly materials. 32 Still, as noted above, the main target of 
the deconstructive imagination was the field itself, identified with one or two ideas, but never 
identified by the full set of paradigms I have done so here. Titles such as The Ideology of 
Religious Studies, Manufacturing Religion, and The Western Construction of Religion testify to a 
healthy round of critical studies that have made the field much more aware of its complex 
historiography. 33 However, the titles of these books bark louder than their arguments actually 
bite. The most extreme position, swallowed by many a religion writer with an audible gulp, was 
defined early on by Jonathan Z Smith when he wrote "Religion is solely the creation of the 
scholar's study."34 While waived as a banner by later critical studies of flavors, Smith's assertion 
has not been clearly analyzed or challenged to date. One wonders, for example, what the 
vigorous section of the American population lobbying for religious causes would make of such a 
statement. Indeed, Smith's understanding of "religion" may even underestimate how quickly 
such a term, passing out of the scholar's window, is drawn upon in real encounters of all kinds in 
a variety of borderlands: travel writers composing texts of the distant and exotic; missionaries 
trying to explain their cultural communication problems to the "boards" back home who want 
news of converts; as well as the many dictionary projects that began soon after first attempts by 
missionaries and anthropologists alike to engage indigenous communities in talk of their 
beliefs. 35 No matter how it was created, the idea of religion came to be was reified in line with 
the Christian prototype of a set of beliefs about God and quickly supplied a variety of needs 
incurred by the cultural diversity encountered, such as the need speak to them and of them in 
terms more complex than simply "the saved" and "'the rest." 36 
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Smith also underestimates the extensive influence of the term today. Many Muslims and 
Buddhists would currently be hard pressed to think of their "religions" without the categories 
that we might trace back to a Christian prototype and experiences of Euro-American intrusion. 
Indeed, defining cultural practices as religion (or vice versa) has had the unexpected result in 
America of protecting them by putting them on an equalizing footing under the law with 
Christianity and other world religions. Ogallala Sioux or Inuit fishing communities will still talk 
about their cultural identity in other terms than religion, such as a way of life that has come 
down to them from their ancestors and not just a set of beliefs; but then many of them were 
forced to convert to Christianity and the distinction between their religion and their culture is a 
solution to how to maintain the latter and acknowledge the realities of the former.37 
In this way the postmodern critique of modernism facilitated numerous inquires into 
assumptions that formed the Christian prototype for religion in general, adding to more long-
standing questions about the comparative aspects of the "world religions" paradigm and 
providing the context for debates that have destabilized the notion of scientific truth determined 
the rational and irrational. The latter debates left both sides of the Enlightenment dichotomy of 
science and religion as historical constructions that do not always, and have not always, fit the 
circumstances with which scholars understood themselves to be dealing. Yet Said's 
demonstration of the construction of bodies of knowledge used by Western powers for agendas 
that spoke to cultural progress and political domination on the one hand, and spoke for the 
colonized as their best hope for all the benefits of Western civilization on the other (salvation 
then, trade now?), inevitably led to a reflexive habit: is Said's picture of the power of European 
discourse about the Orient, disorienting as it originally was, just a bit too empowering its 
description of effective agency? What continuities does this black box have with the others 
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identified above? Said's study is old enough that a developed critique of it has moved the 
conversation into more parsed realities that this essay has any business enumerating. Although 
the ruckus over globalization-for, against, reality, mirage, historically "old hat," etc.-it shows 
how difficult it will be to avoid meta-narratives in which the interests of a dominant culture are 
projected as reality, as the future, as the excellent outcome for all who cooperate--or the cause of ' 
unprecedented poverty and even environmental degradation. 
Even a short stretch of service in the scholarly professions today is sufficient to teach one 
that today's corrections (one would have written "truth" twenty-five years ago) are tomorrow's 
examples of short-sightedness. Compare the literature that began about twenty-years ago on the 
scholar's obligation with regard to cultural products of colonized and conquered peoples that are 
plundered to end up in museum collections or the black market that encourages more plunder. It 
was clear that a thoughtful person could not encourage the destructive vandalism of 
archeological sites by buying a truly old museum-quality pot from the Pueblo peoples of New 
Mexico. Yet in a recent essay, Kwame Anthony Appiah, reflecting on the "cultural patrimony" 
of his native Ghana, makes a much more nuanced if unexpected argument for the repatriation 
when goods are looted from people with known names and clear cultural links, but the validity of 
why "the British Museum's claim to be repository of the heritage not of Britain but of the 
world." That view strikes him as "exactly right," although Appiah would be more comfortable 
with their continued residence there if the treasures of a vanished civilization are indeed shared 
more widely. 38 Of course, the deadly details will be those arguments about whether a culture has 
truly vanished or continued in some form. 
It is not clear where the study of religion is going, as so many new books are quick to say, 
but the choices have always appeared limited. The field might define "religion" in a narrow 
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manner, reflecting either strict specifics of content or style of practice (belief in a supernatural 
being, which is quite true for all systems of religious-like practice) or historical criteria suiting its 
emergence in the Christian dominated world of late medieval Europe (related to being bound by 
vows in thirteenth century sources). Or it may suppose a universality that could never be proven, 
but posit an open "family of resemblances" with which to describe the commonalities. The field 
may abandon the term as an historical artifact and place analytic weight on "culture" or 
"tradition," hoping they can do the job. As a fourth alternative, it might agree that the European 
roots of the notion of religion have been transcended by cultural contacts that have spread the 
concept and encouraged a rapidly varying set of nuances in how, why and when it is used. One 
reveals one's hand in making any such list, so I acknowledge that this conclusion project is part 
of a current project, although it.suggests a project tracing some major main lines of transmission, 
translation and usage that are beyond my plans despite how exciting I find the idea. 
There is, however, yet another option and it is a real one facing the field, even if it is 
currently hard to make sense of. Generated by a diverse set of voices, almost all emanating from 
the sciences, sociology to neurology, there is fresh mobilization to cast "religion" as a universal, 
adaptive, cognitive property in the evolution of the history of the human race. With a seductive 
confidence in the certainty of their claims and frequently embarrassing naivete as to what has 
been said in a century of social scientific work, this broad line of theorizing has enough new 
science at its disposal to be more than a curious diversion, but much less than developed, 
paradigmatic view. Aside from a small group of rational choice theorists, represented by Rodney 
Stark, the posthumous influence of the anthropologist Roy Rappaport' s enormous study of ritual, 
and a few books by Ilkka Pyssiainen, who is said to have been trained in theology and 
comparative religion, there is a group of cognitive theorists who see themselves as indebted to 
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Pascal Boyer, and another group who see themselves as more broadly revising the social 
sciences, represented well if not solely by Stephen Turner.39 
The rational choice and Boyer cognitive theorists are apt to claim "finally" to put the 
study of religion on a scientific footing, with each heralding a new naturalism or taking credit for ' 
a "new science" of religion (there have been so many!). These scholars intend to address religion 
in a more disciplined manner (than whom?) using the newer (really newer?) tools of economic or 
cognitive precision. Yet so far the confidence of both rational choice and cognitive theory has 
rested in great part on a total reluctance to address any definitions beyond the most self-
evident-and self-serving-ones. The referents for religion, capital, and piety, for example, are 
all clear-cut and unexamined-as is the method's location in any ideological paradigm. They 
distinguish themselves with small modifications of their definition of religion as belief in 
supernatural beings, Superhuman Agency, or Counter-Intuitiveness. The works of Daniel 
Dennett, David Wilson Sloan and Stephen Turner appear to engage in little of the ideological 
shadow boxing with traditional scholars of religion that mars the scholars who follow in the 
footsteps of Boyer.40 With exceptions here and there, the more enthusiastic scientists tend to 
ignore previous classics in the study of religion, ready to start out fresh with what they do-
evolutionary biology or neurology, cognitive psychology, and so on. The popularity of these 
theorists at conferences at least signals interest in more constructive ways of thinking that are not 
excessively self-reflexive and bring, perhaps, the certainty of "that old time science." 
In general, as this fresh mobilization of science wrests the study of religion from its 
traditional handlers, most of those handlers have moved on themselves, notably with work on 
social memory as developed by Paul Connerton and Danielle Hervieu-Leger, as well as the 
social ramifications of agency or cognitive programming on religious experience as seen in 
26 
studies by Ann Taves and Robert N. McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson. 41 Using practice and 
performance theory., others have focused less on the mental states long thought to define religion 
and more on the creative activities. All of these groups have opened up just some of the most 
identifiable fronts in the study of religion. It is an open question to what extent they will avoid 
some of the knots that have defined that study for so long. A vowed atheism or scientific 
precision is certainly not going to do it. In too many of these theorists, there is a palpable 
eagerness to overcome the pesky challenges of postmodernist paradigm's view of the Western 
construction of religion. To the extent that it is not taken seriously, the new fronts in religion 
may turn out to be very familiar; certainly the popularity at conferences of those cognitive 
theorists who are each inventing a new science of religion signals interest in ways of thinking 
that are not excessively self-reflexive and bring, perhaps, the certainty of "that old time 
science." 
Tilting at Paradigms 
In one form or another, the five paradigms described above are constants in the discipline 
of History as well as Religious Studies. They demonstrate the staying power of major models 
over centuries, the type of enduring resiliency that has created fields of study, absorbed repeated 
challenges, and stubbornly resisted abandonment. Feuerbach, that 19th century theologian-turned ' 
Hegelian-turned philosophical anthropologist of religion, put it with a simplicity that Marx 
would echo: "man does not dominate his fundamental conception of the world; on the contrary, it 
is it that dominates him, animates him, determines, and governs him." 42 We do not have ideas 
about the world so much as they have us. But Feuerbach's nineteenth century pessimism 
eventually gave way to twentieth century confidence that if we cannot change things we can 
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imagine them in our own image, as far from static. Fundamental conceptions may absorb 
repeated challenges, but they morph more regularly to avoid such challenges. 
So how does one deal with the paradigms I have isolated? The process of going from a 
paradigm important to the discipline to a problematic way of thinking that should be left behind 
(no parallel to the career span of a professor intended!) is not encouraged by Feuerbach or even 
Kuhn. Kuhn's analysis of the replacement of scientific paradigms may not be completely 
descriptive of the more diverse methods and interests of the humanities and social sciences, but I 
do not think it seriously misleads. In brief, he argued that an old paradigm is not an old paradigm 
until there is a new one to replace it, one that already has substantial support. People do not 
throw out a way of thinking to leave themselves dependent on one person's method; they 
certainly will do nothing to make their own previous work suddenly retrograde. A challenge to 
an aging paradigm will be viewed as something more promising than tilting at windmills only if 
it entails a clearly developed alternative way of thinking already constructively productive for 
more than a few. And that would only be the beginning: whoever started the paradigm toppling 
would probably not recognize, or enjoy, the working result. 
It might be interesting to illustrate the difficulties of challenging a paradigm with a 
personal example. My projects on ritual, textuality and, most recently, belief, are not a set of 
integrated arguments, but they are analogous examples of engagements with reigning 
assumptions and they present some amusing lessons. 
My work on ritual is my most complete challenge since it even included an attempt at a 
constructive alternative. I tried to dismantle the 19th century construction of ritual as a universal 
phenomenon, considered utterly distinct in its structural mode of action and, inevitably, 
dependent on all of our unexamined assumptions about thought and action. I wrote two books on 
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the topic before I realized that there was a deeper, core paradigm shaping the notion of ritual that 
made my study into a set of wooden arrows bouncing harmlessly off a steel tank, namely, the 
idea of sacrifice. 43 Sacrifice is .the endlessly mystifying act of violence at the heart ofreligion 
( especially with Christianity as the model) and, in theory, the fount of all other modes of ritual 
action, such as initiation, offerings, prayers, and sacred dramas. Not realizing that sacrifice was 
the thread to pull, I simply addressed it in passing to avoid giving it the traditional degree of 
attention. Intent on challenging the basic assumption of the uniqueness of ritual, I took the 
contrary view-analyzing at ritual activities as fully within the context of all other forms of 
social action. If ritual is not a uniquely different way of acting, that is, lacking a particular 
universal structure, then the questions shift to what is the difference between ritual and other 
ways of acting and, very key to my mind, when and why would people decide to do ritual acts 
instead of something else. I depicted ritual as one type of social praxis, namely, "practices of 
ritualization," and even used a "control," so to speak, by comparing a ritual way of acting to 
"theorizing" as yet another type of social action. In the end, this all meant that I defined general 
characteristic principles of practice, and then explored how ritual distinctly played with these 
principles (as did theorizing). I emerged with examples of how people effectively ritualize a set 
of otherwise normal actions and explain why that can be a strategic way of acting in particular 
types of some situations. In addition, I tried to account for the mythic view of "unchanging" 
tradition (which is the preferred focus or context for most ritualizing) as well as all the many ad 
hoc ritual activities-religious, civic, and familial-that people consciously and unconsciously 
deploy in their lives. 
Needless to say, I was not successful in single-handedly providing a new understanding 
of sacrifice. The attraction of the concept may be hard to convey, but it crops up in some widely 
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popular form almost every decade. My career alone has seen three sacrifice fads. There recently 
was Rene Girard's psycho-theological theory of the murdered scapegoat, and a decade and a half, 
before him, Georges Bataille' s notion that the profane, when taken to transgressive extremes 
such as sacrificial killing ( or self-mutilation), mystically transforms itself into an experience of 
the sacred. 44 On the basis of those ideas alone, I should have gone back to take on sacrifice 
explicitly. The concept is certainly relevant in public religious and political life, for example, the 
ritualization of terrorism in orchestrated acts by which Palestinian "sons" are sacrificed, instead 
of the ram, in acts of terrorism against Jews. The ritual can be seen as an attempt to sacralize the 
political struggle for "the land" in a manner that undermines the sacralization claimed by Jewish 
settlers and, indeed, the government of Israel. 
Meanwhile, in a third style, studies of sacrifice as the classic example of unique ritual 
action continue to be written. Invited to join a prestigious anthology of terms, the editors gave 
me the topic of "performance," included "sacrifice," leaving ritual out altogether. 45 The recent 
vogue is exemplified by the late anthropologist, Roy Rappaport, in a lengthy posthumous volume 
that describes ritual as "the social act basic to humanity," the act that at the dawn of human 
history, and even today, that socializes the merely human into true humanity. 46 This formulation 
has begun to appear in many popular forms. Surprisingly, Robert Bellah has given an exceptional 
show of support for Rappaport's nearly mystical and ultimately apocalyptic paean to the power 
of ritual. His defense of Rappaport is eventually followed by a critique of my analysis of 
"ritualizing" as fundamentally nihilistic, as if I were denying the existence of real acts of ritual 
simply by challenging the idea of a uniquely-structured entity behind the name.47 Ritual 
(sacrifice), as the cornerstone of human evolutionary adaptation, will be around awhile as a 
trendier version of the previous ideas. 
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Overall, therefore, I am not impressed with any ground gained in my first extended bout 
with a paradigm. I have learned to take the romanticism of ideas for scholars much more 
seriously; my understanding of theorizing is leading, I hope, to a fuller analysis. However, I also 
tried to explore the shape of paradigm in a project on the nature oftextuality in China. I saw 
textuality as invoking distinct cosmological structures, although the focus on Chinese texts was 
due to my own love of their aesthetic materiality, as well as the conviction, now commonplace, 
that the particular form of written language would generate a different text-supporting cosmos 
than that of the European Bible. In the historical saga of the latter, one of the main themes is the 
story of how the writing conquers orality, the priests defeat the prophets, the messiah dies to live 
on in the Reformation Biblical text. In Chinese history, an early divinatory cosmos and spoken 
words of the masters become bound in commentary until new sources of texts were found in new 
layers of the cosmos, an imaginative development that followed the introduction of Buddhism. 
Printing affected both Europe and China quite differently at first, but more similarly over time. 
What is the significance in all this, I wondered, for the medium, the message, the power structure, 
and competition of cosmological visions? I could go on to link these issues to the introduction of 
the Bible in China and the profound effect of the first Western books in a culture in which 
community groups would collect stray bits of scrap paper, especially with writing on them, and 
bring them baskets to burn at the temple for "merit," a notion that appeared in the cosmos of 
China's earliest scribes. An account of the religious text in China would show up the influence of 
a paradigm about the Biblical cosmos and its effect on the nature and authority of texts even into 
the modem era-that is, through the Reformation, which made the text everything and in the 
process gave birth to the sciences of textual analysis. Protestantism and our cultural paradigm 
involve the tension between the sacred and the analyzed text. There is a master narrative in 
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which the history of writing and printing in Europe is basically taken to describe how it happens 
elsewhere. This narrative led Benedict Anderson to remark: "I was startled to discover: in many 
notices of Imagined Communities, that this Eurocentric provincialism remained quite 
undisturbed." 48 
I am currently exploring another set of paradigms within the concept of belief, in part as 
an effort to keep my scholarship in tune with how most religious people today see themselves 
and define their practices. However, other colleagues probing the field have focused on the 
discourse surrounding the "cultural necessity of religion" paradigm and noted the stubborn 
tendency of religion scholars to treat religion as always a good thing. Of course, religion scholars 
are not fools; we know that religion is not always doing good, but assumptions about its 
fundamental moral nature is certainly another black box that convolutes our thinking. 49 Over the ' 
years there has been talk about self-imposed constraints or censoring due to the institutions 
sponsoring our scholarship or even our own earliest loyalties. Striking a very basic note, 
Jonathan Z. Smith argued, in connection with his study of Jonestown, that we should study 
religions we did not like; others echoed and pushed this unaccustomed perspective. 50 Recently, 
however, Robert Orsi offered a very simple critical formulation, saying that scholars of religion 
are wedded to the idea that religion is good. 51 Whenever it is not acting well, we explain it away 
until the incident is no longer religion but something else-political extremism, a personality cult, 
degenerate or demented discontents, and so on. Orsi analyzes this tendency in an argument about 
the moral responsibilities of a researcher, and proposes a new formulation for the stance of the 
participant-observer studying religion acting badly. His point may be the beginning of a fuller 
challenge to a paradigm that may be even more basic than the one with which I began, 
Christianity as the prototype. 
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Historians surely have other paradigms particular to their perspective, which bring their 
own tricks of vision while generating the scholarship we study and teach--such as the box behind 
the truism that not knowing history dooms one to repeat it. One historian tells me that this adage 
it is wrong, wrong, wrong; situations are never really alike--Iraq is not Vietnam. Yet it all 
depends on the point to be made, the frame that is imposed, the context created by the discourse 
underway. Taking the long view, paradigms are born and surely some fade away in time. It 
seems proper that our disciplinary resources get past second-guessing the latest intellectual fad 
and, using all tools, work to keep the larger picture in view. This is best done now as it has 
always been, with the thick description of cross-cultural studies and the cross-disciplinary 
interaction of scholars. 
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Religion - Constructing the West 
(But What about the Rest?) 
Catherine Bell 
Santa Clara University 
Since I do not know my audience, it might be tactful to preface this talk with a friendly 
warning about the sort of thing you are going to get. Recently an eminent sociologist of religion 
used the conclusion of a short survey of new theories on society and culture to single me out for 
a position of which he wanted no part, namely, a trendy skepticism that bordered on complete 
nominalism (actually, I think he meant nihilism given the critique). Of course, to me, his was a 
fairly thorough misreading ofmy argument, but we all know "every reading is a misreading," 1; I 
am guilty of misreadings too, but not nominalism, skepticism but not nearly young enough to be 
trendy. My argument here is an historical one about cultural definitions. I want to unwrap, as 
accurately as I can, how the idea of religion -- that this is religion but that is something else, 
magic or civic duty -- was constructed in Western culture, a construction that few would deny 
was, in many ways, constitutive of Western culture. It is an argument that has some application 
to current realities. 
The prominent part that religion is playing in the news-from stories about global threats 
of terrorism to the local politics of state school board decisions (Intelligent Design vs 
Evolution)-is such that one can conclude that religions are cultures, even quite distant cultures 
despite the radical proximity - or impingement - that is so casual in this era. Samuel 
Huntington's has been much-critiqued for his suggestion of a coming "clash" of religious 
civilizations. Well, he may probably prove incorrect in the long term; but in the short term we 
are certainly caught up in smaller clashes now almost every where there are religious subcultures, 
even within populations that have many other ties uniting them. 
According to the history we teach, with the 18th century Enlightenment religion became 
formally distinct from the state, and that distinction curtailed its control over society. This 
curtailment allowed social developments that had been previously seen, at times, as anti-
Christian, such as early scientific pursuits and civic citizenship for those of other religions or 
sectarian groups -- ultimately what we know as secular society itself. But today it is said that we 
are seeing "fundamentalist" movements rising to reject these secular arrangements, to challenge 
the containment of religion and refuse modernity as Europe and America have developed it. And 
should these fundamentalisms have their way, creating an evangelical Christian America or a 
subdivided Iraq, clashing with its neighbors, then how long before there would be global size 
clashes? Religion might even succeed in accomplishing the horror that the cold war avoided. 
When I start ruminating along these lines I run smack into an old "confusion" - like a 
messy room that one tries to avoid seeing. It is a basic confusion about the very meaning 
"religion" has come to have in the world, and I fear there can be no neat map for understanding it. 
As a "seasoned" professor of the subject, you might not expect me to have a profound perplexity 
about the very subject of my expertise, but who better?. I don't particularly want to hand you my , 
confusions (in fact, I would rather like to think yours are further along than mine), but I do want 
to make sure you understand how the global situation you and I have to deal with relies to a great 
degree on the meanings we give religion. 
I do not think that there is going to be a great global clash of civilizations, but I do think 
there will be constant clashes among any number of subcultures, spurred by religious idealism or 
conservativism at least as much as the protection of economic or national interests. They will 
happen again with school boards here in the States, they will build up in a demographically 
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changing Europe, and they will define much of life in the Middle East and Africa. The stakes in 
these clashes will involve resources like oil, water, farmland, or sheer political leverage; but 
many the arguments and some of the long-term goals will hinge on people's understanding of 
their religions. 
So, in a nutshell, the point of my talk today is to try to provide a description of the 
historical-conceptual background that Euro-Americans carry in regard to religion. My 
description is an argument for what the term religion has come to mean for us and how that has 
happened. The argument also suggests that these Euro-American meanings might differ from or 
influence others. I have to believe, when my confusion threatens to get out of hand, that the more 
self-understanding we bring to any cultural clash, the more we will engage the people and the 
issues, not the rhetoric that packages things. So, you see, academics are always caught in a 
dialectic of idealism and skepticism. 
I. Paradigms 
There are, I believe, a handful of paradigms or sets of assumptions that one can 
demonstrate the history and structure of our understanding of religion. I use the term paradigm in 
its most neutral sense. While often blamed for constraining thought, paradigms clearly function 
as our most basic tool for advancing knowledge as a social enterprise. Paradigms are those 
overly convenient and under-theorized sets of terms that create the scaffolding for a whole litany 
of interconnected ideas. 2 Eventually, however, we notice this very opportune assistance and 
become suspicious that reality could so neatly fit our needs; we suspect that the inner scaffolding 
may have its own history of construction and even ideological uses. From this perspective, to call 
something a paradigm is to recognize it as a type of "black box" operating in our discourse; and 
we are obliged catch hold of such boxes and inquire "what are you and why are you here?" I 
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RADICAL INTERPRETATION IN RELIGION 
By Nancy Frankenberry 
C Bell 
"'The Chinese Believe in_Spirits': Belief and Believing in the Study of Religion" 
Chinese Believe In Spirits Summary 
Spate of recent books 
Field's lack of involvement 
Rodney Needham 
Commonplace: belief is sooo Christianity-centered; comparison is distortion 
Belief=culture, problems left 
Philosophical uses: more individual oriented than anthro 
Needham: Hume to Harnack 
Davidson's radical interpretation: interconnectedness of beliefs and meaning 
Their relationship to interpretation, need to infer them 
Granting others reason/truth simply to decide about truth about them 
Level of sentence 
Threat to multiple truths 
Universal and particular 
Davidson tries to hold on to both: 
truth dependent on language/culture vs shared rationalism that enables us to interpret the 
meaning of statements 
Same project in philosophical ethics 
Richard Schweder: relavativism vs universalism=> all the diff positions 
In order to elucidate a post-modernist anthropology 
Answer: transcendence w/o superiority 
HR=tension betw universalism and particularism 
Scholarship as a vehicle for identifying particularism and forging abstract 
Universal isms 
Belief: recent def of rel as an over-reaching folk category that misreads & does violence 
to other cultures: corrective yes, leaves problems 
First, we have by now created "religion" in general and it is out and about 
Seco~1d, even cultures like China can find examples of belief 
"Our language about belief and meaning is part of an understanding of religion that keeps 
reasserting itself because a tense relationship universalism and particularism may be integral to 
all theoretical projects as we culturally construct them" 105 (tho some projects do try to undo our 
cultural assumptions about knowledge) 
=our characterization of the specific illusions of others; shorthand for that which is most culture-
bound, determined, particular. Three assumptions: 
1) cultural beliefs explained (not be ref to a universal!) by reconstructing the system in which 
they "mean"; do not exist in our views, so no other route for meaning; thus a coherent system of 
beliefs creates the meaningful structure, religion (106) Circularity of all this makes it work for us 
2) deeply held mental orientation or conviction: all or nothing 
Both assumptions basic to Schweder' s treatment of the "witch" questions, = central anthro 
question and faultline, no more anthro if every answered. Reconstructing the system of ideas in 
which his statement makes sense means what in the end? That he is a witch, right? 
3) we grant belief a priority to action (discussed elsewhere) 
Coherence - recent quality for the meaningfulness of a system (Berger), also what religion should provide, 
that is, meaningful coherence (but students have not found it; nor clergy; 
Beliefs as specific sets of actions, as social practice versus a T/F linguistic statement or 
{ 
mental conviction 
Looking at how people are religious: very little coherence, instead 
"Bundles of behaviors" or 'habits of action" by which most situations are dealt with 
Meaningfulness more a matter of family~ jobs, or service projects; religion used merely to 
buttress them; of course, just a particular expectation of religion 
Articulating the similarities and differences among how groups expect religion to provide 
meaning- how is this possible? Davidson's "principle of charity" behind interpretation 
Chinese Believe in Spirits 
Like Long Island residents, much variation in types and degrees of beliefs 
Historical examples 
Individual aware of variation & have a sense of choice & no coherence 
Chinese society is quite diverse, history of cultural traffic 
Contrasts w Rosaldo's isolated llongot (really, no debate over heads?) 
Religion 
People constantly asking themselves what to believe, how much, with what degree of investment, 
questions that we ask about religion, but everyone asks them about stocks, politicians, school 
boards, etc. Still, these questions concern cultural boundaries of religion, always in flux. 
Examples: Wolfs crazy non-shaman; Falungong on rel or exercise 
In fact, a coherently organized system of beliefs is a very deliberate creation, a product prepared 
for a purpose. Shanshu stress coherence in their project to present a universal system 
Test of hypothesis: A Wolfs ethnography of grades of spirit currency as corresponding 
to a culturally deep understanding mirroring the social landscape ... but suggestive at best. 
Little coherence among beliefs hold, accdg to few studies. [Even though we tend to 
believe about believers that what they want most is a sense of systematic coherence in the cosmos 
Of course, my own research, finds beliefs not prior to religious action, but sort of parallel , 
or resulting from. 
Religion implies a false coherence or systematization: "We cannot appeal to belief to describe 
how people exist within their cultures; yet without belief, it is not clear what we mean by 
religion." 115 
"Bundle of behaviors" known as feng-shui? Traveled to American culture very easily, w which 
its congruence is minimal at best. Cp martial arts, taiqi, zen 
Appreciation historicity of our categories: If notion of religion seems to fall apart in one 
place, it resurfaces in another: Christian evangelicals 
Conclusion: coherence or incoherence can be explored on a more realistic footing if scholarship can let go 
of the transcendence status still clutched by Schweder or the logically prior theory of interpretation sought 
by Davidson. But we will have to spend more time figuring out how to situate ourselves. 
[A discipline, like philosophy or religious studies, exists primarily to save us the work of figuring out 
where and how we can situate ourselves. It lets us take it for granted that we have a vista, a place to stand, 
and a small soap box from which to expound in ways that do not seem ridiculous, at least to those 
sharing most of the same cultural caegories.] 
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"The Chinese Believe In Spirits": Belief and Believing 
in the Study of Religion 
Catherine Bell 
Santa Clara University 
A recent round of books, both popular and scholarly, reveal that as a society we are, once 
again, fascinated with the issue of belief. While the more popular books tend to adopt a fairly 
straightforward and uncomplicated notion of believing and then find major problems of 
rationality, the more scholarly books readily accept a type of rati~~ality to beliefs while 
problematizing the act of believing in other, more involuted way0Both types of argument 
remind the scholar of religion that the academic dis · line of religious studies has not 
contributed much to this discussion for quite awhil 2 :As described in Rodney Needham's 1972 
work, Belief, Language and Experience, which was both a fulsome anthropological treatment of 
the problems and a cautionary tale for further studies, the concept of belief poses particular 
problems for comparative analysis since belief does not appear to be identifiable or similarly 
important in religions we want to compare and from which we want to abstract more general 
descriptions. Moreover, it is a commonplace that tnany of our assumptions about the centrality of 
belief in religion have e)Rerged in .a decidedly Christian context, making comparison a distortion 
7 
,~ __ ~ ~ 
of other religious view~Anthropological studies since Needham have tended to collapse belief vv f - 71 ,....-. 
into 'culture', which has worked well enough most the time, but it not only avoids the explicit 
problem of why and how 'beliefs' and 'believing' become prominent in the way in which many 
people participate in a culture, it also retreats from the problem of various ways in which any one 
person may appropriate parts of the culture. Recourse to the concept of culture not only leaves 
many of these questions to popular writers, it also tends to push anthropology into an extreme 
cultural relativism that is painfully dependent upon the fragile and often unarticulated nature of 
this idea of culture. Scholars ofreligion, on the other hand, generally want to use the language of 
belief to say that members of such- and-such a religion generally hold such-and-such conceptions 
that motivate their activities. While people have pointed to the overriding need for such an 
abstract language despite ongoing revelations of its weaknesses, we also know that a term like ~ 
belief keeps tying atµRneta-language to assumptions that are more culturally constrained than /~ &A. 
really care to defen~ 1cU( 
Another reason for the field's hesitation about belief may also lie in philosophical ~~s 
of the term. Philosophical usage tends to emphasize a more individualistic version of ~~ 
anthropology's 'culture,' and in so doing deals at least in passing, with the possibility of / W 1.,t/-~ 
idiosyncrasy, madness, or the intent to delud~hilosophers seeking a language with which to 1) 1)d;Yt 
analyze how human beings go about interpreting their world, particularly the linguistic 
communications within it, often make use of the concept of belief to link it to, or play it off, a 
notion of truth. Needham discussed the links and distinctions drawn between belief and truth in --- -
the philosophical tradition stretching_from Hume to Wittg~nst~jn l{ampshire, and Harnack. 
rviorerecently, Donald Davidson has made liberal use of belief in his theory of "radical -
mterpretat10n. "6 He argues that ~e cannot make sense of a person's utterances without 
understanding something of their intentions and beliefs, but "we cannot infer the belief without 
knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief. "7 His 
theory of radical interpretation, therefore, assumes the interconnectedness of belief and meaning 
as well as their formal role in interpretation. For the sake of his larger argument, essentially a 
theory about a theory, Davidson focuses on the belief ( or 'preference), integral to interpretation, 
that the statements made by another are or can be true. In fact, he points out, we must grant other. 
speakers, however aberrant or idiosyncratic, a great deal of reason and truth, or else we would 
have no way to conclude they are being unreasonable or untrue. Davidso goes on to propose a 
theory of how we infer belief and meaning, arguing that the inference at statements can be held 
to be true cannot be separate from this basic theory of interpretation. 8 owever, philosophical 
discussions like Davidson's, which relate belief and meaning to truth, however truth is 
understood, not only seem to threaten religious studies' post-theological emphasis on the validity 
of different world views, they also appear to threaten to push analysis to the level of the sentence, 
from where is appears hard to come to any conclusions about religion in general. 
Despite these fears, the question of how to use the concept of belief and how to identify 
Ahe types of phenomenon potentially illuminated by such a concept remain an inescapable aspect < ;f studying religion within the language traditions that the field of religious studies inherits. This 
essay, which is for me both an initial and perhaps belated foray into the topic, will explore some 
unarticulated tendencies in the our use of the notion of belief, and tie our use of this concept to a 
particular way of thinking about religion. In the end, I will sketch a possible way to approach 
these issues from a rather different direction. 
Universal and Particular 
A particularly provocative dimension of Davidson's analysis of interpretation is the 
attempt to hold on to two positions that are usually polarized in such a way as to force a choice 
of one over the other. On the one hand, he invokes truth (or reality) as clearly dependent on 
language ( or culture), a stance that supports many current understandings of cultural pluralism 
and relativism, which are compelling and popular positions these days. On the other hand, 
Davidson also points to a type of shared rationalism that enables us to recognize and interpret the 
meaning of statements made by others even when the linguistic or cultural overlap is very thin. 
By holding on to both positions, Davidson attempts to find something of a middle way or, rather, 
as he puts it, to place theories of interpretation on a new footing. I have read Davidson prima~i~ ~ 
for this struggle to hold on to both positions in ways that make sense of what we are lookinyifi · 
the study of religion: sometimes it feels like we are encountering very different realities that lead 
us to question our own; at other times, we experience, and point to, a great deal of similarity, 
although we can get nervous about that too. In both cases, we wonder what is inevitably 
particular and what, if anything, is, has been, or is becoming universal. 
When reduced to this formulation, however, Davidson's project is one that is widely 
shared at the moment. Philosophical ethics, in particular, may be doing the most explicit work on 
how to think about cultural relativism without endorsing complete relativism, but there are and 
have been other engagements. 9 Among anthropologists, few have tried to imagine a more explicit 
convergence of relativism and universalism than Richard Shweder. In several studies in the 
1980s, he groped to identify all the presuppositions of these polarized positions by delineating 
and classifying a wide variety of formulations of each. 10 By making transparent what he saw as 
,...uAthe main tensions in the field, Shweder hoped to elucidate the basic stance and components of a _ vJt'c: post-positivist, postmodern anthropology. I do not think his conclusion - that anthropological 
~:.v;.. ~a 1 theorists should adopt a "transcendence without superiority" from which they should "take 
~1 L 'literally' (~s atter of belief) those reality-posits so alien in ord~djs~p-~~r other realities 
'r?J~ 1'1$ within the self"t - is eit~er satisfying or successful. 1 ~Yet the effort was 1a'scmating, instructive, 
~ andbold. ~~-,A-~"2,~~? 
Religious studies, especially the history of r/rtgi~ns, has also addressed the issue of 
universalism and particularism and, like most academic fields, it has probably been formed by 
nsion between them. 12 The differentiation of the study ofreligion from theology more than 
ears ago was one early engagement of the issue, by which an emerging "history of 
g ons" approach felt its way to what was arguably a type of universalized theolqgy and a> -frs--0 
fresh, if incomplete, particularization of Christianity and its si~gs. When the field began to 
focus more on methods of comparison, it took another angle on these polarized options~ asking 
several related questions: if all religions are comparable manifestations of some tyP, of 
? . 
(0 
universal, such as homo religiosus or the sacre@ should we be comparing to illuminate the 
universal or the particular or, somehow, both?~nd what can be adequately compared to what for 
what end? With the more recent emergence of linguistic and cognitive theories, as well as studies 
effectively deconstructing universal narratives::One wonders if there is any other issue so 
responsible for what we do and how we do it today. In no small way, scholarshi u_12®rstands 
itself as both a vehicle for identifying particularism we sometimes ~egarded o~rselves as 
'liberating' it) and forging formulationsofan underlying or abs.tract unj~e~alism-,-The~~phasis 
illaY~hiftf back and fa'rth, but each, as Davidson might suggest, i~mpossible to infer without the 
other. 
Belief 
According to recent critiques, 'r~ion' is an over-reaching folk category that misreads 
and even does violence to other cultures\S)This is, of course, a corrective, and undoubtedly a 
slightly exaggerated one, which has the merit of addressing the many liberties we have taken 
with the ;erm for so long. Yet these critiques leave two concerns unanswered. 
~veral centuries of talking about 'religion in general' has created a sense of 
religion in many places that might, arguably, have categorized things differently without such 
influence. It is not so easy to recontain the term 'religion' at this point in history. It may be just 
another form of hegemonic imperialism to claim, for example, that the Chinese today are wrong 
or deluded in using the word 'religion' to describe either past or current practices in their culture. 
Ifwe are to be clear about the historicity of such terminology, we must follow through and track 
how the concept is being used today beyond our own theorizing. We know there are no platonic 
theoreti~ai-ca.1 ories, but we keep thinking we can freeze them for this study or that critique. 
~cond work in the materials of a culture that has long constituted a good examlt-!_e of 
classificat10ns that do not fit the Euro-American understanding of religion, namely China(2,;)Y et 
if one looks beyond the careful slices of Chinese culture that are usually chosen as 
representative, one can find much that is not completely alien to any definition of 'religion,' 
medieval, enlightenment, or postmodern. It can be refreshing, of course, to drop the notion of 
religion out of the picture as completely as possible, and either explore the variety of Chinese 
categories that have been used or fish for other ways of identifying what is either comparahle or 
distinguishable among practices. 
These concerns notwithstanding, the attempt to demote 'religion' from a universal (the 
"consensus of nations"), a biological facility, or a cognitive structure to a theory of the specific 
classificatory organization of a particular culture helps to illuminate some of the problems 
attending our language of belief and meaning. In the same way, I want to suggest, our language 
about b1ief and meaning is part of an understanding of religion that keeps reasserting itself 
. 7 ? becaus~ tense relationship between universalism and particularism - whether or not it is the 
~ type of solution sought by Davidson and Shweder, among others, may be integral to theoretical 
projects as we have_ culturally cast them. Even if we pay full attention to the historicity of the 
social system examined as well as the historicity of the project of examining it, it is not clear that 
we secure a footing for scholarship that drops the allure of transcendence as another version of /J 
the particularism-universalism polarity. 15 f· 
While we have tended to use 'religion' to denote a dimension of open-ended 
commonality, something found in most if not all human cultures, we have used the term 'belief in 
~7 the highly tailored, supporting role of denoting the culturally particular foci of a religion --
specificall tho things that_we hold to not exist in fact. If a group 'believes' in less particular or 
~y problemiti~ things like love or the tragic dimensions of life, we tend to refer to these 
not as beliefs, but as cultural values, attitudes, or dispositions. If a group ho)d convictions about 
astrological destiny, we are very willing to describe such attitudes as belieU,s net-aS;;CrrltlJIJe. 
() Belief is our characterization of the specific illusions of others. But the distinction between belief 
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and culture is not dramatically demarcated: belief is also our shorthand for the epitome of what 
yv~ see as being encultured, culture-bound, or culturall dete!!!}ine~: 
/ We explafo a cu turallyparticular belief, and that is a very redundant phrase, by its place 
in a structured system of ideas that we assemble. In this way we see what the belief 'means.' 
Since the objects of the beliefs do not actually exist in our view, there is no other route for 
meaning; so the meaningfulness of beliefs is dependent upon rendering them coherent within a 
system of ideas. Coherent systems of belief create a meanin ful structure, namely 'religion,' 
which makes sense6,2f the particular and the illusiona . This can be a very circular way to 
work. 
In connection with this tendency to identify belief with extremes of cultural particularism 
and determinism, we also talk about belief as a type of deeply-held mental orientation or 
conviction. That is, belief is described as one !)'pe of thing an all-or-nothing, on-or-off state.: 
There is little evi ence to warrantsuch a view ~~tsideof~ertain specifi~ confessional practice~. 
Both formulations of belief, as the illusion rendered meaningful when made part of a larger 
coherent system understood as religion and as a state of deeply-held convictions, emerge in 
~ ~weder's ~nt that the interpretat~<?_~-of beliefs is the ~l~nthro olo~_al ~e~tio_~ d 
- fl its fault-line. He evo es the 'witch' question that lies at the root of anthropology, namely, if your-
~ Ao/-~ mfon;a;;-t tells you, perhaps at some risk of negative consequences, that she or he is actually a 
V~1 witch, what can you make of this statement when your own reality makes clear there are no 
witches? 16 Generally, we must reconstruct the system of ideas that rationalize and render such 
(Y statements coherent if we are to "interpret" them. This is an true advance, of course, on the 
{F-. ,(9..,, earlier view that such statements are proof of some sort of "primitive mentality." 17 Yet it is hard 
X to be convinced that an interpretation in which a belief, taken as a designated illusion that is nonetheless a 'type' of truth, that is, as having its own particular reality, is all that different from interpretations based on a primitive mentality. Neither do I think anything is solved by 
concluding, as Shweder does, that unquestionably the informant is a witch. 18 
A third problematic assumption, which I have addressed at length elsewhere, is the ease 
with which we grant belief a prior existence in order to cast it as the a priori shaper and 
instigator of action. 19 While belief may well work this way some of the time, we have no 
evidence that this happens most of the time. Such an assumption, however, does allow us to 
'explain' action by connecting it to its motivating beliefs, and from there to a larger reconstructed 
system, understood to be 'the' relevant system by its coherence and ability to explain the 
particulars with which the interpreter started. 
Coherence 
It is relatively recent thing for scholars to emphasize meaningful and systemic coherence 
in relation to what religion is all about. Only in the second half of the 20th century, for the most 
part, has the rovision of coherence been seen as the_siefining role ofreligion, that is,~wfiaf ~ 
tfieorists think it should do when religion clearly can ~o longer explain the nature ~f the universe 
or act as the authoritative source of morality. 20 And this is not just the stance of theorists. When I 
quiz my students, completely unread in the relevant anthropological literature, meaningful 
~ coherence is what they also have absorbed as the expected role and real contribution ofreligion. 
Th am that they have not found it or a sufficiently steady experience of it.21 They are 
,,, rticularly a are of, and appalled by, what they see as the rampant incoherence -- the 
fragmentation, ypocrisy, or compromises - in the lives of adults around them. For these 
1 
ents, as fo most scholars of religion, religion should have a holistic coherence that delivers 
meaning '.tr xperiences. Yet even those who have devoted their lives to religion - the clergy of 
many different persuasions -- rarely find those qualities in their religious experience if you ask 
them. 22 Coherence can be found only in some explicij: self-presentations by persons, texts, or 
instituti~ can a;gue for the existen;e of a 'deepe/ coherence, of course, eith~r i; the -
organization of the brain, the personal psyche, the social structure, or the dynamics of culture --
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all universalizations that support the major theories and disciplines of the 20th century. Awkward 
to use today, but still regularly invoked, these approaches contrast with attempts to see beliefs 
and believing as a matter of s·pecific sets of actions or situations, that is, approaching believing as 
µy e~~~ practice rather than_ a (tr~ 5:r f~Js~) _!i!]gl!_istic statement or mental conviction. 23 
To indulge an autobiographical example, I originally thought to study religion because I 
was interested in how most people -- that is, folks not schooled in the language and history of 
philosophy -- made sense of their lives and worlds. I have not been heavily invested in any 
particular formulation of this focus, just in the general human project implied, which has to 
include how readily people get by without giving much attention to making any larger sense qf 
thing . It was clear to me growing up amon-g the natives of Long Island in the 1950s and 60s -
indeed, it was a striking feature of the religious attitudes there -- just how little ~oherence 
religion actually seemed to . rovide ~ w~ e~elf~~ed 19 p.rovi9~. Later, in the 1970s, 
coherence oecame a more explicitly stated expectation, but as before, religiosity within the 
<
spectrum of c??ventional lifestyles seemed to hinge ~12 internaJizing a complex array of 
epartmentalizationsand disassociations. 
'--- - - --·- --·---- On Long Island, and in other places I have come to know well, what is thought of as 
religion by the natives is more a matter of loose ackaged sets of behaviors -what we can also 
call "bundles of behaviors" or "habits of action. '24 or Long Islanders, these packaged sets of 
distinct behaviors were used to deal with such events as death, serious illness, perverse 
misfortune, and occasionally life-crises like birth, marriage or divorce, as 
well as, naturally, the ritual life of defined communities gathered at the church, synagogue, house 
meeting, prayer circle, or meditation group. In actual fact, family, jobs, and personal projects of 
service to others were more obvious over-arching systems of meaning; religion appeared to be 
invoked simply to support them. Long Islanders' delineation and expectations of religion are not 
the same as other places that could be described. Yet neither are these other places so different 
that we cannot articulate similarities and differences. The commonality that allows for such 
articulations is the 'principle of charity' defined by Davidson, a particularly felicitous if 
provocative basis for any new take on interpretation. 25 
The Chinese "Believe" 
In even the most sophisticated literature on Chinese religion and culture, it is readily 
stated that the Chinese believe in spirits. Some Chinese will say something like that too, as I 
learned at a shamanic exorcism down the block from where I lived in Taipei. After the bloodied 
shaman was through with his spectral combat, and everyone was relaxing, the apartment owner 
complained that she had heard there were no ghosts in America, which seemed so unfair since 
large numbers of them kept bothering people in Taiwan. Analogously, there is the eloquent essay 
by the early 20th century sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, entitled "The World Without Ghosts," where 
he recounts growing up surrounded by ghosts who were as real to him as his many relatives. 26 
Fei used the ghost theme to set up a thoughtful contrast between Chinese and American cultures. 
As beliefs go, believing in spirits is not a particularly strange example, and we are very 
accustomed to the holistic construction known as Chinese religion, which can make such beliefs 
coherent among themselves and understandable as a type of meaningful truth. 
Yet if the Chinese 'believe' in spirits in anything like the way my Long Island community 
believed in papal authority, or even the way Christian colleagues believe in a central doctrine like 
the divinity of Jesus Christ, then the statement that the Chinese believe in ancestral spirits is, at 
best, a very vague generalization that ignores everything interesting. 27 It ignores the great 
differences from one person to another, awareness of the possibility of other positions, the 
individualized inner juggling and tensions, as well as pragmatic non-judgments and refusals to 
engage. Most language about belief, and about Chinese religion in general, leaves little room for 
these features and certainly does not begin to account for them. 28 
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There are, as you would imagine, many Chinese positions on spirits. Just a sampling of 
the most famous and familiar ones can demonstrate the complexity of believing, at least in regard 
to this one topic in Chinese history. In the fifth century BCE, for example, the sage Mo Tzu 
argued that the degeneration of civilization since the sage-kings was due to only one thing, doubt 
about the existence of ghosts and spirits. Those who say "of course there are no spirits," he 
argued, bewilder the people and bring disorder to the empire. In fact, he continued, people can 
know that spirits exist in exactly the same way that they know anything exists - through reliable 
testimony, the con sens s of textual sources that have proven their authority in other matters, and 
personal experience e senses. 29 Several centuries later, the Han dynasty writer, Wang 
Ch 'ung, made the opposite argument in order to refute Taoist teachings. With what has been 
characterized by later readers as admirable rationalism, Wang argued that "man is a creature. His 
rank may be ever so high ... , but his nature does not differ from other creatures. There is no 
creature who does not die" and soon become dust. 30 Hence, for Wang Gh'ung, there can be no 
ghosts, spirits, or gods. In the medieval period, Han YU (768-824 CE) admonished th emperor 
for his public attentions to the "bone of the Buddha" in an essay that became ell known among 
the literate. 31 More widespread were the ubiquitous tales of the supernatural, such a those 
collected by Hung Mai in the lih century, which all turned on the moment when someone who 
C
, _ ;)l --s~~ did not believe in spirits personally experienced their intervention and came to realize the truth 
\f'.J f~ · \ of their existence. 32 
() L- Sr Any village or urban neighborhood in China, Taiwan or Hong Kong also yields a wide 
{J 
spectrum of positions on spirits. What is important about the variety, I think, is the evidence that 
individuals are very aware of the number of possible opinions and thus have located their own 
'-1 
position -- if it is clear enough to be called that -- as a matter of some choice and deliberation. 
These people know that others hold different ideas that many reject the whole thing, that people 
may act contradictorily, or some feign belief fo sleK:serving reasons. There is little to suggest 
1 ; / that 'belief in spirits comes with the culture o:Ji a~y Qne sort of belief. There is, in other words, _ y 
.,; l very little systematic coherence. l ·~ "St-. v C-1 V 
// As interpreters of texts and cultures, scholars ofreligion know that a Chinese text 
/ / preaching filiality to one's ancestral spirits cannot be taken as descriptive of the actual state of 
" // n ~ cultural affairs in China, any more than a Long Island sermon about loving the poor can be taken U::l'vi-as descriptive of Catholic life as it is really lived there. It is much more accurate, and certainly 
0 
more interesting, to read admonishments and affirmations as argumentative practices, perhaps 
involving some complex sharing of ideals, but not as representations of a static or coherent 
situation. 
If we argue that a person's options are still culturally limited in the forms and degrees of 
belief possible, clearly the limit is much further out or more blurred than we usually 
acknowledge. Of course, Chinese culture is extremely diverse and even by the medieval period it 
had seen a great deal of cultural trafficking. Perhaps this plurality influenced the boundaries of 
what could be thought in the culture, let alone what constituted belief and its systemic coherence. 
A possible counter-example dealing with a relatively more isolated society is suggested by 
Renato Rosaldo's account of headhunting among the Ilongot. 33 He implies little or no debate, 
doubt, or discussion among the II on got about the efficacy, and meaningfulness, of headhunting; 
but he does note discussions of its necessity and periods when young men did not take heads 
prior to marriage. If there is no evidence of various shades of conviction and degrees of 
involvement in headhunting practices, then that would seem to be an unusual situation 
warranting study as such. 
Religion 
All native statements about belief can be seen as concerned with the nature ( classifying 
and boundaries) of religion in the sense that people on Long Island and in Beijing are constantly 
asking themselves what to believe, how much to believe it, and with what specific investments or 
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commitments. This is true not just for so-called religious ideas, of course, but also for personal 
affairs or economic and political matters. People regularly ask questions that deal with what we 
might call the cultural boundaries and defimtion of re 1gion. There are some familiar examples, 
such as the famous Rites Controversy provoked oythe J~uits in 17th century China, which 
revolved around the question whether ancestor worship was relig~ch and had to be 
abandoned by converts, or whether it was an aspect of customaD;tetfquetfe and no more 
threatening to converts than th~iven in greeting. 34 Of course, this was a more critical 
question for the foreign missionaries than for most~t-aH,, Chinese. A careful 
ethnography by Margery Wolf details the extended deliberations in a small village in Taiwan 
over the question of whether a particular woman was a shaman-to-be called by the spirits or an 
batty and unsympathetic outsider to be shunned. 35 Drawing on more recent examples, members 
of the recently outlawed group, the Falundafa (Falungong), te-soms-0~ctent like other qigong 
societies in China since the 1960s, have had to decide to what extent their practices are religious 
or simply therapeutic physical exercises that do not threaten other religious affiliations or fall 
under government control of religion. For various political reasons and agendas, their 
deliberations and articulated positions are carefully calibrated to keep the line between religion 
and therapeutic exercise more unclear than clear. 36 
When a coherently organized systemization of beliefs is proposed by a Chinese source, 
then a very specific argument is being made about the way things really are. The creation of a 
broadly designed system of c~§_is ~Qill!_icu}~r _E~e_!_oric~_l.P-oject, one undert 4ken 
111 1genous y'aswell as by outside scholars. And the difference between the practices of these 
two groups is~ perhaps, one of the many distinctions that should lose its importance in our 
analyses. 37 For example, coherence is an important part of the argument made by a subset of 
Chinese texts known as morality books (shanshu), which emerged in 1 i 11 century China among 
the opportunities of easy wood-block printing, inexpensive paper, and manageable distribution; 
they are still produced and circulated today. These texts are explicitly engaged in an enormous 
polemical effort to provide a totally comprehensive and coherent understanding of the workings 
of the world, both visible and invisible, in terms of universal and inexorable laws of cosmic 
retributio_ -;:-despite evidence available to all that appears to contradicts such a system. In this 
project, thes~ morality books reinterpret a wide variety of local and regional practices in terms of 
a system said to underlie the otherwise incoherent or incomplete cosmologies attributed to 
Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and folk religion. 38 As such, this project often echoes 
scholarly studies that present a coherent overview, at least more coherent than the last scholarly 
attempt, of a definable cultural tra -i1'.IOn) although such overviews can be found particularly 
unhelpful come a real encounte ith so e aspect of the said tradition. · 
As a type of test oft 1e h pothesi I am proposing, one can look again at a well-known 
example of an underlying a~d app rw determinative cultural structure, namely, Arthur Wolfs 
ethnographic account of the different grades of spirit currency burned to ghosts, ancestors, and 
gods -- coarse yellow paper, paper with a silver applique, and finer paper with a gold applique, 
respectively. Although focusing on one part of Taiwanese rural society, Wolf argued that this 
system of paper types demonstrates a more basic and wider cultural understanding of the 
organization of the cosmos, one "that mirrors the social landscape of its adherents. "39 His 
ethnography is often cited as evidence of a latent structure in Chinese folk practice, in reference 
to which a particular belief, such as the existence of ancestral spirits, makes sense to people and 
accounts for a variety of related actions. Howver, it is equally persuasive, and correct to argue 
that Wolfrepresented this practice as more coherent and routine than it really was ops. 
Extended ethnographic observation adds so many qualifications and regional differ nces that the 
original assertion can be regarded, at best, as heavily generalized, that is, as much s ggestive 
than descriptive. 40 1 
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Several sociological studies have attempted to assess the degree of coherence among the 
beliefs to which people are willing to attest, and their results reinforce each other: there is 
sur risin I little coherence among people's formulated beliefs and it decreases as one moves 
from more educate an art1cu ate peop e,coin orta e wit narrative or abstract categories, to 
the less-educated, who are not as apt to use them. 41 Two of these studies also inquired into the 
"meaning" of various ritual practices and found little consensus among the explanations given, 
even when people were asked about ritual features that had well-known, even memorized, 
doctrinal explanations associated with them. Instead of these formalized and accessible 
explanations of belief, which informants could volunteer when pressed, people routinely 
preferred to use their own, fairly personal 'takes,' which used very loosely related ideas and 
claimed to be rooted in experience. 
My own research into ritual activity makes me tend to think of beliefs not as something 
prior to or separate from action, that is, not as something mental, cognitive, or linguistic in 
opposition to the physical or active. If there are habits of the body, there can be habits of thought 
and expression as well as speech and self-presentation. They are all social activities. While I use 
terms like 'religion' - albeit with all the historical qualifications and hesitations shared by others -
- when talking about Chinese materials, the language of belief seems more distorting, in 
particular, by specifically imposing a false sense of coherence, conviction, systemization, and 
meaning. We cannot appeal to 'belief to describe how people exist within their cultures; yet 
without 'belief,' it is not clear what we mean by 'religion.' If it seems easier to talk about Chinese 
religion, rather than Chinese beliefs, it may be simply because one is more comfortable today 
attributing a working coherence among cultural phenomena rather than implying the illusion and 
falsity of specific ideas. 
This problem brings up an interesting association, namely, the strange fortunes of what 
would seem to be a particularly Chinese "bundle of behaviors," the prognostications offengshui 
(wind and water), which are ubiquitous in California and becoming familiar elsewhere in the 
United States. Going beyond the dabbling of "new-agers" or the concerns of transplanted 
Chinese,fengshui is also being used by all sorts of serious people as a type of back-up system of 
cosmic control and insurance. It is possible that one day, we may compare its global spread to 
such other cultural practices as food spicing and tea drinking. A similar phenomenon can be seen 
in the enduring popularity of the Asian martial arts, especially taiqi, begun in the late 1970s and 
early 80s, or Japanese Zen meditation, begun in the 1930a. Fengshui, taiqi and zazen are closely 
tied to ritual postures considered very basic to Chinese and Japanese culture, yet they have been 
readily translated to the more pluralist sections of American society. The viable translatability 
and subsequent longevity of these sets of practices indicate the existence of something not 
readily caught in either universals or particulars, something both more durable and mutable and 
much less hindered by incoherence with other sets of practice. 
In short, such packaged sets of behaviors blur 'religion' as such. As a feature of a global 
society and culture, the translatability offengshui, taiqi and zazen is evidence of cultural 
properties going in many directions - perhaps too many for our notions of religion and culture to 
track. In the end, religion may vanish as any sort of empirical entity in one place, only to emerge 
in another, as attested by the growing numbers of Christian evangelicals in Beijing as well as the 
government officials trying to control them with a stretched classification schema. To appreciate 
these issues is to be more fully historical in our understanding and use of theoretical categories. 
Fengshui is not particularly illuminated by being regarded as a belief or part of a more 
comprehensive religion, terms that return to the defining polarities of universalism and 
particularism. Nor do the activities of members of the Falundafa fit traditional theories of 
religion, although they do evoke many older models in Chinese history. Theorists do not need to 
stop using the terms belief and religion, but their ~rica~e~ must be made part of them. 
And theorists do not need to stop theorizi~ course - a \;r i:1t 1s a distinct cultural practice 
8 
to seek universal explanations and doing so must be as legitimate as offering incense to one's 
ancestors -- as long as no one gets hurt. But the coherence or incoherence of practices can be 
explored on a more realistic footing if scholarship can let go of the transcendent status still 
clutched by Shweder and the quest for a logically prior theory of interpretation still sought by 
Davidson. Without the panorama provided by these perspectives, we will have to spend a lot time 
figuring out how to situate ourselve~ -b.ut.tl:IB-c~~atf~t'di:in"®~rn-to ak 'th . 
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encounter with Ilongot culture. See his Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1989; 1993). In Ilongot Headhunting 1883-1974, particularly pp. 55, Rosaldo describes the 
lion got concept of history and Ilongot unwillingness to accept the veracity of stories of the past, as well as 
the lack of any uniformity to their accounts. "In general," Rosal do writes, "Ilongots are unlikely to accept as 
true any narrative about events they neither saw for themselves nor heard about from an eyewitness" (p. 55). 
Of course, in this passage Rosaldo is assessing attitudes toward stories and explanations, not toward 
activities that are considered (by whom?) central to the culture, like headhunting. In terms of comparative 
ethics, one approach to all the other problems of cultural comparison and objectivity, Rosaldo has 
addressed the 'ethics' of Ilongot headhunting. In "Of Headhunters and Soldiers: Separating Cultural and 
Ethical Relativism," Santa Clara Magazine 42, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 18-21, Rosal do argues that the acceptance 
of cultural differences, even extreme ones, does not lead to an acceptance of the chaos of ethical relativism. 
34 On the rites controversy, see David E. Mungello, ed., The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History 
and Meaning (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1994); Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci 
(New York: Viking, 1984) and The Search/or Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990); and Lionel M. 
Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism (Durham: Duke University, 1997). 
35 See Margery Wolf, "The Woman Who Didn't Become a Shaman," in A Thrice Told Tale 
(Stanford: Stanford University, 1992), pp. 93-126. 
36 Catherine Bell, "Sects and Exercise: One Look at the Falungong," unpublished paper, 2000. 
37 For an example of what this might look like as analysis, see Susan Friend Harding's The Book of 
Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 2000). 
38 What is most striking about these texts is not their cosmic message, but their juxtaposition of 
esoteric talismanic properties with mass distribution. See Catherine Bell, "Printing and Religion in China: 
Some Evidence from the Taishang ganying pian," Journal of Chinese Religions 20 (Fall 1992): 173-86; 
and Catherine Bell, "'A Precious Raft to Save the World': The Interaction of Scriptural Traditions and 
Printing in a Chinese Morality Book," Late Imperial China 17, no. 1 (June 1996): 58-200. 
39 Arthur P. Wolf, "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors" in Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 197 4 ), pp. 131-92, particularly 131. 
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40 I develop this argument, citing the conflicting ethnographic studies, with regard to the 'universal' 
Chinese practice of domestic ancestor worship in Bell, "Performance," Taylor, ed,, Critical Terms in the 
Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998. Pp. 205-24. 
41 See David K. Jordan, "The jiaw of Shigaang (Taiwan): An Essay in Folk Interpretation," Asian 
Folklore Studies 35, no. 2 (1976):81-107; Peter Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 
in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61; and Peter 
Stromberg, "Consensus and Variation in the Interpretation of Religious Symbolism: A Swedish Example," 
American Ethnologist 8 (1981):544-59. 
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Belief, Beliefs, Believing: 
Declensions of "The Problem" 1 
It is impossible to be nonchalant about the fact that the topic of belief has 
been addressed at this university for about as long as universities as such have 
existed. As home base for centuries of theologians, philosophers, linguists, and 
anthropologists, who have constantly redefined the so-called "problem of belief," ' 
one is automatically humbled, if not crushed, by the weight of the history of all 
these opinions. Is there anything left to be said? Of course. Knowledge is not a 
glass one can fill up or a wall that is built, brick by brick, generation by generation, 
to be judged someday as sufficient, if not complete. Knowledge is a constant 
exercise of interpretation in which all the components - the interpreter, the 
interpreted, and the contextual reasons to bother in the first place - are always 
shifting. So, pinned, perhaps, but not crushed by the weight of history, let me give 
belief yet another try. 
Belief is identified in different ways by philosophers, anthropologists, and 
cultural theorists, but it has become something of a habit to refer to the issue as 
"the problem." Even across the· full spread of academic disciplines, there are 
scholars who will identify belief as the problem of their respective fields. 2 In the 
time I have with you today, I would like to explore the problem status that belief 
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for the formal study of religion in particular. I wish in doing so I could expose the 
vacuous triviality or sententious cynicism of the current research trajectories, and 
2 
then map a brilliant route through the problem. But I can only work to make an 
argument for a line of thinking that may allow us to ask some fresh and pertinent 
questions; it will not solve all the problems identified with belief and certainly 
would not satisfy any of my predecessors in the preceding centuries of lectures on 
this topic. In an area like this one, an additional perspective cannot improve on the 
work of others in any absolute sense; but it may have the virtue of supplying more 
effective words for the questions of this generation or a more effective approach to 
work with such questions in a clearer fashion. 
It should be noted at the outset that few terms in any discipline spread 
themselves across the lexicon of the European languages as broadly as belief. Its 
uses are legion. One uses the tenn in reference to the God of biblical qualities and 
one's confidence in a particular television weathercast. That old master of the 
English language, W. C. Fields, captured the crux of the dilemma when he 
characteristically pronounced that "Everyone should believe in something. I 
believe I'll have another drink." 3 Fields aside, the relevant literature stretches from 
David Hume to Donald Davidson and from Wilfred Cantwell Smith to Slavoj 
Zizek.4 One is informed by the work of Paul Connerton and Danielle Hervieu-
Leger on memory; Pierre Bourdieu and Michel de Certeau on practice; Rodney 
Believing Talk, Oxford 3 
Created on 10/10/2006 8:23 PM 
Needham on the significant anthropological issues; Paul Veyne and Donald Lopez 
have been historical and theoretical touchstones. 5 And the theological tradition is 
indispensable, of course, from Tertullian to Tillich, Irenaeus to Rahner. Belief is 
clearly an issue in human reasoning and communication, cognition and memory, 
3 
psychological orientation and social conditioning, religious reflection, and analyses 
of secularism. I want to cobble together a rather simple direction using my ideas 
about their ideas primarily to foster a long overdue discussion in my own field, the 
history of religions, spurring it with an exploration of the value of the term as an 
analytic tool in the study of religion. 
I. Surveying "The Problem" 
The popular press is very ready to see particular problems posed by belief 
and believers._ Several years ago I could note studies on the silliness of religious 
beliefs, such as Wendy Kaminer's Sleeping with Terrestrials: the Rise of 
lrrationalism and the Perils of Piety and Michael Shermer's Why People Believe 
Weird Things.6 Since then, reactions to the terrorism of 9/11 in America have come 
into print, examining not just extreme Islamists, but the religious radicalism seen in 
American politics. Most recently, Sam Harris has won much attention for his 
stinging critique of all forms of religious belief in The End of Faith: Religion, 
Terror and Future of Reason. 7 However, such strong reactions are also due to the 
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decision by the state of Kansas school board to introduce "intelligent design" along 
side evolution in the state's science curriculum. 8 Although their decision was 
successfully challenged in court, and half of the school board was subsequently 
voted out of office, the specter of religion creeping into science classes is 
providing much grist for the mills of indignant scholars. It would be hard to be 
more iconoclastic than the book by the distinguished philosopher of science, 
Daniel Dennett. In Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, he 
compares religion to a virus that can thrive in the body of a receptive host, whose 
subsequent (irrational) behavior enables the propagation of the virus species. 9 
These opinions constitute the latest chapter in W estem culture's perpetual 
polarization of belief and reason, faith and rationality, religion and science. 10 These 
issues were articulated most clearly, of course, in the social reorganizations and 
formal documents of the Enlightenment, where the poles of this dialectic were set. 
Yet we are still seeing our culture in terms of faith versus reason even though we 
clearly live in a very post-Enlightenment world. Indeed, the Enlightenment 
paradigm now encodes a wide variety of ideological if not material interests, 
specifically, in America, biblical religion versus Darwinian science. Scientists, 
theologians, hack writers all contribute to the fray that politicians have been very 
willing to exploit. All start from the same stark duality in which science is the 
natural opposite of religion, each pole constantly alert to contain the power wielded 
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by the other. Only a savvy journalist or two has suggested the degree to which this 
simplistic view of religion and science is a play of shadow puppets manipulated by 
a variety of interest groups on the political playing field. In the end, the paradigm 
of reason versus belief is deeply ingrained in the discourse of modem culture even 
though it is not a very good depiction of the conditions of modem culture. 11 
In the discourse community of philosophy, quite beyond the machinations of 
the popular marketplace of ideas, the qualities of belief are not opposed to reason 
and simplified Enlightenment dichotomies have been left behind, although not 
forgotten. The views of thinkers from Hume to Wittgenstein could be surveyed at 
this point to illustrate a lively philosophical tradition, continued by such late 20th 
century figures as Stuart Hampshire, Gilbert Harman, and Richard Rorty; with 
Rorty one also evokes the lineage of American pragmatism from William James 
through John Dewey. 12 In an earlier publication I focused on the American 
philosopher Donald Davidson, at some length, to understand better the "problem of' 
belief' as it figures in current philosophical· analyses. In striking contrast to the 
popular perspective, philosophy generally thinks of belief as a universal quality, 
playing an integral role in a basic holism (not a division) interlacing thought and 
action in general. Davidson's "principle of charity," a name appreciated especially 
by the novice, argues that broad agreement is the condition for any linguistic 
understanding of each other. 13 Asserting that "belief is central to all kinds of 
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thought," he explains that belief is what allows us to take for granted general 
perceptions of the material world that are basic to the formation of thoughts, 
spoken statements, and the conditions needed to understand each other. 14 Belief 
and meaningfulness are dependent on each other, and have a formal role in the act 
of interpretation. 
To give a more specific example, Davidson argues that we have to believe 
that the statements someone makes are or can be true, even if we conclude he or 
6 
she is lying, mistaken, or crazy. Thus we must infer belief to grant the meaning 
needed to make the most basic act of interpreting each other. This is probably 
enough Davidson to illustrate the contrast he presents to the popular view opposing 
belief with the meaningfulness of reason; instead of making belief the weak of half 
of this type of dualism, a philosopher like Davidson locates the problem of belief 
in the universal act of person-to-person interpretation. 
In the set of closely intertwined disciplines -- anthropology/sociology, 
cognitive theory, and the study of religion -- the problem of belief is conceived in 
quite distinct ways, but in each case the fundamental issue concerns the degree of 
holism that is understood as basic to social understanding. Still, these fields would 
not use Davidson's terminology, so comparing their views of belief is rather 
difficult. But for most scholars of culture, belief is the problem of universalism 
versus particularism: that is, what can we assume to be common to all people 
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simply by virtue of our common roots in evolution, history, or even the human 
condition, and what is culturally particular to a social practice even while subject 
to forces of diffusion that can push certain activities well beyond an original point 
of germination. However, universality can sometimes mean common to all social 
7 
life and sometimes simply "mentally accessibility to all." In the latter case, because 
one may be familiar with belief in the God of the Abrahamic religions, one may 
feel - rightly or wrongly - that one has some access to how ancient Greeks 
believed in their pantheon of gods. 
Particularism suggests that we have no such access to the experiences of 
another religion and, indeed, can only make sense of what is so foreign by 
attempting to reconstruct, only more or less accurately, a system of ideas in which 
specific pieces can be illuminated. By the time any universal or particularlist 
project is underway, it is probably rife with assumptions and precarious leaps of 
logic. Yet, at the same time, it is easy to see a measure of common sense to both 
positions - that we can understand something about other human experiences and 
we should not assume that we can understand anything about them. 
Few have tried as hard as the anthropologist Richard Shweder to find a 
reasonable synthesis to the opposition of universalism and particularism. In a series 
of studies in the 1980s he tried to clarify all the different versions of the arguments 
on both sides, and then he attempted to elucidate a self-consciously post~positivist, 
Believing Talk, Oxford 3 
Created on 10/10/2006 8 :23 PM 
8 
postmodernist position. Shweder argued that the discipline of anthropology was the 
product of a collision between our notions of universality and particularity. This 
collision created a "fault-line," he argued, using the metaphor of continental plates, 
which can be illustrated by various vexing scenarios that come up routinely for the 
anthropologist. Indeed, Shweder suggests, were anyone able to resolve such 
scenarios, anthropology as we know it would probably not be needed any more; 
the whole field would collapse. A typical scenario is the "witch question," which is 
actually not so removed from the possible experience within a multi-cultural 
society. Accord to Shweder, the witch scenario unfolds when your informant, the 
person whose judgment you have so greatly relied upon, takes you aside one day 
and admits, possibly at some degree of danger to himself, that he is really a witch. 
You come from a tradition that does not believe in witches, so do you accept this 
l -
statement by your informant as true or not true? ) 
With the argument that the interpretation of beliefs is the central 
anthropological question and the distinctive fault-line of the discipline, Shweder's 
answer is two-fold: unquestionably, the person is a witch (in this way Shweder 
recognizes the culturally relative and particular), but as the anthropologist who 
must reconstruct the system of ideas that "makes sense" of this belief, he can claim 
a type of "transcendence" of the particular and the relative ( thereby recognizing a 
capacity to perceive the universal in some form). Shweder hastens to add that this 
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sense of transcendence must not be accompanied by any sense of superiority, since 
one culture is simply using its categories to interpret another -- and the same 
operation is no doubt being performed by the informant. Shweder wants to 
establish a position of relative "transcendence without superiority" with regard to 
the "realities" that another culture presents to one's own cultural categories. 16 I 
think that Shweder has, in fact, described one of the ways we negotiate the fault-
line; he does not describe how to resolve it. Anthropology may be safe for another 
day.11 
The respected anthropologist Katherine Ewing provides a curious postscript 
to Shweder's fault-line "witch" question. 18 Ewing's works on Sufism, particularly 
the highly secret relationship between disciple and Sufi master, and she contributed 
a remarkable account of personal experience in the journal, American 
Anthropologist. Subtitled "The Temptation to Belieye," Ewing used her own 
experiences with a Sufi master, who seemed to be directing her dreams, to 
articulate a common experience among anthropologists thoroughly embedded in a 
culture, the drift into a generally vague but sporadically more explicit form of 
belief in the ideas they are studying, often derided as "going native." Ewing 
describes how the circumstances of her dreams left her wobbling in her confidence 
as an objective ethnographer. To an extent not clear to herself, she became a type a 
believer and, therefore, an insider--someone who understood and was told more. 19 .. 
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Yet going native can leave one unable to explain any of this insider information to 
one's professional community by virtue of vows of confidence, or simply the 
inability to convey the convincing insider experience. 20 
In contrast to the fine parsing of the problem of belief in anthropology, the 
term presents few concerns for cognitive theory, a field that is currently the locus 
of much excited debate by scholars of all types. Composed of psychologists, 
neurologists, evolutionary biologists and all the subfields in between, cognitive 
theory gives a great deal of attention to why and how people belief. One recent title 
is explicit -- "Why Would Anyone Believe in God?"21 The most common "short" 
answer identifies believing as a cognitive process selected for its adaptive value in 
the evolutionary task of human beings surviving in stable groups. This makes 
believing part of what created thinking, sociable humans, although some cognitive 
theorists are quick to point out that it is a vestige of evolution that ill equips us for 
modern life. 
Despite a focus on etiology of belief, cognitive theory is a bit quick to define 
it as the religious act of positing the existence of what they call "counter-intuitive 
agencies." 22 So, while philosophers regard religious believing as just one instance 
of the large_r cognitive phenomenon of belief, so far that is the main interest to 
cognitive theory. Most cognitivists are unabashedly scientific, intent on 
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"explaining" ( eklaren, not verstehen) why irrational beliefs, or religion, came into 
existence and remained long past its most obvious adaptive uses.23 
For those in the fields of neurology, the neurophysiology of cognition, or 
evolutionary biology, their interest in religion is tied to new research tools like 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) as well as the synergy of these new fields 
coming together around new maps of the mind and paradigms of consciousness 
and neural processing. 24 Their apparent lack of hermeneutical interest in the 
challenges posed by language is in keeping with the style of science generally, but 
it makes their work feel very alien to humanists. When they locate "the problem of 
belief, they solve it, that is, they explain what is going on. Even when their 
explanations can only be speculative, they sound very reductionist to scholars 
concerned to interpret ( verstehen) rather than explain ( eklaren ). 25 
However, the late anthropologist, Roy Rappaport, used cognitive theory, 
among other things, to develop a speculative account but insightful and popular 
analysis of the nature of belief. He assumed its biological evolution and focused on 
the dynamics of its social enactment, through which an experience and concept of 
"the sacred" was generated among human beings and functioned, in tum, to mold 
them as human beings. This social process involved, as Vico, Comte, and Hume all 
suggested, an experience of power and an act of submission to the idea of a higher 
authority. Rappaport playfully describes the concept of power in this way: "The 
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unfalsifiable supported by the undeniable yields the unquestionable, which 
transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the conventional into the correct, the 
necessary, and the natural." The process of deferring the quality and significance 
unquestionableness to the unknown comes to constitute sanctity itself; it is as a 
I 
fonn of absolute authority that the sacred makes possible "the foundation upon 
which the human way of life stands." For Rappaport, belief in sanctity enables 
humanity to evolve social community, intellectual reflexivity, ·and the experience 
of transcendence itself. 26 
12 
The idea that religion may be a selected adaptive feature in human evolution 
is far from new; it goes back to many pre-Darwinian notions of social evolution. In 
mid-twentieth century phenomenological theories of religion, an approach based 
on religion as sui generis or non-reducible to other forces, scholars such as Mircea 
Eliade would even speculate about evolutionary origins before confining 
discussion to the "phenomenon" at hand, the origins of which should not matter. 27 
The phenomenology of religion approach, otherwise known as the history of 
religions, has been significantly derelict, compared to its disciplinary neighbors, in 
discussing belief. Perhaps the need to distinguish itself from theology explains the 
odd lacuna in their decades of analysis. Yet it is surprising that belief, as a separate 
entry, was left out of the multi-volume Encyclopedia of Religion edited by Eliade 
and published in 1986.28 Instead, the reader is told to "See Doubt (and Belief)," 
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which provides a thoughtful but very theological engagement of the topic. Belief 
may have been ceded to the theologians in order to help define the borders of the 
phenomenological study of religion. With an exception here and here, my 
colleagues in the history of religions -- compared to philosophers, anthropologists 
and cognitive theorists -- have not seen a "problem" with belief. In fact, they do 
not seem to see belief at all, although they refer to it all the time. 29 
II. Universal and Particular 
The preceding discussion has been a brief scurry through some background 
for the problem of belief. Let me now focus on one of the most central issues and 
illustrate it with materials more germane to historical studies - and that is, the 
universality or particularity of our references to belief. In other words, can we say 
that all people believe in religious entities? Can we describe all religious ideas as 
beliefs? Or does "believing" imply a very specific type of self-conscious 
relationship with specific types of divine entities? The ethnographic evidence is 
mixed. In 1972 Rodney Needham noted the expedient ease with which many 
ethnographers blithely claimed that such and such people believe in this and that 
god or gods, comfortable with the assumption that the English verb "to believe" 
capturns the particular religious sensibilities of a very different people. 30 Of course, , 
as the Shweder discussion made clear, a universal assumption about the know-
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ability of other peoples and cultures has been basic to anthropology. Similarly, a 
fundamental assumption about the unity of believing as a phenomenon has 
supported the whole enterprise of comparative religions and most "world 
religions" textbooks. 
14 
In contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham pointed out the 
close _attention to local terms first used by Evans-Pritchard in his study of the Nuer 
and their theology. Needham himself examined the indigenous terms for anything 
comparable to belief among the Navaho, Hinduism, the dialects of the P 1ilippines, 
and the Penan of Borneo. The exercise gave evidence, he suggested, of "the 
bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently translated by the 
English 'believe'. "31 
Most recently, the Buddhologist Donald Lopez analyzed the term belief for 
its usefulness in the study of religion, challenging the assumption of uni ,ersality. 
For Lopez, our notion of belief as something common to all religions is part of our 
blindness to difference and willingness to convert the world to one way of thinking.' 
He argues that what we intend by belief has a clear historical locus in the matrix of 
meanings forged by early Christianity and developed in the course of Christian 
history as it sought to define its theological orthodoxy and institutional 
jurisdiction. 32 It was during the Inquisition, in fact, that belief acquired its current 
distinctive gloss by which outward action is deemed an inadequate indication of 
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the views one harbors deep within the heart. Only torture can reveal those 
sentiments and elicit true repentance, if needed. 
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Lopez illustrates his point with the dramatic narrative of Peter of Verona, a 
13th century preacher asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisition against 
the Gnostic heresy of the Cathars or Albigensians. This early Inquisition 
institutionalized testing a person for one's true beliefs, while defining the errors 
and punishments associated with the sin of heresy against the church. But Lopez 
notes that the Inquisition was also deeply involved in the confiscation of property, 
which added to the local zeal of the movement, and in a struggle for political 
control of a great deal of southern France between the pope and the Holy loman 
Emperor. Peter of Verona, early Inquisitor, eventually became a martyr to the 
cause: the story has it that as he was dying from a stab wound, he inscribed 
"credo," the beginning of the orthodox creed, on the ground with his mvn blood. 
The credo, of course, points back to the long historical importance of oral 
and public assertion of one's beliefs, although all the creeds of the early ,_·hurch 
arose in the context of disputing heresies. However, summing up a great deal of 
history in this one brief historical sketch of Peter the Inquisitor and martyr, Lopez 
concludes that Christianity came to distinguish belief not by what a person said 
publicly, but by "the invisible content of the mind." 33 Since the means foi" 
identifying believers from non-believers would give great power to the onf~ 
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deciding who had what in their hearts, Lopez also concludes that the ides of belief 
"is neither natural nor universal. It might be described as an ideology, an idea that 
arises from a specific set of material interests." 34 
Lopez develops a second example describing the 1881 Buddhist Catechism 
with which Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Bud hism into 
the modem world. In Olcott's understanding, Buddhism was a religion and, 
therefore, a system of beliefs. So he was shocked by how poorly the pio s monks 
of Sri Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs that early translat1 .)11s had 
had made so familiar to Olcott. He was especially concerned that Buddhisis be able 
to hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries who were dest·oying 
the indigenous culture. Pointing to Olcott' s "ideology of belief," Lopez suggests 
that his assumptions about the universal nature of religion were rooted in Christian 
history and doomed to obfuscate real understanding of Buddhism. 35 
Although Lopez's argument for the cultural particularism of belief is 
welcome for taking up the topic of belief at all, I cannot fully agree with hjs 
conclusions. Still, in a publication of my own not long after his, I indirecti y 
supported a similar position by challenging the frequently quoted formula that "the 
Chinese believe in spirits." In fact, the closer one tried to pin down such a 
generalization, the more complicated became the ideas of "the Chinese" s well as 
"believe in spirits. "36 
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My arguments supplemented those that Lopez invoked when he co ntered 
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the assumed "universality" of belief by pointing to the cultural particularity of the 
concept's origins. But Lopez was convinced that the concept of belief originated in 
the matrix of Christianity and that its onslaught obfuscated the real dynam!cs of 
local Singhalese Buddhism. I would question Lopez's analysis in these tw~ areas. 
First, does the concept of belief that we have today, which went out to conquer the 
world in the 1st century and, he suggests, again in the 16th, really originate in 
Christianity? Paul Veyne' s study of belief among the ancient Greeks complicates , 
the picture, as does a new study of the legacy of Pythagoras and several studies of 
1st century BC/ AD Judaism. 37 38The more we learn about how the Christian matrix 
of belief fits into the full historical mosaic of social forces at the time of its 
supposed creation, the less originality we can automatically ascribe to that very 
successful religion. In other words, I am not convinced its so Christian. 
Second, although Lopez focus on just this one encounter of Olcott and tum 
of the century Singhalese Buddhism, he knows better than I that the British were 
far from the first Europeans in Sir Lanka, that the Europeans were not the 1irst to 
conquer and colonize the island, and that the island had been swept by the winds of 
other cultural influences for several millennia. It is also well accepted that he Sri 
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Lankans had the right to appropriate colonial categories, such as the idea of beliefs 
one learns by heart, in whatever way they wished. And they did. In fact, great parts 
of the world today increasingly understand themselves in terms of religious 
movements involving what Lopez describes as the Christian ideas of choice, 
conversion, and commitment that make up the Western notion of belief. If the three 
fastest growing religions are Catholicism, Islam and Christian evangelicalism, then 
belief is not a category we can dismiss for its checkered ideological past in the 
hands of papal Inquisitors or colonial catechists. It has meaning to many today. 
Two short studies by de Certeau are provocative for rethinking the issue of 
belief. He suggests, perhaps unwittingly, that most modern European languages 
allow sufficient looseness to the idea of belief to justify the very general sense in 
which we might interpret the term, that is, as the understanding that more often 
than not human beings think of themselves as coexisting ·in the cosmos with other 
invisible beings, usually sacred or superhuman, and this coexistence involves 
certain interactions with them. De Certeau himself assumes universality in his 
analysis of how believing sets up a temporally defined contractual relationship, 
marked by the investment of one party with the clear sense of something 
eventually due in return. 39 Yet he is a sociologist of modern industrial society, 
suggesting that today we. can never really understand belief. It is a wary modern 
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conclusion, based on the popular view, he suggests, that for us now there are "too , 
many things to believe and not enough credibility to go around." 40 
De Certeau actually dips in and out of two understandings of belief, ones 
that would be familiar to Needham. In one line of analysis he cleverly describes 
belief as what we have when we no longer believe.4 ~ Yet in pointing to this 
"fallen" state, de Certeau assumes a disruptive change in some automatic c,1ltural 
moment, a change that came with degrees of choice about what to believe or how 
much to believe it. When the cultural status quo is rocked by change, then "beliefs" 
are apt to be formulated or clarified. They may eve~ be compared, the new with the 
old, if only to attempt to dismiss the influence of a visiting anthropologist or 
missionary. In this discussion de Certeau seems to imply the existence of an 
innocent, pre-choice, unself-conscious mode of transaction with the gods, who are 
not formulated in concepts any more than they need to be. Stories, titles, di3tinctive 
ritual greetings or offerings - these are the ways such innocents believe; certainly 
not in reasoned concepts. Only when the missionaries arrive, the Phoenicians land, 
the Jews conquer Canaan, or cultures clash, are presented with choices, which, as a 
break from the old, must be accompanied by an extra show of commitment. Then 
we are no longer dealing with the gods; we are dealing just with our beliefs. -+2 
IV. Rejection 
Believing Talk, Oxford 3 
Created on 10/10/2006 8:23 PM 
20 
In contrast to Lopez and de Certeau, Paul Veyne does not make arguments 
about the universal and the particular; he talk about "modalities" of belief and the 
effect of choices. He describes one modality as coming into being when the option 
of doubt opens up a new type of choice, the unprecedented social position of being 
in a position to doubt. Veyne describes Pausanius, laboring over his compilation of ' 
the stories of local gods, deciding that a "kernel of truth" must reside in the many 
redundant tales he had amassed. Before him, of course, Herodotus reported what 
many different people told him with the amused distance of one not closely 
attached to a particular version. And Thucydides researched the stories he , vas told, 
to create one clear narrative of the Peloponnesian war that, being the most reliable 
version he could determine, he believed in. These are not the triumph of logos over 
mythos, Veyne suggests, but the development of mythos, and history, and 
criticism-all modalities of belief, co-existing modalities of truth. 
Several elements come together in Veyne' s account that will not be easily 
undone in Western culture (creating a limit to what can co-exist). First, the cultural 
pluralism seen in the plethora of local tales that Pausanius gathers, the social 
shaded perspectives compared by Thucydides, the culturally varied material 
reported by Herodotus. Secondly, the process of comparison and choice: dt.e to the 
pluralism that he stumbled upon, Pausanius chose to assume a so-called "historical 
kernel" of truth in all the myths, while entertaining a new type of doubt about the 
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details, especially the repetitive mythic themes. It is ~ familiar modality of both 
believing and doubting. Thucydides took the other extreme, to leave out the 
fantastic altogether in favor of a distinctly non-mythic realism demonstrated by the 
internal logic of the narration itself. In this choice, mythos is defined as the 
incredible and doubtful, irrelevant to the type of critical history in which 
Thucydides now believed. 43 
By the time Christianity developed in the long simmering melting pot of the 
Mediterranean world, if you got around a bit beyond your own village, your beliefs 
would identify and locate you; if you got around a lot more, they were apt t,J 
involve some personal choices, whether it was Mithraism, attachment to a 
particular Roman god, convictions about the Christ in any of the various versions 
of his significance, or involvement in some sect of Jewish nationalism. When 
personal choice entered the picture, believing was aiways seen as a type of 
conversion away from the rule of reason, which would never be more than the rule 
of the familiar, the status quo, simple common sense; exercising choice wa ... an 
acceptance of the incredible, remaking your old identity by the choosing as well as 
by what was chosen. A set of beliefs to which one orally testified became the crux , 
of being Christian, or a follower of Mithra, a devotee of Jupiter, and so on. 
Textual culture -- seen in the different enterprises of Pausanius, the Essenes, 
or the letter-writing Christian Paul -- could make its own claims as a mediu~n, that 
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is, develop its own modalities of belief and doubt. The gathering together of a 
canonical set of scriptures, the way so many Christianities were weeded out of the 
early Church and history, established some of its authority by the attributions to 
attributed to people who had been there as witnesses. While this made the texts a 
great source of authority for the revelation of Christ, oral and public recitation of 
the credo made one a Christian. 44 Continuing to work V eyne' s generous term, 
further modalities of belief would open up between scriptural testimony, on the one 
hand, and the institutionalization of apostolic succession claiming authority over 
them, on the other. This early distinction would to ripen into the great divide of the 
16th century Reformation. 
Lopez might be analyzed historically a bit further. In which case, early 
Christianity pulled together many influences to imbue the practices of believing 
with its own particular set of meanings. As with every winner on the historical 
stage, Christianity developed to define the parameters of believing for so much 
subsequent European history, although other local models always existed, if with 
difficulty. Within the Christian matrix, belief was premised on individual choice 
and, as such, could always vie with the traditions of tribe, city, or family. It was a 
matter of choice, conversion, commitment, with doubt of the other firming up into 
rnjection of all else, at times even repulsion. This process was ritualized early on in 
the institution of the catechumenate. At the same time, the succession of creeds 
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articulated by the early churches continued to ritualize entrance into the rightful 
"house" through the oral profession of the doctrines of one's faith. 
Lopez ment~ons the feature of rejection in passing; and I think he is very 
right to note this aspect of the Christian model. Its modality of choice clearly 
meant a concomitant rejection: I believe in this, not that; I am a Christian, not a 
Roman, not a Jew. Choice does not require rejection, but it became the final 
component for the emergent Christianity that cast and recast itself in those early 
centuries. Indeed, after so much time modem Christians have had to learn how 
commitment and rejection can relax into choice and mere doubt, otherwise real 
tolerance would be inconceivable. 
V. Believing 
Yet Lopez's analysis raises some questions. 
23 
First, is Christianity really the model of believing in the many of cultures of 
Europe as well as its colonial legatees? Has· the model remained fixed in nuance 
and emphasis? And, can a certain historical set of Christian assumptions indelibly 
shape our sense of the term in all the European languages for all time? Christians 
certainly fit the traditions of the Jews, Muslims and various pagans into their own 
model, and what did not fit could not be easily thought. Lopez is undoubtedly 
correct in his characterization of the substance of that model for some of medieval 
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history, but since the Enlightenment, and probably the Renaissance, that model has 
been tweaked and refitted and subject to interpretation. As a small example, I have 
known Catholic institutions for a good part of my life, in one connection or another, 
and I know that up close 20th century Roman Catholic believing has changed 
dramatically in a mere half century in most places in Europe and America. I think 
the question of historical homogeneity impacts how we view the probable origins 
of the model.45 Were the really Christian? 
Second, an easy contrast to the religious matrix of choice, conversion, 
commitment and rejection would be the religious cultures of the primarily oral 
peoples Europeans encountered. Yet the assumption that such peoples were all 
sufficiently isolated to afforded no real socio-cultural choices to individuals until 
the Christian missionary arrived is probably overstated and in danger of 
propagating, under the table, so to speak, more of a Christian-centered 
understanding of history. As an assumption, this theoretical isolation and lack of 
choice among indigenous peoples is probably very dependent on a Protestant 
tendency to misunderstand orality itself as inherently primitive; this view made it 
very difficult for the earliest ethnographers to even refer to indigenous spiritualities 
as "religions" - and when they could, the implied continuity across cultures 
implied was not appreciated by European religious, and academic, authorities. We 
are increasingly learning that indigenous cultures in the past were rarely so isolated 
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or marked by consensus that the individual had no choices to make, such as --
trading further afar, joining the cults that would arise at times of stress, absorbing 
more quickly the influence of conquering tribes whose enlarged kingdoms would 
evolve more complex religious patterns, or simply the decision to assume a larger 
role in the ceremonial life of the community -- like the blinded hunter, Ogotemmeli, 
who was the keeper of the Dogon sacred lore imparted to Marcel Griaule. 46 No 
matter how small and isolated, everyone in a community would not be involved 
with their spirits and cultural lore to the same degree or in the same way. 47 This is .. 
not to deny that some communities appear to engage in whole-sale rejections of 
outside influences, such as the missionaries, in favor of their own traditions. But I 
do question the uniqueness of the "choice and conversion of the individual" model. 
These are not technical quibbles aimed at Lopez's argument; I think they are 
inherently challenges to the degree of "particularity" to which we think we can 
resort when jettisoning master narratives and grand universalities. If the Christian 
model of belief described by Lopez really has older roots and many varietals, and 
oral cultures do not prevent the presence of some of the components of this so-
called Christian model, then an even more central - methodological -- question 
looms. Is the historical freight of the notion of belief in the European world so set 
and insurmountable that the term has not or cannot evolve to be used - with care 
and imagination -- to describe other ways of believing? To say it cannot could 
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suggest that other cultures do not believe in anything like the sense of the term. Do 
we really want to be so particular that we are thrown back on another form of 
ethnocentrism? 
I do not think that stretching our term belief to attempt to describe very 
differently constructed relationships with the supernatural is demanded by the 
hermeneutics of suspicion that drives a good post-modernist historian. Neither can 
I imagine any usage that would allow us to cease examining the baggage the term 
might still carry or take on. 48 
I am suggesting that, contra Lopez's anti-universalism (understood more as 
colonialism), we might want to press our basic terminology beyond its usual 
culture-reinforcing channels, avoiding universalism as well as excessive 
particularism. We would so do to have a basic analytical tool with which to explore 
real similarities as well as real differences, thereby allowing us to revise our tools 
even further to create ones more capable of multi-cultural purposes. Although the 
methodological channels for pursuing this approach are not obvious, I think the 
language of practice theory provides some basic guidelines. With a practice 
approach, we would ask about believing, not belief or beliefs. First of all, we could 
not assume that there is any one way of believing. Then we would ask how 
believing is constructed in the "semantic system" of particular cultural settings: 
what inner logic distinguishes it in Dagon or Buddhist cultures from other forms of .. 
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thinking, philosophizing, etc. To explore how believing is constructed would 
involve laying out the semantic field in which it is locally distinguished -- to 
whatever extent it ,may actually be distinguished. This is more complicated than 
simply determining what is believed and the forms believing takes. In addition, a 
practice approach would not let us assume that believing is a purely internal state 
of any kind, nor a personal understanding of ritualized relationships with divine 
powers. 
27 
Practice theory is based on a "critical" methodology, which first demands 
that we deconstruct the issue to determine exactly why we are interested in it, why 
it is a problem to be explored or explained. In other words, we must uncover the 
implicit expectations, the assumptions at stake, the crown jewels in the pocket of a 
particular view of reality, that is, the value that is endangered if some assumption 
of our reality is unveiled. Practice theory also expects critical analysis to include an 
explicit rationale for the usefulness of the rethought term or issue. To analyze 
modes of believing, therefore, should not yield the same analysis as ritualizing or 
textualizing, to use some topics I have addressed before with practice theory; nor 
should it yield the same descriptions as 19th century theories of animism, 
monotheism, polytheism, pantheism, etc. 
De Certeau' s work is the oldest and clearest 'practice-like' theory around, to 
date, but provocative resources lie in the ideas of Connerton and Hervieu-Leger on 
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memory ( which attempt to shake up our premises and explore other cultural issues 
that may be involved in believing), and in some cognitive theories of the socially 
adaptive value of agency. 
I cannot lay out for you today a "practice theory of believing" - much as I 
wish my work were at that stage. I am confined to a "gadfly" role for today. I do 
want to suggest, however, that exploration of believing among Greeks and Romans 
would have to begin as an historical analysis of a non-essentialized lineage of 
people, groups, stories, texts, and rites both public and private over varying 
amounts of time and place. Such a study could arguably isolate some particular 
cultural strategies at work in the different ways Greeks, and Romans, believed --
what I would call a strategic way of acting that enabled a certain type of meshing ' 
of constructed expectations, understood cosmology, and reinforcing personal 
experience, a meshing that would accomplish personalized socio-cultural ends, 
however political or even aesthetic they might be, however incomplete in any 
particular instance. I suggest that, for starters, choice, commitment, and rejection is 
not at all what Christian believing it about. That is what Christians like to think 
they are doing, and while not irrelevant by any means, it is only half the story. 
Most likely, believing most generally is likely to involve the ways in which 
contradictions are maintained, not truths affirmed. 49 
Thank you. 
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visit a seventh reliquary displaying the foreskin of Jesus. Like Pausanius, he was struck by doubt. But rather 
than grant a kernel of truth, or hope, to any one of them, he seems to have ditched his previous piety to 
sarcastically question the whole business. Eisenstein's example describes the circulation of people around 
Europe and the holy land, the circulation of texts that encouraged them and then described their experiences, 
presenting them with a variety of competing holy items, even competing notions of holiness. Perhaps not many 
were as disposed to cynicism as the writer of the complaint about a few too many foreskins; they may simply 
have refused to select, continuing to put their hope in one relic after another. But surely economic limits and 
the ability of some displays and stories to exert their influence would make choices inevitable-and some 
monasteries died while others prospered into major centers. In any case, plural options, or choices, could 
induce the faithful to accept much in the name of believing or reject it all for more critical stances. The 
diversity that Greek and Roman culture presented, especially the alternatives presented to Jews or Christians 
should they travel through Rome or beyond, forced choices on people at every turn. CHECK 
45 Christianity itself was never so homogenous that it could represent a unified modality or matrix, without 
variations in every possible component. The Christian matrix lived within the religion as well, as the 
Inquisition itself too clearly reminds us. Lopez's presentation of the role of the Inquisition in defining the 
nature of belief represents a very historically defined moment in church history and one that sounds like a 
conceptual prelude to the Reformation. In the early Christian communities, we know that the nature of belief as 
well as the exact focus of belief were very much up for debate. What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem, 
asked Tertullian; Origen took up the same question roughly a century later. But a century after Origen, he was 
a declared heretic as the church came to define more clearly its place in a Greco-Roman empire, even if it 
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fought off all Gnostic rationalizations of the particular divine-human revelation that Jesus Christ was thought 
to represent. The matrix is assembled slowly, and as it did, more corners and centers of Christendom 
experienced fewer choices or conversions, the rejections mere pro forma condemnations of distant he1;etics and 
Pii~:s-in turn amazed Europe with their sophistication. Griaule's earliest books called these ideas African 
philosophy; but it was years later that the Dogon elders decided to tell him the real story.See Marcel Griault, 
Conversations with Ogotemmeli: An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas (London: Oxford, 1975 [ 1965]). 
47 Bell in Frankenberry, ed., Radical Interpretation. 
48 In Lopez's quickly drawn example, late 19th century Sinhalese Buddhism acts as a type of polar opposite to 
Christianity. In this sketch, Theravada Buddhism is not built around beliefs, and certainly not the confessional, 
doctrinal or theological exploration of them; it is a practice, entirely moral at first, intent on distinct forms of 
physical and mental self-restraint at the more demanding level of the monk, with the explicit goals of a better 
rebirth and eventual transcendence (to use a Western term). Of course, the first Buddhists were probably 
converts of a sort; they chose commitment to a different path, perhaps not rejecting others so much as 
prioritizing the options, and maybe the differences were minor. But choice is exercised repeatedly in the stories 
of Buddhism. As you may know, the questions "do Buddhists believe?" evokes the very old, and tired, 
question once endemic to comparative and world religion enterprises as to whether Buddhism could properly 
be called a religion or nor. This tempest in a teapot hails from the days when Buddhist practice was less 
defining of the tradition to Westerners than Buddhist scriptural teachings; clearly, Buddhism violated most of 
the definitional "norms" that religions believe in a transcendent being or benign force corresponding to a type 
of eternal soul. Ninian Smart, among others, was convinced that ifwe let Buddhism in to the 'religion' category, 
and he did (it certainly meant textbooks sold better), then why not communism, that other great example of a 
soul-less ideology qua religion. So his cold war textbooks, and a few others, usually did include some 
discussion of communism and treated Buddhism as a religion with odd parameters - until it got to Mahayana 
of course. 
49 To suggest an answer would be to suggest what is distinctive about the modality of believing that the Greeks , 
evinced toward their gods before too much critical analysis had piled up as a cultural option and all the stories 
were gathered to be revered as myths. Whatever it was earlier and later, it was different from believing among 
the Romans, whose mytl ic narrative was standardized earlier on and remained a bit separate from many 
activities of cultic worship. The "problem of belief' may be something different in every disciplinary field, 
given their particular histories ofresearch and research materials. But for the study ofreligion, the problem of 
belief is clearly a meanir:gless dead end. What can we ever say about belief in general? We can talk about 
beliefs, which are many, all had or held in different ways. Like any discipline, including Shweder's fault-lined 
anthropology, we are concerned with the limits of what we know, the differences that we see and imagine, as 
well as the commonalities that we cannot help but assume. This means that religious studies must focus on the 
practice of believing, on 110w people believe, construct believing relationships ... Through critical analysis we 
must leave the Christian baggage behind, which it can do only when we know it, as best we can at this point in 
history, but committed to continually plumbing the depths. Looking at the practice of believing, relativizing 
believing, emphasizing the activities rather than a hypothetical mindset, may enable us to do this. While is it 
another paper to lay out a full analysis of what it means to focus on the practice of believing, I think the simple 
change in wording open~ the imagination to allow new and different questions. It may not take us as far as we 
need to go; we may still find ourselves caught, like an oversize fish, in yet another fine netting of cu'.tural 
assumptions. But for the post-colonial anti-Christian dilemma that Lopez would leave us in, or de Certeau's 
romantic having it both ways, or Veyne's generative classicism of myth to analysis, but all truths -these do 
not allow us to go further a field, they beach us on dry land. They confine us to an impossibility, or a Christian 
ideology defined to seize goods and land; or a nai've mythic truth compared to the critical truth, all the gift of 
the Greeks. Yes, the Greeks became self-conscious about their gods, but so did the Romans while being as 
bound to them as to the city and their history and their fortunes; but a far traveled people, there was always an , 
odd element of doubt. The special qualities of believing for the Greeks and the Romans -- that is something 
this seminar wi11 be addressing. I simply hope to have sketched out enough to indicate the main issues behind 
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the well trodden paths and the reasons to look to another route where the adventuresome will find different 
questions to ask ... 
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Berkeley Institute of Buddhist Studies (October 5, 2006) 
I prepared the bulk of this paper for a group of Oxford-Princeton classicists, 
who are offering an annual seminar, the topic this time being the issue of faith ( or 
belief) in the ancient world. In ten pages I am leaving out, I take them on a very 
quick tour of the "problem of belief' as it have been defined in several key 
disciplines in the humanities and social sciences -- notably philosophy, 
anthropology, cognitive theory, and my own field, the history of religions. That is 
the first section. I want to pick up here, with some adaptations for a Buddhalogical 
audience, with the specific issue so important to the study of religion, namely, the 
universality or particularity of what we mean by belief. 
In other words, can we say that all people believe in religious entities? Can 
we describe all religious ideas as beliefs, or might "believing" imply a very 
specific type of conscious or unconscious relationship to particular entities? The 
ethnographic evidence for going in all these directions is mixed. In 1972 Rodney 
Needham noted the expedient ease with which many ethnographers blithely 
claimed that such and such people believe in this and that god or gods, comfortable 
with the assumption that the English verb "to believe" captured the particular . 
religious sensibilities of a very different culture.29 Of course, a universal 
assumption about the know-ability of other peoples and their cultures has been 
basic to anthropology. Similarly, a fundamental assumption about the unity of 
11 
believing as a phenomenon has supported the whole enterprise of comparative 
religions and most "world religions" textbooks. But it may also be responsible for 
much of what is unsatisfactory with such projects as well. 
In contrast to those who found belief everywhere, Needham pointed out the 
close attention to local terms first seen in Evans-Pritchard's study of the Nuer and 
their theology. Needham himself examined the indigenous terms for anything 
roughly comparable to belief in Navaho religion, Hinduism, the dialects of the 
Philippines, and the religious ideas of the Penan of Borneo. The exercise gave 
evidence of "the bewildering variety of senses attaching to words ... indifferently 
translated by the English 'believe'. "30 
Most recently, the Buddhologist Donald Lopez launched a very targeted 
attack on the assumption of universality in our notion of belief. He argues that the 
term has a clear historical locus in the matrix of meanings forged by early 
Christianity and developed in the course of Christian history as the Church sought 
to define theological orthodoxy and institutional jurisdiction. 31 It was in the 
Inquisition, Lopez suggests that belief acquired its current distinctive gloss, namely, 
that outward action is an inadequate indication of the views one harbors deep 
within the heart. Only torture, if needed, can reveal those sentiments and elicit true 
repentance. 
Lopez uses a dramatic narrative, the story of Peter of Verona, a 13th century 
preacher, who was asked by Pope Gregory IX to launch an Inquisition against the 
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Gnostic heresy of the Cathars ( or Albigensians ). It was the Inquisition, Lopez notes, 
that institutionalized testing a person's true beliefs and defined the errors and 
punishments associated with the sin of heresy against the church. But the 
Inquisition was also deeply involved in the confiscation of property, which added 
to the local zeal of the movement, and in the struggle for political control of a great 
deal of southern France being waged between the pope and the Holy Roman 
Emperor. Peter of Verona was eventually deemed a martyr; his story has it that as 
he was dying from stab wounds, he inscribed the credo, the beginning of the 
orthodox creed, on the ground with his own blood. With a tad less evidence than 
one might want for a very complicated chapter in medieval history, the story of 
Peter and subsequent Inquisitions lets Lopez conclude that Christianity, in this 
period at least, distinguished belief not by what a person said, but by "the invisible 
content of the mind. "32 Since the means for identifying believers from non-
believers gave great power to the one deciding who had what in their hearts, Lopez 
pushes this conclusion further: the idea of belief" is neither natural nor universal. , 
It might be described as an ideology, an idea that arises from a specific set of 
material interests. "33 
Lopez gives a second example describing the 1881 Buddhist Catechism with 
which Colonel Henry Steele Olcott sought to bring Singhalese Buddhism into the 
modern world. In Olcott's understanding, Buddhism was a religion and, therefore, 
a system of beliefs. So he was shocked by how poorly the pious monks of Sri 
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Lanka could recite back to him the basic beliefs that the translated textual sources 
had taught so well to Olcott. He was especially concerned that Buddhists be able to, 
hold off the growing influence of Christian missionaries destroying the indigenous 
culture. Lopez argues that the "ideology of belief," assumed by Olcott to be the 
universal nature of religion, was rooted in nothing more than the assumptions of 
Christian history. 34 
Although Lopez's argument for the cultural particularism of belief is a 
striking one, I cannot fully agree with his conclusion. Nonetheless, in a 2002 
publication I presented data that indirectly supports a similar position. Arguing 
with the frequently quoted formula that "the Chinese believe in spirits," I noted 
how reality got more complicated the closer one came to any particular situation. 35 
Chinese historical literature contains a variety of explicit positions on spirits, 
although the famous anti-spirit arguments are also admissions of the popularity of 
the pro-spirit view. But a corresponding discomfort attends the sheer enormity of a 
generalization like "the Chinese," a particularly heterogeneous group outside the 
early, semi-mythical ancestry of the Han people. At least one classic ethnographic 
study, based just in Taiwan but generalizing to broad conclusions about the unity 
of Chinese popular religion, has been cited as authoritative for three ~ecades. Yet 
wider fieldwork can now, unfortunately, ·deflate the author's long accepted 
claims. 36 It seems that when regional practices are seriously analyzed, the variety is 
so great that there is no obvious cultural coherence whereby the cosmos reflects 
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social categories, and vice versa. 37 The supposed unity of "the Chinese" at the 
dynamic level of folk culture is not something that can be assumed. 
More subtle issues are captured in a lovely essay by the early 20th century 
sociologist, Fei Xiaotung, entitled "A World without Ghosts." 38 Fei Xiaotung 
describes growing up in a large house with closed-off wings, all said to be 
populated by an endless number of ancestral ghosts. He shivered and shook at 
times, but in retrospect it was a closely populated world that made home a large 
and interesting community of which he felt a part. F ei compares such a boyhood to 
the American model of growing up under the influence of comic books about an 
endless stream of superheroes. How could these two mindsets not result in very 
different people and cultures, he asks; but for all the confidence in facing the future 
instilled in the American child, F ei concludes he would not trade his floating 
family and more subsumed individuality. Now, to what extent can we assume that 
F ei, writing as a sociologist so many years removed from boyhood, believes in 
spirits? The essay form, the simple but insightful comparison, his tender nostalgia 
- they all suggest that his beliefs were culturally automatic and unquestioned at 
one time, but the worldly professional is not the boy; he became quite self-
conscious and distant in regard to believing it all. Do the Chinese believe in spirits 
only when they are young? When they are older, some may but others do not? All 
told, to say "the Chinese believe ... " in any particular thing can be an entertaining 
but hardly scholarly generalization. 
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III Choice 
My arguments generally supported those of Lopez when he countered the 
assumed "universality" of belief by pointing to the cultural particularity of the 
concept's origins. But the main issue for Lopez, convinced that belief originated in 
the matrix of Christianity, was the onslaught of a foreign and ideological category 
that obfuscated the real dynamics of local Singhalese Buddhism. Here, I think, 
Lopez's analysis should be challenged in two ways. 
First, does the concept of belief that we have today, which went out to 
conquer the world in the 1st century and again in the 16th, really originate in 
Christianity? Paul Veyne' s study of belief among the ancient Greeks complicates 
the picture, as does a new study of Pythagoras and his cult/legacy, and several 
studies of 1st century BC/AD Judaism. 39 40 The more we learn about what Lopes 
called the Christian matrix of belief and how it fitted into the full historical mosaic 
of social forces at the time of its supposed creation, the less originality we can 
automatically ascribe to this very successful religion. 
Second, in his monograph Lopez is historical only about this particular East-
West colonial encounter. But we know he does not mean to imply that Singhalese , 
culture was free of colonizing influences until Olcott arrived. The British were not 
the first Europeans in Sir Lanka, not by far; and Europeans were not the first to 
conquer and colonize the island. In other words, the island had been swept by the 
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winds of outside cultural influence for several millennia. Lopez would also agree 
that Sri Lankans had the creative right to appropriate certain colonial categories, 
such as the idea of beliefs that one knows by heart (note the phrase and what rote 
memorization has meant in our culture). In fact, the forces represented by Olcott 
were incredibly successful and great parts of the world today increasingly 
understand themselves in terms of religious movements involving choice, 
conversion, and commitment- all implicit in Lopez's Western notion of belief. 
Now the three fastest growing religions are Catholicism, Islam and Christian 
evangelicalism, so belief is not a category we can dismiss for its checkered past in 
the hands of papal Inquisitors or colonial catechists. Explorations of the ways in 
which belief is now working in a mostly post-colonial world would undoubtedly be 
quite interesting. 
[Story of UCLA Buddhologist; ordained in Yi Fo Sheng (Theravada)?] 
In addition to Lopez's chapter on belief, two short studies by Michel de 
Certeau are also very provocative for rethinking the issue of belief. De Certeau 
leaves me wondering if most modem European languages do not allow sufficient 
looseness to the idea of belief to justify the very general sense in which we might 
interpret the term -- as the understanding that more often than not human beings 
think of themselves as coexisting in the cosmos with other invisible beings, usually 
sacred or superhuman, and this coexistence involves certain interactions with them. 
De Certeau himself assumes a universality to belief in his analysis of how 
believing sets up a temporally defined contractual relationship, marked by the 
investment of one party with the clear sense of something eventually due in return 
(perhaps a version ofMauss's theory of the gift).41 Yet as a sociologist of modem 
industrial society, he also discusses how little we know, or can ever know, about 
belief. It is a wary modem conclusion, based on the popular view, he suggests, that 
for us now there are "too many things to believe and not enough credibility to go 
around." 42 De _Certeau actually seems to dip in and out of two understandings of 
belief, ones that would be familiar to Needham. In one line of analysis he cleverly 
describes "beliefs" as what we have left when we no longer believe. 43 Yet in 
pointing to that "fallen," post-indigenous state in which cultural options become 
available, de Certeau assumes a disruptive change in some automatic cultural 
moment, a change that comes by offering a degree of choice about what to believe 
or how much to believe it. Whenever the cultural status quo is rocked by such 
change, beliefs are apt to be formulated more clearly or fully. They may even be 
compared, new with old, if only to attempt to dismiss the influence of a visiting 
trader, anthropologist, or missionary. So, at times, de Certeau seems to imply the 
existence of an innocent, pre-modem, unself-conscious mode of transaction with 
the gods, who are not formulated in concepts any more than they need to be. 
Stories, titles, distinctive ritual greetings or offerings - these are the ways such 
innocents believe; not in reasoned concepts. Only when the missionaries arrive, the 
Phoenicians land, the Jews conquer Canaan, or cultures clash and are presented 
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with choices. These, to justify the break from the old, must be accompanied by an · 
extra show of personal commitment. Then we are no longer dealing with the gods; 
we are dealing with our beliefs. 44 
IV. Rejection 
In contrast to Lopez and de Certeau, Paul V eyne does not make any 
universal/particular-style arguments; he uses the more subtle, and obscure, 
language of "modalities" of belief. He clearly describes one modality that comes 
into being when the option of doubt opens up a new type of choice, along with the 
unprecedented social position of being one in a position to doubt. Veyne describes 
Pausanius, laboring over his compilation of the stories of local gods, deciding that 
a "kernel of truth" must reside in the many redundant tales he had amassed. 
Herodotus reported what many different people had told him with the amused 
distance of one not closely attached to a particular version - another modality of 
belief, write Veyne. Thucydides researched particular types of the stories and 
retold one clear narrative of the Peloponnesian war -- in his way, as the most 
reliable version he could determine. This is not the triumph of logos over mythos, 
Veyne suggests, but the development of mythos, history, and then criticism-all 
modalities of belief, modalities of truth. 
Several elements come together in Veyne' s account that will not be easily 
undone in Western culture. First, cultural pluralism -- in the plethora of local tales , 
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that Pausanius gathers, in the culturally wider answers to the curiosity of 
Herodotus, then in the different accounts compared and analyzed by Thucydides. 
Secondly, Veyne outlines a process of comparison and choice -- due to the 
pluralism that he stumbled upon, Pausanius chose to assume a so-called "historical 
kernel" of truth in all the myths, while entertaining a new type of doubt about the 
details, especially the repetitive mythic themes. It is a familiar modality of both 
believing and doubting. At the other extreme, Thucydides chose to leave out the 
fantastic altogether in favor of a distinctly non-mythic realism that demonstrates an 
internal logic within the narration, further defining mythos as the incredible and 
doubtful, irrelevant to the type of critical history in which he now believed and 
wrote - as another modality of belief. 45 
By the time Christianity developed in the long simmering melting pot of the 
Mediterranean world, if you got around a bit beyond your own village, your beliefs 
would identify and locate you; if you got around a lot more, they were apt to taken 
on as a personal choice, whether it was Mithraism, a particular Roman god, the 
new Christ in any of the various versions of his significance, or some sect of 
Jewish nationalism. When personal choice entered the picture, believing was 
always came to be seen as a conversion away from the rule of reason, which is, of 
course, simply the rule of the familiar, the status quo, common sense; such choices 
were an acceptance of the incredible, a remaking of one's old identity by the 
choosing as well as by what was chosen. A set of beliefs to which one orally ( and 
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ritually) testified became the crux of being Christian, or a follower of Mithra, a 
devotee of Jupiter, and so on. Textual culture, seen in the early efforts of Pausanius 
through Thucydides, could make its own claims as a medium of critical thought, 
that is, develop its own modalities of belief and doubt. The gathering together of a 
canonical set of scriptures, which was the way so many Christianities were weeded 
out, with the resulting texts attributed to people who were reputed witnesses, made 
the texts a source of authority for the central message--revelation of Christ. But 
oral and public recitation of the credo made one a Christian. 46 To keep working 
Veyne' s generous term, further modalities of belief would open up between 
scriptural testimony and the institutionalization of apostolic succession that 
claimed the authority to guarantee them, and ripen into great divide of the 15th 
century Reformation. 
It seems correct to me, just as Lopez has argued, that early Christianity 
pulled together many influences to imbue the activity of believing with a particular 
constellation of meanings. Like every winner on the historical stage, Christianity 
defined the parameters of believing for so much subsequent European history, 
· although some other local models were able to hang on in places. Within the 
Christian modality, belief was built on individual choice and, as such, could always 
vie with the traditions of tribe, city, or family: choice, conversion, commitment, 
with 'doubt of the other' firming up into 'rejection' (even repulsion) of all else. 
Ritualized early on in the catechumenate, the succession of creeds articulated by 
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the early churches continued to ritualize entrance of individuals into the rightful 
house of Christ with the oral profession of faith. 
Lopez mentions the feature of rejection in passing; but I think he is very 
right to note this feature of the Christian model. It's type of choice always meant a 
concomitant rejection: I believe in this, not that; I am a Christian, not a Roman, not 
a Jew, ideally, not master nor slave, male nor female. Being Christian was meant 
as the all-encompassing signifier. Indeed, after so many centuries of this style, 
modern Christians have had to learn how commitment and rejection can relax into 
personal choice (perhaps some doubt of others) merely in order for social tolerance 
to become conceivable. 
V. Believing 
Yet Lopez's analysis raises some questions. 
First, is Christianity really the model of believing in the many of cultures of 
Europe as well its colonial legatees? Has the model remained an historically fixed 
matrix? And -- can a certain set of Christian assumptions indelibly shape our sense .. 
of the term in all the European languages for all time? Christians certainly fitted 
the traditions of the Jews, Muslims and various pagans into their own models, and 
what did not fit was so other it was hard to even see. Lopez is undoubtedly correct 
in his characterization of the substance of that model or modality at many points 
points in our history, but how homogeneous must the model be over time to 
22 
include recent history and future trajectories, in all the main languages of study? 
For example, I have known Catholic institutions for a good part of my life, in one 
connection or another, and I know that up close_ Roman Catholic believing has 
changed dramatically in a mere half century in most places in America and Europe. 
This has been the subject of much analysis by Catholics and a few sociologists. I 
think the question of homogeneity does not only impact how we see the history of 
the West, and Christianity itself, it also impacts how we evaluate the probable 
origins of the modality. 47 Were they really so Christian? 
Second, an easy contrast to the religious matrix of choice, conversion, 
commitment and rejection would be the religious practices of the primarily oral 
cultures of the indigenous peoples Europeans encountered - as we even assume 
them to be today, of course. Yet the somewhat buried assumption that such peoples 
were all sufficiently isolated to afforded no real socio-cultural choices to 
individuals until the Christian missionary arrived is probably overstated and in 
danger of propagating, under the table, so to speak, more of a Christian-centered 
understanding of history. As an assumption, the theoretical isolation and lack of 
choice of indigenous peoples probably depends greatly on the Protestant 
misunderstanding of orality itself as inherently primitive, a view that made it very 
difficult for the earliest ethnographers to even refer to indigenous spiritualities as 
"religion" (the continuities across cultures implied by the term religion were not at 
first particularly appreciated by European religious and academic authorities). We 
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are learning that indigenous cultures in the past were rarely so isolated or marked 
by consensus that the individual had no choices to make, such as -- trading further 
afar, joining the cults that would arise particularly at times of stress that split larger 
communities into factions with different histories, absorbing more quickly the 
influence of conquering tribes whose enlarged kingdoms would evolve more 
complex religious patterns, or simply the personal choice to take a bigger role in 
the ceremonial life of the community -- like the blinded hunter, Ogotemmeli, who ~ 
gradually revealed Dogon religious ideas to Marcel Griaule, who in tum amazed 
Europe with their sophistication. [Griaule's earliest books called these ideas 
African philosophy; it was only years later that the Dogon elders decided to tell 
him the real story]. 48 No matter how small and isolated, everyone in a community 
would not be involved with their spirits and cultural lore to the same degree or in 
the same way. 49 This is not to deny that, based on some very thorough 
ethnographies, some communities appear to engage in whole-sale community 
rejections of some outside influences, such as the missionaries, in favor of their 
own traditions. But I do challenge the uniqueness of the "choice and conversion of 
the individual" model. 
These are not technical quibbles aimed just at Lopez; I think they inherently 
challenge the degree of "particularity" to which we think we can resort when 
jettisoning master narratives and grand universalities. If the Christian model of 
belief described by Lopez really has older roots and many varietals, and oral 
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cultures do not prevent the presence of some of the components of this so-called 
Christian model, then an even more central - methodological -- question looms. Is 
the historical freight of the notion of belief in the European world so set and 
insurmountable that the term cannot be used - with care and imagination -- to 
describe other ways of believing? To say it cannot could suggest that other 
cultures do not believe in any like the sense of the term. Do we really want to be so 
particular that we are thrown back on to another form of ethnocentrism? 
I do not think that stretching our term belief to attempt to describe very 
differently constructed relationships with the supernatural - shared ritual relations 
ones or quite personal psychological ones - is demanded by the hermeneutics of 
suspicion that drives a good post-modernist historian. And it goes without saying 
that neither can I imagine any usage that would allow us to cease examining the 
baggage the term might still carry, or take on. 
In Lopez's quickly drawn example, late 19th century Sinhalese Buddhism 
acts as a type of polar opposite to Christianity. In this sketch, Theravada Buddhism 
is not built around beliefs, and certainly not the confessional, doctrinal or 
theological exploration of them; it is a practice, entirely moral at first, intent on 
distinct forms of physical and mental self-restraint at the more demanding level of 
the monk, with the explicit goals of a better rebirth and eventual transcendence (to ' 
use a Western term). Of course, the first Buddhists were probably converts of a 
sort; they chose commitment to a different path, perhaps not rejecting others so 
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much as prioritizing the options, and maybe the differences were minor. But choice 
is exercised repeatedly in the stories of Buddhism. 
As you may know, the questions "do Buddhists believe?" evokes the very 
old, and tired, question once endemic to comparative and world religion enterprises 
as to whether Buddhism could properly be called a religion or not. This tempest in 
a teapot hails from the days when Buddhist practice was less defining of the 
tradition to Westerners than Buddhist scriptural teachings; clearly, Buddhism 
violated most of the definitional "norms" that religions believe in a transcendent 
being or benign force corresponding to a type of eternal soul. Ninian Smart, among 
others, was convinced that if we let Buddhism in to the 'religion' category, and he 
did (it certainly meant textbooks sold better), then why not communism, that other 
great example of a soul-less ideology qua religion. So his cold war textbooks, and 
a few others, usually did include some discussion of communism and treated 
Buddhism as a religion with odd parameters - until it got to Mahayana of course. 
I am, of course, simply suggesting, contra Lopez, that we might want to 
press our basic terminology beyond its usual culture-reinforcing channels, avoiding 
universalism as well as excessive particularism, but giving us a tool with which to 
explore real similarities as well as real difference among historical ways of being; 
so doing helps to revise our categories even further into ones more capable of 
multi-cultural purposes. Still, the methodological channels for pursuing this 
approach are not obvious, though I think we have in the language of practice 
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theory so basic guidelines. Taking a practice approach, we would ask about 
believing, not belief or beliefs; we would ask how believing is constructed, with 
what imagery that distinguishes it in Dogon or Buddhist culture from other forms 
of thinking, philosophizing, etc. To explore how believing is constructed would 
involve laying out the semantic field in which it is distinguished, to whatever 
extent it may be distinguished. This is more complicated than simply determining 
what is believed and the forms believing takes. From the start we could not assume 
that there was any one way of believing, but if a comparable mode of religiosity 
existed, there would be a spectrum of distinguished forms or positions. In addition, 
I should add, it would be central to a practice approach to make sure that believing ' 
was not assumed to be a purely internal state, personal understanding of the 
cosmos, a private relationship that when put into words already succumbed to a 
relatively alien medium. [That has been the reigning assumption about belief, 
undergirding any description of modality. In fact, of course, nothing that is 
assumed to be a purely personal reality is ever actually dealt with as such or even 
formally studied as such. Think of Freudian theory, its theory of the self and its 
practice of treating, that in, reaching into, the self.] 
Practice theory is also based on the notion of a critical methodology, which , 
first demands that we deconstruct the so-called issue to determine exactly why we 
are interested in it; in other words, we must uncover the implicit expectations, the 
assumptions at stake, the crown jewels in the pocket of a particular view of reality, 
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that is, the value that is endangered if some aspect of our assumed reality proves to 
be less absolute. Practice theory also demands that the resulting analysis illuminate 
real applications inadequately by earlier methods. That is, it expects the critical 
analysis to include an explicit rationale for the usefulness of the rethought term or 
issue. To analyze modes of believing should not yield the same analysis as 
ritualizing, or textualizing, to use some topics I have addressed before with 
practice theory; nor should it yield the same descriptions as 19th century theories of 
animism, monotheism, polytheism, pantheism, etc. Though I think those analyses 
paved the way for our approach to believing to leave behind some of the 
assumptions of the Christian culture is which the study of religion arose. 
De Certeau's work is the oldest and clearest practice-like theory around, to 
date, but provocative resources lie in the ideas of Connerton and Hervieu-Leger on 
memory ( which attempt to shake up our premises and explore other cultural issues 
that may be involved in believing), and there are also resources in some cognitive 
theories of the socially adaptive value of agency. I cannot lay out for you today a 
"practice theory of believing" - much as I wish my work was at that stage. I am 
confined to a more "gadfly" role for now. I do want to suggest, however, that 
exploration of believing among Buddhists -- or the Greeks and Romanss -- would 
have to begin as an historical analysis of a non-essentialized lineage of people, 
groups, stories, rites, and books over varying amounts of time and place. Such a 
study could arguably isolate some particular cultural strategies at work in the way a 
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Buddhist or a Greek believed, what I would call a strategic way of acting that 
enabled a certain type of meshing of constructed expectations, understood 
cosmology, and reinforcing personal experience - one that would accomplish 
personalized socio-cultural ends, however political or aesthetic they might be 
deemed to be, however incomplete in any particular instance. I would suggest that 
choice, commitment, and rejection is not at all what Christian believing it about; 
that is what it wants one to think it is doing, not what it is really doing. Probably 
believing is more likely to be a way in which contradictions are maintained, not 
truths affirmed. 
In the case of Buddhist studies in particular, scholars have been very 
respectful of the scriptural assumptions, and monastic disclaimers in the face of 
missionary onslaughts. Even the disproven theories of the strategy behind Chinese 
popular religious beliefs are far more concrete than anything I have ever read for 
Buddhism. In effect, we have never really subjected Buddhism to such an analysis 
of Buddhist believing, even though I have seen Thai Buddhist catechisms, joined 
Buddhist chants for world peace, and marveled at medieval art depicting the role of 
the bodhisattva who makes itself available to be entreated by a devotee. Is this 
believing? I really want to ask you. On one level of course, on another level why 
should it be, on yet another level, what is going on? What do the Buddhologists say? 
Thank you. 
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Extra text 
To suggest an answer would be to suggest what is distinctive about the modality of 
believing that the Greeks evinced toward their gods before too much critical analysis had piled 
up as a cultural option and all the stories were gathered to be revered as myths. Whatever it was 
earlier and later, it was different from believing among the Romans, whose mythic narrative was 
standardized earlier on and remained a bit separate from many activities of cultic worship. 
The "problem of belief' may be something different in every disciplinary field, given 
their particular histories of research and research materials. But for the study of religion, the 
problem of belief is clearly a meaningless dead end. What can we ever say about belief in 
general? We can talk about beliefs, which are many, all had or held in different ways. Like any 
discipline, including Shweder's fault-lined anthropology, we are concerned with the limits of 
what we know, the differences that we see and imagine, as well as the commonalities that we 
cannot help but assume. This means that religious studies must focus on the practice of believing, 
on how people believe, construct believing relationships ... Through critical analysis we must 
leave the Christian baggage behind, which it can do only when we know it, as best we can at this ' 
point in history, but committed to continually plumbing the depths. Looking at the practice of 
believing, relativizing believing, emphasizing the activities rather than a hypothetical mindset, 
may enable us to do this. 
While is it another paper to lay out a full analysis of what it means to focus on the 
practice of believing, I think the simple change in wording opens the imagination to allow new 
and different questions. It may not take us as far as we need to go; we may still find ourselves 
caught, like an oversize fish, in yet another fine netting of cultural assumptions. But for the post-
colonial anti-Christian dilemma that Lopez would leave us in, or de Certeau's romantic having it 
both ways, or Veyne' s generative classicism of myth to analysis, but all truths - these do not 
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allow us to go further a field, they beach us on dry land. They confine us to an impossibility, or a 
Christian ideology defined to seize goods and land; or a naYve mythic truth compared to the 
critical truth, all the gift of the Greeks. Yes, the Greeks became self-conscious about their gods, 
but so did the Romans while being as bound to them as to the city and their history and their 
fortunes; but a far traveled people, there was always an odd element of doubt. The special 
qualities of believing for the Greeks and the Romans -- that is something this seminar will be 
addressing. I simply hope to have sketched out enough to indicate the main issues behind the 
well trodden paths and the reasons to look to another route where the adventuresome will find 
different questions to ask ... 
Thank you. 
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Prayer & Notes 
Thesis --
Religion, Belief and Prayer are, for analytical purposes, three distinct entities - so 
some sort! 
Analytic Move -
Breaking the automatic connection with religion allows fresh perspectives, 
particularly in view of the bind 'religion' is in when approached/defined 'scientifically'. 
This is not to diss such efforts. But they do not allow us to unwrap religion, which is 
taken as a given, definitely a sociological, historical, psychological "thing" out there. 
Historical Move -
There is a long history of sciences of man, sciences of religion, sciences of the 
social, etc, which have brought me and my various colleagues here today of course as a 
discourse community. These sciences revise and redo each other, but that is the nature of 
research, analysis, testing - and both our institutions oflearning and the short-term 
historical memory of disciplines with increasing numbers of trunks of such written 
endeavors in our attics. And in an age of inter-disciplinary discussion, represented by the 
bestseller at least (the book that everyone is reading, must be read), a very welcome 
development in ages of specialization, we feel free to dip in and out of other fields 
without getting too bogged down by their historical luggage. I do it, you do it; we should 
be called on it at times. 
Are Vico and Tyler so forgottern? Yes and no. We don't build in American 
culture, we recreate, which requires razing the ground with dim remembering of any of 
its historical features, rarely acknowledging historical orientations that have delivered us 
to this moment. We 'remember' when we have other purposes. 
Personal Identifications -
Sciences and cognitive theory are not my main resources/opponents/contexts, etc. 
for reasoning about religion and religion issues. 
I use the evolving history of our thinking about religion - from the pre Christian 
elements of theology to the postmodern critiques of any such category as religion ( or 
belief, etc) 
In addition to this diachronic axis, I also use the more synchronic resources of 
modern (18-21 st century) anthropology. ( Sociology and psychology less thoroughly?) 
Added to a specialization in Chinese culture and history, this latter set of resources 
enables me to distance myself to some extent from aspects of debates revolving around 
English terms, Christian categories, and even the customs of the Euro-American 
academy. I am not unique in this background, nor more privileged(?) than that brought 
by others. 
Verstehen and eklaren were basic to my education - with all the debates on the 
side of how to best verstehen, and the ramifications of the projects so envisioned. 
Postmodemism was not really challenging the full deck of cards here, due to its own 
sympathies toward verstehen. · 
Challenges -
Cognitive theory's new universalism 
Anthropology's/ area studies' particularism 
The persistent, because useful, divide between the social and the personal 

Notes from Tomoko conversation about Genealogies of the Study of Religion 
1-734-332-0164 Home 
A genealogy of a subfield that is part of a larger effort to explain the field to outsiders 
(need seen in conversations with the Social Science Research Council) and perhaps to be 
the first product of a Mellon-sponsored conference on setting up rel depts. at UMichigan, 
UCBerkeley and JohnsHopkins, only major research universities without them (just 
programs at best). Outsiders do not understand about 'divinity' school programs, 
academic thrust of subfields like Biblical studies, or the major issues that drive the field 
in all its formations. 
Not a survey of literature, not a history of major figures. More angled to explain the 
scholarship, what does the area stand for, what type of scholarship does it produce, how 
to understand the field. Issue-oriented. A book for orienting outsiders (unlike Critical 
Terms which addressed insiders somewhat provocatively). 
My assignment: something about cognition, but not to be limited to cognitive theory as 
that has been recently defined. Not psychology of religion either. But because of my 
belief work, and my 'deft' handling of cognitive theory in my UChicago alum of the year 
talk. 
Cognition and Performance: Study of the Religious Imagination 
Cognition and Action in Studying the Religious Imagination 
Cognitive States and Performative Activities 
Questions of Cognition and Belief 
Cognition and Belief 
Cognitive Questions on Religious Dispositions 
Cognition 
NEED TO KNOW WHAT PHIL OF REL (MC TAYLOR) IS GOING TO COVER 
She did not ask for anything on ritual and performance. Someone doing Anthropology of 
Religion; two on theology (i.e., Greely and David Tracey on catholic imagination; Veyne 
on historical/cultural imaginations; even JZS 's Imagining Religions: Babylon to 
Jonestovm [what does into say about imagining, who does it, scholar or native?]); one on 
the Philosophy of Religion (which covers belief, hopefully religious language ... ); but no 
one the creation of art and no 'sociology' tho the highlights would be in anthropology. 
--Marx? Feuerbach? 
--Otto? 
--Wm James 
--Freud and Jung? 
--Adaptive mechanism (Burkert; Boyer; ); softer Atran, Barrett, Andresen 
--Rappaport (developing Durkheim, and more .. ) 
--Belief: Wittgenstein, more philos, to Veyne more histo-cultural 
--Geertz - cultural ideology, moods & motivations (cognition is the personal realm?) 
--R. Needham 
--Mysticism? Transcendence? (Underhill; lots of phil ofrel on this; also Eliade) vs 
rationalism?? 
--Faith and Knowledge= phil of rel (justification as in Audi and Basil Mitchell [Klemke 
text 618 
--Experience (W Proudfoot; Bob Sharf; Taves in ERel'05; also Wach Types of Religious 
Experience '51 and Max Weber's Sociology of Religion) 
--Prayer? 
--The sacred? 
--Ritual as example of cog turn, via the attentions of Lawson and McCauley 
--Why people believe outrageous things .... (Kaiminer, Shermer) 
All these, but the study of religion - while ready to see religion in psycho-social-cultural 
terms - is not ready to reduce it to economics, frontal lobe anamolies, evolutionary 
adaptive mechanisms, but it is ready to see all these as part of the picture. Not religion as 
'sui generic,' a position that was staked out by Eliade but not strongly picked up by the 
major figures or developments in the field, but a conflagration of forces and mechanisms, 
which could make it increasingly less relevant for large portions of society or, 
conversely, still playing a vital if historically different role in various cultural contexts. 
I Catherine Bell - Genealogies.doc 
Book Proposal 
Genealogies of the Study of Religion 
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